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Preface 
Most philosophers who have written in the mainstream 
of Kantian scholarship in the past fifty years or so have 
turned to the 'Transcendental Analytic' of the CPR for 
Kant's thoughts on objectivity and its cognates. For 
many reasons, not the least of which is the extraordinary 
philosophical quality of this section, the amount of 'phil- 
:osophical time' afforded it is understandable enough. 
For it is in this section that Kant presents his solutions 
to the most important philosophical problems of his time; 
that these were genuine philosophical problems and not 
merely topics for idle metaphysical speculation is evid- 
:enced by the fact that philosophers today, with great 
variation and the benefit of sophisticated argumentative 
skills acquired since the eighteenth century, are still 
addressing these problems. How is it possible to estab- 
:lish the objective validity of statements? How is it 
possible to distinguish subjective experience from the 
objective world of which experience is had? Under what 
conditions is knowledge possible at all: If the possibi- 
:lity of objective knowledge could not be grounded, to 
paraphrase Kant, necessarily, then experience (of a 
common, shared world) and science (of nature) would be 
indefensible against a sophisticated scepticism such as 
Hume's. Regardless of how we approach the 'Transcendental 
Analytic', despite what we read into it or read out of it, 
its central, structuring argument is unmistakeable: grant 
the initial premise that we do as a matter of fact have 
experience; there are certain conditions, p and r, which 
must be true if experience is to be possible; we do have 
experience; therefore the conditions p and r are true.. 
This approach to the problem of objective knowledge has 
led some philosophers to define the problem of objectivity 
in general as the problem of establishing the objective 
validity of statements in particular. This, in so far as 
it goes, is correct but it doesn't go far enough, either 
for Kant or for someone interested in the general problem 
situation with respect to the objectivity of knowledge in 
general and science in particular. Kant's struggle in 
trying to show that synthetic a priori knowledge is poss- 
ible should indicate that objectivity is not just a 
question of demonstrating the truth or falsity of various 
hinds cf statemcnts we make about the world, iiicludiilg the 
class of synthetic a prioristatements. The main thrust 
of the Kantian notion of the synthetic a priori was to 
show that objectivity is a function of what is given in 
intuiton and what is provided by thought itself. The log - 
:ical properties of the synthetic a priori reflect this 
combination of the empirical with the a priori in so far 
as no genuinely synthetic a priori statement can be reduced 
to, or analyzed in terms of, the subject -predicate relation. 
But the interesting question here is not whether there are 
statements such as these but whether there can be such 
statements at all, and if there can be, how there can be. 
Now Kant's answer to this group of questions is provided 
in the form of a theory with respect to the nature of 
reality, namely, transcendental idealism. This doctrine, 
combined with a structure of argument which has come to be 
known as transcendental argument, is used by Kant to show 
that there are certain concepts and principles which are 
constitutive of reality without being in any way whatso- 
:ever, derived from experience; these concepts and princ- 
:iples are contributed by the mind in the course of the 
construction of the world of appearances. Thus, synthetic 
a priori knowledge is possible because and in so far ash 
the mind imposes its forms on the world. We can guarantee 
objectivity only if we can guarantee the truth of synthetic 
a priori judgments and we can guarantee the truth of syn- 
thetic a priori judgments by showing that their truth is 
required for the possibility of experience and that we have 
ourselves constructed the world of appearances in such a 
way as to make them true. Now this response begs a lot 
of questions but the most important one concerns the nature 
of the relation between language (concepts) and reality, or, 
quite simply, between thought and reality. Does thought 
condition, determine or otherwise structure, reality or 
does reality determine the nature and structure of thought? 
This essay is an argument to the effect that Kant's ingenious 
response to this question cannot be true, at least not in 
its original form, and that we require another metaphysical 
theory of the nature of reality with which to answer this 
question, namely, something vaguely resembling Leibnizian 
realism. The problem of synthetic a prior knowledge is 
one Possible formulation of the problem of the grounds or 
foundations of objectivity: do the grounds of objectivity 
lie in the nature of subjects knowing objects or in the 
nature of the things known? Do there exist entities in 
the world which are necessary to the world -order or is 
the world -order grounded in a transcendental condition? 
As will be seen, while I reject transcendental idealism 
and-some of its subordinate doctrines, I do not by any 
means reject Kant's story about the categories, the princ- 
iples of the understanding and the ideas of reason.. Rather, 
I argue that these require an ontological casting if they 
are to receive vindication as essential elements of know - 
:ledge in general and of science. As eaistemic predicates 
the categories are insufficient to guarantee the possibi- 
:lity of empirical knowledge and a science of nature because 
something stronger than conceptual necessity is needed to 
demonstrate the objectivity of concepts. Conceptual nec- 
:essity or epistemic necessary may be sufficient tor show - 
:ing that a concept has legitimate application but it alone 
cannot show that the concepts in question are in fact 
applicable. If the categories are to be applicable to ex- 
:perience then they must be taken to describe features of 
things and if they describe features of things then Kant's 
theory of categories can be construed as a formal theory 
of ontological categories and ontological features. Con - 
: joined with this is the theoretical conviction that 
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thought and language are ontologically revealing and dis- 
:crimina.tory about the sorts of things there are, and, 
that there must be an isomorphism between conceptual 
(linguistic) structures and ontological structures. Thus 
the categories can be understood as being prescriptive of, 
and anticipatory of, ontology, and not just about the 
structure of our conceptual framework. 
This thesis took root in a dissatisfaction with the 
way in which the problem of objective knowledge - the pro- 
:blem of objectivity in general - in the context of Kant's 
theoretical enterprise, had been discussed and understood 
by those philosophers working in this area. In brief, 
too little attention has been given to works other than 
the Critique of Pure Reason, or when it has been given, it 
is usually under the awesome shadow of the First Critique. 
It is clear to me now that a complete picture of Kant's 
theory of objectivity cannot he understood from the Firs 
Critique alone; for Y.ant's philosophy and theory of science 
and scientific theorizing, tell a rather different story, 
about things in themselves, the unconditioned, and the 
conditions necessary and sufficient for objectivity. In 
order to present a cogent argument in defense of this thesis, 
it has been necessary to go through a number of Kant's works 
in some detail and this has meant writing an essay longer 
than I had expected to write when I first started; indeed, 
since I began, publications have appeared which touch upon 
some of the topics I discuss and these naturally suggest 
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alternative ways of approaching the problems dealt with 
but for the most part, I am convinced that it was required 
to argue at length about the different aspects of the 
whole problem of objectivity, if my central thesis was to 
be at all persuasive. While I have no illusions about 
the extent to which I have answered the central problems 
of objectivity, I do think that there is more to the 
problems related to objectivity in the context of Kant's 
theoretical framework than has previously been generally 
understood. 
In this essay I have tried to work my way through 
to a general conclusion with respect to metaphysical the - 
:ories pertaining to the nature of reality and the place 
of ontology and epistemology within such theories. It hard- 
: ly needs to be said that a piece of work of this kind, 
ranging as it does over a wide spectrum of Kant's works, 
and attempting to address itself to many particular diff- 
:erent issues in order to better pronounce on some import- 
:ant issues of a more general sort, is indebted to many 
authors who have written in or around the subject -area. 
The fact that I have relegated all references to secondary 
material to the notes is not meant to hide this debt but 
to make for an uncluttered text. My intellectual debts 
are many and cannot be represented by any single school or 
group of thinkers; I owe much to the work of Buchdahl, 
Putnam, Sellars and Silber all of whom may perhaps be said 
to be representative of the philosophical perspective 
according to which philosophical problems are properly 
understood and illuminating only when considered in the 
context of related problem areas. At any rate, from such 
as these I have profited greatly. There are many others 
whose work on Kantian and related problems have enriched 
my own appreciation of the difficulties involved in an 
issue such as the problem of objectivity and I try to 
acknowledge this appreciation whenever appropriate in the 
notes to the text. 
Thanks are due to many who have helped in such a 
variety of ways in the course of the writing of this thesis. 
My supervisor, Professor W.H. Walsh, always made generous 
comments on my work from the very crude drafts of the first 
chapters to the final draft; his kindness and assistance 
have been greatly appreciated. To Rosal and Kate 
Arbuthnot, both of whom have lived as closely to this thesis 
for the past three or so years; as I have, no word of thanks 
could suffice for their efforts at making possible a place 
in which this thesis could be written; their humour was 
infectious and their affection a blessing, only they know 
what it has meant to me. 
Mrs. L. Berry produced a typescript with diligence 
and care during a rather extended period and I am most 
grateful for her efforts. 
Finally, my deepest gratitude to those two without 
whose help this thesis would have been a long way from be- 
coming "objectively real "; their warm concern and constant 
support, both practical and otherwise, are a great pleasure 
to acknowledge; to them - my parents - this effort is 
dedicated. 
References and Abbreviations 
For the Critique of Pure Reason I have followed the 
convenient and customary method of referring to the first 
(1781) and second (1787) editions known as 'A' and 'B'. 
For the Critique of Judgment, the First Introduction to 
the Critique of Judgment, and the Inaugural Dissertation, 
I have likewise followed what appears to be the customary 
practice of referring to the pages of these works by para - 
:graph or section number. With respect to the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science and 'On a Discovery' refer- 
ence is to the Akademie edition's page references includ- 
:ed in the margin of the English translations of the 
former, by James Ellington, and of the latter, by Henry 
Allison. For the Religion Within the Limits of Reason 
Alone I have simply referred to the page number of the 
English translations by Greene and Hudson. 
By far the majority of references to the works of 
Leibniz are to those found in the collection of trans- 
lated works edited by L. Loemker, although there are 
references to P. Weiner's Scribner edition of works by 
Leibniz as well. Reference to works of Leibniz other 
than those to be found in the above collections are given, 
with corresponding abbreviations, as they occur in the 
I.CA l. CL11U 11V 1.C5 . 
For the most part, references to works other than 
those by Kant and Leibniz are given, not in the text of 
the essay but in the notes to the separate chapters. This 
practice has been followed to make for an uncluttered and 
hopefully, smooth - reading text. Detailed bibliographical 
information for all works mentioned and otherwise used, 
in the writing of this essay is provided in the biblio- 
graphy. 
The following is a list of abbreviations used frequently 
in the text and notes: 
CPR Critique of Pure Reason 
CJ Critique of Judgment 
MFNS Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 
ID Inaugural Dissertation 
F. Intro.First Introduction to the Critique of Judg- 
ment 
Intro. Introduction to the Critique of Judgment 
Religion Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. 
L Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, 
edited by L. Loemker. 
"But, to explain myself distinctly, before all else it is 
necessary to consider that the modifications which may be- 
:long naturally or without miracle to a subject, must 
come to it from the limitations or variations of a real 
genus, or of a constant and absolute original nature. For 
it is thus that philosophers distinguish the modes of an 
absolute being from that being itself; as it is known that 
size, figure ard.motion are manifestly limitations and 
variations of corporeal nature. For it is clear in what 
way a limited extension gives figures, and that the change 
which takes place in it is nothing but motion. And every 
time that we find some quality in a subject, we must 
believe that if we understood the nature of this subject 
and of this quality, we should conceive how this quality 
can result therefrom. Thus, in the order of nature 
(miracles set aside), it is not optional with God to give 
to substances indifferently such or such qualities, and 
he will never give them any but those which shall be 
natural to them; that is, which can be derived from their 
nature as explicable modifications. Thus it may be 
asserted that matter will not naturally have the above 
mentioned attraction, and will not move of itself in a 
curved line, because it is not possible to conceive how 
this takes place there; that is, to explain it mechani- 
:cally; whereas that which is natural, must be able to 
become distinctly conceivable if we were admitted into 
the secrets of things." 
(Leibniz in the Preface to the New Essays) 
"Indeed it is only on the assumption of differences in 
nature, just as it is also only under the condition that 
its objects exhibit homogeneity, that we can have any 
faculty of understanding whatsoever. For the diversity of 
that which is comprehended under a concept is precisely 
what gives occasion for the employment of the concept and 
the exercise of the understanding. 
Every concept may be regarded as a point which, as 
the station for an observer, has its own horizon, that is, 
a variety of things which can be represented, and, as it 
were, surveyed from that standpoint. This horizon must 
be capable of containing an infinite number of points, 
each of which has its own narrower horizon;that is, every 
species contains subspecies, according to the principle 
of specification, and the logical horizon consists exclu- 
sively of smaller horizons (subspecies), never of points 
which possess no extent (individuals). But for different 
horizons, that is, genera, each of which is determined by 
its own concept, there can be a common horizon, in refer- 
ence to which, as from a common centre, they can all be 
surveyed; and from this higher genus we can proceed until 
we arrive at the highest of all genera, and so at the 
universal and true horizon, which is determined from the 
standpoint of the highest concept, and which comprehends 
under itself all manifoldness - genera, species, subspecies." 
(Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason) 
Introduction 
"When he asked himself how we might know anything 
about the world Kant replied that there were 
three possible theories Knowledge might be read 
off from the world It might be read into 
the world by us; this is Kant's own view about 
the limited synthetic a priori knowledge we 
possess. Or there might be a pre -established 
harmony between the world and our cognitive 
faculties .... Kant's own account is promising; 
at least in a slightly modified form - he has no 
right to deny that the picture we construct may 
coincide with the real nature of the world in 
itself, and his list of the principles of human 
thinking requires amendment. But it will not 
cover all the ground. As we saw earlier, con- 
straints internal to his theory require him to 
admit the existence of things in themselves, 
with his own mind among them as an active sub - 
:ject of synthesis .... And finally we have now 
seen that Kant's solution leaves it unexplained 
why the world should be so readily comprehensible 
to us, and that it affords no confidence that the 
future will continue to follow those relatively 
simple laws which we make the basis for our 
inductive extrapolations. These are not things 
that can be read into the world, in the construc- 
tion of the world of appearances; they depend 
on how the world itself turns out, and therefore 
on the character of the data we receive in 
sensory experience." (R. Walker, Kant; p. 174) 
Part of Kant's central purpose in the CPR is to 
demonstrate that the empiricist account of knowledge (know- 
:ledge h ed off from the :;orl^) and the dogmatic can be r ad
rationalist account of knowledge (there is a harmony be- 
tween the world and our cognitive faculties) are false, 
and that his own account is the only defensible one. Both 
the empiricist and the rationalist Kant had in mind as his 
key opponents were Locke and Leibniz and both of these 
philosophers were realists; that is to say, from the 
perspective of ontology both Leibniz and Locke thought that 
objective knowledge of the world was grounded in certain 
kinds of entities in the world even (as they were both 
prepared to acknowledge) if knowledge of such entities was 
inaccessible to us. Kant has often been portrayed as 
being primarily interested in knowledge and questions per - 
:taining to the features which any comprehensible world 
must possess if it is to be a world for us at all. Yet, 
Kant spends a good part of CPR arguing against the claims 
of Leibniz and Locke, that is, Kant seems to think that 
he is obliged to perform the negative task of refuting 
any theory according to which knowledge of the world is 
rooted in objects in the world rather than in our think - 
:ing about the world. The fact is that it is not enough 
for Kant to argue that the categories and principles are 
constitutive of experience (objectivity) for this implies 
the correlative thesis that the world is a world of appear- 
:ances and not things in themselves and in order to properly 
defend this claim Kant must show that the claims of Leibniz 
are false. In a word, Kant is obl_gedl to demonstrate the 
falsity of Leibnizian realism (in Ch. IV I provide some 
detail with respect to the Kant -Leibniz debate). 
Kant's own theory is of course transcendental 
idealism which I define in the first chapter as the thesis 
the central claim of which is that objectivity is tied to, 
and rooted in, the nature of the knowing and thinking sub - 
:ject. It is the subject's contribution to the overall 
cognitive situation which makes for objective knowledge 
and the order of things in the world is an order that we, 
as knowing subjects, have put there. This is an astonish- 
claim to make when one looks at its consquences for 
ontology which I do in Ch. I; but it is astonishing 
not because the subject is alleged to make a contribution 
to the 'construction' of the objective world for this claim 
is one which has prima facie plausibility. What, in my 
view, lends extravagance to transcendental idealism is the 
implied thesis that those features of the world or of 
experience which are contributed to the cognitive situation 
by the subject, exist only for subjects knowing objects, 
which is to say, that the world is really ultimately 
(transcendentally) ideal. One can see why Kaht might have 
felt obliged to refute the claims of a theory according to 
which knowing subjects were neutral with respect to those 
features of objects which made .the wo 3 d. and objects in 
the world, knowable. Kant's answer to the question under 
what conditions knowledge is possible, is to refer to the 
possibility of establishing synthetic a priori knowledge 
and certain 'necessary' structural truths about the world, 
while Leibniz's response (although Leibniz paid such scant 
attention to epistemology that it is highly improbable he 
would even have raised such a query) would be that knowledge 
is possible because the world consists ultimately of the 
sorts of entities which make it knowable. It is true that 
Leibniz could also have said that knowledge is possible 
because there is a pre -established harmony between the.. 
world and our cognitive faculties; this may even be de- 
fensible but I shall, for the purposes of this essay, dis- 
:regard this claim of Leibnizian realism on the ground that 
it is associated with the idealist strain in Leibnizianism 
and this I reject (as shall be shown later). Kant's 
thesis to the effect that the world is a world of appear - 
:ances and that we know things in the world according to 
their appearances implies that we do not know things (as 
Leibniz would have it) in accordance with the way they 
really are; it follows from this that Kant's doctrine of 
the thing in itself and the metaphysics of transcendental 
idealism in general ought not to be excised (as Strawson 
and-others suggest) from Kant's theoretical programme with- 
:out due consideration of their function within the context 
of this problem. It is clear that Kant's whole programme 
was designed to steer a safe passage between scepticism 
and dogmatism and this could only be achieved if transcen- 
:dental idealism has both an ontological and an epistemo- 
logical interpretation. The thesis that the world is a 
world of appearances is an ontological thesis; the thesis 
that we know things in accordance with their appearances 
is an epistemological thesis and together they form the 
core of Kant's critical enterprise. To avoid one for the 
other (usually ontology for epistemology) can only lead to 
a failure to confront the problem of how objective know- 
:ledge is possible, and if it is possible, whether the 
conditions effecting its possibility are realized. This, 
as I see it, is the central problem of the foundations of 
objectivity. Is it objects .or our thinking about objects 
that determines what Kant calls the 'order of the world'? 
To argue that it is our thinking about things that is the 
source of Lhe world -order is equivalent to arguing that 
the grounds of objectivity lie in the nature of knowing 
subjects, that appearances are connected. by rules which 
the "connecting faculty prescribes" alone. (B164) In 
ICI attempt to detail this argument by examining the claims 
of transcendental idealism and the justification required 
to make good these claims. If the relation between thought 
and reality is anything like Kant and those who follow him, 
maintain it is, then, discoveries concerning the nature of 
thought are very likely to tell us something about the 
nature of reality. Why, after all, is it that facts 
about the world and a.hnnt the nature of things can he had 
from our conceptual schemes? Kant's explanation, as we 
shall see, is to ground the relation between thought and 
reality in the nature of the thinking subject, by means 
of transcendental necessity. And we shall see that this 
answer presents Kant with serious ontological problems. 
The purpose of Ch. I is to provide an interpretation 
of transcendental idealism with respect to the problem of 
objectivity. The central thesis of transcendental idealism 
is that the foundations of objectivity lie in the nature of 
the subject; it is this claim which creates problems for 
Kant's system. 
My aim in Ch. II and in Ch. III is to demonstrate 
in some detail the specific ontological problems which 
arise as a result of Kant's theory of objectivity. If 
objectivityis defined in terms of the nature of subject- 
:ivity than our ontology shall be limited to and by, the 
forms of the knowing subject. This amounts to permanently 
locating our ontological perspective within the domain of 
the knowable created by the conditions of human subjectivity. 
I shall be concerned to show that there are at least two 
kinds of entities which cannot be accounted for by the 
ontology of transcendental idealism, namely, moral agents 
(persons) endowed with the power of spontaneity and living 
things or organisms. The latter as discussed in the 
Critique of Judgment, is the subject of Ch. III. The argu- 
:ment in these two chapters is that Kant's struggles with 
the problem of freedom in his moral philosophy, and with 
teleology with respect to living things, show that Kant's 
theory cannot account for ontological diversity. Since 
the form of human subjectivity determines the ontological 
horizon within which objects can be known, only those 
objects satisfying the requirements spelled out by the 
categories of CPR will qualify as possible objects of 
experience. Those kinds of things falling outside the 
framework specified and legislated by the categorial 
framework of CPR are consequently legislated out of possible 
experience. Any metaphysical theory of reality (which is 
how I understand both transcendental idealism and Leibnizian 
realism) which has these implications must be considered 
unacceptable. In Ch. V I attempt to reinforce this argu- 
:ment against the claims of transcendental idealism with a 
separate argument designed to show that Kant's argument for 
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the transcendentally ideal nature of the matter of appear - 
:ance in the 'Second Antinomy' fails to establish that 
matter is mere appearance. 
If the claims of transcendental idealism are reject - 
:ed then we must look for an alternative theory of the nat- 
:ure of reality - from the perspective of philosophical 
theory - with which to account for objectivity in such a 
way as to allow for ontological diversity. In Part Two 
of this essay, and in Ch. IV in particular, I present a 
case for adopting something vaguely resembling Leibnizian 
realism. To begin with, in Ch. IV I argue that th -e real 
debate between Leibniz and Kant, that is, between some 
form of Leibnizian realism and Kantian idealism, is an 
ontological one. Leibniz, like Lockejmaintained that the 
foundations of the world -order lie in insensible entities. 
Locke located such grounds in the spatial configuration 
of things whereas Leibniz accorded unconditioned reality 
to forces as the centers of activity. Because Kant thought 
that Locke could not show the connection between the in- 
:sensible essences of things and their manifest properties, 
Kant assumed that the grounds of the world -order could not 
be located in matter or anything pertaining to matter. 
This connection must always remain opaque3to our discursive 
intellects at least. The problem then is to find some 
source of the known order of the world which would not be 
indiscernible and Kant's solution here constitutes the 
heart of the critical philosophy: to locate the grounds of 
the world- order, the source of the order of appearances, 
in the transcendental unity of apperception. We are thus 
provided with a justification of our knowledge of appear- 
:ances. But, first of all, Leibniz does have an account 
of the connection between appearances and their origin or 
source, namely, substantial entities whose living forces 
constitute their being and the being of all that is. 
Secondly, Kant's own account (as we would now expect from 
trañscendental idealism) fails to show that there is some - 
:thing other than mind which we come to know through the 
categories and principles, for if the transcendental unity 
of apperception or its functional equivalent is the source 
of appearances, then, what is the force of the claim that 
we possess knowledge of an objective world? As Leibnizian 
realism does provide an account of how substantial entities s
ground phenomena, and, as I reject the often suggested 
claim to the effect that substantial entities, ente echies 
or monads, are no more than entities in a phenomenalistic 
world of fleeting perceptions, the Lcibnizian theory would 
seem to be the more promising to use as a basis for the 
construction of a possible ontology. Also, I try to show 
in this chapter that Kant's claim to the effect that Leibniz 
blurred the distinction between sensibility and understand- 
:ing is, at best, inconclusive, and that these epistemo- 
:logical differences can be seen to disguise an underlying 
ontological debate. 
To accept a Leibnizian account of the grounds of 
appearances is to accept that there exist in the world 
entities which are the source of the world -order, and that 
such entities must a fortiori, be unconditioned. In Ch.V 
my purpose isto demonstrate that by coupling this Leibnizian 
account of the grounds of objectivity as lying in uncon- 
:ditioned entities, with the derivation of the legitimacy 
of the unconditioned within the domain of science, a 
derivation effected by Kant's account of the formulation 
of -the ideas of reason in CPR, it is possible.to argue that 
(1) science presupposes the existence of things in them- 
:selves for its possibility and (2) science must have the 
unconditioned as its goal because the unconditioned is the 
source of the physical necessity which binds together our 
empirical laws and our empirical theories into a system. 
And as Kant has a theory according to which systematic 
unity with respect to lawsof nature and empirical theories 
is the criterion of empirical truth in science, we arrive 
at the conclusion that the possibility of a science of 
nature depends on there existing some unconditiOned entity 
in the world which is necessary to the order of the world. 
If we accept transcendental idealism, then we must admit 
that a complete science of nature is impossible for the 
unconditioned can never enter into real causal interaction 
with the conditioned. We also see that the truth of trans - 
:cendental idealism seems to depend more on the fact that 
knowledge of the unconditioned is impossible than on the 
correlative ontological claim that unconditioned entities 
are necessary, or may be necessary to the world -order. 
Kant thought that unconditioned entities could not enter 
into real interaction with conditioned entities for to do 
so they (unconditioned) would become conditioned. This is 
always the argument that Kant offers with respect to the 
unconditioned and it derives from his conviction that 
unconditioned entities could not exist within the world 
but only outside the natural order of things. There is 
no reason, however, to accept this position especially if 
we can show that Kant's argument in the 'Second Antinomy' 
to the effect that unconditioned entities (simples) cannot 
be met with in experience (and by implication, can have no 
ontological significance as well) fails to prove indirectly 
the truth of transcendental idealism with respect to the 
matter of experience. Indeed, as we shall see in the final 
chapter, Kant's postulated forces of attraction and repul- 
:sion are unconditioned, and if transcendental idea?ism.is 
false, Karat's attempts to characterize these fundamental 
forces as transcendentally ideal fail. 
Throughout the various chapters I will have indicat- 
:ed that Kant's categories are the specifications for the 
concept of an object in general, that is, for the concept 
of an object operative at the most basic and minimal level 
of experience. As such the categories describe the minimal 
and necessary features which any object must possess. This 
alone is insufficient to guarantee the objectivity of the 
categorial framework for we have as yet only a partial 
specification. of the concept of an object. The process of 
specifying the concept of an object, filling it in, as it 
were, is equivalent to discovering whether there exists 
those features of the world which can ground objectivity, 
i.e. to complete the specification of the concept of an 
object. And if transcendental idealism is false, this 
means developing an ontology based on the unconditioned 
thereby providing an account of the grounds of objectivity 
which does not rely on showing a concept's objective valid- 
:ity by means of transcendental necessity. In the final 
chapter I make an attempt at outlining in a very tentative 
fashion, the basis for such an ontology in terms of the 
unconditioned forces of attraction and repulsion postulated 
by Kant in the MFNS. If the categories can receive com- 
,:plete specification only by being filled out at the em- 
pirical level, and if this amounts to showing that the 
objectivity of the categorial framework can only be estab- 
:lished by cur knowledge of nature in particular, than we 
are entitled to construe the categories as ontologically 
necessary. As Heidegger has said, the categories are 
really 'anticipations' of objects, specifying in advance 
the ontological structure of the world. This of course 
makes perfect sense for a metaphysical theory of the nature 
of reality which takes the unconditioned as the ground of 
objectivity; for such an ontology would be based on the 
unconditioned, in this case, forces, and the function of 
a categorial system within such a thedry of ontology could 
only be to prescribe what such an ontology would be like. 
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According to Kant's epistemology, all knowledge is 
necessarily knowledge of appearances and appearances are 
phenomenal and conditioned while the real is noumenal and 
unconditioned. If, as I have argued, science has knowledge 
of the unconditioned as its goal, and the unconditioned is 
always unknown and noumenal, it follows that science is the 
continuous search for the unknown. In this final chapter 
my task is to complete this argument in so far as is poss- 
:ible and in outline only, by suggesting that Kant's own 
conception of forces as the fundamental constituents of 
matter is a plausible candidate, from the philosophical 
perspective, for the unconditioned, The unconditionally 
real (i.e. Leibnizian) are forces understood in terms of 
intensive magnitudes; only the Real, as Kant says in the 
Anticipations of Perception, has intensive magnitude and 
only the real as such has Being. As we shall see, inten- 
:sive magnitudes resist classification as either. pr mar_v 
or secondary properties; primary or secondary properties 
cannot be classified as the real for the real is itself 
as that which possesses being) the ground of the manifest 
properties possessed by observable things, Forces as the 
unconditioned can be described as monad -like in so far as 
forces (and their point centers of influence) are not in 
space and time (in Kant's sense of 'in' where something 
must be observable or constructible or picturable) while 
they condition everything that is in space and time. 
Forces do not, however, share that feature of Leibniz's 
original conception of monads according to which sub- 
:stances do not enter into real causal relations with one 
another; forces, as the parts of matter, are unconditioned, 
but not in such a way as to make causal relations among 
substances impossible. Nor, of course, are forces 
'reducible' to series of changing perceptions in each 
monad; on this idealist reading monads are incapable of 
producing transeunt forces which can be said to actually 
cause changes in the states of the entities existing out - 
:side the entities producing the force in question. It is 
not crucial to my interpretation of forces as the fundamen- 
tal 'stuff' of the world that they be characterized as 
monads; it is simply .an appropriate description of forces 
as a kind of entity in view of the unconditionally real 
ontological status of monads in their original Leibnizian 
form. 
A possible ontology based on the unconditioned as 
here conceived, must incorporate both a theory of reality 
which takes up the perspective of knowledge and a theory 
of reality from which the object (physical world and the 
laws pertaining to it) is viewed from the perspective of 
being, or, from the perspective of the object. This brief 
sketch then, provides some idea of the kind of ontology 
required to complement the structural truths with respect 
to the world specified by the categories, principles and 
ideas, an account which can be supplied not by transcenden- 
:tal idealism but by Leibnizian realism. 
PART ONE 
Transcendental Idealism and the Perspective of Ontology 
I Transcendental Idealism and the Problem 
of Objectivity 
1. Kant's theory of objectivity., in its bare essentials, 
is expressed through the doctrine of transcendental 
idealism with which I shall be concerned in the present 
chapter. My purpose in this chapter is to show that 
transcendental idealism cannot overcome the problems which 
it meets over the grounds or foundations of objectivity. 
Kant and his predecessors thought that transcendental 
idealism was the single tenable alternative to empirical 
idealism on the one hand and transcendental realism on the 
other. Thus, transcendental idealism can be located as 
the successful middle ground between these two related but 
false positions; indeed, it is one of Kant's central 
purposes in the CPR to demonstrate the falsity of the 
claims of these two extremes. The metaphysics of Berkeley, 
Locke, Leibniz and Kant are theories of the nature of 
reality and as theoretical frameworks they express 
structural truths pertaining to the nature of.objective 
reality and the limitations of human knowledge in grasping 
it. As there exist good arguments (including Kant's) 
against the claims of empirical idealism, I think we can 
agree that, concerning its broad claims about the nature 
of reality, it is false. In any case, empirical idealism 
of the Berkeleyean variety, surely requires the postulation 
of God or some surrogate of God if it is to have even prima 
facie plausibility. But what of transcendental realism? 
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Is Kant successful in CPR in showing that the theories of 
Locke and Leibniz, the two realists he was most concerned 
to refute, are false? Accepting that transcendental 
idealism is Kant's general programme for demonstrating the 
falsity of these theories, I shall attempt to answer this 
question in the negative by arguing that transcendental 
idealism, as a theory of (the foundations of) objectivity, 
cannot account for the ontological diversity - the 
different kinds of entities which there are - in the world. 
This is the task of the first three chapters. 
2. The ultimate goal of the First Critique is to 
demonstrate the possibility of objective knowledge, to 
spell out the conditions which provide for objective 
knowledge in general and a science of nature in particular. 
In a sentence, Kant's approach is to specify the structure, 
or nature of, human knowledge by attempting to show what 
general features the world must possess, any world must 
possess, if it is to be comprehensible. That this is 
Kant's central purpose in the First Critique is commonly 
recognised in the literature. There is, however,_ a second 
and correlative aim in the First Critique, namely, to refute 
the claims of transcendental realism the most important 
proponent of which was Leibniz. The defining thesis of 
transcendental realism is that there exists within the 
world entities which are, to use Kant's term, unconditioned, 
or, to appropriate the main thesis to Kant's problem situation, 
that the world itself as a totality exists as an absolute 
or unconditioned totality. Given Kant's aim to explain 
the nature of objectivity and the possibility of objective 
knowledge through the categories, why did he think it so 
urgent to demonstrate that the question of unconditioned 
entities or unconditioned totalities, the problem of their 
existence, was inscrutable to human understanding and that 
theories (transcendental realism) which attached explanatory 
roles to such entities with respect to some aspect of the 
known world, were false? Surely Kant, in the 'Dialectic' 
of CPR, was not simply performing an historical service in 
exposing the dialectical error of all preceding meta - 
:physical thought, transcendental realism included. I 
suggest that there is a genuine problem here, a conflict 
between two competing theories of the nature of objectivity, 
transcendental realism (Leibnizian realism) and trans- 
:cendental idealism. The defining thesis of transcendental 
idealism can be straightforwardly put as follows: the 
foundations of objectivity lie in the nature of the knowing 
subject and it is the subject's contribution to the overall 
cognitive situation (in the form of the categories) which 
secures the possibility of objective judgments. If we 
define the transcendental realist position relative to the 
question of the foundations of objectivity, it can, I think, 
be put as follows: the foundations of objectivity lie in 
the nature of the object known and the objective validity 
of judgments is secured, ultimately, by there being 
certain kinds of entities possessing certain kinds of 
properties. 
If the claim that the foundations of the objective 
world -order lies in the nature of the subject is (one of) 
the central claim(s) of transcendental idealism, then to 
argue, as Kant does, that the known world is 
transcendentally ideal, is just to maintain that the 
objectivity of objects is ultimately a function of knowing 
subjects, i.e. that the known world is ultimately 
(= transcendentally) ideal. For those conditions of 
experience which make objectivity possible are contributed 
by the subject and to describe these categorial features as 
transcendentally ideal is to seem to argue for, or to beg 
the conclusion that, without contributing subjects, these 
objectivity features would no .exist. Transcendental 
realism and in particular, Leibnizian realism, provide for 
a theory of the nature of objectivity which is a direct 
challenge to Kant's; for if the nature of objectivity is 
such that the foundations of the latter are to be sought 
not in the knowing subject but in objects known, then those 
general characteristics and features which make knowledge 
of objects possible are to be sought in the objects them- 
:selves. And while knowledge of the features which 
objects possess is obviously dependent on there existing 
knowing subjects, the possibility of knowledge is not. 
Thus, Kant's question concerning the possibility of 
objective knowledge can be regarded as providing an 
interpretative framework for both transcendental idealism 
and transcendental realism. The transcendental realist 
wants to argue that the possibility of objective knowledge 
can he explained only by reference to the nature of the 
things known, i.e. by comprehension of those properties 
which make a thing the sort of thing it is. It follows 
from this that questions about the grounds of objectivity 
are questions about the real nature of things, the basic 
'stuff' of the world, whether this be conceived as atoms, 
corpuscles or monads. It is not necessary that the 
transcendental realist believes knowledge of the 
fundamental constituents of the world to be possible in 
order to think that it is the real nature of things which 
explains their manifest properties. In fact; both a 
transcendental idealist such as Kant and transcendental 
realists like Locke and Leibniz, thought that knowledge in 
accordance with a thing's nature or essence was not possible 
for finite intellects like ours. Consider however, the 
. conclusions drawn from this by each of them. Leibniz 
claims the fact that we cannot know the true nature of 
things implies a cautionary epistemological attitude towards 
things as we do know them and therefore we get Leibniz's 
very provisional -sounding description of phenomena as 'bene 
fundata'. Leibniz's tone about our knowledge of phenomena 
throughout his career is provisional, not sceptical or even 
semi -sceptical. The fact that we cannot claim knowledge of 
things according to their natures does not imply that what 
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we do know of things, their manifest properties, is not to 
be accounted for by reference to their real natures. There 
is always the lingering suspicion that for Leibniz the day 
might come when such knowledge would indeed be possible, a 
suspicion prompted no doubt by Leibniz's intense 
preoccupation with dynamics and his formulation of a force 
theory of substantial entities at the physical level. At 
the metaphysical level, these substantial entities composed 
of 'vis viva' become monads, but even here, where Leibniz 
moves, as Buchdahl has said, with an almost reckless 
abandon, we can read him (Leibniz) as arguing that, since 
the real grounds of things is not manifest we shall have 
to characterize our theorizing with respect to such grounds 
as ideal (,i.e, we will always seek for a knowledge of the 
real natures of things but will never attain it. And this 
is consistency, not anti -realism. 
Locke, without the metaphysical grandeur of Leibniz, 
argues in just this way as well For Locke the grounds 
of the world are to be found in the insensible (atomic, 
monadic) parts of things implying a limitation on what is 
knowable for rational beings. The real essence of a thing, 
that which makes a thing the sort of thing it is, is 
insensible; more precisely, it is the configurations of 
the insensible parts of things which constitutes their real 
essence. As with Leibniz, so with Locke, we have the 
physical and the metaphysical overlapping, for Locke writing 
against the background of Newton's dominating influence, 
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the insensible parts of things are really atoms. Committed 
as Locke was to an atomist cosmology, he could yet see no 
way in which the insensible could be shown to be the ground 
of the sensible; thus, knowledge of grounds became for 
Locke as well, ideal knowledge. In Bk. III of the Essay 
Locke states: "The other and more rational opinion is of 
those who look on all natural things to have a real, but 
unknown, constitution of their insensible parts, from which 
flow those sensible qualities which serve to distinguish 
them one from another, according as we have occasion to rank 
them into sorts, under common denominations." Bk. (III, 
CH.3 Sec. 17). 
Both Locke and Leibniz are agreed that the lack of 
complete knowledge of the essence or nature of objects 
implies a lack of knowledge about the Grounds of 
objectivity. Here, Kant's transcendental idealism stands 
out in striking. contrast. Kant also wishes to deny the 
possibility of a knowledge of essences or natures because 
he thinks such knowledge necessarily involves things -in- 
themselves; however, unlike his two predecessors, Kant 
does not think that a lack of such knowledge involves or 
entails, a lack of knowledge of the grounds of objectivity. 
Knowledge of the grounds of objectivity, on Kant's account, 
is not knowledge of the real nature of things or their 
properties but a knowledge of those features of things 
which have their origin in the knowing subject and are 
essential only in the sense that any world which is to be 
comprehensible to us, must possess them. And as usual 
with Kant, this move is achieved by altering the terms of 
the problem, viz. we no longer talk of knowledge of object 
but of the possibility of knowledge of objects. Thus, 
questions pertaining to the foundations of objectivity 
are questions involving the possibility of transcendental 
knowledge. Knowledge of the foundations of objectivity 
becomes, for Kant, transcendental knowledge. 
3. To deny the possibility of knowing things in 
accordance with their real natures while maintaining that 
this need not entail even a partial scepticism towards our 
knowledge of the foundations of objectivity, does not, 
initially at least, seem a very promising position. For, 
if questions about the foundations of objectivity are 
questions about how, ultimately, objective knowledge is 
possible and what conditions have to be met for it to be 
possible, then surely we are entitled to demand some 
explanation of whether the requirements for objective 
knowledge are satisfied and, if so, how they are. Leibniz 
and Locke, when faced with this demand, can (I am not saying 
they would) offer an explanation in terms of the nature of 
the basic constituents of the world, substantial entities 
or atoms. Not only does Kant think that such knowledge 
of the nature of things is not possible, he thinks that 
human knowledge does not concern, or is not of, things at 
all. That is, Kant wants to argue that what knowledge we 
do have, however incomplete, however partial, does not 
involve things as they really are. Locke and Leibniz, 
even though they did not think complete knowledge was 
possible, did not on that account deny that what knowledge 
we did have could be explained in terms of the nature of 
things. For Kant is forced to admit that ultimately we 
cannot talk of knowledge of things at all, only of 
appearances; this is a consequence of transcendental 
idealism. According to transcendental idealism, knowledge 
of things in themselves is, in principle, ruled out, 
thereby making even partial knowledge of things impossible. 
It is all or nothing and thus Kant's insistence that our 
knowledge is knowledge of appearances, not things in 
themselves. Consequently, Kant's answer to the question 
concerning the grounds of objectivity could be that.th^ 
foundations of objectivity lie in the nature of appearances; 
but this is equivalent to saying that the foundations of 
objectivity lie in the knowing subject for the 'nature' of 
appearances is just those features of the world contributed 
by the knowing subject and which make for the possibility 
of an objective world in the first place. Ultimately, 
knowledge is knowledge of appearances since the features 
which any comprehensible world must possess are contributed 
by the knowing subject. Thus, the grounds of objectivity 
lie in the nature of the knowing subject. The 
epistemology of transcendental idealism has the effect of 
fully committing Kant to the thesis that we really only 
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have knowledge of appearances, not things in themselves; 
Kant appeals to our common sense intuitions to mitigate 
the force of the epistemological committment to this thesis, 
by pointing to the empirically real aspect of the everyday 
world and its objects. But the appeal must be judged a 
failure for once the question of the foundations of 
appearances is raised, the distinction between the 
empirically real and the transcendentally ideal 'becomes 
irrelevant. Consider: Questions of the foundations of 
objectivity are questions of how, ultimately, objective 
knowledge is possible and Kant's answer to this is that 
ultimately such knowledge is transcendental, i.e, can only 
be judged objectively valid if the essential, necessary 
requirements for establishing such validity reside in the 
of nature  the Since knowledge of the 
foundations of objectivity is transcendental knowledge and 
since transcendental knowledge is true of or applicable to, 
the world considered from the perspective of transcendental 
idealism only, within empirical reality there can be neither 
essential or necessary knowledge, nor essential or necessary 
existents. The world of science belongs to empirical 
reality and thus laws of nature, general or particular, are 
for Kant empirical; it must be said though that Kant is 
indecisive, to say the least, about the status of laws of 
nature, e.g. Newton's laws, which are described as being 
both a priori and a posteriori. The point can, in effect, 
be put as follows: the strengths of the principles guiding 
and structuring Kant's critical project derive from his 
central thesis of transcendental idealism and related 
thesis, e.g. that minds constitute the known world. 
Outside the context of transcendental idealism these 
thesis are quite ineffective and their limitations are 
quickly exposed. The problem which is rumbling beneath 
all of this is Kant's mishandling of questions pertaining 
to ontology. Kant exploits to the full his insights into 
the transcendentally ideal nature of the known world, i.e. 
the world considered from the perspective of judgment or 
knowledge but because he does not really want to say that 
the world is, i.e. from the perspective of the object or 
from the perspective of ontology, transcendentally ideal 
(hut because of his commitment to the epistemology of 
transcendental ìdeal_;sm rannnt sav that he does not want 
to say this) we are offered next best, the empirically 
real (rather than ultimately real) nature of the world. 
This severing of ontological and epistemological locutions 
is a feature of Kant's work from CPR on and its artificial 
sounding note can be heard once the cracks in Kant's theory 
of objectivity begin to appear. 
4. This separation between questions ontological and 
epistemological is one which some recent Kant commentators 
have inherited. We need. only witness the jettisoning of 
Kant's doctrine concerning things in themselves from 
consideration of his work in general and in particular, 
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when considering the significance of his theory of 
transcendental idealism. Now, if my contention that at 
the core of Kant's whole programme there lies the problem 
of (the foundations of) objectivity, is correct or, at 
least tenable, then the tendency to deliberately ignore or 
as Strawson says, excise, the metaphysics of transcendental 
idealism, is a mistake. At least it is a mistake if one 
believes that the problem of objectivity as explicated is 
of genuine significance and that the overall theoretical 
interests of realists like Locke and Leibniz demonstrate 
the centrality of this problem. Kant wants to argue that 
our knowledge of the world is not dependent upon, or 
derived from, things in themselves as against realists like 
Locke and Leibniz for whom the nature of knowledge is 
derived from the nature of things (= things in themselves). 
Thus Kant's thesis that we know appearances only and not 
things in themselves means that he must provide some 
account of the possibility of such knowledge apart from 
things in themselves or without consideration of the 
natures of different types of objects. In other words, 
to the question, 'What is the origin of the objectivity of 
objects ?', Kant has one answer and Leibniz and Locke have 
another. To refuse to recognize the significance of Kant's 
doctrine of things in themselves (even if one thinks this 
simply involves Kant's denial of their existence or 
efficacy in knowledge) is to refuse to acknowledge the 
central philosophical significance of this question and 
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and the problem with which Kant struggled vis avis the 
Leibnizians and the Lockeans. 
5. According to Kant, the world is empirically real 
only within the context of transcendental idealism. This 
basic doctrine of Kant's is most explicit in the 'Fourth 
Paralogism' of CPR. Here Kant criticizes idealism under- 
:stood not as the denial of the existence of external 
objects but as the expression of uncertainty regarding 
their reality. It turns out that Kant is presenting a 
criticism of representationalist theories of perception, 
or more specifically, the 'veil of perception' doctrine; 
objects are perceived, not directly but indirectly through 
perceptions from which their (the objects') existence is 
inferred. Immediate knowledge of external objects is 
impossible since once's perceptions, as it were, are placed 
between one and the external objects which are their source. 
As such, perceptions are the link with the reality of 
external objects and the barrier preventing immediate 
contact with external reality. This is one of the 
particular problems which transcendental idealism is 
designed to avoid; Kant thinks that, if the problem of 
perception is constructed in this way by the idealist, then 
scepticism is inescapable, indeed, it's logically demanded. 
The crucial difficulty, Kant says, is that the idealist 
locates reality in externality, viz, the first assumption 
is that the reality of external objects lies outside the 
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subject's power of representation, and this is a mistake; 
for us (for beings with the powers and limitations of human 
cognition), reality is representational. As Kant states, 
"....representation and intuition presuppose space, and 
reality in space, being the reality of a mere representation, 
is nothing other than perception itself. The real of 
outer appearances is therefore real in perception only, and 
can be real in no other way." (A376) The success of Kant's 
argument against idealism rests on showing that the having 
of perceptions of events entails the truth of the proposi- 
:tion that something happens in space and presumably, Kant 
believes that the idealist would grant that he experiences 
perceptions. Once it is recognized that the mere having 
of> 
perceptions presupposes (for perceptions are 
e V vents of a kind and events   t take time and happen in space) 
there are no grounds remaining for distinguishing real from 
ideal perceptions. Whatever reality is in itself, it can 
only be known or, can only present itself to us in space 
through perception. Accepting that externality must be 
(re) presented in space through perception, what is (re) 
presented is, and can only be, the real. One has the 
suspicion here, where Kant is at his most phenomenalistic, 
that he is really asking how anything other than what is 
presented in perception could seriously be considered as 
candidates for the real; for appearances are represent - 
:ational and external objects are appearances (A370) or 
external objects are just a "species of representations" 
(ibid), therefore, external objects are essentially 
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representational. Kant's purported refutation of the 
suggestion that we cannot be certain of the existence of 
the external world is achieved by exploiting the distinc- 
:tion between things in themselves and appearances. If 
the world of external objects was a world of things in 
themselves there would be.no legitimate way of inferring 
its existence; it is because the world is a world of 
appearances, i.e. a product of the powers of human cogni- 
tion, that we can be certain of its existence. We impose 
those features.of the world which make it knowable in the 
first place, such as the causal argument 'of the Second 
Analogy. Thus the argument of the Fourth Paralogism is 
supposed to guarantee our faith in the existence of the 
external world. There is however, another theme or 
intimation of a theme, running through the Fourth 
Paralogism, viz. the attempt to establish the reality of 
the material element of perception. But what is the 
material element of perception? Is it not simply the 
external objects as represented in space and time? The 
answers throw up the strong realist flavour of the Fourth 
Paralogism. The material element of perception is not 
the external objects represented in space and time but the 
matter of sensation; "It is sensation ... that indicates 
a reality in space or in time ..." (A374) External objects 
qua appearances do not cause sensations, only physical 
objects or parts thereof are capable of causing bodily 
sensation. The real in space which causes sensation is 
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the physical matter of external objects and it is this 
physical matter (= the material element) which makes 
possible sensible intuition, as Kant points out: "... per - 
:ception is that whereby the material required to enable us 
to think objects of sensible intuition must first be given." 
(A374; emphasis mine) Elsewhere, in the 'Anticipations 
of Perception', it is the real which corresponds to sen- 
:sations "that represents that something the very concept 
of which includes being (A175 = B217; cf. also A143.= 
B183). Being, not existence, corresponds to sensation in 
the world but this argument shall be pursued further'on in 
the context of Kant's theory of matter; here my purpose is 
to draw attention to the realist element in Kant's thought, 
especially prominent where Kant is trying to use trans- 
cendental idealism to refute those doubting the certainty 
of the existence of external objects. There is a strain 
here which the empirically real /transcendentally ideal 
distinction cannot accommodate. If, from the point of 
view of judgment, we can answer the sceptic's doubts about 
the existence of the external world by showing that the 
external world is not completely independent from the know- 
:ing subject, i.e. by demonstrating the truth of trans - 
:cendental idealism, then, from the perspective of the 
object, we must surely be entitled to expect that the fact 
that the world does not have complete autonomy from the 
knowing subject - a fact entailed by, or implicit in, 
transcendental idealism - should have consequences for 
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ontology. If the fact - if it is a fact - that the world 
is a world of appearances, is effectively neutral with 
respect to the kind(s) of entities (and their natures) there 
are in the world, that is, with respect to ontology, then 
what is its significance? Actually Kant's theory that 
the world is a world of appearances is not so insignificant 
but my point still holds. Kant's theory of the empirically 
real /transcendentally ideal can be expressed as follows: 
because our world is a world of appearances.we can be cer- 
:tain that there corresponds "to our outer intuitions some - 
:thing real in space ". The real, however, correspónds to 
sensation,and recalling the 'Anticipations', is a measure 
of the degree of being in the world, or, as the case may be, 
complete non -being. It is the real in space which for Kant 
is the ultimate cause of sensation; the real possesses, as 
it were, a degree of being which can be measured or approx- 
:imated by us through the strength of the sensation which is 
its effect. The presence of this degree of being in an 
object is called its 'intensive magnitude'. I shall be. 
discussing intensive magnitudes in Ch.VI ; here, I want to 
note that if the real in space which corresponds to our 
outer intuitions (A375) is, or can be shown to be, the 
real which in "the pure concept of understanding .... 
corresponds to sensation" (A143 = B182) and as such belongs 
to the realm of being, then it is not merely empirically 
real; it is ultimately real, part of what there is and no 
attempt to transcendentally idealize the real can succeed 
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unless we want to conflate the realm of being and the realm 
of knowledge. 
Two points need to be made here. First, Kant recog- 
nizes that the real pertains to being not knowledge and 
that without the real or the postulation of something 
(forces) as the real, there would be nothing describable 
as actual or inactual. Kant expresses what amounts to the 
same thing in the 'Schematism': 
"Reality, in the pure concept of 
understanding, is that which 
corresponds to a sensation in 
general; it is that, therefore, 
the concept of which in itself 
points to being (in time). 
Negation is that the concept of 
which represents not -being (in 
time). The opposition of these 
two thus rests upon the distinction 
of one and the same time as filled 
and as empty." (A143.= B182)" 
Reality (being) and negation (non- being) represent respect- 
ively, time filled and time empty, the former where some- 
:thing is, the latter, where there is nothing. Time filled 
is not represented by what is knowable but by that in which 
there is something to be known. As we might expect, Kant 
does not want to have to say that the real belonging to 
things and which corresponds to sensation is the ultimately 
real, i.e. that which determines the thinghood of a thing; 
even if the real is what determines the being of a thing in 
time, time itself is but a form of intuition" ... and so of 
objects as appearances, that in the objects which correspond 
to sensation is not the transcendental matter of all objects 
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as things in themselves (thinghood, reality)." (ibid) But 
why should we not regard this last statement as one of 
Kant's many token disclaimers with respect to things in 
themselves as what is in principle unknowable (and there- 
:fore, unsayable)? We shall not be able to accept .it in 
any case for it is a straightforward statement to the 
effect that the real which determines the thinghood of 
things and presumably, tlasfore, all that exists, is in us, 
the perceiving subjects, for time is the form of inner 
sense. Nor can Kant accept this for it is a mockery of 
his outer sense doctrine and leaves him with a theory to 
the effect that the world is really an auto - affection of 
the soul. Thus, if we reject Kant's token disclaimer, not 
it a token disclaimer but because its consequences 
are clearly unacceptable, then we can regard the relation 
between the real in objects and sensation at its face value, 
i.e. without the trappings of transcendental idealism and 
the empirical /transcendental distinction that it entails. 
The second point I want to make is that there is in 
CPR the intimation that the real in space, that correspond- 
ing to sensation, is indispensable to there being anything 
to be known (by means of the categories) at all. We have 
seen that the real in space and time, whatever it is, is 
what fills space and time and both in CPR and the Meta- 
physical Foundations of Natural Science (= MFNS), matter 
is what fills space. Matter, however, is also the real 
corresponding to sensation; thus has Kant left clues to the 
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discovery of what he cannot say directly because of 
transcendental idealism, viz. that the real is (perhaps) 
some property (microproperty) of matter. This makes 
perfect sense even within the context of Kant's theory of 
sensibility for sensible intuition is empirical in so far 
as it is affected by the actual through sensation, in space 
and time (B147). The empirical effects of the actual in 
space and time are the various qualities of sensation, e.g. 
colours, tastes but Kant makes it clear that the real in 
space is not a secondary property or reducible to a second- - 
:ary property, if anything, the real is what underlies such 
properties: "The quality of sensation, as for instance in 
colours, taste, etc., is always merely empirical, and can- 
:not be represented a priori. But the real, which corres- 
ponds to sensations in general, as opposed to negation 
= O, represents only that something the very concept of 
which includes being...." (A175 = B217). And the real has 
being which is represented (by affection) through sensation. 
Thus, if anything at all can be postulated as the real it 
will not be captured in statements about secondary quali- 
:ties or statements about experiencing colours, tastes, 
etc. because Kant does not think secondary properties 
belong to objects or are properties of objects 
This makes perfect sense for something postulated as being 
that without which nothing would be actual; it itself is 
not empirical and therefore not expressible with empirical 
concepts and in empirical statments. That the (ultimately) 
real is not empirical or observable fits the conception of 
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such entity as viewed from the perspective of modern physics, 
with the exception of quantum physics. It also fits the 
vaguely Leibnizian characterization of such an entity as 
the fundamentally real constituent of the universe, once 
the idealist overtures of Leibniz's metaphysics are re- 
jected. It is this type of entity which might satisfy 
the complete requirements of a theory of the foundations of 
objectivity. In MFNS, Kant presents a force theory of 
matter which can provide a physical basis for such an 
attempted reconstruction.. In its original Kantian form 
it won't do because of the framework of transcendental 
idealism within which it is cast and transcendental idealism 
is, I am arguing, riddled with difficulties over the found - 
:ations of objectivity. Thus, something else, as a 
general philosophical underpinning and.structure, some 
alternative theory is required. It is this requirement 
that I believe-a theory in the tradition of Leibnizian 
realism, with the account of the foundations of objectivity 
that it entails, can satisfy. 
6. Kant's argument against idealism amounts to a form - 
:ulation of transcendental idealism: externality must be 
(re) presented in space through perception; all candidates 
for the real must therefore be (re) presented in space 
through perception (since, literally, there is no other way 
for anything to be for human cognition); therefore, we have 
nocption but to accept that which is in fact (re) presented 
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in space through perception, as the real. Since however, 
space is the form of outer sense or, alternatively, space 
is really, 'in us', we can be as certain of the existence 
of external objects as we are of the changing states of 
inner sense 1 (= the objects of inner sense). The objects 
existing in space, with spatial configurations, are species 
of our representations in that they are a kind of represent - 
:ing, to wit, they are a kind of representing in the only 
mode in which an object can be an object for us. It would 
seem then, on this account, with respect to our knowledge 
of external objects, we know them as empirically real, but 
with respect to the objects simpliciter, they are not really 
external, at least we can't say they are, for nothing can be 
said to exist outside space, i.e. outside our forms of 
perception. This is what it means to describe objects as 
transcendentally ideal. The epistemological thesis of 
empirical realism is implied by the ontological thesis of 
transcendental idealism: that we know objects as empiri- 
:cally real is a consequence of our interpreting them as 
transcendentally ideal. If we choose to reject this 
ontological interpretation of the world by ignoring the 
metaphysics of transcendental idealism then the strongest 
theoretical defence for the claims of empirical realism as 
an epistemological thesis is no longer available. In Kant's 
philosophy, accepting that transcendental idealism is the 
central controlling element therein, ontology is logically 
prior to epistemology. Ontology pertains to the nature 
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and being of things in contrast to questions regarding our 
knowledge of things; a fully fledged or complete theory 
of transcendental idealism must address itself to questions 
concerning ontology. In order to strengthen this conten- 
:tion still further, I offer the following brief argument. 
Following Sellars 2, I shall refer to empirical 
objects as representeds, rather than the usual 'represent - 
:ations'. Within Kant's theoretical framework, the know - 
:able .( =what it is possible to know) is structurally defined 
a priori by the categories and the forms of sensibility; it 
is because the limits of human cognition are determined on 
a priori grounds (residing in the nature of the knowing 
subject) that other possible modes of cognition 'of objects, 
modes of knowing possessed by beings whose constitutions 
differ (in varying degrees perhaps) from ours, cannot be 
discounted. For experience could conceivably produce 
beings for whom the same objects were perceived in a 
different mode; indeed, our own human perceptual apparatus 
has been altered within the context of experimental 
psychology, to effectively create a mode of cognition so 
abnormal as.to make a normally recognizable perception 
unidentifiable to the percepient. Thé point is that, 
because Kant's argument for the limits of human cognition 
rest on a priori grounds, it is vulnerable to the exigen- 
cies of experience and the de facto indeterminacy of 
future conditions. Thus, on the basis of Kant's arguments 
we cannot claim to have exhausted the possible modes of 
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knowing things but it is this conclusion that Kant tries 
to avoid by describing our knowledge of the world as a 
knowledge of representeds or, in his own terminology, 
knowledge of what is 'in us'. Kant's refusal to recog- 
:nize, other than in a token fashion, other possible modes 
of cognition can perhaps be explained by his belief that 
the argument's transcendental status depended on its obtain - 
:ing with universality and necessity, and to acknowledge, 
even as possible, other forms of cognition of objects, would 
seriously mitigate, if not destroy, the force of these 
claims. In any case, the transcendentally ideal status of 
the known is a result of Kant's technique of deriving their 
knowability from the conditions of the possibility of ex- 
perience. The strength of the tie between the know - 
:ability of things and the conditions for the possibility 
of experience is reflected in the represented feature 
which things possess in the Kantian world. Kant's ex- 
pressions 'in us' and 'outside us' are, as he himself 
states, dangerously ambiguous; however, on the basis of 
a close reading of.the 'Fourth Paralogism', it is possible 
to avoid the pitfalls of the ambiguity by distinguishing 
sharply between the transcendental and empirical uses of 
these expressions. In its empirical use, 'outside us' 
refers to "things which are to be found in space" (A373) 
where 'space' is understood as that which bodies occupy; 
but in the Kantian framework material things are ultimat- 
:ely representations in space and time and the latter are 
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'in us' qua forms of representation, ergo, material things 
are really the contents of the forms of representations in 
us. The empirical use of 'outside us' is seen to be 
balanced and always kept within the uniquely Kantian per - 
:spective of ultimate idealism, by the transcendental sense 
of 'in us'. The latter, however, has its correlative 
empirical sense in which it refers to the states of repres- 
enting both the material things of the world and the 
individual's own sensual affections (sensations, emotions). 
Since these states are of their own nature, "representeds, 
we are entitled to inquire as to their correlates iñ what 
has(a fortiori) not been represented, i.e.. what is 'out- 
:side us' in the transcendental sense of not being repres- 
entable. This set of definitions has a somewhat 
artificial or contrived ring when paraded forth outside 
their functional context in CPR; their significance how- 
:ever must rot be lost for they are integral to the mean - 
:ing of transcendental idealism and the ambiguity which 
surrounds them is simply a measure of difficulties at the 
core of transcendental idealism. Consider the following: 
The empirical sense of 'in us', as has been appreciated in 
the literature .3, represents Kant at his most phénomenalis- 
:tic. What hasn't been so clearly recognized is the extent 
to which the phenomenalist element is exploited to produce 
what is, effectively, the double meaning of 'in us', at the 
transcendental level and the empirical level. .I cannot 
present a detailed defence of this claim but I think these 
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passages from the 'Fourth Paralogism' evidence a marked 
inability on the part of transcendental idealism to deal 
with the ontological problems confronting it. 
"We can indeed admit that something, 
which may be (in the transcendental 
sense) outside us, is the cause of 
our outer intuitions, but this is 
not the object of which we are here 
thinking in the representations of 
matter and of corporeal things; for 
these -are mere appearances, that is, 
mere kinds of representations, which 
are never to be met with save in us..." (A373) 
Again, we find a token recognition of the ontological re- 
:quirement of the (in principle) unrepresentable as a 
cause of the representable, followed immediately by a 
statement of the essentially represent tional nature of 
matter and corporeal things, i.e. phenomenalism of sorts, 
which Kant thinks makes the ontological requirement re- 
dundant as appearances obtain their being, as it were, 
through being in us. They are not just known as appear - 
:ances, they are appearances. 
"But it is not of this that we are 
here speaking, but of the empirical 
object, which is called an external 
object if it is represented in .s .áce, 
and an inner object if it is represented 
only in its time -relations. Neither space 
nor time, however, is to be found save in 
us. The expression outside us is thus 
unavoidably (Neither space nor time, 
however, is to be found save in us. The 
expression outside us is thus unavoidably) 
ambiguous in meaning, sometimes signifying 
what as thing in itself exists apart from 
us, and sometimes what belongs solely to 
outer appearance." (A373) 
Kant gives the impression here that the ambiguity of'out- 
:side us' is somehow naturally involved in any philosophical 
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use of the expression, whereas in fact it is imported into 
the context of the discussion, to disguise it seems, Kant's 
ambivalence with respect to the ontological status and role 
of the thing in itself. If Kant was to eliminate the thing 
in itself completely, then he would be left with what would 
look very much like a theory of the auto - affection of the 
soul, i.e. that the known world was a product of the activity 
of the mind. Nor can he fully condone use of the thing in 
itself for to do so would entail at least a partial reifi- 
:cation of the thing in itself, investing it with properties 
and powers required to meet its explanatory role as an onto - 
:logical type, to wit, a type in which the known world could 
be ontologically grounded. Unfortunately, Kant thought 
that such an ontological type had to be located outside the 
world as the cause of the world and the grounds of the world - 
order; there is no reason however, why such an ontological 
type could not exist within the world as an unconditioned 
entity, possessing properties which would serve to explain 
existing laws of science (that is, explain why the laws of 
nature have the explanatory power they do have) and all 
other known objects in the world. The unconditioned, so 
conceived, would itself be unexplained because.nothing 
exists in terms of which it could be explained at that 
stage in the progress of science. If a more basic, fund - 
:amental entity is discovered then it becomes the un- 
:conditioned explainer. So the particular candidate might 
and can change to meet the vicissitu es of discovery. Nor 
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need this type of entity be supersensible as Kant also 
seemed to think for we know the need be nothing super - 
:sensible about mierophysical objects. 
From this reading of the 'Fourth Paralogism', Kant 
seems to fall into phenomenalism as a consequence of his 
defence of the claim that we can be as certain of the 
existence of the external world as we are of our own mental 
states. He thus comes to adumbrate what seems to be an 
ontological thesis pertaining to the physical world, i.e. 
material things are complexes of spatial and temporal rep - 
:resentations in individual minds. Now, for anyone who 
maintains this theory of objects coupled with the insistence 
that objects are empirically real, 'outside us' would be 
Even though Kant believes that the real 
world is a world of physical objects, transcendental idealism 
obliges him to argue that the real can only be revealed, as 
it were, through perception and is therefore a represented 
real. For Kant, this claim is equivalent to the claim that 
we know appearances only and not things in themselves. 
But this claim, as Kant himself recognized, is at best a 
partial truth for the efficacy of the realm of things in 
themselves is required if man's moral nature, grounded in 
his unconditioned power of spontaneity, is to be explained 
and established as objectively real. Furthermore, while 
Kant recognized this fact, his attempt to explain it and 
accommodate its implications into his philosophy as a 
whole, failed abysmally. Kant postulated that man as 
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moral being exists in the timeless world of noumena where 
events can occur without causal antecedents, i.e. freely; 
man also exists, however, as a natural being in the 
phenomenal world possessing those features specified by the 
categories, most notably, that nothing happens without a 
causal antecedent and all events are in time. The 
noumenal world is completely undetermined while the 
phenomenal world is determined to the extent that it is 
totally predictable in principle. Man's freedom and man's 
determinism do not have to be reconciled because they belong 
to different worlds, worlds which, moreover, do not interact. 
As I shall be discussing in the following chapter, to 
seriously propose that there is no interaction between these 
two worlds is equivalent to affirming that they are super -'. 
:fluous to one another; and this fails completely to account 
for man's moral experience. One begins to understand how 
narrow are the ontological horizons of the world prescribed . 
by transcendental idealism. 
7. The central argument used by Kant to defeat the 
claims of transcendental realism is, in brief, that space, 
time and material things are representations in individual 
minds, and that reality is constituted by such represent - 
:ations. One of the difficulties of transcendental 
realism, Kant believed, is that it requires one to explain 
how ideas (of objects) in the mind come to represent 
veridically the absolutely independent objects in the world; 
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how, that is, can we be certain that our representations 
are isomorphic with the independent reality they are 
supposed to represent, without presupposing the truth of 
the theoretical framework of transcendental realism being 
argued for? (Yet another option, after a fashion, is to 
ask how we can translate mental state statements into 
physical object statements without presupposing that one 
set is reducible to another.) 
This is one of the problems that transcendental idealism 
is designed to avoid as Kant argues that we really do have 
direct access to the empirically real nature of objects; 
the material world exists 'in' (= 'in us') our represent - 
:ations, not outside them, as we project forms of repre- 
sentation (space and time) on external objects. As 
empirically real, these forms are features of the world 
but ultimately, they are grounded in the nature of the 
subject. Kant states: 
"...our doctrine (transcendental idealism) 
thus removes all difficulty in the way of 
accepting the existence of matter on the 
unaided testimony of our mere self - 
consciousness, or of declaring it to be 
thereby proved in the same manner as the 
existence of myself as thinking being is 
proved. There can be no question that 
I am conscious of my representations; 
these representations and I myself, who 
have the representations, therefore 
exist. External objects (bodies), 
however, are mere appearances, and are 
therefore nothing but a species of my 
representations, the objects of which 
are something only through these represen- 
:tations. Apart from them they are 
nothing... in both cases (representations 
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of myself and extended beings) alike 
the objects are nothing but represen- 
:tations, the immediate perception of 
which is at the same time a sufficient 
proof of their reality." (A370 - A371) 
This passage is indicative of Kant's' argument throughout 
the CPR to the effect that experience of material things 
and of one's mental states is possible only within rep- 
:resentings, i.e. representations whose essential features 
have been derived from the nature of the subject. It is 
the defining predicates of human subjectivity which ground 
the possibility of knowledge. As the foundations of 
human knowledge reside in the transcendental unity of 
apperception and not in the nature of things known, Kant 
can make do with a world of "appearances as representations" 
by accounting for the objectivity of appearances in terms 
of the defining predicates of human subjectivity, space, 
time and the categories. It is this transcendental twist, 
so to speak, to Locke's theory of objectivity, according to 
which ideas in the mind are ultimately shown to be object - 
:ively valid by the discovery of the nature of the object 
they represented, that provides transcendental idealism 
with its credibility as a theory of objectivity. Kant 
seems to have thought that what I have called the trans - 
:cendental twist represented a solution to the problem of 
demonstrating the possibility of objective knowledge. 
However, as we have already glimpsed, it seems that Kant 
has promised more for transcendental idealism then it can 
produce. 
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Let us concede for the moment that material things 
are "sensible representations" or, in the idiom I have 
adopted, representables in the minds of individuals. Is 
the question: 'What can be said (known) about the corre- 
:lates of these representables ?' a legitimate question in 
the present context? My answer is that the question has 
a defensible and an indefensible, version. If 'correlate' 
is meant to refer to a reality of which the représéritings 
are the appearance and which is purported to have some 
unspecifiable causal connection with the world of appear - 
:ances, then, I must say that the question leads straight 
into the realm of unsupported dogma. For we are in effect 
being asked to entertain the chance possibility of there 
being two worlds, one a world of observable, law- governed 
appearances, the other a world of non -observables about 
whose natures we can at best hypothesize. There is how - 
:ever a less incredible interpretation of the question. 
Representations, insofar as the material world exists or 
has its being in them, can be conceived as having correl- 
:ates. These could be typified as: (1) what is constituted 
in the representation; (2)* What is, as a matter of fact, 
not constituted in the representation but could be, e.g. 
assuming the contents of some representations to be 
material objects, some property of material objects not 
yet discovered and thus not known to exist but may be in 
the future. What this suggests is that the different 
ontological types introduced by the appearance -reality 
distinction can be defended without the trappings of the 
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two -world theory. Justification for countenacing onto- 
:logical types (kinds) should be derived not only from 
epistemological considerations with respect to the 
conditions of knowledge; if different kinds of entities 
exist then the concepts required to express the different 
natures of these entities would be expected to have their 
origin in the kinds of entities they express. As it 
stands, Kant's distinction between the way that a thing 
appears and the way that a thing really is apart from our 
representing of it, provides for the possibility that the 
thing as represented is non -isomorphic with the thing as 
it exists simliciter, since the latter as an ontological 
type, is disengaged from the realm of knowledge. If, 
however, we restore ontological respectability, so to speak, 
to the concept of thing in itself (= thing as it exists 
simpliciter) by arguing that it has a semantical function 
to serve, i.e. there exists types of entities which require 
just such a semantics, then it can be vindicated. I can- 
not in this essay pursue the question of how semantics 
and ontology are related, in anything like the detail it 
requires, but I shall in Ch. 3 indicate just how trans- 
cendental idealism doesn't possess the ontological 
diversity required for science and teleology, precisely 
because its semantics licenses only one kind of entity. 
The non- isomorphism which seems to be implicit in 
Kant's original appearance -reality distinction is what 
lends plausibility to the world- behind - the -scenes inter- 
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:pretation of the thing -in- itself. To offer a description 
of. an object as existing simpliciter allows for the possib- 
ility that a thing, a property, which at a given time is 
unknown to us, may yet be discovered: Kant's interpreta- 
tion of the appearance- reality distinction fails to allow 
for this possibility, for things in themselves are in 
principle not knowable. Anything not representable under 
the conditions of space, time and the categories, is 
eternally unknowable; this is a structural truth of Kant's 
system and it cannot be modified to allow for the recognition 
of new discovery and changing scientific knowledge.- I shall 
be presenting an argument in Ch. , following Peter Krausser, 
to the effect that Kant's theory in-CPR implies the necessity 
of postulating unknowable things in themselves if scientific 
inquiry is to be possible. 
It will become apparant as this essay proceeds, that 
Kant's concept of the thing in itself can, indeed, must be 
vindicated if anything of Kant's theory of objectivity, in 
its original form, is to be salvaged. This will involve 
a rejection of transcendental idealism, at least in its 
original Kantian form and the endorsement of a realism the 
historical precedent for which is Leibniz.- 
8. The problem of correlating representations with 
something which can be described as existing simpliciter 
worried Kant as late as the writing of the first edition 
CPR. At 104(A), referring to the "object of 
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representations ", Kant says: 
"We have stated above that appear- 
ances are themselves nothing but 
sensible representations, which, 
as such and in themselves, must 
not be taken as objects capable 
of existing outc.ide our power of 
representation. What, then, is 
to be understood when we speak 
of an object corresponding to 
and consequently also distinct 
from, our knowledge ?" 
Kant put this very same question to Marcus Herz in the 
famous 1772 letter where Kant claimed that the problem of 
the relation between knowledge and its object was the key 
to the solution of metaphysics. There the question was: 
"What is the ground of the relation of that in us which 
we call representation to the object ? "4 which exemplifies 
the general philosophical problem of the "transcendental 
object ". By Lhe time Kant wrote the first edition 
'Deduction' he had arrived at a genuinely new solution to 
the problem. The ground of the relation between rep - 
:resentations and their objects resides neither in the 
representations nor in the things represented but in the 
representing through concepts by the subject. The subject 
projects conceptual necessity upon representations thereby 
contributing those features of experience which justify 
the objectivity of appearances. It is the thought of the 
concept of an object in general which corresponds to our 
representations and which conceptually "binds" them into 
a necessary unity; it is through the concept of an object 
that the subject effects the transition from judgments about 
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one's representations to judgments about the world, where 
the extended world exists only in representations. This 
is the difference between statements like, 'I feel cold' or 
'I have a sensation of coldness' and statements like., 
'There is something causing my cold sensation'. Now Kant 
and those who have followed him in thinking that conceptual 
necessity is sufficient to demonstrate the objectivity of 
categorial concepts, regard the difference between these 
two kinds of statements as one of degree of objectivity. 
A perceptual report about my own state ('I feel cold') is 
usually understood as a description of how I am being 
sensuously affected without any assumption that others are 
being similarly affected. Such a report is subjectively 
true, true in that it accurately describes the way that I 
feel, and subjective because it is descriptive of my state 
only. Now if perceptual reports are to obtain a full 
compliment of objectivity, i.e. be regarded as objectively 
true, it is sufficient for those thinking that objectivity 
can be established by conceptual necessity, that a number 
of perceptual reports agree. Thus, if everyone in a room 
is cold, we can safely judge the room to -be cold. This 
kind of objectivity is based on intersubjective agreement, 
rather than on there actually being something in the world 
which causally corresponds to commonly experienced 
sensations. What, on the model of conceptual necessity, 
Kant is obliged to say is this: When I am being sensuous- 
ly affected in some way, in order to obtain cognitive 
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apprehension of the experience, I must coneptualize it in 
a causal order that fixes it in time and space. This is 
the function of the concept of an object in general. That 
there is something in time and space that corresponds to 
the way in which I must represent the experience to myself, 
i.e. whether or not there is an object =X, is unknown. 
Unfortunately, this account of the objectivity of appear - 
:ances raises as many problems as it solves. First of 
all, if Kant was convinced that intentional or conceptual 
necessity was sufficient to explain the objectivity of 
appearances, why did he remain agnostic with respect to 
the existence of the object = X corresponding to appear - 
:ances? If intentional necessity really provides an 
adequate account of objectivity then presumably it does 
so independently of the question of the existence of the 
object = X. What Kant should have said was that even if 
the object = X was known to correspond to our representations, 
this was not the ground of objectivity, as only intentional 
necessity can provide such a ground for the relation between 
the known and the knower. But Kant does not argue in 
this way; instead, he argues to the effect that_a defence 
of intentional necessity entails a denial of de re or real 
necessity on the sole basis that we can never know the 
real nature of things. For there is no reason, if we 
accept that knowledge is distinct from being, that our 
forms of judgment could not originate in the knowing 
subject, while the data of knowledge - what is known - 
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has its source in the real nature of things. Kant, of 
course, recognizes only intentional necessity. This 
creates the strong suspicion that underlying Kant's trans 
:cendental idealism is the belief that the foundations of 
objectivity is to be found in things in themselves, but as 
we can never have knowledge of things in themselves and 
want to avoid scepticism, we shall make the grounds of 
objectivity conditions of the possibility of knowledge; thus 
the transcendental unity of apperception and intentional 
necessity as the way of objectifying the categoria concepts 
which are specifications of it. 
The second problem involved with trying to explain 
objectivity in terms of conceptual necessity only is that no 
independent source of appearances can be postulated. If 
something over and above appearances is postulated as the 
source of appearances, other than the knowing subject, then 
conceptual necessity cannot be the sole explanation of objecL- 
:ivity; if appearances are ultimately grounded in the nature 
of the knowing subject (as a species of representations) then 
how is Kant to explain the existence of something other than 
mind, i.e. matter. If there is anything at all to be 
known (and presumably Kant does think there is otherwise 
why postulate conditions for knowledge) it cannot have its 
origin in the nature of the knowing subject, for then, all 
knowledge would really be a form of self -knowledge; the 
only world to be known is the world of the self.. 
Actually, Kant does come very near to this 
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kind of position at times especially when trying to explain 
his theory of synthesis but that is another problem. 
Kant is far from offering a satisfactory solution to 
his old problem of explaining the "ground of the relation 
of representations in us to the object ". Since Kant denies 
that knowledge of objects is based on the constituting pre- 
dicates of the objects (for that would be equivalent to 
having knowledge of things in themselves) while at the same 
time maintaining that objective knowledge is possible, he 
must provide an alternative account of the grounds of such 
knowledge. If the grounds of our knowledge of things lie 
not in the things known then they must lie in the knower. 
Leibniz thought that a complete knowledge of the nature of 
things was not possible for discursive intellects but he 
did not therefore deny that what knowledge we did possess 
was derived from things. Kant is led to deny all know- 
:ledge of things simpliciter because he cannot see how a 
complete knowledge of the order of things in the world 
grounded in the nature of things, is possible. Thus, the 
knowing subject becomes the source of the order of things 
in the world. But surely if this procedure is.to be even 
prima facie acceptable, Kant must show definitively that 
we can never know any of the basic, defining properties of 
things. Once this had been shown, the shift from a world 
of things to a world of appearances which is the most 
significant consequence of Kant's scepticism with respect 
to our knowledge of things, would seem more plausible. 
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Kant never sets out a direct argument to the effect that 
we cannot know anything of the nature of things. Once 
again, it is not sufficient that Kant argues for the claims 
of transcendental idealism for the truth of the latter pre - 
:supposes the falsity of a theory like Leibniz's realism, 
or a modern brand of realism for that matter. 
9. The tendency in recent Kant scholarship has been to 
play down the role of the transcendental object = X. Kemp'. 
Smith treats the notion of transcendental object with what 
almost amounts to scholarly contempt 5. 'He regards it as 
no more than an unfortunate remnant of Kant's pre -Critical 
days, a contention which is now highly disputable since 
the transcendental object is discussed by Kant in the Opus 
Posturiium. I suspect that Kant's permanent interest in the 
notion of a transcendental object reflects his worries that 
the CPR's official doctrine that the world is a world of 
appearances - ultimately, cannot support even a mind -matter 
ontology. We glimpsed in the last section the problem 
which arises as a result of Kant's excessive dependence on 
conceptual necessity as a means of proving a concept's 
objective validity. The transcendental object's presence 
in Kant's later writings could be an indication that he was 
coming to some such conclusion himself. However this may 
be, I want to present an argument to the effect that a 
certain interpretation of the concept of the transcendental 
object underlines the requirement for the adoption of an 
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ontological perspective of Kant's theory of objectivity, or, 
that the metaphysics of transcendental idealism is essential 
to Kant's whole programme. 
First, a preliminary remark about the text of CPR. 
When I first examined the 'Transcendental Deduction' in A 
and B I felt convinced that, despite the fact that there 
was no mention of the term 'transcendental object' in the 
B Deduction, each version contained its own theory of the 
transcendental object. While I still think this is a 
defensible view, it is hardly possible to argue that the 
entire text of the B Deduction bears out the interpretation 
of the transcendental object I believe can be offered. 
Therefore, rather than structure my argument around the 
'contention that each version of the us 
with a theory of the transcendental object, in any reading 
of the two texts, I have decided not to anchor my inter - 
:pretation in this strong claim. The purpose of my argu- 
:ment is, of course, not affected. 
Kant's approach to the issue of objectivity, in 
particular, his concern with the criteria of 'objecthood' 
and objective knowledge, is quite different in the A 
Deduction from what it is in the B Deduction. In the A 
Deduction, Kant stresses the necessity of the unity of 
consciousness, the requirement that diverse experiences 
be held together in a single consciousness. Kant's 
explanation of the connectibility of representations in 
consciousness is shrouded in a psychologistic idiom which 
creates the regrettable impression that Kant is making 
claims about how our minds actually assimilate their material 
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in constructing 'our' world. While I do think, and argue 
for the contention, that transcendental idealism obliges 
Kant to accept that the subject is the sole creator of 
world- order, it is not to be understood in a literal sense. 
Kant's faculty talk is not essential to any of the argu- 
ments which he advances in spelling out the roles of 
imagination and understanding. We can eliminate the 
faculty talk and substitute it with specific descriptions 
of the mind's capacities which we can defend, as Kant 
ultimately does, with transcendental arguments of the 
form: 'The mind must have these capacities if experience 
is to be possible'. That Kant chose to describe the mind's 
operations in terms which were fashionable at the time he 
was writing seems not to be a very penetrating or effective 
criticism of his overall estimate of ti7e ` mind's s place in 
the order of things. 
The understanding brings the "raw material" of 
intuition, which has been synthesized in apprehension and 
reproduced in imagination, under concepts, an activity 
Kant thinks is similar to recognizing an experience and 
then proceeding to identify it (A98 - A104). The mind 
must engage itself with the raw material of sensible 
intuition to synthesize, or, effect, a unitary objective 
world; the mind is really introducing order in the world, 
imposing its own necessity on the world where there exists 
no natural necessity. This briefly is the account 
provided in the A Deduction. 
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In the B Deduction the emphasis is placed on the 
role of judgment in determining (conceptually) the object - 
:ive world. The B Deduction is generally regarded as a 
successful attempt on Kant's part in' eliminating the short - 
:comings of the A Deduction; the psychologistic language 
is minimal, and instead we are provided with a logical 
account of the conditions for a possible experience. 
Kant links experience, making judgments and applying the 
categories, together in an argument which has the follow- 
ing form: All experience involves judgment, without the 
making of judgments we would have chaos instead of ordered 
experiences; the metaphysical deduction has shown, more- 
:over, that the forms of judgment (and the only possible 
forms of judgment at that) are the forms according to 
which we classify (= unify) objects; the categories are 
the conceptual equivalent of the forms of judgment and it 
is by means of the categories that the "raw material" is 
subsumed (in 12 possible ways) under concepts. Thus, the 
categories are necessary conditions for the possibility of 
experience. Kant's aim in the B Deduction remains what 
it was in the A Deduction, i.e. to show that the categories 
are specifications of the concept of an object in general, 
or, as Kant defines judgment in MFNS, "...precisely deter - 
:mined definition of a judgment in general (as an act by 
which given representations first become cognitions of an 
object)".6 
Both the A Deduction and the B Deduction have as 
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their central aim the establishment of the possibility of 
objective knowledge. In the A Deduction Kant's strategy 
is to argue that if we are to acquire knowledge of objects, 
then our representations must be referred to a 'something' 
which is the transcendental object, or, that they'must be 
thought only as something in general = X' (A104). Now to 
say that our representations must be referred to a some- 
:thing in general = X is equivalent to saying that they 
must be brought under the concept of something in general 
X if experience is to be possible;and this is the 
function of'a category. Hence, the transcendental object 
is functionally equivalent to the category of an object in 
general and as Kant's categories are specifications of the 
concept of an object in general, the transcendental object 
as something which must be thought, becomes quite super - 
:fluous 7. In the B Deduction in which Kant was trying 
to present a simpler and clearer exposition of his argument, 
the transcendental object is not mentioned. It is through 
the transcendental object and its categorial determinations 
that necessity - and therefore objectivity - is conferred 
upon representations; as such, the transcendental object is 
a pure concept the mere thought of which is sufficient to 
unite in consciousness the diverse predicates (= the mani- 
:fold) of a particular representation, e.g. three sides of 
a triangle. The transcendental object is then, a concep- 
:tual item in Kant's theoretical framework, a framework 
within which objectivity is established by means of 
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epistemic or transcendental necessity; all knowledge for 
Kant rests on a transcendental condition, viz. the trans- 
:cendental unity of consciousness: 
"Thus we think a triangle as an object, 
in that we are conscious of the com- 
bination of three straight lines 
according to a rule by which such an 
intuition can always be represented. 
This unity of rule determines all the 
manifold, and limits it to conditions 
which make unity of apperception 
possible The concept of this unity 
is the representation of the object 
= X All necessity, without 
exception, is grounded in a trans- 
cendental condition. There must, 
therefore, be a transcendental ground 
of the unity of consciousness in the 
synthesis of the manifold of all our 
intuitions, and consequently also of 
the concepts of objects in general 
a ground without which it would be 
impossible to think any object for 
our intuitions; for this object is no 
more than that something, the concept 
of which expresses such a necessity 
of synthesis." (A106) 
It is from the perspective of knowledge of the object, i.e. 
the object considered solely from the point of view of its 
cognitive apprehension, that transcendental necessity can 
effectively demonstrate objective validity. But this, 
surely, is not the only perspective, nor is it at all 
obvious that the objectivity of objects, so to speak, can 
be established from this perspective without consideration 
of the perspective of the object itself - the object 
simpliciter. Kant's claim that all necessity is trans - 
:cendental amounts to the claim that no consideration need 
be given to the object of knowledge in establishing the 
objective validity of judgments; but, how, in that case, 
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can Kant provide an account of the objects of knowledge 
themselves, or, what it is our judgments are about? The 
fact is that not only does Kant's framework, the explana- 
:tory framework of transcendental idealism, seem unable 
to provide for such an account, Kant does not think it is 
necessary. This is because Kant thought transcendental 
idealism was true, a fact which underlines my contention 
that transcendental idealism is the center of Kant's 
system; if transcendental idealism is untenable however, 
then Kant's method of demonstrating the objective validity 
of concepts is deprived of its essential support, i.e. 
that the foundations of the known world lie in the nature 
of the subject, recalling that for Kant: (1) the known 
world = the world, and (2) all knowledge (= necessity) 
res Ls on a t ansceiidental condition, which is equivalent 
to saying that (3) knowledge is grounded in the nature of 
the subject. 
The analysis of the transcendental object which I 
have given tells only half the story, for Kant does use 
the term 'transcendental object' when referring to some- 
:thing corresponding to our representations of objects and 
'the something' is not a concept but a putative object 
corresponding to appearances, lying outside our powers of 
representation. This notion of the transcendental object 
- according to which the transcendental object is provided 
with an ontological sense - may indeed be a survival from 
Kant's pre- critical days but that it is does not explain 
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why Kant still discusses it in the CPR and in his later 
writings. Furthermore, Kant's discussion of this sense 
of transcendental object shows that he knew exactly what 
he was doing - considering the legitimacy of a notion 
which his entire theoretical framework rules out. May it 
not be the case that there was a real tension in Kant's 
thought, a tension which finds expression in the ambivalent 
attitude towards the question of the source of appearances 
(in a transcendental condition or the real corresponding to 
appearances). Perhaps, that is, Kant himself suspected 
that the truth of transcendental idealism - the center of 
his theoretical framework - depends ultimately on the claim, 
expressed throughout Kant's work, concerning our lack of 
knowledge of the world as it really is, rather than on any 
claim to the effect that the unconditionally real is not 
(if only we could know) the real grounds of objective know - 
:ledge. This is the fundamental structural truth about 
the world from the theoretical perspective of transcendental 
idealism and it is also, I am arguing, its basic flaw. If 
unconditioned entities or powers can be shown to be necess- 
:ary to account for the foundations of objectivity, then 
transcendental idealism is refuted. In the next chapter, 
I shall argue that the power of spontaneity must, according 
to Kant's moral philosophy, be such an unconditioned power. 
Furthermore, spontaneity is not only the source of practical 
reason, or reason as manifested in moral behaviour; it is 
the. source of theoretical reason as well (there is only one 
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reason, as Kant said). Thus, the unconditioned lies at 
heart of Kant's philosophy. The power of spontaneity is 
the ontological foundation of reason and freedom, and thus 
the source of human creativity - through which man inter - 
:acts with and alters the course of, the natural world. 
But the power of spontaneity is not the ontological found - 
:ation of the physical world or as Kant is wont to call it, 
the world of matter. Once again, Kant is not permitted to 
postulate a real ground for the order of things in the 
world of matter because any such ground would conflict with 
the thesis of transcendental idealism that the ground of 
the known world is the transcendental unity of apperception 
(the structural core of subjectivity). I believe and 
shall argue in the closing chapters of this essay that it 
is necessary to postulate a type of entiLy which is onto - 
:logically unconditioned in order to complete any defensible 
theory of objectivity. Paradoxically, Kant provides the 
materials for the preliminary sketch for such an argument; 
in MFNS, the two forces of repulsion and attraction postu- 
:lated as the basic constituents of matter, cannot be 
described from the perspective of conditionedness - they 
are unconditioned and Kant's sole reason for not regarding 
them as such is his commitment to transcendental idealism. 
If the latter theory is false, or at least, untenable, 
then there exists no reason why an explanation of object - 
:ivity which legitimizes the unconditioned as an ontologi- 
cal type, should not be accepted. 
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The above was a digression which I thought approp- 
riate to insert at this point in the discussion in order 
to supply at least initial support for what I have said 
and will now say, concerning the transcendental object. 
The intuition lying behind transcendental idealism 
is, I belhve, that human beings are limited to a perspectival 
grasp of reality because of the constitutional limitations 
of their perceptual and conceptual powers. Hence, any 
theory of reality must account for this fundamental truth 
about us, by recognizing that the world, the only world 
for -us, is a world of appearances. Our theories of the 
nature of reality, scientific and metaphysical, will there- 
fore reflect our perspectival grasping of reality as well 
as the actual nature of reality apart from our grasping 
of it (actually, on a strict interpretation of transcenden- 
tal idealism, it is doubtful if even a glimpse of reality 
is possible). Now the weakness in a structured intuition 
of this sort is the unargued for assumption that it makes, 
i.e. the real ground of appearances, although unknown, can- 
:not manifest itself through the known. In other words, 
the falsity of the Leibnizian intuition that the fundamenta- 
constituents of the universe, although unknowable, are no 
less fundamental for that, is not entailed by any of the 
claims of transcendental idealism. If the Leibnizian 
position is interpreted as an argument to the effect that 
whatever kind of entity is discovered to be the basic 
stuff cc the universe, it is to be regarded as the basic 
- 50 - 
'stuff' until something more fundamental than it is dis- 
covered, then, we can construe the unconditioned, e.g. 
atoms, monads, point centers of influence, as knowable; 
Point centers of influence (say) are ontologically un- 
conditioned and there exists nothing more fundamental 
in terms of which they can be explained while they 
explain the being of everything that is. The following 
passage from CPR reveals Kant's thinking about his own 
theory to be based on such a grasp of knowledge and being: 
"The absolutely inward (nature) of matter, as it 
would have to be conceived by pure understanding, 
is nothing but a phantom; for matter is not among 
the objects of pure understanding, and the trans - 
:cendental object which may be the ground of this 
appearance that we call matter is a mere some- 
thing of which we should not understand what is 
is, even if someone were in a position to tell 
us. For we can understand only that which 
brings with it, in intuition, something corres- 
:ponding to our words. If by the complaints - 
that we have hó insight whatsoever into the inner 
(nature) of things - it be meant that we cannot 
conceive by pure understanding what the things 
which appear to us may be in themselves, they 
are entirely illegitimate and unreasonable. For 
what is demanded is that we should be able to 
know things, and therefore intuit them, without 
senses, and therefore that we should have a 
faculty of knowledge altogether different from 
the human Through observation and analysis 
of appearances we penetrate to nature's inner 
recesses .... But with all this knowledge, and 
even if the whole of nature were revealed to us, 
we should still never be able to answer those 
transcendental questions which go beyond nature. 
The reason of this is that'it is not given to us 
to observe our own mind with any other intuition 
than that of inner sense; and that it is precisely 
in the mind that the secret of the source of our 
sensibility is located. The relation of sens- 
:ibility to an object and what the transground of 
this (objective) unity may be, are matters so 
deeply concealed that we, who after all know even 
ourselves only through inner sense and therefore 
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as appearance, can never be justified in treat- 
ing sensibility as being a suitable instrument 
of investigation for discovering anything save 
always still other appearances - eager as we yet 
are to explore their non -sensible cause." 
(A277 -A278 = B333 -B334) 
The divorce between the realms of knowledge and 
being is an outcome of transcendental idealism and the 
result of this separation is a positive scepticism with 
respect to our knowledge of the world, we can only have 
knowledge of appearances, not things in themselves. So 
the transcendental object is interpreted as an ideal 
object of knowledge rather than a real object. By.dis- 
:tinguishing the existence of objects in representations 
from their existence simpliciter, Kant in effect creates 
two autonomous realms, knowledge and being. In the 
section entitled 'Transition to the Transcendental Deduc- 
tion of the Categories', Kant states that there are only 
two theories of the relation between representations and 
objects: 
"There are two possible ways in which synthetic 
representations and their objects can estab- 
:lish connections, obtain necessary relation 
to one another, and, as it were, meet one 
another. Either the object alone must make 
the representation possible, or the repre- 
:sentation alone must make the object possible. 
In the former case, this relation is only 
empirical and the representation is never 
possible a priori. This is true of appear- 
ances, as regards that in them which belongs 
to sensation. In the latter case, represen- 
:tation in itself does not produce its object 
insofar as existence is concerned, for wd 
are not here speaking of causality by means 
of the will. None the less the representa- 
:tion is a priori determinant of the object, 
if it be the case that only through the rep - 
:resentation is it possible to know anything 
as an object." (A92 = 24 -125) 
0 
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Either our representations are as they are because their 
objects are (concepts conform to objects) or, the represen- 
:tations or something about the representations determine 
the kind of object it is possible for there to be represen- 
:ted (objects conform to concepts). If it is true that 
the knowledge we have of objects is limited to and 
concepts (representations) then it follows a fortiori that 
concepts determine what is to count as objects. This 
relation, as Kant admits, is an epistemological one, having 
no bearing on the existence of objects. Kant would argue 
that this simply means the only knowledge it is possible 
to have a priori is knowledge with respect to the structural 
or formal characteristics of objects, i.e. the defining 
features of objects. And that is equivalent to the claim 
that we can only know objects as we represent them, not as 
they exist simpliciter. Now two separate claims are 
implied by this:(1) A priori knowledge of the existence of 
objects ±.s impossible for discursive intellects such as 
ours; humans do not possess intellectual intuition. (2) 
Knowledge of objects as existing outside our representa- 
tions is not possible; we can never know objects as exis- 
:ting simpliciter. Constrained by a theory of objects 
according to which objects are interpreted as ultimately 
(transcendentally), a species of representations, Kant can 
make no dogmatic or positive claims about things existing 
outside our representations. But representations are not 
self- objectifying, so to speak, that is, they cannot them- 
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:selves provide explanatory grounds for their objectivity; 
Kant re- interprets the dogmatic claim with respect to things 
simpliciter in terms which are neither dogmatic nor sceptical, 
by postulating a putative object = X, a something which must 
be thought as the object of representations. The thought of 
the putative object = X confers necessity upon our represen- 
:tations, and provides the constraint which is the criterion 
for distinguishing subjective from objective representations. 
Again, the necessity is epistemic, required solely for the 
cognitive apprehension of "objects ", thereby disengaging 
the whole question of the existence of a transcendental 
object corresponding to our representations from the general 
problem of determining the objectivity of objects. Nothing 
more 'concrete' than a putative object is required to 
guarantee objectivity so long as conceptual necessity remains 
the essential criterion thereof. The existential status of 
the transcendental object is bracketed, or neutralised, with 
respect to the problem of establishing the objectivity of 
representations, a de- ontologizing slide legitimized by the 
correlative ontological bracketing of objects as existing 
simpliciter. Kant's thesis that phenomenal or empirical 
objects exist only in representations requires the postula- 
:tion of an ontologically neutral kind of object - the 
transcendental object. Kant can only neutralise questions 
pertaining to the ontological status of the transcendental 
object, he cannot and does not, claim that such questions 
can be answered only negatively. Here, at this juncture, 
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we can see clearly the tension in Kant's thought created 
by the workings of two different tendencies, the phenomenalist 
and the realist. Kant's phenomenalism underlies his epis- 
:temological thesis that conceptual necessity is the essen- 
tial criterion of objectivity while his realism seems to 
be aligned with the ontological thesis that objects may 
(= transcendentally) exist simpliciter from the perspective 
of the possibility of knowledge, i.e. by talking only about 
our representations and bracketing the world of material 
things (while acknowledging their physical appearance) into 
the representations. 
The spectre of the thought of the transcendental 
object is lurking in the pages of the 'Analytic' when it 
is not explicitly discussed. In the A Deduction Kant had 
said that the unity which the thought of the transcendental 
object made necessary amongst representations is logically 
equivalent to the formal unity of consciousness, or in 
plain verse, to knowing the object: "....the unity which 
the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the 
formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the mani- 
:fold of representations. It is only when we have thus 
produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition that 
we are in a position to say that we know the object." 
(A105: emphasis mine) In the B Deduction the concept of an 
object in general becomes the format for the categories, 
the latter being specifications of the concept of the 
transcendental object = X. Instead of anchoring the 
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categorial specifications to representations in the way 
that the transcendental object brought unity to the rep - 
:resentations in the A Deduction, Kant drops the phen- 
omenalist idiom altogether and replaces it with a defini- 
:tion of the concepts of objects in general in terms of 
the possibility of experience. This has been regarded as 
the core of Kant's critical philosophy, its truly original 
center. But how successful is it? Consider: Are not 
the conditions of possible experience provided in the B 
Deduction equivalent to the conditions, in the A Deduc- 
:tion's phenomenalist language, which function as criteria 
for objecthood - that the object exist in our representa- 
:.tions .(= being in space and time and subject to pure 
concepts)? In other words, is it not the case that, in 
Kant's theoretical programme, to be an object possessing 
features which any comprehensible object must have, is 
just to be an object existing in representations? Witness 
how the replacement of the appropriate words in this B 
Deduction passage produces the A Deduction account: "Our 
conclusion therefore is this: the categories, as yielding 
knowledge of things,have no kind of application, save 
only in regard to things which may be objects of possible 
experience." (B147 = B148) And the suggested rewording: 
'the pure concepts, as yielding knowledge of things exis- 
ting 'simpliciter, have no kind of application, save only 
in regard to things as they exist in representations'. 
The point of this exercise is to show that Kant's attempt 
in the B.Deduction to provide a logical account of the 
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possibility of experience presupposes the fundamental 
question of the foundations of objectivity no less than 
the apparently pre -critical A Deduction does. 'Kant him- 
:self intimates this when he states: "How they (the 
categories) make experience possible and what are the 
principles of the possibility of experience that they 
supply in their application to appearances..." (B167) In 
this same passage we find a restatement of the possible 
relations between objects and their representations (dis- 
:cussed a few pages back); the terms 'objects' and 'rep - 
:resentations' are now replaced by the terms 'experience' 
and 'concepts' respectively confirming that the argument 
has been recast in terms of the central guiding notion 
of the possibility of experience: "There are only two ways 
in which we can account for a necessary agreement of 
experience with the concepts of its objects: either 
experience makes these concepts possible or these concepts 
make experience possible...there remains therefore only the 
second supposition....n.amely, that the categories contain, 
on the side of the understanding, the grounds of the 
possibility of all experience in general." (B166 -B167) 
(last emphasis mine). 
It may be considered arguable that Kant's logical 
account of the conditions for a possible experience is 
embedded in the context of the grounds of objectivity; it 
has been argued, for example, that the B Deduction argument 
concerns judgments, not representations or even concepts. 
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And the conditions required for the possibility of making 
judgments can be derived from the single assumption of an 
intersubjective world - the world of experience, the real 
domain of judgments. Notions such as the world as it 
exists in representings and the world as it exists 
simpliciter are nothing but metaphysical fancies. There 
is only one world, the common, intersubjective world of 
experience. This argument has much to recommend it, but 
it leaves unexplained the fundamental problem which any 
theory of a priori concepts must address itself to, viz. 
the relation between the a priori concepts and experience. 
A system of a priori concepts in terms of which objectivity 
is defined, whether it be in the form of the 'unity of 
representations' or 'judgments of experience', must provide 
for an explanation of the relation between what is a priori 
(thought) and what is not (reality). This is thD problem 
of the foundations of objectivity and it is a problem which 
lies at the heart of Kant's philosophy. In this section 
I have tried to show, by concentrating on Kant's treatment 
of the transcendental object, that both the so- called 
psychologistic account of the A Deduction and the logical 
account of the B Deduction, represent two attempts at 
resolving that problem. Kant's notion of the transcendental 
object acquires the function of a fulcrum, so to speak, of 
the basically Kantian contrast between material things as 
existing in representations and material things as existing 
simpliciter. Although the contrast assumes different formal 
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expression - the idiom of phenomenalism and the idiom of 
judgment - it is a contrast which is sustained throughout 
Kant's struggle with the whole issue of objectivity. The 
notion of the transcendental object is an important one, 
Kemp Smith's disparaging comments notwithstanding. In 
CPR Kant claims to have provided an account of the world 
of everyday experience - the empirically real world - which 
is both undogmatic and unsceptical. He does so by arguing 
that the world of our experience is the world which fits 
out categorial framework; Kant doesn't argue for this 
directly; he just assumes its truth since nothing could 
ever be experienced which didn't agree with our categorial 
framework. And if nothing could ever be experienced which 
didn't agree with our categorial framework, then we need 
not distinguish the world as we experience it and the world. 
It is cognitive nonsense to talk of two such worlds when 
our categorial.framework provides for the possibility of - 
just this one world. Thus does Kant build into his cogiplex 
argument the compulsion that the world as we come to know it 
through judgment is actually the world as its exists 
simpliciter. His arguments based on conceptual necessity 
lend strong support to this ploy. Only the notion of the 
transcendental object provides the clue to this, for it 
could be interpreted as follows: for the purposes of 
knowledge, the formal predicates of the world of our 
experience can be shown to be tied to our modes of ex- 
periencing - hence transcendental necessity; from the 
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perspective of things themselves, something not tied to our 
mode of experiencing, that is, something which is the source 
of the things themselves, must be postulated. This some- 
:thing is the transcendental object which from the point of 
view of knowledge can only be regarded as a concept. 
10 The arguments of the preceding sections were meant 
to expose the precise nature of the problem which, I 
contend, lies at the heart of Kant's philosophical enter- 
prise. In closing this chapter, I want to lend some 
plausibility to this claim by placing the problem as it 
relates to Kant's system in the context of a more general 
philosophical problem. 
The fundamental problem of transcendental idealism 
is that, while it provides an account of the possibility of 
knowledge of things, it lacks the explanatory power to 
provide an account of the possibility of things. Accord- 
ing to Kant's version of transcendental idealism anything 
which satisfies the conditions of the knowability of an 
object is a possible object. Of all possible objects 
those are actual which are given in intuition or are 
connected with what is given in intuition. But, if an 
object must satisfy certain a priori conditions to be 
knowable, then, there must be one or more characteristics 
about the object in virtue of which the object satisfies 
the requisite conditions. Recent Kant interpretation 
has tended to play down the ontological implications of 
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transcendental idealism in favour of more analytic enter - 
:prises. Thus, textual materials from CPR which are 
essential building blocks for a reconstructed theory of 
objectivity have been ex' ci_sed from the general discussion 
of Kant's theory of experience as unworthy of serious phil- 
:osophical consideration. Such an approach is inadequate 
for understanding the complexities of the Kantian theory of 
experience. As I understand it, the central, controlling 
position of this theory is the emphasis it places on the 
co- operation between thought about objects and the objects 
thought about in what we know as experience, or, to under - 
:line the active mode of thought, in what is cognized as 
experience, what is taken to be the common world of object - 
:ive fact including the world of science. The necessities 
found in experience thus conceived are, according to the 
analytic interpretation, necessities which are conceptual; 
which is to say that they apply to our thinking about the 
world and the objects in it. Intuitional material (= the 
given) conforms to the structure of thought which is deter - 
:mined and specified by the categorial necessities. And 
it is at this juncture that there arises some questions 
which need. to be asked in a non -cursory fashion: How is 
it that what is given in intuition is so amenable to, so 
conveniently fits, the specifications (= the categories) 
of the thought structure? I am not asking the rather 
spurious question as to how or why what is given in 
intuition can be thought at all, but why the given meets 
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the specifications prescribed. The overall significance 
of this question can be grasped when we consider that, 
within the context of Kant's theoretical framework, only 
one kind of object actually does meet the specifications 
laid down by the categories. This is the kind of object 
which falls under the predicate 'is a material object' 
and since the objects falling under this predicate exhaust 
that class of objects satisfying the conditions for poss- 
ible objects of experience, only material objects are 
possible objects of experience. Living organisms, moral 
agents and fundamental entities postulated by science, 
are eliminated as possible objects of experience. 
The question which I have raised is part of a 
broader philosophical problem with respect to the nature 
of thought and reality, a problem which some thinker; have 
demoted to the stockpile of pseudo philosophical problems. 
Do the categorial concepts which wo employ in thinking 
about reality determine reality or are our basic cate- 
gorial concepts, if not wholly determined by reality, 
set in motion_by it? Is reality, in other words, a 
catalyst for our conceptual specifications? Let us 
imagine the natural world to be occupied by entities 
radically different in kind from those we know; what 
grounds would there be for supposing that we would possess 
a set of categorial concepts which would enable us to 
understand this world? If one replies (as I would) that 
no such grounds could be given, then, it would be difficult 
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to avoid the conclusion that, were our subsequent exper- 
ience in this changed world to prove quite different from 
our experience in this world, it would not be because of 
any change in our categorial concepts but because of the 
changed world. The point of this little thought experiment 
is this. Does language reflect the world of objective 
reality or does language as semantics and as a cultural 
and social force determine what we are to classify as the 
facts? In Kantian terminology: Is thought constitutive 
or merely regulative? Kant's whole critical programme 
can be viewed as a long involved story of how what we can 
know is limited by what we think. The knowable must fall 
within the bounds of the thinkable. Kant argues that the 
necessities involved in our experience are the necessities 
in our concepts of things, i.e. in the way that we think 
about things. This being the case we should want to know 
why these concepts involved necessity and in particular, 
whence this necessity is derived. If it is true that 
garden variety objects like tables and chairs must be 
thought as spatial and temporal particulars, then we must 
inquire whether this necessity in our thinking about things 
is due to the things thought about or whether it belongs 
to, or derived from, the nature of thought itself. Kant's 
answer is that the necessities are part of the structure 
of thought, or more precisely, part of the structure of 
the thinking subject, and insofar as we must conceptualize 
things in just this way if they are to be comprehensible, 
the necessities can be understood as aspects of our forms 
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of representation. The.world must be like this because 
this is what our concepts are like. 
The claim that the world appears to us as our con- 
cepts entitle us to represent it, is a claim about the 
grounds of objectivity, that the grounds of objectivity 
are found in thought about objects and not in the objects 
themselves. I am arguing that this separation of the 
nature of objects from our thought about them requires an 
explanation for it entails, as I have already mentioned, the 
claim that the realm of knowledge is disengaged from the realm 
of being. If transcendental idealism is considered as an 
epistemological theii s only then i nwer 
falls short of this problem. 
A transcendental realist, i.e. someone who asserts 
that the necessities involved in experience are in the 
world or in material things as existing simpliciter does 
have an explanatory thesis with respect to the relation 
between knowledge and its object, to wit, that the necessi- 
:ties which seem to characterize our thinking about objects 
are not conceptual in origin. A modern transcendental 
realist identifies necessities in our experience with the 
physical properties of material things and provides an 
analysis of the physical nature of objects in terms of 
dispositional properties of objects. Without certain 
physical properties material objects would not be what 
they are; their essences define their natures. What is 
Kant's answer to this requirement? Interpreters who see 
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Kant in a wholly analytic light have no answer to this pr_ob- 
:lem. Their position seems to be this. The nature of 
things insofar as this can be discovered at all, is deter- 
:mined by the nature of our concepts. There is a very. 
strong link between how things are and how we think and speak 
about things, so strong in fact, that if our categorial 
concepts were different then things would not appear to us 
as they do. But this only poses the further problem of 
why it is that facts about the world and about the nature 
of things (even if these are only structural) can be had 
from what we know of our conceptual scheme. Why should 
our categorial concepts specify the objects to which they 
are applicable? And this seems to be Kant's own question, 
'How is a priori knowledge possible ?' We want to know 
what it is about our conceptual structure which gives it 
this constitutive power. How are the minimum conditions 
for knowledge laid down by the categories net, if they are 
met? If the relation between thought and reality is any - 
:thing like Kant and those who follow him maintain it is, 
then discoveries concerning the nature of thought are very 
likely to tell us something about the nature of reality. 
I am not alone in thinking that the relation is problematic 
and that Kant's answer is unsatisfactory as it stands. 
Humbert Schwyzer, in an article concerned with some compar- 
isons between the metaphysics of Kant and Wittgenstein, 
notes but does not follow up, the failure of so- called 
conceptual analysts to come to grips with this problem: 
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"However, I have the impression that, 
by and large, those contemporary 
analytic philosophers other than 
Wittgenstein who find the appeal 
to how we speak relevant and import - 
:tant, do not in any clear way at 
least, see themselves as Copernican 
Revolutionaries;.... They too often 
regard their work simply as "conceptual 
analysis" and, I fear, conveniently put 
aside any question as to the relation 
of concepts to objects, of thought to 
reality." 
Towards the end of Part I of Bounds of Sense, Strawson 
addresses himself to just this question. There he asks 
whether or not the basic Kantian formulation that our 
conception of experience and its limits is determined "by 
our capacities ", is a feasible one. If the answer is 
that it is not, then what alternative explanation can be 
offered? It would seem that Strawson's answer is that 
the question itself is gratuitous: "To this I can only 
reply that I see no reason why any such high doctrine 
should be necessary here.... There is nothing here to demand, 
or permit, an explanation such as Kant's." 
Kant's explanation, which we have seen is essential 
to his whole critical programme, is to ground the relation 
between thought and reality in the nature of the thinking 
subject and by means of transcendental necessity - hence what 
I shall call the theory of transcendental objectivity. This, 
at least, is the explanation provided by the CPR; as we 
shall see shortly, Kant's conception of moral agency, his 
very conception of freedom and reason, and his conception 
of living organisms, reduce his theory of objectivity to 
at best a partial truth. 
Chapter II 
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Freedom and Reason: Ontology 
"Reason/ in Kant's philosophy,is 
essentially free; freedom is 
essentially rational; and both 
consist ultimately in spontaneity. "l 
The purpose of Chapter I is to provide an interpretation 
of transcendental idealism with respect to the problem of 
objectivity. The central thesis of transcendental idealism 
is that the foundations of objectivity lie in the nature of 
the subject.; it is this claim which creates problems for 
Kant's system. If objectivity is defined in terms of the 
nature of subjectivity then our ontology shall be limited 
to and by, the forms of the knowing subject. This amounts 
to permanently locating our ontological perspective within 
the domain of the knowable created by the conditions of 
human subjectivity. 
In this chapter I waist to show a specific ontological 
problem which arises as a result of Kant's theory of object - 
:ivi.tY. Both in this chapter and the following one I shall 
be concerned to show that there are at least two kinds of 
entities which cannot be accounted for by transcendental 
idealism, namely, moral agents endowed with the power of 
spontaneity and living things or organisms. The latter, 
as discussed by Kant in the Critique of Judgment, is the 
subject of Chapter III. 
Kant's distinction between the noumenal and the 
phenomenal is usually regarded as being essential to his 
moral philosophy. Whereas reason in its theoretical 
employment is governed by the category of causality in the 
world of phenomena, reason in its practical mode must allow 
for the possibility of a freely acting self who stands out - 
:side the sequence of conditioned events. Unfortunately, 
Kant's attempt to provide a theoretical account of how 
reason can manifest itself as both conditioned and free 
makes a mockery of our actual moral experience. John 
Silber, whose writings on Kant's moral philosophy I follow 
in this chapter, has argued persuasively that Kant's moral 
philosophy would have to be deemed a failure if it could 
not explain the simplest of moral experiences.2 I should 
emphasize at this point that it is not part of my purpose 
to pursue the intricacies of Kant's moral and ethical 
doctrines but to develop an argument to the effect that 
Kant's conceptions of freedom and rationality require r 
genuine ontological. underpinning. 
It is often said that freedom is necessary for the 
possibility of moral obligation. This is true for obliga- 
tion presupposes responsibility and responsibility pre- 
:supposes freedom. In accounting for the experience of 
moral obligation, that is, of a person in the noumenal 
realm being tempted by his self in the natural world, Kant 
argues that the moral self as it exists in the noumenal realm 
is timeless and therefore not affected by the series of 
prior causally conditioned events while regarding it as the 
timeless cause of the self's action in the natural world. 
(cf. A550 =B578 - A553 =B581) The noumenal agency of the 
self somehow brings about the series of causally conditioned 
events without actually interfering with them. Nothing 
in the natural world is changed by the noumenal free causes 
and since our moral decisions belong to the free noumenal 
realm, they are thus rendered saperfluouswith respect to 
events in the phenomenal world. However, essential to 
the very conception of human action is the idea that through 
action we can and do change the course of events in the 
natural world, interfering with the natural order of things 
to create a series of events which would otherwise not have 
occurred. Kant's conception of the interaction of the 
self as existing in the noumenal realm and the self in the 
phenomenal realm thus totally fails to account for our 
moral experience. Furthermore, by designating the noumenal 
realm as the proper domain of moral volition and then mak- 
:ing the noumenal timeless, Kant makes nonsense of what is 
apparently the most obvious and significant aspect of moral 
experience, its temporality. We are tempted by desires 
which are either resisted or succumbed to in time; decisions 
are taken by the power of the will, and the subsequent 
satisfaction or guilt felt, in time. "The pilgrim's and 
the rakds progress are, as the word "progress" indicates, 
thoroughly temporal adventures. "3 
Kant's bifurcation of the realm of being into the 
phenomenal and the noumenal arises from the theoretical 
requirement of resolving the problem of freedom and deter - 
:minism in the 'Third Antinomy'. Kant's "solution" would 
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place him, I should think, in the camp of the compatibilists. 
The freedom of human action is compatible with the in prin- 
ciple determinism of human behaviour in the phenomenal world; 
freedom, Kant thought, is itself a kind of causality, a 
causality of the will which is uncaused or has no antecedent 
determinants. Insofar as freedom gives rise to action, man 
is free; but human action must be expressed in the phenomenal 
world in which it is regarded as an effect of the free 
causality of the will and thus describable in the language 
of determinism as are all events in the phenomenal world. 
To place the. free causality of the will in the noumenal 
realm is equivalent to making all decisions, acts of 
volition, excruciating moral dilemmas timeless wonders of 
parallel worlds whose interaction Kant does not postulate. 
Where the noumenal ends, the phenomenal begins; Kant can - 
:not allow for the possibility of interaction between an 
uncaused cause and a caused cause because of his commitment 
to the deterministic world of CPR. The interaction that 
Kant supposes he has postulated is no more than formal or 
epistemological which is just to say that there is no real 
interaction between ontologically distinct realms. But 
as we have seen this is what is required if the facts of 
moral experience are to be explained. To have the power 
to act is to have the power to interfere with, to alter the 
natural world in some way. This power separates us from 
the natural world in kind; to act is to witness the 
genuine interaction of one ontological realm with another. 
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The 'Third Antinomy' simply exposes the problem of 
reconciling freedom in the noumenal realm with determinism 
in the phenomenal realm, but offers no explanation. How 
is it possible that one and the same event can be the 
effect of a free cause and a causally conditioned event 
at the same time? A.C. Ewing has noted the almost 
Pickwickian nature of Kant's supposed solution: 
"What is easier to say than that the self 
as thing -in- itself or noumenon is free, 
and as phenomenon determined by natural 
causality in all its actions. At first 
sight, at any rate, this solution seems 
to come perilously near to being what 
Mr. Sidgwick described the solution of 
the third antinomy as tending to become, 
that is, an explanation by saving that 
'we may also suppose an unknown relation 
to an unknown entity, which is not a 
phenomenon, which might afford the re- 
:quired explanation if we only knew it.'4 
What is really damaging to Kant's solution in the 'Third 
Antinomy' is that even if we accepted the thesis that the 
noumenal and the phenomenal worlds existed independently 
of each other hut nonetheless harmoniously so that freely 
willed decisions and causally conditioned events always 
agree, the degree to which this thesis is out of touch 
with our actual experience and fails to account for that 
experience, ultimately requires us to reject it. This 
objection also holds good against another interpretation 
of the phenomena -noumena problem, viz. that it is possible 
to construct different conceptual frameworks within which 
to explain events, with different principles used to 
explain those events in each framework, thereby preserving 
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the meaning of actions originating in the noumenal realm 
and events taking effect in the phenomenal realm. Davidson 
advances this kind of Kantian solution; he states "...We 
explain a man's free actions (by) accounts of intentional 
behaviour (which) operate in a conceptual framework re- 
:moved from the direct reach of physical law by describing 
both cause and effect, reason and action, as aspects of a 
portrait of a human agent. "5 But recourse to different 
contexts of meaning can at most explain the possibility of 
providing different descriptions of human action or physical 
events, that, is, it is an attempt to show that freedom and 
determinism are compatible and that the idea of imputing 
different levels of meaning to one and the same event is 
an idea which has cognitive content. What needs explain - 
:ing however, is the real compatibility of the noumenal 
with the phenomenal in light of our moral experience; the 
whole point is that the real possibility of, say, the 
experience of moral obligation (which Kant, incidentally, 
called the one fact of pure reason) rests on the genuine, 
and not merely conceptual, coming together of ontologically 
distinct worlds. It is worth quoting Ewing once again here 
for he is most perceptive in discerning the failure of 
Kant's solution: 
"It is because he makes a mechanical or 
quasi -mechanical causality universal 
among phenomena that he has to separate 
the noumenal from the phenomenal so 
completely, as the timeless from the 
temporal. The awkwardness and obscurity 
of Kant's solution comes, no doubt, partly 
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from the difficulties of the subject, 
but also from the fact that, because 
he supposed the only kind of necessity 
to be quasi- mechanical, he regarded 
himself as having proved in the 
Transcendental Analytic not only necess- 
:ity but also 'natural' (quasi -mechanical) 
necessity to be universally valid among 
phenomena and was consequently only able 
to secure freedom in another, non -temporal 
sphere, totally alien to the world in 
which we live. "6 
I must add here that, though Ewing is right, he may be so 
for the wrong reasons. For Kant does try to argue the 
case for providing a purely teleological explanation of 
phenomena, in the 'Dialectic' of CPR and the CoJ. What 
Kant really seems to be seeking an explanation for is the 
grounds of the whole world -order, grounds which he realizes 
must lie in the unconditioned and Kant always conceived of 
the unconditioned as necessarily supersensible and often 
theological in nature. He argues that reason is disposed 
to follow through the entire series of conditioned things 
until it reaches the unconditioned (and ideal) source of 
all conditioned things which is then hypostatized as the 
real (=ontological) ground of the world -order (from which 
all systematic unity is derived). It is true that Kant 
regards this "purposive unity" of things as a "merely" 
regulative principle of reason, by which Kant means that 
it has no objective validity, but it is also true, as I 
try to show in Ch. 5, that this is the ultimate explanation 
of the order of the world and'that the explanation express - 
:ed through the doctrine of transcendental idealism is 
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contingently true, i.e. its truth comes to depend.not on 
the falsity of any explanation based on knowledge Of the 
unconditioned, but, on our failure to attain to that know - 
:ledge. If Kant's objections to the concept of the:.tn- 
:conditioned and his objections to ascribing explaiatory 
power to such a concept, can be shown to be a result of 
some of his own mistaken notions -such as, the uncondition- 
:ed is supersensible, or noumenal - then, it might become 
a fully respectable philosophical concept. 
Since the experience of moral obligation pre - 
:supposes the freedom to act (freedom of the WillküÍ), and 
freedom is the expression of man's ultimate spontaneity 
through the actions of the Willk.r, the fact that moral 
experience is temporal and phenomenal, establishes once and 
for all man's involvement in the noumenal and phenomenal 
orders at the same time. The fact of moral obligation 
demands the recognition of the objective reality of more 
than one kind of ontological entity. 
2, Kant's conception of freedom is the key structuring 
idea of his theory of personality. As such, freedom is 
seen to be much more than a formal requirement for the 
possibility of moral action which pure rational beings 
must possess. Freedom defined as a rational requirement 
for action only, as Kant realized, loses all meaning. It 
is only for beings who are both rational and sensible, that 
is, beings who have to choose to either actualize their 
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power of free- willing or to deny that power by acting as 
if their desires or inclinations were the sole determinants 
of their action, that freedom can be a reality rather than 
a mere illusion of itself. Through the moral law (the 
'ought indelibly carved in the heart of every human being) 
we become aware of our power to act in defiance of our 
desires, or, in spite of them, to act as we think we ought. 
This does not mean, as moral philosophers commenting on 
Kant's work have so mistakeably understood it to mean, 
that desires and inclinations have no motivational influ- 
ence upon human action; it is an assertion of our freedom 
to decide for ourselves, to determine ourselves. what desires 
or inclinations shall effect us. In effect, Kant argues 
that those effects which determine one's behaviour are 
themselves ultimately determined one's self L f al , not 
merely through one's self conceived as determined by its 
own nature. This is the essence of Kant's conception of 
transcendental freedom, the freedom to act independently 
of all antecedent conditions including the determining 
conditions of one's own nature. And freedom thus con- 
ceived is the expression of Ebsolute spontaneity, the power, 
with respect to action, to choose, even if it is only to 
choose which effects will determine one's behaviour. It 
is the power, in the context of Kant's theory of the will, 
of the Willkür to choose between alternatives. 
To act as transcendentally free beings is to realize 
the power of spontaneity which we possess ( "There is in man 
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a power of self- determination... "). (A534 =B562) It is in 
virtue of a man's capacity for genuinely free .(= uncondition- 
:ed) action that he is able to secure for himself the know- 
ledge that he is distinct from mechanistic and determinis- 
tic life forms. And assuming this to be the case, that 
power in individuals which is the source of their freedom 
might be expected to be the distinguishing feature of their 
natures. Indeed, Kant regards spontaneity as that possess- 
:ion of the mind which entitles us to call ourselves 
intelligences (í3158n). Spontaneity is the defining onto- 
:logical feature of the self serving even as the root of 
synthesis, that "blind but indispensable function of the 
soul...." (A78= B103). Synthesis, an apparently inscrut- 
:able power ascribed to the imagination, is the mode of 
expression for the self's spontaneity at Lhe level of 
judgment or theoretical reason; "But if this manifold is 
to be known, the spontaneity of our thought re Mires that 
it be gone through in a certain way, taken up, and connect 
:ed. This act I name synthesis." (A77 =B102) (First 
emphasis mine). Kant's failure to provide an epistemologi- 
cal basis for the power of synthesis, that is,-his failure 
to offer a categorial explanation of its presence in 
thought (the 'act' of thought) is equivalent to Kant's 
failure, rendered legitimate within the context of trans- 
:cendental idealism, to account for our awareness of ourselves 
as original, spontaneous beings. To provide such an 
account, would be to purport to explain an unconditioned 
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power, manifestly conflicting with the requirements of 
categorial -conditioned knowledge. Paradoxically, an ex- 
:planation of the dynamics of reason in producing cate- 
:gorially- conditioned knowledge cannot be secured unless 
the requirements of categorially - determined knowledge are 
ignored. Spontaneity cannot be left unexplained, for it 
is the ontological foundation of both reason and freedom; 
reason, in both its theoretical and practical aspects would 
be inconceivable without spontaneity. To demonstrate this, 
I shall consider Kant's conception of the two basic ways 
that transcendental freedom can be expressed, namely, heter- 
:onomously and autonomously.7 
Heteronomous action is an actualization of our trans - 
:cendental freedom no less than autonomous action. To act 
heteronomously is to choose to act according to those des - 
:ires or inclincations which are strongest. Although the 
individual has himself proposed his object of volition and 
determined it in the act of selecting it as the material 
or content of his volitional object, in heteronomous action 
the individual chooses to act as if this were not the case, 
i.e. as if he were compelled to act in accordance with his 
strongest desires. As Silber says: "He thinks of himself 
passively as if he were determined by laws other than those 
of his own choosing; he acts as if he were determined by the 
same laws of nature that determine the behaviour of animals. "8 
There can be no denying that to regard one's self as subject 
to a law governing the behaviour of animals is to choose to 
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regard one's self as such; thus, one freely decides to 
adopt a heteronomous expression of transcendental freedom. 
However, when one freely decides to act heteronomously, 
one is freely taking a decision to regard oneself as unfree, 
unable to act independent of desires and wants, thus freely 
choosing to act as if one were not free at all. In the 
very act through which one's radical independence from 
external conditions is affirmed, one chooses to act as if 
one possessed no such independence at all. Every hetero- 
:nomous act represents a loss - an abnegation - of one's 
freedom. 
Of course, if heteronomous action was the only mode 
of realizing transcendental freedom then the latter would 
be no more than an illusion. The power to act autonomously, 
i.e. to act against the flow of desires and wants and there - 
:by establish one's independence from them, must be a real 
possibility. In acting autonomously, one expresses the 
unconditionedness of one's nature as a free and rational 
being, for one positively wills to act in accordance with 
a maxim that can rationally be a maxim for all willing 
beings such as oneself. To base one's action on a 
universal maxim such as this is not only to affirm one's 
independence from external conditions, it is to express as 
well one's essential rationality. To act on the basis of 
a universal maxim is the one and only way of asserting one's 
independence from external conditions; but to act in accord - 
:ance with such universality one must first determine maxims 
expressing it and such maxims can be determined only by 
the use of reason. Nor does action based upon universal 
maxims imply that an individual is no longer subject to the 
influence of desires or wants; desires and wants and 
inclinations are still part of the object of volition 
which willing involves, only the determination of the 
desires and wants is based on the universal maxim, in will - 
:ing an object on the basis of a universal maxim one freely 
chooses those desires and wants that will motivationally 
influence one. Likewise, one uses reason to determine 
maxims leading to heteronomous action; such maxims are 
based on inclinations and desires but nonetheless involve 
the use of reason in their formulation. Heteronomy and 
autonomy can thus be seen to be the two expressions of 
transcendental freedom and of the rationality of those 
possessing that freedom. Both reason and freedom are 
involved in action, either heteronomously and irrationally 
when one chooses to act against one's fundamental nature, 
or autonomously and rationally when one chooses to affirm 
one's nature (by the will's transcendence of desires and 
inclinations in the determination of universal maxims). 
Now, if heteronomous actions are no less an express - 
:ion of the freedom of one's nature then are automonous 
actions, and both involve the participation of reason in 
the adoption of maxims (to act solely from impulse would 
require the total eclipse of our rationality by our 
animality), then, heteronomy and autonomy represent the 
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two possible modes of expressing reason and freedom. 
Furthermore, actions involving the use of reason such as 
judging, creating, appreciating artistic works, are 
actions which express our essential spontaneity, the power 
of the mind to create, judge and appreciate artistic works. 
Reason, therefore, is itself free, that is, properly ex- 
:presses our power of spontaneity, and freedom, is itself 
rational. Ultimately, both are expressions of our fund - 
:amental natures the ontological core of which is spon- 
:taneity; freedom and reason are, through heteronomy and 
autonomy, spontaneity, supplying the structure and form 
for the latter's expression 
3. To provide some support for our claim that freedom 
and reason are grounded in spontaneity and that reason is 
free and freedom is rational,. we need only turn to the 
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. 
. (-Foundations) 
where Kant argues that validity with respect to judgments 
. presupposes the essential freedom of thought much as the 
experience of moral responsibility does. .If reason in 
its theoretical aspect is not free from causal condition - 
:ing then all grounds for deciding valid and invalid lines 
of reasoning would disappear. For, reason, if completely 
causally determined in its theoretical functions, could 
only follow the course of reasoning it was determined to 
take. We would thus be causally 'forced' to think in 
this way, indeed, we would not properly be thinking at all. 
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To think is just to create one's thoughts and arguments, 
or imaginings, and then to determine their validity against 
a standard. To formulate arguments the conclusions of 
which do not agree with the law of non- contradiction, 
leaves one susceptible to the charge of irrationality; on 
the basis that one was causally determined to formulate 
regularly arguments with conclusions not meeting the minimal 
standards of rationality set out by the law of non- contrad- 
:iction, one would, at worst, be thought to have been pro - 
:grammed irrationally. Thinking is thus seen to be thor- 
oughly free; our very conception of reason would be 
impossible without the supposition of its freedom. The 
creative nature of reason in its multifarious forms depends 
not simply on a freedom from external constraints, but 
more importantly, on a freedom for spontaneous creative 
thought. In the Foundations Kant states: "... all laws 
which are inseparably bound up with freedom hold for it 
(being who cannot act but under the idea of freedom -- JD) 
just as if its will were proved free in itself by theoretical 
philosophy. .... Now, we cannot conceive of a reason 
which consciously responds to a bidding from the outside 
with respect to its judgments, for then the subject would 
attribute the determination of its power of judgment not 
to reason but to an impulse. Reason must regard itself 
as the author of its principles, independently of foreign 
influences...." (par. 448) In the final analysis, theor- 
etical and practical reason are merely different applica- 
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:tions of one and the same reason the essential freedom of 
which is rooted in spontaneity. Just as in morality, the 
freedom to choose or not to choose is a presupposition of 
moral responsibility with respect to action, so in thought, 
the capacity to think freely is a necessary condition for 
regarding persons as responsible for what they think and 
therefore, as rational beings. In Kant's philosophy, 
freedom and reason are the two interlocking modes of ex- 
:pression of man's nature, and both are rooted in the power 
of spontaneity. 
It is at this point that the implications of Kant's 
theory that both freedom and reason are grounded in spon- 
:taneity become apparent. Spontaneity is the very essence 
of man's nature; it is what makes man the sort of being he 
is. Freedom and reason, as the two modes for expressing 
that spontaneity, are thus the fundamental manifestations 
of man's nature, that is, they are the form or structure 
which spontaneity requires. Freedom and reason, however, 
are themselves expressible only through action and / or 
judgment, that is,.through heteronomy and autonomy. Kant's 
conception of heteronomous and autonomous action supplies 
spontaneity with a structure that is derived from, and is 
expressive of, man's fundamental nature. And this is ex- 
:actly what Kant must provide for his argument would seem 
to imply that there is an ontological core to man's nature, 
and if there is an ontological core to our nature, then, 
there surely must be some specified way in which our 
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natures ought to be expressed; in order to retain and 
strengthen the freedom and reason we possess, therefore, 
we must affirm both by acting freely and rationally, and 
correspondingly, to fail or refuse to express our freedom 
and rationality in the ways it is possible for us to do so, 
is equivalent to denying what we are, leading to, through 
time, the destruction of our personalities. The most 
important normative principle introduced by Kant as a spec- 
ification of how we must act or will, is the moral law. 
Far from being a purely rational requirement for action, 
the moral law is shown to be integrated into the nature of 
the human personality itself. According to Kant's moral 
theory freedom and the moral law mutually imply one another. 
The moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom and free - 
:dom is the ratio'essendi of the moral law. Autonomous 
action is action done in accordance with the moral law, 
thereby making the moral law a prescription for self -ful- 
:fillment since it is through autonomy that one realize's 
one's potential as a free being. However, because the 
moral law is shown to be implied by freedom and thus a 
structural component of our free and rational nature, it is 
also open to one to choose to reject the unconditional 
moral law in heteronomous action. In so doing, one goes 
a step further in the destruction of one's personality 
while at the same time expressing one's free nature; one 
cannot escape one's transcendental freedom even in the 
course of denying it - to do so one would not be human, 
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not possess a free and rational nature. The most one can 
do is refuse the moral law, the law of our nature, and as 
this is equivalent to self -denial, there inevitably follows 
a diminishment of our freedom and rationality. Autonomous 
action is the means for the fulfillment of our nature, in 
and through autonomy we actualize our potential as free and 
rational beings; likewise, heteronomous action represents 
a denial of the means for the fulfillment of our natures 
and a rejection of its law, and continual denial leads to 
a personality which is starved,whose essential powers are 
dissipated over a period of time. 
What Kant's theory of personality, as I have des- 
cribed it, implies, is that since freedom and rationality 
express the law of our nature, anything less than the com-- 
:plete expression of our nature in autonomous action must, 
to greater and lesser degrees, involve the self -destruction, 
by gradual loss, of our personalities. A pattern of cont- 
:inous heteronomous action would lead to the complete 
abnegation of our powers of freedom and reason. In fact, 
Kant attempts to provide, in Religion Within the Limits of 
Reason Alone .(= Religion), an account of the effects on 
personality of the failure to act autonomously, or, the 
effects of a continuous series of heteronomous actions on 
the personality. Here, Kant offers a partial analysis of 
the will in terms of a theory of dispositions, so that, for 
the first time in Kant's writings, he can account for an 
enduring moral self that is affected through time by its 
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disposition towards good and evil action. In developing 
his conception of the will as a dispositional being, rather 
than a mere rational capacity exhausted in a single action, 
Kant provides the beginnings of a complete moral theory 
based on the ontological grounding of freedom and reason 
in spontaneity. 
In order to comprehend the implications of Kant's 
theory of the will as I have described it, for a Kantian 
theory of being, I want to refer to a discusion by 
Hintikka of the concept of a self -defeating action. 8A 
It is quite clear that the various kinds of self- defeating 
actions identified by Hintikka with respect to the Cartesian 
cogito are logically equivalent to the Kantian notion of 
self -destroying heteronomous actions. Briefly, Hintikka's 
analysis is a defense of the view that persons, as thinking 
beings, are susceptible to certain kinds of effects as a 
result of their ontological natures. Even within the 
context of epistemological or logical theories of the 
structure of action, persons ought not to be considered as 
ontologically neutral entities. Descartes' argument to 
the effect that cogito, ergo sum, if denied, involves not 
simply a suspension of thought and all that implies, but 
the destruction of one's very nature, i.e. man as thinking 
substance. The denial that my thinking and my being are 
essentially connected is an "existentially self -defeating 
performance ". As Hintikka says: 
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"....(Descartes) his ceasing to think 
would not only mean ceasing to be 
aware of his own existence; it would 
put an end to the particular way in 
which his existence was found to man - 
:ifest itself. To change the metaphor, 
ceasing to think would not be like 
closing one's eyes, Lut like putting out 
the lamp. For this reason, thinking 
was for Descartes something that could 
not be disentangled from his existence; 
it was the very essence of his nature." 
For Kant, not thinking as such, but freedom and rationality 
- the prior conditions for thought - are the essential 
"m nifestations" of man's nature. And as our free natures 
are actualized in action, action must, given Kant's argu- 
ment, be rationally structured with respect to the onto- 
:logical ground of spontaneity. Hence, heteronomous action 
over time is destructive of man's nature. 
By placing heteronomy and autonomy within the context 
of a theory of dispositions Kant can provide for the devel- 
opment of the personality inconiunction with the develop- - 
:ment of the moral life. Although Kant's own final 
solution to the problems arising because of his conception 
of freedom - such as the problem of forgiveness as discuss- 
ed by Silber 9 - is inadequate and demands changes in his 
conception of freedom as he originally formulated it, this 
leaves unaffected Kant's characterization of freedom and 
reason as expressive modes of our nature - spontaneity. 
The advantages of ascribing a dispositional nature to 
Willktr are obvious. Most important, Kant can give an 
explanation of good and evil, and variations anywhere 
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between these two, as moral predicates of human agents. 
On the grounds that one's moral nature is exhausted in a 
single action, any reasonable evaluation of one's moral 
worth is rendered impossible. Kant's actual presentation 
of his theory of the will in the Religion is meant to ex- 
:plain the intimate relationship of our transcendental 
freedom, the moral law - the law of our nature - and the 
fulfillment or gradual loss of personality. For the 
purposes of providing an analysis of the will in moral 
conflict, Kant separates the will into two parts: the 
Willkür, the power to choose between alternatives, and the 
Wille, the normative aspect of the will - the moral law - 
which presents the Willkür with the conditions for its self - 
fulfillment by acting autonomously and rationally. When 
presented with the moral law by the Wille, the'Willktir 
chóoses either to act in accordance with the condition for 
its own fulfillment or against that condition and suffer the 
consequent diminution of that very power which it actual - 
:izes in order to make the choice it is confronted with. 
By choosing to act in accordance with the condition for 
its fulfillment and actualize its free nature autonomously, 
the will, through the choice of the Willkür, becomes 
rational, and reason, which is here represented by the 
Wille, as the rational structure of its nature, becomes 
practical. The normative structure supplied by' Wille, is 
adopted freely by Willkür . Even though the' Willkür is 
free to choose to accept or reject the incentive of Wille 
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in the form of the moral law as the norm of action, the 
very possibility of the functioning of Willkar depends on 
a minimal consideration of the law presented to it by Wille. 
Again, without the necessity to consider the choice it ought 
to make in order to actualize its free nature, the very con - 
:cept of a free nature would be nonsense; if there is a 
freedom for then there must be a freedom against. Thus 
Kant: In seeking, therefore, the ground of the morally -evil 
in man, (we find that) sensuous' nature comprises too little, 
for when the incentives which can spring from freedom are 
taken away, man is reduced to a merely animal being:" 
'(Religion, p.3O) It is the interdependence of man's free - 
:dom and rationality which underlies the requirement that 
Wille supply an incentive for Willkfìr; no incentive would 
imply pure freedom, i.e. there would be nothing to be flee 
from, and such a concert of freedom is completely non - 
:rational. In other words, Kant's argument amounts to a 
claim that there is one and only one rational pattern for 
human action; as I have.said, accepting that the power of 
spontaneity is the ground of action, then, human action is 
structured as is this spontaneous power.. The structure of 
spontaneity is freedom and reason, including as these do, 
the choice to either destroy or preserve that structure 
with respect to man's nature; and to preserve that struc- 
:ture, i.e. to act in such a way that our actions will not 
be self- defeating, we must act in accordance with this 
pattern of action. In fact, Kant's argument proceeds 
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from an analysis of the will into Willkür and Wille to 
those conditions necessary for the successful functioning 
of the will, and, lastly, to the postulation of the moral 
law as the condition for the self- preserving functioning 
of the will. Kant again: "To conceive of oneself as a 
freely acting being and yet as exempt from the law which 
is appropriate to such a being (the moral law) would be 
tantamount to conceiving a cause operating without any laws 
whatsoever (for determination according to natural laws is 
excluded by the fact of freedom); this is a self-contra- 
:diction." (Religion, p.30) Kant conceives of an evil 
disposition in a person as a Willkür which continually 
chooses to reject or act against the incentive provided by 
the Wille. 10 Such a destructive pattern of action leads 
to the inevitable and at least, in principle, total loss 
of freedom; in such a person, no personality to speak of 
would be left, his nature would be that of an animal. 
Kant`s conception of morality, his notion of men as 
moral beings, can now be comprehended as derived from his 
theory of freedom and reason according to which they are 
interdependent and essential predicates of man's being. 
As supplying the structure of spontaneity, freedom and 
reason are the expressive modes of our natures as finite 
beings; by grounding freedom and reason in spontaneity and 
thus effecting their ontological interdependence, Kant 
can at least formulate the beginnings of an account of our 
real moral experience, an experience which is primarily 
characterized' by struggle and conflict. 
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4. If, as I have been arguing, freedom and reason in 
Kant's philosophy are rooted in the power of spontaneity, 
then an ontological interpretation must be provided for 
thé reciprocal activities of reason and freedom. For 
reason, both theoretical and practical, i.e. with respect 
to judgment and with respect to action, is dynamic and not 
merely logical. Kant recognized these two aspects of 
reason as early as Thé Inaugural' Dissertation (= ID) 11 
where he clearly distinguishes between the logical and real 
use of reason. Spontaneity, "the mind's power of produc- 
:ing representations from.itself" (A51 = B75), is the onto- 
:logical ground for the creative and dynamic use of reason 
in understanding, imagination, artistic appreciation, and 
morality. Kant leaves thé epistemological status of 
spontaneity as a power rooted in human subjectivity, 
ambiguous, but this is what we would expect. Kant's 
elaborate defense of his conception of reason and freedom 
comes to depend on the existence of areal source in terms 
of which Kant can provide at least a prima facie plausible 
account of the strùcture and powers he has attributed to 
these two essential. predicates of man's nature..., Spontaneity 
may be inscrutable but it is no less real for that. Un- 
fortunately for Kant, he is not allowed to simply grant 
that spontaneity is cognitively opaque but existentially 
real. Aside from the highly counter- intuitive flavour of 
characterizing something as manifesting itself as real 
while at the same time remaining inscrutable (that is, 
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entirely unknowable) to our cognitive capacities Kant is 
committed to remaining, at best, neutral with respect to 
the reality of anything lying outside the causal categorial 
framework. Spontaneity, as the source of the uncondition- 
: al law of cur nature and the source of the freedom essential 
to thought, is unconditioned. Accepting that Kant's model 
for causal order is the conception of a conditioned series, 
and that anything not causally ordered in this way becomes 
theoretically incomprehensible with respect to its reality, 
then, Kant's theoretical framework, controlled as it is by 
the epistemology of transcendental idealism, cannot-author- 
:ize the recognition of the reality of spontaneity. 
Furthermore, when we lay these two 'facts' of Kant's system 
side by side, namely, that the world is a world of appear- 
:ances (the thesis of transcendental idealism argued for 
in Ch. I) and the power of spontaneity which is the source 
of the form of the world of appearances, must it not be 
admitted that there is at least one thing in the world, or 
somehow effectively engaged with the world, which is other 
than appearance? Silber, without detailing theproblem, 
hints at the central problem raised by the power of spon- 
taneity as the unconditioned source of appearances for 
Kant's system when he says: "Only the desire to avoid need - 
:less conflict ... prevents my saying that spontaneity is 
the ontological foundation of both rationality and freedom 
in Kant's philosophy." 12 The conflict, however, is hardly 
needless; it represents a problem central to Kant's whole 
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enterprise, viz. the problem which arises because Kant's 
world, his ontological horizon, is determined by the forms 
of human subjectivity. Anything not shown to be thus 
determined, cannot be shown to be objectively real. Kant's 
problem of ontological diversity as evidenced in his failure 
to account for spontaneity parallels the problem of establish - 
:ing the objectively real. Since Kant believes there to be 
only one objectively valid categorial framework, he can only 
recognize as objectively real, whatever. fits, Or is author- 
:ized by, that framework. In light of this, it becomes 
understandable why Silber should think that the conception 
of spontaneity as ontological ground, can be incorporated 
into Kant's system without. resulting in profound change. 
Silber maintains,. at least appears to maintain, that the 
account of the categories provided in the CPR ought not to 
be regarded as Kant's last word on how nature and experience 
&re made comprehensible to us. 13 In fact, Silber suggests 
that we replace this conception of nature with the concep- 
:tion offered by Kant in CoJ, namely, nature understood 
according to the principle of finality. Briefly, the 
advantage in this is that our categories would not be con- 
stitutive of nature but simply regulative, i.e. standards 
guiding our inquiry into nature; and, of course, we would 
have different defining regulative categories for the 
different frameworks, moral, teleological and scientific. 
Once the constitutivity of the categories is redefined as 
merely regulative in effect, nothing stands in the way of 
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compatible diverse frameworks within which to explain 
different kinds of objects. Silber states that the 
principle of finality is regulative and not, like the 
categories, constitutive; furthermore, the principle of 
finality is a completely objective principle for it is, 
as Kant makes clear in CoJ, necessary for our knowledge of 
living things and the acquisition of scientific knowledge. 
According to Silber,_ "Finality, ... is a regulative, re- 
flective principle when used at the behest of science. 
And as a reflective principle it does not conflict with 
either a reflective or even a determinate employment of 
the idea of freedom; both principles may be used to interpret 
the same account." 14 Silber's suggestion amounts to a 
rejection of the radical distinction 
tutive and the regulative, thus allowing for the use of 
different sets of principles with which to understand 
different kinds of objects, e.g. living things, men as moral 
agents; there seems to me, however, to be one basic diff- 
:iculty with this kind of suggested re- interpretation of 
Kant's original theory. It is true that the central 
defect in Kant's theory of experience is that the categories 
alone determine what ifs:to be regarded as the objectively 
real but the remedy is not to reject the concept of 'con - 
:sti.tution' completely. Without the idea of the con - 
:stitution of nature in general by the categories, as pres- 
:ented in CPR, how are we to distinguish between differently 
constituted sets of objects or kinds of things at all? We 
() J 
could not say that there were parts of experience that are 
really different from one another because different kinds 
of things are involved. The world of moral experience is 
different from the world of material objects not merely 
because the principles we use in explaining each world are 
different; rather, they are different fundamentally because 
the things in each realm are differently 'constituted'. To 
reject Kant's account in CPR of the categories completely 
would be to lose the concept of constitution as well and as 
objective validity is possible only through the constituting 
work of the categories, objective knowledge with respect to 
any realm of experience would be impossible. The realms 
of moral experience and living things are differently con - 
:stituted from the realm of material objects to which the 
categories are applicable; this is entailed by the fact 
that the categories are not constitutive of realms other 
than what Kant.calls 'nature'. 
Kant's problem then is this: Only the categorial 
framework of CPR is objectively valid and only the kind of 
thing constituted within this categorial framework is 
objectively real. Spontaneity, the unconditioned ground 
of reason and freedom, is an ontological type different 
from that legitimized by the categories - thus, the onto - 
:logical kind to which the source or ground of reason and 
freedom belongs, is rendered illegitimate. Neither the 
world of moral experience nor, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, the world of living things, can receive author- 
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:ization as ontological types different from the type 
constituted by the categories. Either an object is of 
the kind defined by the predicate 'is a material thing', 
or it is not objectively real. 
5. By way of offering support for my argument that 
Kant's ontology lacks the diversity required to account 
for the different kinds of entities there are in the 
world, I want to conclude this chapter by briefly dis- 
:cussing an interpretation of Kant's metaphysics which is 
sympathetic to the position I am assuming in this essay. 
This is the interpretation offered by Heidegger in his 
writings on Kant. 15 According to Heideggar, Kant's 
CPR is fundamentally a work in ontology. Heidegger does 
not deny that Kant is concerned with discovering the con- - 
:ditions of the possibility of experience, or, the con - 
:ditions of the possibility of knowledge, but he does . 
deny that the establishment of objectively valid knowledge 
was Kant's ultimate concern. On the contrary, Kant was 
interested in the conditions for the possibility of know- 
:ledge because he realized that it was only by :comprehend - 
:ing the finitude of human knowledge - in what that finitude 
consists - that metaphysics, which for Heidegger is always 
concerned with the realm of being, can be firmly established. 
For Heidegger, the importance of thought (= reason) in Kant's 
metaphysics, merely evidences Kant's central insight that 
our way of asking about the thing is essential to the 
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discovery of what things can be for us; thus, Heidegger 
states: 
"But how can it be explained that in 
spite of the fundamental and author - 
:itative significance of intuition 
in human knowledge Kant himself 
places the main problem of the analysis 
of knowledge into the discussion of 
thought? The reason is as simple as 
it is obvious. Precisely because Kant 
- contrary to rational metaphysics, which 
put the essence of knowledge into pure 
reason and into mere conceptual thought 
- posits intuition as the supporting 
fundamental moment of human knowledge, 
thought must now be deprived of its 
former presumed superiority and 
exclusive validity. But the Critique 
could not be content with the negative 
task of disputing the presumption of 
conceptual thought. It had first and 
foremost to define and ground anew the 
essence of thought. The extended 
discussion... of concept and judgment 
is the clearest proof that from now on 
intuition will remain the authority 
without which thought is nothing." 16 
Heidegger's thesis centers around the claim that intuition 
is the defining characteristic of human finitude and as . 
such, is the controlling contributory element in knowledge; 
it is through intuition that the object, i.e. what is to 
bere- presented, is first given and given for that which 
represents .(= the subject). 17 But the "givenness of 
the given" (What is a Thing, p. 217) is made comprehensible 
to us through the principles of the understanding which 
effect the forming of the standing -against of the object 
for human pre - senting (Vor- stellen). Briefly, Heidegger 
seems to mean that the objects of knowledge do not hover 
in a limbo, they must encounter us from somewhere, a 
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suggestion Heidegger makes plausible by referring to Kant's 
term for object,namely, Gegenstand (gegen = against). What 
encounters us in this way is determined by the principles 
as an object, or, as something which is constant, some- 
:thing which has a stand. It would be out of place to 
detail here Heidegger's analysis; in any case, a condensed 
version of hisposition will suffice to allow me to make 
my point with clarity. Heidegger has grasped that any 
theory which grounds the objectivity of objects in the 
nature of subjectivity can only do so by making those 
features of objects of knowledge which are universal, char - 
:acteristics, and essential characteristics at that, of 
the knowing subject. That this is Heidegger's position 
can be seen from his closing remark to What is á Thing ?, 
(p.244) that "The question "'What is a thing ?'' is the 
question "'Who is man ?' ". Kant's claims about intuition 
and understanding and their role in knowledge, are since 
they are claims about our cognitive faculties, claims with 
respect to the nature o,f man. Space and time as the forms 
of intuition for knowing subjects and the principles of 
understanding, are also of course, minimal conditions for 
the possibility of experience, or, the conditions for the 
possibility of knowledge of objects; therefore, epistemol- 
:ogical questions pertaining to the cognitive and intuitive 
constitution of man as finite knower are at the same time 
ontological questions involving the nature of things. 
Kant's manner of asking about the thing thus leads ultimately 
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to ontology: the being of man as finite knower. 
The most significant aspect of Heidegger's reading 
of Kant, at least from the perspective of this essay, is 
that Heidegger effectively provides an ontological cast- 
ing of the 'Analytic' of CPR, an ontological reading 
that is anchored in his theory of the time -structure of 
the transcendental imagination. The principles of the 
understanding become conditions of the possibility of 
objects of experience as well as conditions of the poss- 
ibility of experience. Although Kant himself says as 
much at A158 = B197 of CPR, he fails toshow how this is 
possible within the 'context of an epistemological read- 
ing of CPR. For what the claim amounts to is this: the 
epistemological features of predicates of the knowing sub= 
:ject are likewise :(= at the same time Heidegger) onto - 
:logical predicates. Those categorial features which 
objects must possess if they are to be knowable are the 
defining predicates of the finite knowing subject. Again, 
it makes sense to ground knowledge in the nature of sub- 
jectivity only if the essential defining predicates of 
the knower are, ór form, the' horizon within which objects 
can be known; and this is the position Heidegger wishés to 
advance (in his own way). He states: "....the act of 
orientation which lets something take up a position 
opposite to...forms as such the horizon of objectivity 
in general. The going beyond to ..., which in finite 
knowledge is necessary in advance and at every moment, is 
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accordingly a constant ex- position to ... '(Eks'tasis) . 
But this essential ex- position to ... in its position forms 
and pro -poses to itself a horizon." 18 For Heidegger, 
Kant's categories and principles of the understanding as 
well as space and time as forms of intuition, are the 
grounds of objectivity in the sense that they prepare or 
anticipate the horizon within which finite knowers can 
-.comprehend things as things. In What IS a: Thing? 
Heidegger provides an interpretation of the principles 
of understanding according to which they are conditions 
of the possibility of things in that they define the Onto-. 
. 10nß ica lnr i :r n f nb j _ _ =t The principles express 
"only the highest principle, but in such a way that in 
their belonging together they explicitly cite all that 
which belongs to the full content of the nature of ex- 
:perience and the nature of anobjecto" 19 This inter 
:pretation of Heidegger's regarding man's finitude and 
objectivity draws out and makes explicit what is already 
present in Kant's work, especially the CPR.. Kant's. 
doctrine of sensibility characterizes man as finite know 
:er while the hegemony of the categories, ás we have seen, 
implies that the criteria for objective knowledge, for 
the objectively real, can only be satisfied within the 
framework specified by the categories. Heidegger simply 
exploits Kant's original position that, by grounding all 
knowledge in the nature of subjectivity, objectivity is 
limited to and by, the forms of the knowing subject.. 
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Heidegger's programme then can be seen as an attempt to 
show that either we accept the ontological implications 
of Kant's position (transcendental idealism) or accept 
that Kant fails to explain how the categories and the 
principles lay the ground for the objectivity of objects, 
or, the thingness of things. The connection between 
man's finitude and objectivity is problematic for Kant 
since he must show how the principles define the onto - 
:logical horizon of objects; in both What is a Thing? and 
Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger tries to 
explain this problem of Kant's. The followhg passage 
from the latter work is one of thé clearer explications 
of the nature of the problem and what is required to 
resolve it: 
"A finite cognitive being is able to relato 
itself to an essent which it itself is not 
and which it has not created, only if this 
essent can by itself chine forward to be met. 
However, in order that this essent can be 
encountered as the essent that it is, it 
must be recognized in advance as essent, i.e. 
with respect to the structure of its Being. 
But this implies that ontological knowledge, 
which in this circumstance is always pre - 
:ontological, is the condition of the 
possibility that an essent as such can, in 
general, become an object for .a finite being. 
All finite beings must have this basic ability 
which can be described as a turning toward... 
which lets something become an object. 
In this primordial act of orientation, 
the finite being first pro -poses to itself a 
free space within which something can'corres- 
:pond to it. To hold oneself in advance in 
such a free -space and to form it originally 
is nothing other than transcendence which 
marks all finite comportment with regard to 
the essent. If the possibility of onto 
:logical knowledge is based upon the pure 
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synthesis, and if it is ontological know - 
:ledge which makes the act of objectification 
possible, then the pure synthesis must mani- 
:fest itself as that which organizes and 
supports the unified totality of the intrinsic, 
essential structure of transcendence. Through 
the elucidation of the structure of the pure 
synthesis the inmost essence of the finitude 
of reason is revealed." (Kant and the 
Problem of Métaphysics, pp. 74 -75) 
The "turning towards" and "recognizing in advance" are Heid- 
:egger's explanation of Kant's assertion that we, as finite 
beings, possess a capacity for receiving representations, 
i.e. intuition; for Heidegger, .it is not sufficient to 
simply state that intuition is the defining mark of human 
finitude. What requires explanation is how this is poss- 
e r t_,,.,, t_, finite t t 1}).J_ 1t our structure û8 îiaî,..c j., 11.'j is not in some way 
already 'tuned' to thé ontological structure of what is 
intuited. Heidegger's answer is that we define the 
horizon within which things can be known but this means 
that our essential predicates as knowers are ontological, 
not epistemic only. It is this ontological structure 
which Heidegger goes on to describe as belonging to the 
transcendental imagination. 
If Kant does, as I have been arguing, locate the 
source of objectivity in the nature of the knowing subject, 
then Heidegger is at least correct in suggesting that an 
ontological characterization of the structure of subject - 
:ivity is required. Is this not a minimal requirement if 
subjectivity is to ground objectivity? 
Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's metaphysics 
highlights the central problem of Kant's theory of object 
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:ivity: if the foundations of objectivity do not lie in 
the nature of the object, then they must be located in 
the nature of the subject; but a theory of objectivity 
which locates the grounds of objectivity in the subject 
can only explain how this is possible by making the epis- 
:.temic predicates of the knowing subject, ontological pre - 
:dicates. As our discussion of Kant's transcendental 
idealism makes clear, the effect of grounding objectivity 
in subjectivity is that the ontological horizon within 
which objects can be known as objects, is defined by the 
forms of subjectivity, and this leads to the further pro - 
:blem with respect to the ontology of Kant's world - the 
problem of the last section - that Kant's ontology is 
insufficient as an account of the multiplicity of kinds 
of entities in the world. To support this argument, I 
shall consider Kant's notion of living organisms within 
the context of the principle of teleology. Living 
organisms fall outside the realm of things constituted by 
the categories; the question therefore arises - What kind 
of ontological status are we to accord to living things? 
Teleology and Living-Things: Ontology 
Chapter III 
"But where a thing is recognized to be 
a product of nature, then something more 
is required .... if, despite its being 
such a product, we are yet to estimate 
it as an end, and, consequently, as a 
physical end .... I would say that a 
thing exists as a physical end if it is 
(though in a double sense)' both' 'cause 
and effect of itself." (CJ: No. 64) 
1. If the overall argument of Ch. II is correct then .
the hegemony accorded to the theoretical framework of the 
categories of CPR does not allow for the possibility of 
moral experience as we know :it. Since the only object- 
:ively valid theoretical framework seems to be that de= 
:fined by the categories, anything not falling within this 
framework, or whose possibility cannot be demonstrated 
therein, must be located outside the realm of knowledge 
proper; thus, persons as agents are not really a part of 
the world of material things and their apparent interaction 
with the world of material things must remain unexplained. 
are in some sense, however weak, 'outside' the 
world of material things which is objectively grounded 
persons, according to this account, belong to the world 
of noumena. I want to strengthen this argument by exam- 
:ining in this chapter another area of Kant's philosophy - 
his analysis of teleological judgment with respect to 
living things - with an aim to showing that here too we 
witness Kant's inability to countenance entities which 
fall, or seem to fall, within an explanatory framework 
(at the most general level of explanation) that differs 
- 103 - 
from that defined by the categories of CPR, where, as we 
have seen, the failure to legitimize a framework other than 
that of CPR amounts to a failure to provide an account of 
how certain kinds of things, persons, living things, belong 
in the world rather than outside it. 
The forms of explanation used to understand bio- 
:logical and organic phenomena differ from those used to 
understand and explain ordinary physical phenomena. Now 
that we have a fully- fledged science of living things - 
biology, the explanatory power of which extends even to 
the cellular micro -structure responsible for the trans- 
:mission and change, through time, of biological forms 
themselves (the study of DNA in genetics, the child of 
biology), there is no longer the requirement to justify 
the use of a substantially different set of explanatory 
principles guiding the study of organic phenomena than 
that used to explain material and physical phenomena. 
The laws of matter in motion may be applicable to biolog- 
:ical phenomena but they do not provide an exhaustive 
explanation of them, which is why Kant thinks a teleologi- 
:cal framework is necessary for the comprehension of liv- 
ing things. The growth of the acorn into the oak is 
governed by the laws of matter in motion no less than 
inorganic phenomena are but in the case of the former what 
requires explanation is the apparent order which seems to 
be a built -in feature of the development of organisms. 
Organisms would be unproblematic if it were possible to 
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attribute intentions to them; in that case, organisms 
would, like ourselves, have goals, adopt ends and in gen- 
eral, be describable as goal-oriented beings. Because, 
however, we do not normally predicate intentionality of 
organisms, their apparent goal- directed activity is pro - 
:blematic and is not, Kant believes, made any less so by 
mechanical explanation. Kant thinks, or seems to think, 
that there are features of the organic world which are 
not describable within the mechanic framework of CPR; 
because living organisms possess qualities other than 
those possessed by physical things, we require a different 
set of concepts or principles in order to comprehend them, 
in order to investigate the realm of living things. How - 
:ever, although Kant thinks that living entities require 
a different set of concepts for their comprehension and 
explanation - expressed in Kant's suggestion that we re- 
:gard living things as if they were ends of nature, i.e. 
as if they had been designed (by a maker of organisms ?) 
he does not think that this entitles us to say that living 
organisms are differently constituted than physical entit 
:ies; in a word, Kant does not attach any bntologi'cal sig- 
:nificance to the claim that organic phenomena require their 
own concepts for their comprehension. But if we are not 
entitled to draw conclusions about the features and prop- 
:erties of living things from the concepts we use to 
understand and explain them, then what does the alleged 
difference between living things and material things amount 
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to? Kant's response is that the only difference between 
the objects of the realms of material things and organisms 
is that different concepts and principles are required for 
the explanation of the objects within each realm. I 
shall argue that Kant cannot consistently maintain this 
position with respect to the difference between the objects 
of the realm legislated by the categories of CPR and the 
objects whose understanding requires a teleological frame- 
:work, that is, I shall argue that the distinction between 
the two realms is a distinction between kinds of entities. 
Kant's reason for refusing to grant ontological signifi- 
: cance to the distinction between the two realms, is of 
course, that he is committed to saying that the only 
categorial framework which is objectively valid is that 
legislated by the categories of CPR and to interpret the 
teleological principles as constitutive of living organ - 
:isms and biological phenomena in general, rather than 
regulative of our investigation into them, would be 
equivalent to destroying the exclusivity of the categories 
with respect to the constitutivity of the objective realm. 
But if biological phenomena require teleological principles 
for their explanation, while material things do not, then 
surely there ismme distinguishing ontological feature 
which they possess and that requires such a framework. 
2. Kant thought that teleology was á problem because 
the framework of teleological explanation clashes with 
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the mechanistic framework of CPR; while mechanical laws 
might go part of the way towards explaining living organ - 
:isms, such laws are in principle incapable of providing 
a complete explanatory framework for vital entities be- 
:cause, in a word, they cannot explain life itself. 
Furthermore, from the point of view of human knowledge 
and its attendant cognitive limitations, teleological 
principles are necessary for the explanation of organisms, 
i.e. we must regard organized beings as physical ends 
(CJ: No. 77). Bent this implies, as Kant realizes, that 
things regarded as physical ends are 'contingent with res- 
pect to the system of mechanical laws and that the universe 
itself, within the framework of mechanism, is contingent 
(CJ: No. 75). The necessity accorded to teleological 
principles with respect to organisms amounts to recog- 
:nition on Kant's part of the different logic structuring 
our inquiry into nature of living things than that guiding 
our construction of mechanical systems of explanation. 
And what is this but a recognition that no one set of 
concepts or explanatory principles is sufficient to explain 
the diversity in kinds of things there are in the world to 
be understood? To extend the class of teleological con- 
cepts to allaying organisms, all life - forms - non -human 
animals, plants - is to acknowledge the existence of a 
class of objects in the world with which we become familiar 
as we begin to understand how to use and improve upon, that 
In other words, while it is particular class of concepts. 
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true that the employment of a certain set of concepts in 
a particular language, at a given time and in a given 
place, could have been quite different assuming certain 
circumstantial changes, this only shows that no one set 
of concepts is 'necessary', i.e. another could have done 
the job. And what is important here is not that classes 
of concepts are not necessary but that this use of con - 
:cepts and language is conventional, i.e. that such con- 
ventional methods for dealing with different kinds of 
situations objects, events, in the world, exist. The 
fact that we possess a set of teleological concepts and 
principles at all is evidence of a certain kind of object 
in the world the existence of which seems to demand such 
concepts for their comprehension; the fact that. the set 
of legitimate teleological concepts is not fixed, that 
the very form of teleological explanation changes (witness 
the recent literature on the nature of teleological ex- 
:planation) as the logic of teleological statements and 
descriptions is sharpened shows only that* some explana- 
:tory systems are more or less successful than others. 
It does not alter the fact that 'some kind of teleological 
explanation is required to account fana certain sort of 
object, or class of objects, in the world. What I want 
to say here is that explanations are embedded in the 
world, so to speak, not because any one system of ex- 
:planation is necessary or universal but because there 
exists in the world the class of objects which require 
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some explanatory framework; the existence of more than 
one class or kind of thing in the world requires that 
more than one system of explanation (concepts, principles) 
be used. 
When we look at Kant °s argument for the require - 
:ment that we have one set of concepts for living things 
and another set for ordinary physical things, we find 
that he says that the requirement is the result of the 
peculiar nature of our cognitive faculties: By the 
pécüli:ar cönstitutionof my cognitive faculties the only 
way I can judge of the possibility of those things-and 
of their production is by conceiving for that purpose a 
cause working designedly .... (this) is a subjective 
principle for the use merely of the reflective judgment, 
of which it is, consequently, a maxim that reason pres- 
;cribes." (CJ: No. 75) The necessity involved with the 
application of teleological judgments is due ultimately 
to the requirements of our cognitive capacities rather 
than anything pertaining to the specific nature of organ - 
:ic phenomena. Whereas the fact that living organisms 
cannot be subsumed under the explanatory framework of 
mechanism suggests that living organisms are different in 
kind from ordinary physical things, Kant seems more con- 
:cerned to demonstrate that the most we are entitled to 
assume is that the difference in explanation forms is a 
conceptual necessity - a requirement of our cognitive 
constitution. There is no ontological problem here 
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between entities of different kinds but a problem with 
respect to judgment. And this can be seen quite clearly 
for Kant leaves little doubt that he believes we must use 
teleological explanations because of the limitations of 
our human, all too human, perspective (= judgment). In 
the course of a discussion of the possibility of there 
arising a Newton who might effect a reduction of even the 
simplest organism, like a blade of grass, to purely mech- 
anical principles (which, incidentally, Kant considers 
impossible), Kant suggests that the real reason for deny - 
:ing objective validity to teleological judgment is that 
we could never attain the perspective required for such 
knowledge, i.e. the perspective of a higher being who 
possessed intellectual intuiton and for whom the intrinsic 
naLuïe of organisms was apparent (ibid; 75). 1 Even 
more definite is Kant's discussion of the peculiarity of 
human understanding that makes the conception of a pilysi- 
:cal end possible for us, in No. 77 (ibid) where he says: 
"The difference turns, therefore, on a peculiarity of our 
(human) understanding relative to our power of judgment 
in reflecting on things in nature. But, if that is the 
case, then we must have here an underlying idea of a poss- 
ible understanding different from the human . the state - 
:ment does not deny that a superhuman understanding may be 
able to discover the source of the possibility of such 
natural products even in the mechanism of nature ... ". 
If we could overcome the disadvantages of our perspective, 
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then the requirement for more than one set of concepts 
would not have to be met. This response of Kant'.s is 
hardly surprising for (as Kant himself acknowledges in 
the same paragraph from which the above quote was taken) 
he has shown that, with respect to ontological questions, 
there are two methods he uses to deal with them; (1) Onto - 
:logical problems are really problems of perspective, or, 
problems associated with objects or kinds of objects can 
only be dealt with from the perspective of knowledge of 
those objects or kinds; (2) Because Kant is committed to 
both conceptual necessity as the only means of showing 
the objective validity of a concept and to the thesis 
that the world is a world of appearances, ontological 
questions, i.e. questions pertaining to 'the nature of...' 
are always considered to have the supersensible as their 
proper domain, where the supersensible is anything other 
than the world of appearances. But if Kant thinks that 
recourse to the concept of the supersensible, in any of 
its Kantian forms, in the present context, is an explan- 
:ation or even partial explanation - and presumably he 
does - for regarding teleological principles as maxims 
devoid of objective status, he is surely mistaken. First 
of all, any appeal to the concept of the supersensible, by 
Kant's own arguments elsewhere, is at best speculative 
even if, as in the present case, it is to show not that 
a concept or principle is objective, but merely subjective 
and regulative; if arguments depending on the conception 
of the supersensible are ineffective for proving the object- 
ive validity of concepts then they are just as ineffective 
for proving the subjectivity, or, non -objective status, of 
concepts. However, there is a more telling argument 
against Kant's use of the concept of the supersensible in 
teleological contexts, viz: if different sets of principles 
are required to provide order and systematic unity to nature 
because there is genuinely more than one kind of entity to 
be organized, is there any reason for believing that this 
heterogeneity in nature and in the principles structuring 
our inquiries into nature, would be any different viewed 
from the perspective of the supersensible substrate of 
nature? Kant thinks that the teleological and mechanical 
modes of explanation required to account for living things 
and brute matter, can be referred to a common principle 
which is the source of both and which therefore, would 
assure us that the conflict between the two divergent modes 
of explanation (of one and the same natural phenonemon) is 
only apparent; the common principle being the conception 
of the supersensible substrate of nature. Kant states: 
"...it is then to be presumed that we may 
confidently study natural laws on lines 
following both principles (mechanism and 
teleology - JD) ... without being disturbed 
by the apparent conflict that arises between 
the principles upon which our estimate of 
the product is formed. For we are at least 
assured of the possibility of both being 
reconciled, even objectively, in a single 
principle, inasmuch as they deal with 
phenomena, and these presuppose a super - 
:sensible ground." (CJ; No. 78) 
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Kant is proposing this as a resolution of the antinomic 
conflict between mechanism and teleology as explanation - 
forms but the attempt is a failure. There is no reason 
to assume that the supersensible ground of nature is 
:form and homogeneous, either in its constituent entities 
or in its organization, when nature as phenomenon reveals 
heterogeneity in bóth. If anything, thecpposite assump- 
:tion would be 'safer having at least thé merit of pre- 
:serving a structural isomorphism between nature and. its 
supersensible ground. There is no - even tentative - 
theoretical justification for the assumption that the 
real ground of nature, i.e. how things really are, is 
organized according to homogeneous principles and that 
its constituent entities are all of the same kind. One 
suspects that perhaps Kant is being pulled by the theo- 
:logical overtones associated with the 'conception of a 
supersensible ground into thinking that a divine intuitive 
intelligence would perceive uniformity and homogeneity 
in nature because'antinomic conflict 'could hardly be said 
to exist for such a being; but even here, what objection 
would a god have to a nature consisting of a variety of 
kinds of entities and organized (therefore) by different 
sets of principles? 
I have jumped to Kant's discussion' of the super - 
;sensible in the context of resolving the alleged antinomy 
between mechanism and teleology because it exposes' the 
real nature of Kant's .problem. Rathér than argue that 
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the antinomy is resolved in a supersensible ground - the 
conception of which Kant tokenly acknowledges to be in- 
:determinate (ibid;No. 78) -- we need only admit that there 
are a variety of organizing principles used in the invest- 
igation of nature and that nature is differentiated into 
kinds of entities. This option is not open to Kant; it 
is worth repeating that Kant's difficulty here as in his 
moral philosophy, is that if he recognizes the teleological 
framework for vital entities, the exclusivity or theoreti- 
cal hegemony of the categorial framework :(= the causal, 
mechanistic framework) of CPR would be destroyed. The 
result is that Kant's system cannot accommodate living 
things as a legitimate (objectively real) kind of entity 
in the world. 
3. On of the central, defining issues in recent dis- 
:cussions of thé nature of teleological explanation is 
whether teleology itself describes objective features of 
the world or teleological attitudes projected on to the 
world. 2 If teleological descriptions are to be regarded 
as true or false then it must be possible to find truth - 
conditions which would justify the predication of a truth 
value to them; however, teleological descriptions, e.g. 
'The spider is weaving its web in order to catch the fly', 
might be merely interpretative, reflecting not an actual 
state of affairs in the world but the conceptualizing of 
the observer(s). We use teleological connectives such as 
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'in order to' as if animals, plants and other forms of 
natural life could really have purposes and intentions, 
whereas in fact the meaning of such teleological descrip- 
:tions in analogical, i.e. it depends upon those teleolog- 
ical descriptions whose meaning is literal, e.g. 'The 
fisherman made his net in order to catch fish'. We can 
understand this statement to be literal because it alleged - 
:ly reports an objective fact, i.e. that the fisherman did 
have the intention of catching fish and thought a net would 
be a good way of so doing. We can't suppose the same to 
be true of the spider, at.least not with any considerable 
degree of certainty or confidence; teleological descriptions 
of animal life, other than human, are therefore to be under - 
:stood as metaphorical primarily because it does not seem 
possible to establish truth -conditions which 'would allow us 
to demonstrate the truth Or falsity of teleological descrip- 
:tions or statements referring to natural. life-forms. Those 
who regard teleological descriptions as literal, even though 
. they acknowledge that teleological descriptions of organisms 
is problematic, hold that there are actual states of affairs 
or properties belonging to objects, that servë to establish' 
the truthof teleological statements - it is a straight- 
:forward case of reference to something - a property, situa- 
:tion, state of affairs - whatever, in thé world. The 
opposite camp, those. who believe teleological statements to 
be essentially analogical, especially those referring to 
organisms, have been called proponents of 'projectionism';3 
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not surprisingly, Kant is regarded as one of the forerunners 
in this group. Kant's basic conviction with respect to 
teleological statements is that principles of teleology 
which underlie them are not constitutive of organic life 
but regulative only, in other words, teleological statements 
are not to be mistaken as descriptive of features of object - 
:ive reality. Kant uses his distinction between reflect - 
:ive and determinant judgment to achieve this result, but; 
as I shall be arguing shortly, I do not think he succeeds 
here. For the moment, I want to sketch a defense of the 
literal view of teleological descriptions given above, 
against the objections of projectionism. I do not want 
to have to commit myself to this literal view with respect 
to teleology generally for the simple I not 
pretend to be familiar with the range of issues involved 
but it is evident that some such view as the literal view 
would be implied by the realist reading of this essay. 
Kant's statement to the effect that we must regard 
living things as if they were designed, as if they were 
organized beings with physical ends, is equivalent to the 
statement that living things seem to have an intended 
function. When he states that "Organisms are ... the only 
beings in nature that, considered in their separate exis- 
tence and apart from any relation to other things, can - 
:not be thought possible except as ends of nature" (ibid; 
No. 65), Kant is recognizing the fact that it seems we can - 
:not but think of organisms as things whose natural functions 
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or activities are essential to what they are and the carry - 
:ing out of designated functions has all the characteristics 
of a being sufficiently organized as to be able to have ends, 
in this case, physical ends. But since we have no concrete 
knowledge of whether organisms were designed or who might 
have designed them, the most we are allowed to say is that 
they seem to have intended functions. Now since state - 
:nients about the natural functions of organisms are not 
literally either true or false, they must be analogical, or 
based on statements about the functions of certain kinds of 
things which, are literally true or false. Statemeñts 
about the functions of artefacts are just such statements, 
e.g. the function of the tool shed is to house the joiner's 
tools. As has been pointed out; "Anyone who construes 
natural function statements as analogical is committed to 
holding that artefact function statements are literal." 4 
The important point here is that it is the so- called 
'literal' kind of function statement that provides the 
fundamental and initial semantics for teleological state- 
ments in general. On this account, the only aspect 
separating the two kinds of function statements.is the lack 
of a set of truth- conditions for natural function statements. 
There is nothing to prevent us from saying that just as the 
natural function statements are analogous with artefact 
function statements, so the former have a set of analogous 
truth conditions related in some way to a set of actual 
truth conditions. The claims which natural function state- 
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:ments make on reality may be just as 'objective' as those 
made by artefact statements in so far as they both equally 
reflect a state of affairs in the world. The lack of a 
known designer in the case of the organisms of the natural 
function statements is hardly sufficient reason for regard- 
:ing the latter as merely subjective (as Kant does). 
Furthermore, there are function -statements with respect to 
biological phenomena that do not seem to be metaphorical 
at all, e.g. 'Wrists exist to support watch bands', is 
simply false and 'The function of the heart is to pump blood 
through the body' seems no less true because we do not know 
whether the heart was actually given that function by a 
designer. Many biologists, after all, accept that organs 
of the human body have functions and these same biologists 
profess not to believe in God. Another problem with the 
projectionist (Kantian) approach to natural function state- 
:ments is that there appears to be no way of disallowing 
secondary or marginal activities of organisms from assuming 
functional status; if we are to say that it is as if the 
heart existed to pump blood through the body without 
specifying that pumping blood is indeed the function of the 
heart given the empirical evidence now available, then, 
since we are disregarding evidence provided by actual and 
possible discoveries, we can just as well say that the 
function of the heart seems to be to make a noise and it 
beats to that effect. The floodgates are open. Any aspect 
of the system of behaviour of an organism, no matter how 
secondary and..merely concomitant with the primary activity 
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of the organism, could be framed within the projectionist's 
form of teleological description; there are no logical 
criteria for distinguishing, say, survival behaviour from 
the concomitant effects of that behaviour. 
Another version of projectionism.is the view that 
the ascription of goals to animals (non -human) is anthro- 
pomorphic. 5 Dogs do not and cannot intend to fetch the 
morning newspaper and thus cannot possibly have this as 
their goal. It is we who interpret animal behaviour in 
this way because it is an easy and natural means of under - 
:standing their behaviour. This view, as a general truth 
with respect to non -human animal life, is simply false; 
it is beyond doubt that some animals do have goals, e.g. 
chimpanzees and dolphins. As we discover more and more 
about animal behaviour it is becoming increasingly apparent 
that animals at the higher end of the evolutionary scale 
behave in a goal- directed way. 
While the abóve arguments do not represent a knock - 
:down case against the projectionist view with respect to 
teleological explanation of natural life forms, they are 
more than sufficient to indicate the implausibility of that 
view. Kant's projectionism is rendered even more implaus- 
:ible because he appears to want to draw rather weighty 
conclusions from the projectionist position. As I have 
said, because Kant regards teleological statements, and 
the teleological framework in general, as essentially no 
more than subjective norms useful as a means of making 
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natural life forms more intelligible to ourselves, he must 
(and does) on the basis of his own arguments, treat the 
teleological framework as non -constitutive of organic life - 
forms. Thus, Kant's commitment to projectionism and the 
theoretical framework for establishing objectivity of the 
CPR, obliges him to regard living things as an illegitimate 
ontological kind and as not existing in the world in the 
complete way that ordinary physical objects do. Because 
Kant packs so much into his conception of teleological 
explanation with respect to organic life, he has a lot to 
lose if his position turns out to be untenable -as now appears . 
very likely. As one writer has put it, "There appears to 
be a different type of teleology here ( i.e. teleology of 
organisms - JD), not assimilable to the artifact -model.... 
Whatever the correct analysis cf these TDs (teleological 
descriptions of organisms - JD) may be, there is a strong 
presumptiion that they make at least some objective claims 
on reality. "6 
4. The peculiar aspect of Kant's apparent refusal to 
recognize organisms as a distinct ontological kind is that 
he identifies three characteristics of products of nature 
which they must have if the concept of a physical end is 
to be afforded objective reality. Kant states that, "It 
is they (Organisms - JD), then, that first afford object - 
:ive reality to the conception of an end that is an end 
of nature and not a practical end. ". (CJ; No. 65) And 
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only that thing can be considered an an organism which is 
"both cause and effect of itself" (ibid; No. 64) and it 
becomes apparent in what follows in this section of CJ that 
what Kant regards as the distinctive traits of living things 
are their life- processess, i.e. the interaction and inter - 
:dependence of the various parts of an organism in sustain - 
:ing itself and in generating its own kind. In effect, 
these characteristics are the defining properties of living 
things and represent the kind of processes (metabolic) which 
constitute such entities and hence serve to differentiate 
organisms from physical objects. Kant does, therefore, 
seem to recognize that there is something essentially 
different about living things. As one commentator on 
Kant's concept of teleology said "It that 
Kail -L saw clearly that natural organisms are quite different 
from machines in so far as they produce themselves, repair 
their own deficiencbs, and so forth." 7 And the power in 
natural organisms to produce themselves and to literally 
change, or rather, transform, themselves is just what it 
is to be a living thing endowed with metabolic processess.8 
Kant thus provides a basic account of the physical 
nature of organisms according to which they are set apart 
from the class of ordinary physical objects. Moreover, 
Kant complements this account by providing a set of teleo- 
:logical principles (the teleological principle which states 
that "an organized natural product is one in which every 
part is reciprocally both end and means" being the most 
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basic - CJ; No. 66) which operate as explanatory laws for 
organisms considered as basic physical but living things. 
Thinking the teleological principle is both universal and 
necessary as a regulative principle for organisms is equiv- 
:alent to believing that this principle holds for this kind 
of entity and without some such principle we would not be 
able to understand the 'possibility' of living things at 
all. Nor should this be surprising, for the very concep- 
tion of linking the possibility of a thing with a set of 
principles which are directed to the specific nature of 
the kind of thing in question, e.g. organisms, physical 
things, is a familiar one with Kant. Buchdahl has discuss- 
ed in detail the extent to which Kant links the possibility 
of matter with laws referring to the essence of matter, i.e. 
forces or point centers of influence. 9 In MFNS Nant' s 
procedure is to explain the physical possibility of matter 
in terms of the forces of attraction and repulsion and thus 
the laws of governing physical things are seen to refer to 
the basic properties of matter. For example, in MFNS in 
the chapter on 'Mechanics' where Kant attempts to construct 
the concept of matter as the moveable having a moving force, 
one of the propositions he tries to prove is Newton's third 
law of motion about the equality of action and reaction. 
This involves constructing, or, showing the possibility of, 
the agency of repulsive (and attractive) forces in the 
communication of motion between bodies, and, since Kant 
adopts a force theory of matter, i.e. matter consists 
ultimately of forces, Kant's project comes to seem like 
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one which tries to base the explanatory power of laws govern - 
:ing physical things on the basic properties of those things - 
forces. In the 'Observation' to his 'Proof' of the third 
mechanical law, Kant's opening remarks suggest that he may 
have conceived the matter this way himself: "This is, then, 
the construction of the communication of motion. This 
construction at the same time carries with it as its nec- 
:essary condition the law of the equality of action and 
reaction." (MFNS; p.112; 549) 10 The point I want to make 
is this: Kant's claim to the effect that we must conceive 
of organisms.as physical ends can be understood as a claim 
that because organisms are the kind of entities try are; 
(living) they are governed, in the sense of 'regulative', 
by teleological principles which are, as Kant himself in- 
sists, universal and necessary. And this is simply, or 
can be understood as being, a version of the explanatory 
model according to which physical laws govern things and 
in which the laws in question are made to refer to (and 
derive their explanatory power from,) the basic constituents 
of those things. In each case, we explain the possibility 
of the kind of thing in question, organisms 'or physical 
things, by a system of principles and laws certainly, but 
ultimately by reference to the basic constituent of the 
sort of thing in question. Thus we explain the inter - 
:action of physical objects, understand why it is that 
bodies do not burst asunder but are held together by 
attractive and repulsive forces, and, with respect to organ- 
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:isms, we can understand the metabolic processes which 
constitute organic life and grasp the transformation of 
one species into another (with the aid of Darwin's theory 
of natural selection upon randomly generated mutations), 
and even the complete disappearance of one sort of thing 
can be explained. In each case however, and Kant insists 
on this, something basic remains unexplained, that is to 
say, within each explanatory framework, we reach the point 
where something must be accepted as an unexplained fact; 
in the case of physical things, what remains unexplained 
(as far as Kant is concerned) are forces End with respect 
to organisms, we cannot explain what exactly distinguishes 
vital entities from matter, i.e. life. 
In light of the fact that Kant sees the need for an 
explanatory framework for organisms that differs from the 
mechanistic and that these organisms "afford objective 
reality to the conception of an end", what is there, on 
Kant's own principles, to prevent teleological principles 
from being constitutive rather than regulative? When we 
add Kant's stated thesis that mechanical laws cannot ex- 
:plain organisms (the latter are "contingent" with respect 
to the framework of mechanical laws) which seems to imply 
that we are dealing with different kinds of things, what 
possible reason is there for continuing to treat the teleo- 
:logical framework, i.e. the teleological principle (the 
principle of finality) as only authorizing subjective 
maxims with respect to the entities within its domain? 
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If organisms and ordinary physical things represent differ - 
:ent ontological kinds and different ontological kinds 
have their own explanatory system structured by the defin- 
:ing characteristics of the 'ontological kind in question, 
then, Kant's own belief that mechanical laws cannot explain 
organic life, is vindicated. The laws governing physical 
things cannot explain organic life -forms because the latter 
are ontologically distinct entities governed by a sat of 
laws structured explanatorily by the properties or organisms; 
thus, Kant's statement that organisms are physical ends tells 
us something about the kind of. explanation organic phenomena 
will receive, the most general level of explanation for such 
phenomena. If we recall that Kant regards the principle of 
teleology as necessary for the comprehension of organisms, 
it becomes evident that Kant's position is that.the.te.ieo- 
:logical principles supply the most.generál explanatory 
framework for organisms just as the categorial principles 
of CPR provide the explanatory framework, at the most 
general level, for physical things. Both sets.of princ- 
:iples are necessary for the comprehension:of their res- 
:pective kinds and we' have no apparent. reason for with - 
:holding 'constitutive' status from the one while granting 
it to' the other. That 'Kant realizes the inadequacy of 
mechanical explanation for organic life is recognized by 
one writer on Kant's teleology when he says: "The modern 
philosopher who tries to reduce teleological statements to 
statements containing no teleological terms is also committed 
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to a vocabulary which he believes to be objective, the 
vocabulary of physico -chemical explanations. He is 
concerned to show that this vocabulary will do the job 
which is done by a teleological one. Kant, on the other 
hand, believes that a non -teleological vocabulary never 
can do that job, because the only non -teleological vocab- 
:ulary available to us is a mechanical one and organisms 
are by definition 'fundamentally different from mechanical 
aggregates.'' ll (emphasis mine) It may be objected that 
the reason Kant refuses to grant constitutive status to 
teleological principles is that both the principles-of 
mechanism and the principles of teleology are applicable 
to organisms as methodological principles, that is, Kant 
thinks that no set of principles could be constitutive 
living things. But there is a problem with this objection, 
viz. the principle of teleology, as I have said,is riecessar 
for the understanding of organisms and therefore, on Kant's 
own arguments, is constitutive of them. Furthermore, to 
say that this is merely a subjective necessity is to miss 
the point for, if this was the case, then the principle of 
mechanism would stand on equal footing with the principle 
of teleology with respect to organisms; that it does not 
stand on equal footing with the principle of teleology 
should be evident from the fact that the latter is necessary 
for the explanation of organisms and does not have any 
application to physical things at all. The principle of 
mechanism, on the other hand, while it is applicable to 
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living things, insofar as they are also physical things, 
is not necessary for their explanation as living things. 
The idea that the principles of mechanism and teleo- 
:logy are placed by Kant on the same footing has created 
surprise andpuzzlement amongst some commentators. One of 
these says: "What is surprising is his assertion that bio- 
:logical investigation can as little do without the teleo= 
:logical principle as scientific investigation can do with 
:out the causal principle. However, in saying this, he 
is not placing them on the same footing. He has already 
called the teleological principle 'regulative', whereas 
the causal principle is a condition of objective experience 
... without the latter principle we would have no experience 
at all. What Kant is claiming is that the two principles 
are necessary as methodological principles." 12 And again, 
a few pages on: "What is pùzzling about Kant's discussion... 
is the fact that he calls the_principle, 'All production of 
material things ... must be estimated as possible on mere 
mechanical laws' (the principle of mechanism - JD), a 
regulative principle .... That is, to repeat, he believes 
he has proved in the first Critique that the categorial 
principles are constitutive of nature and that they 
guarantee that nature is a mechanical system as conceived 
in Newtonian physics." Now suppose for the 'sake of argu- 
:ment that we ignore the arguments I have presented for 
regarding the principle of teleology as constitutive and 
go along with both Kant and the present commentator in 
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thinking it regulative; first of all, if both principles 
are methodological, as is maintained in the above passages 
then presumably they are on the same footing. The con - 
:fusion that this commentator seems to have fallen into 
becomes apparent when it is recognized that Kant has two 
versions of the principle of mechanism, the causal principle 
of CPR and the regulative principle of mechanism of CJ, but 
only a regulative version of the principle of teleology. 
Placing the two principles on equal footing seems to be 
Kant's clear intention in this passage: 
"They are, in fact, quite as unable to free 
themselves from this teleological principle 
as from that of general physical science. 
For just as the abandonment of the latter 
would leave them without any experience at 
all, so the abandonment of the former would 
leave them with no clue to assist their 
observation of a type of natural things 
that have once come to be thought under 
the conception of physical ends," (CJ: No.66) 
So Kant clearly does see both principles as possessing 
equal normative strength and that is just to put them on 
equal footing. But can Kant place them on equal footing 
given his argument with respect to the grounds of the 
causal principle - of which theprinciple of mechanism is 
but an extended version, - i.e. the causal principle is 
essential to the possibility of experience and therefore. 
constitutive of it? The justificatory basis of the 
principle of mechanism is transcendental even if it is 
used in only a methodological way in CJ, whereas the just- 
ificatory basis for the principle of teleology, according 
to Kant, is subjective necessity. Thus, they must be 
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of differing explanatory power, by Kant's own arguments 
and cannot consistently be regarded as similar even as 
regulative principles. And Kant realizes the problem 
here when discussing the antinomy of judgment, only, as we 
shall see more fully and have already glimpsed at, he 
thinks that at the level of regulative or reflective judg- 
ment, no conflict exists: 
...it may come to pass that judgment 
acts upon two maxims in its reflection, 
one of which it receives á priori from 
mere understanding (principle of mechanism 
- JD), but the other of which is prompted 
by particular experiences (principle of 
teleology - JD) that bring reason into 
play to institute an estimate of corporeal 
nature and its laws according to a part- 
. icula_ principle." (CJ; No. 70) 
Given that the principle of mechanism is rooted in an ex- 
planatory framework the principles of which are constit- 
utive of the domain of things they range over, i.e. the 
causal framework of CPR possesses its own concept of an 
object, and, considering that the principle of teleology 
is rooted in a framework which is merely regulative, i.e. 
does not have a concept of an object of its own, there 
would appear to exist no justification for regarding these 
two principles as explanatory equal. 
As I have mentioned, Kant does have, or appears to 
have, an argument designed to ease our worries about the 
compatibility of the mechanistic and the teleological 
principles. In short, Kant's strategy is to locate the 
principles of mechanism aid teleology in the realm of re- 
:flective judgment which has no legislative power with 
- 129 - 
respect to the determination of objects but "is compelled 
to ascend from then particular in nature to the uriarersal" 
(CJ; First Intro. IV) meaning that the search for principles 
(such as mechanism and teleology) "for obtaining a knowledge 
of the natural laws to be found in experience, and which are 
directed to assist us in attaining to conceptions, be. these 
even conceptions of reason, wherever such conceptions are 
absolutely required for the mere purpose of getting to know 
nature in its empirical laws "(ibid; No. 69) is the proper 
function of reflective judgment. Thus, since both the 
principle of teleology and the principle of mechanism are 
methódological principles for science, Kant is placing the 
empirical investigation of nature (i.e. scientific methodology) 
within thé domain of reflective judgment rather than .determ- 
:inart judgment. Also, Kant seems to remove all matters of 
methodology with respect to science from the domain of 
reason despite the precedent of CPR where reason as regula- 
tive was regarded as the architectonic platform for 
empirical science and its laws (CJ; No. 70 - where Kant is 
discussing the contradication that arises from treating the 
principles of mechanism and teleology as constitutive and 
hence objective for determinant judgment,. thus producing 
an antinomy certainly, though not one of judgment, but 
rather a conflict in the legislation of reason. "). 
Kant thinks that thé semblance of antinomy with 
respect to the principles of mechanism and teleology arises 
because they are mistaken as operative withinthe domain of 
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determinant judgment when their proper field of application, 
so to speak, is within the much less (ontologically) replete 
domain of reflective judgment. The latter is independent 
and autonomous with respect to the principles used to aid 
our investigations into empirical nature whereas the deter- 
minant judgment is tied to (and thus heteronomous) the rules 
and laws authorized by the understanding: 
"The determinant judgment does not possess 
as its own separate property any principles 
upon which 'conceptións of objects are founded. 
It is not an autonomy; for its subsumes merely 
under given laws, or concepts, as principles." 
(ibid; No. 69) 
Determinant judgment has no laws of its own with which 
concepts of objects could be determined; its activities 
are completely governed by the understanding which pres- 
:cribes the appropriate principles determining concepts of 
objects and, to use Kant's language, legislates to the 
determinant judgment the authority to subsume the part - 
:icular under the universal (concept of an object). It is 
because determinant judgment does not have any concept of 
an object that is its own, that no conflict could arise 
between different principles or laws (e.g. mechanism and 
teleology); thus Kant's remark that transcendental judgment 
"was not independently nomotheti_c" (ibid; 69) 
The principle of mechanism states that "all produc- 
:tion of material things is possible on mere mechanical 
laws" or in its regulative form, "all production of material 
things must be estimated as possible on mere mechanical laws" 
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(ibid; No. 70) and looks very much like the constitutive 
principle of causality of CPR slightly reconstructed as a 
regulative, empirical principle for the production of 
physical things. In this respect Kant builds into the 
conception of determinant judgment just what he wants to 
get out of it, for when the principle of mechanism and the 
principle of teleology are regarded as constitutive, deter- 
minant judgment is unable to prove either one because it 
(or, reason, as Kant refers to it here) lacks the.legislat- 
:ing power required to.determine a priori "the possibility 
of things on mere mechanical laws" (bid; No. 70). - Thus 
Kant's construal of determinant judgment fits the conception 
of the principle of mechanism as a regulative version of the 
principle of causality of CPR. This, however, is only half 
the story; for the principle of mechanism is that maxim 
which judgment, in its reflection, "receives a priori from. 
mere understanding" (the other, the principle of teleology, 
being prompted by particular experiences). But how else 
could judgment receive the principle of mechanism from the 
understanding unless the determinant judgment which possess- 
.:es conceptions of objects in general (rules, principles) 
whose origin is the understanding, was, so to speak, already 
disposed to receive such a principle? Reflective judgment 
is excluded from having concepts of objects in general but 
determinant judgment, clearly,. in making use of the princ- 
iples and rules of the understanding, is extending, by 
filling in the empirical detail, the concept of an object 
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in general specified by the categories. In the application 
of the principle of mechanism to physical things which can 
be accounted for by empirical laws, judgment is simply 
(empirically) specifying further the concept of an object 
in general. And doesn't Kant himself say as much when at 
the beginning of the discussion of the antinomy of judgment, 
he states: 
"Thus transcendental judgment, which was 
shown to contain the conditions of sub - 
:sumption under the categories, was not 
independently nómóthetic. It only spec- 
ified the conditions of sensuous intuition 
upon which reality, this, application, can 
be afforded to a given conception as a law 
of the understanding." (ibid; No. 69) 
To specify the conditions of sensuous intuition is joist to 
specify the conditions which any object must satisfy if it 
is to be an object of possible experience; any thing belong - 
:ing to the world will possess those features specified by the 
categories, at the most general level of description for 
objects (physical things). Transcendental judgment, through 
determinant judgment, furthers the specification by describ- 
:ing or presenting the conditions for a description, of the 
physical character or nature of material things. Even if 
we accept that there can be ho direct clash between the 
principles of mechanism and teleology granted Kant' s now 
rather cosmetic looking and arbitrary definition of deter - 
:minant judgment - even if we grant Kant this much the 
principle of mechanism remains a specification of the con - 
:cept of an object in general, only more specific and part - 
:icular than the minimal specification provided by the 
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categories. But if this is true then there is some diff- 
:iculty in trying to allow for the parallel explanations 
of mechanism and teleology for Kant himself agrees that 
the principle of teleology is transcendent for determinant 
judgment. If teleology is transcendent for determinant 
judgment then mechanism, accepting our argument that mech- 
anism is the more specified version of the concept of an 
object at the level of empirical laws, must conflict with 
teleology. 
It now begins to appear as if Kant`s distinction 
between the reflective and determinant judgment is rather 
superficial, at least, it does not accomplish what Kant 
hoped it would, i.e. to free the principles of mechanism 
and teleology from conflict by making them regulative and 
not embedded in a framework which must "subsume" in accord - 
:ance with a general prescription for the concept of an 
object. When Kant says that determinant judgment is not 
autonomous this means that the rules and laws of that 
faculty are those of the understanding and that determinant 
judgment must carry out its activities in a way which is 
consistent with the framework of explanation provided it. 
By locating mechanistic and teleological principles in 
reflective judgment Kant hopes to escape this commitment to 
a framework for a concept of the object: 
"On the other hand, looking to the maxims 
of a reflective judgment as first set out, 
we see that they do not in fact contain any 
contradiction at all. For if I say: I must 
estimate the possibility of all events in 
material nature, and, consequently, also all 
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forms considered as its products, on mere 
mechanical laws, I do not thereby assert 
that they are solely possible in this way, 
that is, to the exclusion of every other 
kind of causality." (ibid;No. 70) 
Now Kant's categories are specifications of the concept of 
an object at the most general level of theory and as such 
they are the minimal conditions which any object must 
satisfy if it is to be an object at all. This means that 
any further specification of the concept of an object in 
general at a level where theory is concerned with detail 
(laws and science) and filling out the specifications 
initially provided, must at the very least fit the more 
general specification. If mechanism is a more detailed 
specification of the concept of an object then it must not 
conflict with the kind of specification provided at the 
minimal level, in 5IDrt, the specification-sat each level 
must be congruous with one another. And the framework 
of explanation for living organisms provided by the 
principle of teleology does not fit Kant's initial and 
minimal specifications, regulative or otherwise. The 
point is, that Kant's construal of the categories of CPR 
as a theoretical hegemony disallows the adoption of any 
framework of explanation, at any level, however specified, 
that doesn't agree with it. Teleology, even though it is 
operative in the realm of investigation into nature, is 
precluded by the plan for a concept of an object, formul- 
:ated in CPR. Pushing the whole discussion into the domain 
of reflective judgment does not seem to be addressing 
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the problem. Kant's problem is that the principle of 
mechanism is applicable to material things and is 
thereby involved in the overall plan for specifying the 
concept of an object in general. As such, the principle 
is embedded in the framework initiated by Kant's plan for 
the concept of an object in CPR and with which the princ- 
:iple of teleology does not fit. Kant argues that the 
principles of mechanism and teleology originate in the 
autonomous faculty of reflective judgment, the faculty 
which, as it were, is free to produce whatever principles 
are required to aid our investigation into nature; "But 
in respect of the particular laws with which we can become 
acquainted through experience alone, there is such a wide 
scope for diversity and heterogeneity that judgment must 
be a principle to itself, even for the mere purpose of 
searching for a law and tracking one out in the phenomena 
of nature. For it needs such a principle as a guiding 
thread, if it is even to hope for a consistent body of 
empirical knowledge based on a thorough -going uniformity 
of nature - that is a unity of nature in its empirical 
laws." (ibid; No. 70) This implies that reflective judg- 
:ment is a cognitive faculty for which the production of 
any kind of principle is justified; but how can Kant poss- 
:ibly hope to account for such a free, unconstrained form 
of judgment, given the defining structure of the overall 
cognitive situation provided in CPR? And the faculty of 
judgment is, after all, architectonically placed between 
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understanding and reason, a placing that would not seem 
to license such an unfettered cognitive capacity. 
5. While Kant on his own principles cannot justify the 
adoption of an autonomous faculty like reflective judg- 
ment, it is just such a faculty which is presupposed by 
the fact that we now have a science of biological pheno- 
:mena and the fact that we can and do distinguish living 
organisms from ordinary physical things. And if we are 
able to do this, then we must already understand what, in 
a minimal way, it is for a thing to be a living thing, or, 
in the Kantian terminology, reflective judgment contains 
those conditions required to identify (in order to dis- 
:tinguish and individuate) organisms. Accepting my argu- 
:ment that Kant specifies the life processes which serve 
to individuate organisms then Kant has provided the 
materials for understanding, or, approaching a knowledge 
of, such entities. Why should we not regard our know - 
:.ledge of organic life as objective? Kant has a model 
for the 'objective validity' of a concept of a thing (at 
least for the kind of sortal concepts, 'is a material 
thing', 'is a living thing') according to which a concept 
can be considered objectively real if we possess the 
conditions for showing a priori that the object, or kind 
of object, which the concept is of, is a possible object. 
To understand the possibility of an' object answering to the 
concept of / 
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an object in general we must be able to understand an 
object the mostgeneral features of which are those 
described by the categories; to understand the possibility 
of an object which fits the specific explanatory frame - 
:work (laws and principles) of mechanism we must be able 
to understand not just an object possessing the general 
features belonging to the class of objects described by 
the categorial system of CPR but a class of objects which 
do, as a matter of fact, fit some system of mechanical 
laws and explanation; I believe this is Kant's project 
in MFNS,accepting Newton's laws Kant attempts to construct 
physical objects from forces and thereby demonstrate that 
it is because physical objects are constituted by forces 
that they are susceptible to explanation within the Newtonian 
system. Showing this involves a recognition that it is 
something about physical things (what they are ultimately 
composed of) that makes them the sort of things they are 
and accounts for their comprehension and explanation by 
us (science) within the mechanistic mode. Of course, 
Kant's metaphysicsof experience will not support such a 
reading of the nature of matter if only because.in a world 
of appearances (the thesis of transcendental idealism:no 
entity characterized as physically, or micro- physically 
basic, i.e. unconditioned, is allowable. Thus, I argue 
that we must adopt a form of Leibnizian realism to render 
Kant's physical theory (matter as forces) philosophically 
plausible. This is the subject of the final chapters of 
-- 138 - 
this essay; to return to the question of understanding 
the possibility of an object as a means for showing a 
priori the objective reality of a concept; with respect 
to teleological principles and teleological statements 
of organisms, one might expect Kant's characterization 
of them as merely regulative, i.e. not constitutive of 
the objects they range over, to be a result of Kant's 
position to the effect that we cannot show a priori the 
objectivity of the teleological principle. As it turns 
out, Kant does think that the concept of a physical end 
is inexplicable for "... in order to make use of this 
conception dogmatically for the determinanent judgment 
we should have first to be assured of its objective 
reality, as otherwise we could not subsume any natural 
thing under it. The conception of a thing as a physical 
end is, however, certainly one that is empircally condition - 
:ed, that is, one only possible under certain conditions 
given in experience. Yet it is not one to be abstracted 
from these conditions, but, on the contrary, it is only 
possible on a rational principle in the estimating of the 
object. Being such a principle we have no insight into 
its objective reality, that is to say, we cannot perceive 
that an Object answering to it is possible." (ibid; No. 74) 
Since Kant obviously does think that we must use 
teleological principles to aid our investigations into 
nature, it is clear that he regards our use of such princ- 
iples as empirically necessary, that is, in order to 
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comprehend biological phenomena - the "empirically 
conditioned" kind which justifies the use of the concept 
of a thing as physical end - we must use teleological 
concepts; yet this use of teleological principles notwith- 
:standing, we do not, according to Kant, indeed, cannot, 
really understand -in the sense of obtaining objective 
knowledge of the nature of the kind of entities involved. 
We will never really understand what we are doing because 
we can never show a priori the possibility of an object 
answering to the concept of a physical end. Kant has a 
problem here: if, as I have been arguing, mechanism is, 
or, can consistently be taken to be, a more detailed spec - 
:ification of the concept of an object, - a filling out of 
the categories at the empirical level - then evidence for 
the truth of the principle of mechanism will depend on 
how successful such a principle is in aiding our inquiries 
into nature, but this is not sufficient to demonstrate the 
objective reality of the principle; for that, on Kant's 
own arguments, we would have to show that some set or class 
of objects exist which fit the description or explanation 
provided for them by some set of mechanical laws (as well, 
of course, that there is a set of appropriate mechanical 
laws). What other meaning could the idea of empirically 
specifying the categories (in turn, specifications of the 
concept of an object in general) have if not that there are 
physical things meeting the empirical specifications of the 
categories and that there are mechanical laws which do 
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allow us to comprehend and explain these things? This 
argument is all the more compelling when we see that 
Kant, in MFNS, attempts to 'construct' the concept of 
a physical thing out of forces or point centers of influ- 
:ence and to show that it is because physical things are 
composed of forces that they fit the particular explana- 
:tory framework of Newton's laws; furthermore, each 
chapter in MFNS contains a definition of matter and each 
one of these definitions is building into the concept of 
matter that Kant is working towards, an empirical spec - 
:ification of the concept of an object,in general which 
the categories of CPR specify at the most general level 
of experience. This is not Kant's project in MFNS as he 
conceived it, or, more safely, I do not wish to contend 
that it is. In the final chapter of this essay I will 
argue that this kind of interpretation of MFNS in most 
feasible, apart from what Kant did or did not think he 
was doing there. 
If the principle of mechanism is an aid to our 
empirical inquiry. into nature while being, at the same time, 
a further specification of the concept of an object in 
general, it follows that the concept of an object in- 
general provided by the categories can receive empirical 
vindication (by science, at the level of organized know - 
:ledge) only if the kind. of object in question can be shown 
to be possible; and since what is in question in regard to 
the principle of mechanism is a system of mechanical laws 
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ranging over the kind of thing, then, what is involved in 
showing the objective (empirical) reality of the concepts 
of objects alleged to fit some mechanistic framework, is 
demonstrating that, in Kant's words slightly adjusted, "we 
can perceive that an Object answering to it is possible" 
(final sentence of previous quotation). This implies 
that one could be wrong about the principle of mechanism 
since it may turn out that as a more complete filling -out 
of the categorial concept of an object in general, we 
should finer no one particular set of mechanistic princ- 
iples which could be regarded as the empirical specifi- 
cation of the categories. . Given the change in accepted 
paradigms in the history of science, especially physics, 
this is no me e possibility and we need only remember that 
Kant himself thought that Newtonian science, as an actual 
description of the way the physical world could be said 
to be, very near to being the permanent science. In MFNS 
Kant clearly thinks that it is just this sort of physical 
thing - the sort constituted by two opposing forces - that 
can be explained mechanically by Newton's laws of motion. 
If material things are, or can be, shown not to be composed 
of centers of attraction and repulsion, then the laws 
ranging over them will cease to do so. In other words, 
showing the possibility of things answering to our a priori 
and most general concepts of them, involves ultimately 
demonstrating empirically that such things are physically 
possible, that they fit our empirical specifications and 
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our most general specifications, because they consist of 
the stuff they do consist of. If this interpretation 
can be shown to be a plausible one for Kant then it will 
show that Kant never really rid himself of his Leibnizian 
tendencies. There is of course a strain of idealism 
in Leibniz but I believe this can be ignored without dam - 
:age to the stronger and more explanatorily powerful real - 
:ist leanings. Leibniz's idealism has the appearance of 
being imposed for the purpose of achieving the aims set 
by his other philosophical interests, especially his 
penchant for logical order; in a word, Leibniz's idealism 
is more like a structural clamp than cement which becomes 
part of the content. I cannot argue in this essay direct - 
:l.y against Leibniz's idealist tendencies except where I 
think his idealism directly prevents the adoption of some 
position or interpretation of some position I wish to 
provide. 
Kant acknowledges that the teleological concepts are 
empirical or, more accurately, empirically conditioned 
(previous quotation) and that the principle of teleology 
stands on the same logical level as principle of mechanism. 
And we can now see that this is eminently sensible although 
not quite in the way Kant envisaged. Since the principle 
of mechanism is operative in the realm of empirical science 
while being linked with the concept of an object in general 
that controls Kant's whole system, showing the possibility 
of objects answering to it involves showing that there are 
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those sorts of objects and the laws required to explain 
them (incidentally, showing the objective validity of a 
in kind from 
concept on this account, differs /the method of showing 
the objective validity of concepts in CPR where objective 
validity is essentially connected with the possibility 
of experience in general). So also for the principle of 
teleology, the possibility in question is that of living 
things whose phyiscal life- processes define their being. 
And Kant has provided all the conditions requisite for 
showing that we do or could have knowledge of such a kind 
of thing. Kant of course thinks that because the res- 
pective principles are regulative they do not involve 
objectivity; but nothing could be further from the truth. 
If the principles of teleology and mechanism are applicable 
in the domain of science then it is a question of possess- 
ing a different procedure for establishing their object - 
:ivity and we have no grounds for continuing to recognize_ 
the objects regulated by these principles as in some sense, 
not fully objective; in fact, accepting the development of 
science (biology) Kant's censure of living things from the 
epistemological boundaries of objectivity looks ludicrous. 
As I remarked earlier in this chapter, the peculiar aspect 
of all this is that Kant provides the material for recog- 
:nizing and individuating living things, the physical 
metabolic processes which serve to differentiate organisms 
from ordinary material things, separate explanatory frame- 
:works with principles ranging over the different kinds of 
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entities within each domain. Kant's attempt to show the 
compatibility of mechanism and teleology, finally, evidence 
what is really preventing him from recognizing the reality 
(full- blown) of living things. As with Kant's moral 
philosophy so with his theory of teleology. The exclus- 
ivity of the general explanatory framework of CPR rules 
out even the partial authorization of a domain of differ- 
ently constituted entities than material things by princ- 
:iples or laws of another framework. The truth is that 
the categorial framework legislates at the most general 
level of explanation for material things and anything 
conflicting with this framework e.g. living things, persons 
(thinking and acting) is relegated, on epistemological 
grounds, to an ontological limbo. We must then reject 
Kant's claim for the exclusive authority of the categorial 
scheme of CPR and with it reject another of the central 
claims of transcendental idealism; the legislative 
authority of the categories derives, in part, from the 
fact that they are alleged to be specifications of the con - 
:cept of an object in general arising from the nature of 
the thinking subject, and, since those features which, any 
objective world must possess are just those specified by 
the categories, one. understands why I said that the central 
thesis of transcendental idealism is that the foundations 
of the world- order, the foundations of objectivity, lie in 
the nature of the thinking subject. 
With respect to the question of demonstrating the 
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objectivity of certain concepts by showing the things in 
question to be possible (physically or at the level of 
scientific theory) Buchdahl has provided a suggestion which 
seems to be exploiting just this sense of 'possibility'. 
He remarks that in MFNS Kant is not providing justifica- 
:tion for inductive generalizations based on (Newton's) 
laws or that the categories support these inductive gener- 
:alizations at a more general level, but that Kant is 
actually demonstrating the metaphysical foundations of 
those laws, i.e. how we can explain on a priori grounds 
the fact that this set of laws fits this kind of objects. 
What Buchdahl says in regard to the 'Observation' of the 
third law of mechanics in the chapter on 'Mechanics' in 
MFNS, is: 
"For ... we soon find that as usual Kant 
couples the notion of 'construction' with 
that of 'possibility'. His main concern 
is that of demonstrating the 'possibility' 
of the phenomenon of 'communication of 
motion', in the course of which the law 
of action and reaction is likewise derived... 
This Kant makes perfectly Plain, when he 
writes that his 'problem', in the meta - 
:physics of mechanics, is only 'to make 
this possibility (of communicaon of 
motion ") .... comprehensible'. 
The point in trying to establish the metaphysical found- 
:ations of laws and, as we saw earlier, the notion of 
demonstrating the objectivity of a thing or a kind of 
thing by demonstrating the possibility of an object's 
answering to a concept, is that ultimately the justifica- 
:tion or grounds for the applicability of the concept and 
the explanatory power of the laws must be sought in some 
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other source than the concepts or laws. And this makes 
perfect sense in MFNS where Kant tries to demonstrate how 
physical things can be constructed and how Newton's laws,* 
as a mechanistic system of explanation, apply to such 
things. The laws themselves come to be seen to be de- 
:pendent (in the specific sense that their explanatory 
power is derived from the actual constitution of physical 
things) on the nature of these entities. Nor need there 
be anything deeply mysterious about this possible inter - 
:preation of Kant's philosophy of science for it is 
equivalent to the widely held position with respect to 
laws and their status, viz. that laws at the level of 
' scientific theory must be accompanied by a theory or 
theories about the kind of objects they are reputed to 
range over. Thus, when Kant defines the concept of matter, 
he does effect a 'construction' of sorts by building into 
the concept as he proceeds, just what he wants to get out 
of it, i.e. a conception of a physical thing as a kind of 
thing which can be appropriated to mechanistic explantion. 
There is, furthermore, a significant parallel between the 
kind of demonstration required to show that there are 
physical objects answering to a set of mechanical laws and 
the requirement that for any object of experience in general 
it must answer the conditions specified by the categories. 
If Kant's programme is read as a progression or development 
of, the concept of an object ih general, from the most 
basic and general level of accounting for the possibility 
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of objects of experience, through to the more detailed 
specification of providing an account of how and why 
physical things (and living things) can be explained by 
some system of laws, at the level of empirical theory, then, 
Kant's central notion of anchoring the objectivity of 
objects in a transcendental condition (the nature of the 
thinking subject, the possibility of experience) is open 
to dispute; what, on the above account, would count as 
'proof' for an a priori conceptual scheme like the 
categories is whether the concepts in question received 
the requisite specification or 'filling-out', at the level 
of empirical theory. And this would place Kant in the 
Leibnizian metaphysical camp in which, or, according to 
which, whatever account is provided for the foundations 
of objectivity must be provided in terms of the nature of 
things, rather than our knowledge of those things. Thus, 
the priority of ontology over epistemology, made more 
demanding in Kant's case if the overall argument of the 
first part of this thesis is at all plausible, viz. that 
Kant's ontology, provided largely by transcendental idealism, 
is unacceptable anyway, failing as it does to provide for 
the different ontological kinds that there plainly are. 
I conceive of metaphysics as the theoretical domain 
in which our most general theories about the nature of 
reality are expressed. Kant's categories, in their schem- 
:atized form, specify the metaphysics of experience and 
ordinary knowledge; in the realm of science these meta- 
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:physical specifications are not abandoned; on the con- 
:trary, they become even more entrenched in the overall 
cognitive situation by receiving further specification or, 
if you like schematization, in the domain of empirical 
science, at the level of empirical theory rather than the 
most general level at which Kant's categories in their 
original form, are operative. At both levels however, at 
the level of general metaphysical theory and at the level 
of specific empirical theory, the categories carry our 
ontological prejudices. By requiring that the objective 
validity of concepts (at the most general level) and the 
objective validity of empirical laws (at the more specific 
level) be demonstrated, by showing that for the former, 
there is some object answering to it, and for the latter, 
that there is a set of material things the defining natures 
of which allow them to be explained by the system of empir- 
:ical laws in question, we shall be able to make good our 
claim that ontology must have priority over empistemology 
in Kant's system, despite the general de- ontologizing move - 
:ment of Kant's project. Kant's rationlist origins are dis- 
guised, often subtly by the architectonic of pure reason; 
but they are always present and their influence is effective. 
Since the ontology presupposed by transcendental idealism 
is inadequate for either metaphyiscal or physical theory, 
we must look elsewhere for the ontological underpinnings 
demanded by the kinds of entities specified by the categor- 
:ies (ordinary material things), by the kind of entity pre- 
supposed by Kant's moral philosophy and his very own 
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conception of the nature of reason as dynamic, which we 
saw in the second chapter (persons), and now, it appears, 
by the kind of entity whose existence is pre -supposed by 
teleology (living things). 
In the second part of this essay I shall develop 
an argument to the effect that the ontology required to 
replace the narrow ontological horizons of transcendental 
idealism is one which resembles that presupposed by Leib - 
:nizian realism. Kant moves quite regularly within a 
realist framework as his attempts to salvage empirical 
realism in CPR should tell us. But Kant is more than an 
empirical realist in MFNS where he provides the material 
which enables one to glimpse the realist undercurrents of 
his theory of the nature of matter andphysical things. 
Here we have the basis for the required new ontology, one 
constructed from the perspective, not of judgment, but of 
the object. The difference of perspective here is crucial 
for it mirrors the difference between an epistemological 
and metaphysical perspective in the development of phil- 
:osophical theory, and, quite often the substantial 
differences that separate the Kantian and the Leibnizian 
(realist) frameworks come to little more than a difference 
in perspective of this sort, one which, it is worth men - 
:tioning in passing, arises in part due to Kant's so- called 
transcendental interpretation of the theory of ideas, where- 
:by all knowledge comes to rest on a transcendental condi- 
tion. The ultimate justification for the world order 
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is thus given in terms not of the nature of things ('as 
both Leibniz and Locke tried to do) but in terms of the 
thinking subject or conditions which the thinking subject 
is alleged to possess. But if transcendental idealism 
is false, or, at least, open to serious doubt, then Kant's 
theory of objectivity and the ontology that arises from 
that theory cannot possibly meet the demands placed on 
them as a result of the failure of transcendental idealism, 
most notably, that of trying to provide an account of the 
diversity of kinds of entities in the world. Por a theory 
of reality which locates the source of objectivity in the 
nature of subjectivity, this falls out necessarily since 
the conditions of subjectivity - conditions imposed by 
the limited perspective of the knowing subject - define a 
priori the ontological horizon. With regard to Kant this 
is effected through conceptual necessity. Conceptual 
necessity, or, transcendental necessity is, however, in- 
:sufficient for demonstrating the objective reality of 
concepts, since, as I have hinted already, the complete 
specification of. the concept of an object in general is 
provided by science. 
6. My strategy in Part Two of this essay will be to 
argue that Kant lias a philosophical (metaphysical) theory 
of the unconditioned in the form of the Ideas of Reason 
of CPR. As usual in matters associated with the concept 
of the unconditioned, Kant characterizes the ideas of 
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reason as being of regulative value only, i.e. their employ- 
ment although necessary, is merely methodological with re- 
:gard to the development and organization of theories con- 
cerning the scientific knowledge of nature. According 
to Kant, science is a systematic body of eipirical know- 
:ledge in virtue of the fact that scientific theories are 
related to one another through necessity and it is the 
necessity which binds the theories into a system. Each 
theory within the system obtains and keeps its place within 
the hierarchy of theories because it is related to the 
theories immediately above or below it with necessity. 
This, however,leads to a regress in the series of condition- 
ed but necessarily connected scientific theories until we 
arrive at the unconditioned source of the conditions; it 
will be seen that the necessity Kant imputes to physical 
theories - the necessity of system - derives from the 
unconditioned or, what must, given Kant's conception of 
system, be referred back to an unconditioned ground. As 
Kant inevitably identifies the unconditioned with a super - 
:sensible ground, I shall argue that the metaphysical theory 
of the unconditioned can and should be complemented and 
thereby receive a fuller ontological specification, by a 
theory of the nature of objects, of material things. It 
so happens that in the MFNS Kant provides just such a 
theory in his force theory of matter. The two fundamental 
forces of repulsion and attraction are unconditioned in that 
there is no kind of entity with which we are familiar that 
- 152 - 
can be characterized as. more basic than forces; and even 
if an entity more basic was discovered then it would 
replace forces as the unconditioned. What remains un- 
changed is that something, some kind of entity, must be 
characterized as unconditioned if the conditioned is to be 
explained without infinite regress in our explanatory 
theories. This is a very rough sketch of the argument 
of Ch. 5. In the final chapter, I attempt to integrate 
the philosophical perspective of Leibnizian realism with 
the specific ontological theory of the nature of things as 
consisting of basic entities - forces. Since, throughout 
this essay I have argued for a reversal in Kant's ordering 
of the relation between the perspective of judgment and 
the perspective of the object with respect to objectivity, 
and here try to present the metaphysical framework for the 
argued -for new perspective (Leibniz), we are entitled to 
reconsider Kant's theory of the understanding in light of 
the new perspective. This involves viewing Kant's original 
layout of the categories, the principles and the definitions 
of matters as providing in that order, a detailed picture 
of the ontological specification of the concept of an 
object in general. The world is the way it is because 
objects are composed of the kinds of entities they are 
composed of and our conceptual frameworks reflect this. 
Let me say that I can only provide a sketch of this new 
perspective in this chapter for adequate treatment would 
require the space and time for a separate project. 
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Before any of this, however, I must present my case 
for adopting the general philosophical framework represent - 
:ed by Leibnizian realism and, up to a point, monadism. 
This is the task of Ch. 4. Even if we were to suppose 
that the arguments presented so far against the claims of 
transcendental idealism were sufficient to show that theory's 
unsuitability as a metaphysical theory of reality, we would 
still be required to demonstrate why the Leibnizian frame - 
:work should be thought to be more successful in this 
respect. This is what I do in Ch. 4, largely by consid- 
:ering the Kantian claims as a metaphysical system vis a' 
vis the Leibnizian -Kant does have some very effective 
arguments against Leibnizian positions, e.g. that monadism 
is ultimately unacceptable it cannot account for 
real causal relations between things. But I try to show 
that the more eccentric of Leibniz's positions are attrib- 
:utable to the extreme idealism which infects his writing 
in places, and anyway, I reject the idealist strain in 
monadism. It must be emphasized that it is not Leibniz 
I want, or, more important, need, to defend but the meta - 
:physical framework within which his theories are opera - 
:tive. I conclude this chapter by arguing that the con - 
:cept of a monad, once pruned of its idealistic features, 
just might fit the description of the kind of entity that 
would be characterized by what Kant calls, intensive mag- 
:nitudes, in the 'Anticipations of Perception'. That is, 
at the micro level, at the level at which Kant's analysis 
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of matter into forces is relevant, we can describe monads 
(centers of force) as intensive magnitudes, or, as Kant 
says of intensive magnitudes, the real. Thus we possess 
some description for the real ground' of things, their real 
natures, which is more informative than what would be pro- 
vided by a characterization in terms of forces alone. 
The unconditioned is an ontological category spec - 
:ifying the real as the centers of force (monads) and the 
real is describable in terms of intensive magnitudes. I 
must emphasize the moderation of my claims here. I am 
not claiming to offer a description or analysis of physical 
things but presenting a. characterization of a possible type 
of entity which might serve to complete the specification 
of the concept of an object in general initiated by the 
categories. Since I conceive of the categories as having 
ontological import, the Kantian means by which the cate- 
:gories come to obtain objective reality must be replaced 
by some description and characterization of the real from 
which the objectively real is now seen to be realized. It 
is not a question of epistemic necessity but whether there 
are the types of entities in the world that are, required 
to account for how the world, in its diversity, appears. 
 PART TWO 
Leibnizian Realism, Science and the Perspective of 
Ontology 
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IV The Ontology of Leibnizian Realism: Towards the 
Unconditioned 
For matter, the communion of which with the 
soul arouses so much questioning, is nothing 
but a mere form, or a particular way of rep - 
:resenting an unknown object by means of 
that intuition which is called outer sense. 
There may well be something outside us to 
which this appearance, which we call matter, 
corresponds; in its character of appearance 
it is not, however, outside us, but is only 
a thought in us, although this thought, 
through the above -mentioned outer sense, 
represents it as existing outside us." 
(A385) 
1. The overall argument of Part One was designed to 
show that the central claims of transcendental idealism 
promise much more than they achieve independently of any 
assumptions regarding the truth of the claims of (Leibnizian) 
realism; this was of course essential in order that the 
truth of the theoretical framework that I am arguing for, 
not be assumed. The second and final part of this essay 
represents an attempt to generate the framework required 
to vindicate Kant's categories. The schematized categor- 
:ies are specifications of the concept of an object in 
general but whether things in the world really do possess 
the features laid out by the categories can only be answer- 
ed by showing that the epistemic predicates of the know - 
:er are ontological predicates of things, or to put it 
slightly differently, the categories can only receive 
final vindication if the knower's relationship to the 
known can be shown to be structured by more than epistemic 
necessity. Unless the categories as epistemic predicates 
- 156 
are construed as ontological predicates it will have to be 
left unexplained (and unaccounted for) how and that, science 
empirically continues the specification of the concept of an 
object in general -since there must be a continuity, at all 
levels, of the specification of the concept of an object. 
If there is no continuity, there is no consistency, and if 
there is no consistency between the levels of explanation 
of objects, then empirical science cannot be regarded as 
completing (in principle) the story begun by the categories, 
and finally, if this were to turn out to be true, then what 
possible use would there be for the categories disengaged 
from the real of science? To construe the categories as 
ontological predicates amounts to claiming that it is poss- 
ible to show that things really do stand in causal rela- 
tions with each other; that there is genuine interaction 
between bodies; that there is something in appearances 
which remains unchanged, or, that there is something 
permanent in the universe underlying change and without 
which there would be no change. To construe the categor- 
:ies as disengaged from the realm of science is equivalent 
to conceiving the relationship between metaphysics (phil- 
:osophy) and science as opaque, thereby reducing philosophy 
to irrelevance. But if philosophical theories are theories 
about the nature of reality or pertaining to certain 
structural truths of reality, such as when and why the 
categorial concepts of an explanatory framework are 
applicable (what material things are, what living things 
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are, what persons are), then our philosophical theories 
can be justifiably regarded as prescriptions for the poss- 
:ibility of knowledge while not being able to secure that 
knowledge on their own account. So, for example, the 
categories of CPR can tell us what features anything fall - 
:ing under the concept of a material thing must possess, 
but only science can tell us whether the thing in question 
does actually possess these features. On this view, and 
I shall argue that it is the general philosophical view 
presupposed by Leibnizian realism, philosophy_ sketches out, 
from the perspective of judgment or knowledge, a possible 
ontology, and science (physical theory) vindicates (or 
fails to) this possible ontology sketched by the different 
categorial frameworks, from the perspective of the nature 
of things. Any system of a prioriconcepts is thus seen to 
be grounded in the nature of things while at the same time 
providing or instituting, the framework within which to 
comprehend things. For any ontology we must have a corr- 
:esponding theory of objects for the various kinds of objects 
which go to make up that ontology. Without such a theory 
of objects we would have no theory of meaning for the onto- 
:logy; odd though it may seem, Kant supplies the beginnings 
of a theory of meaning for such a conception of ontology in 
the form of the Ideas of Reason even providing for the con - 
:cept of the unconditioned. In CH. 5, I try to show that 
Kant's theory of system generates the requirement for the 
unconditioned and that this requirement is satisfied in 
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the form of the unconditioned forces of attraction and 
replusion, the basic constituents of matter defined by 
Kant in MFNS. This is the topic of the final chapter. 
In arguing that Kant should be interpreted as providing 
an ontology of objects based on the concept of the uncon- 
ditioned and that this is borne out within the domain of 
his philosophy of science, I am arguing that it is the 
Leibnizian roots of transcendental idealism that ought to 
be embraced. Leibnizian realism is the bed of Kant's 
ontology notwithstanding, as I shall argue shortly, Kant's 
objections to Leibniz's epistemology and to monadism. In 
fact, as I mentioned to Ch. I, the metaphysics of monadism 
is consistent with Kant's own epistemology of transcendental 
idealism. I shah be returning to this shortly. 
2. The overall argument of this chapter is designed to 
show that the real context of the debate between Leibniz 
and Kant (and thus between the metaphysical theories of 
the nature of reality spelled out by Leibnizian realism 
and Kantian (transcendental) idealism is the context de- 
:fined by,on the one side a world -order grounded in the 
nature of things or the metaphysically necessary structure 
of the world, and, on the other side, a world -order which 
rests on a transcendental condition. According to the 
former, the entities of the world are constituted by 
properties necessary to their hatures, without such 
properties they would not be the sort of things they are. 
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According to the latter, all necessity is derived from 
the structure of the knowing subject, so that all necessity 
is epistemic or conceptual. Questions pertaining to the 
possibility of knowledge will receive different kinds of 
responses according to what ontological context we choose 
to address the questions. And this is as we might expect 
for the original debate between Kant and Leibniz, or more 
accurately, Kant's disagreement with Leibniz, centered 
around the question as to how the world alleged to be the 
foundation of the phenomenal world could be known to be the 
world composed of entities constituted by. centers of force. 
The heart of Kant's objection to Leibniz is ontological in 
kind: a world in which substances stand in real causal 
connection with each other or a world in which the inter- 
:action between substances is merely apparent, though 
accounted for. This conclusion re- emphasizes my central 
thesis, viz, that theproblem of objectivity is ultimately 
or firstly, an ontological problem. 
Leibniz, unlike Kant, has an explanation as to how 
phenomena are well -grounded and can thereby provide an 
account of both matter and mind. If transcendental 
idealism is true, with the proviso that Kant stands by the 
correlative thesis of empirical realism as well, then, Kant's 
idealization of space, and, through his attempted idealizatior 
of space, the idealization of matter (for space is the form 
of outer intuition) amount to an ultimate idealism, i.e. 
transcendental idealism is a statement to the effect that 
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. when viewed from the perspective of judgment, the object 
is ultimately ideal. It follows from this that Kant must 
provide some account of what is other than mind or what 
other than mind could count as the source of appearances. 
But if we reject the central claims of transcendental 
idealism (and the thesis of empirical realism as well) 
on the basis of the arguments given in the first part of 
this essay, then it is open to us to prop up the account 
of what, other than mind, could be the source of appear- 
:ances in the world. Kant's force theory of matter, with 
some alterations, can provide such an account, moving us, 
of course, inthe direction of Leibnizian realism. 
In 'The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection' of 
CPR Kant draws a distinction between two ways of dealing 
with concepts for the purpose of understanding their proper 
use; this entire section is amounts to little more than 
another of Kant's correctives of fallacious metaphysical - 
reasoning, in this case, that of Leibniz and the school of 
Wolffe. While the overall importance of this section in 
CPR is very.minor, it does provide a rare opportunity to 
witness Kant attempting to define his own position vis d 
vis the Leibnizian - in the CPR rather than, say, in the 
debate with Eberhard. Kant's distinction involves the 
separation of two kinds of concept -analysis. When attempt - 
:ing to define the right relation of concepts Kant maintains 
that we should consider: (1) the logic of the concepts 
under question - the logical form of concepts, and (2) the 
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origin of ground of each concept. Kant makes this dis- 
:tinction in his own way of course, stating that, "logical 
reflection is a mere act of comparison; for since we take 
no account whatsoever of the faculty'of knowledge to which 
the given representations belong,the representations must 
be treated as being, so far as their place in the mind is 
concerned, all of the same order. Transcendental reflec- 
:tion, on the other hand, since it bears on the objects 
themselves, contains the ground of the possibility of the 
objective comparison of representations with each other, 
and is therefore altogether different from the former type 
of reflection. Indeed they do not even belong to the 
same faculty of knowledge." (B318- .319) 
The business of 'objectively comparing' representa- 
:tions involves making a distinction which, since Frege 
at least, has become commonplace, i.e. a distinction 
between kinds - concepts and the objects falling under 
them. And what Kant calls logical reflection denotes the 
kind of conceptualizing which ignores this distinction, 
resulting in the proliferation of entities wrongly or . 
mistakenly reified. Whereas for Kant the overall 
cognitive situation involves a delicate balance between 
concepts and intuitions located respectively in the under - 
:standing and sensibility, the (urge of Platonism) tendency 
towards the reification of concepts amounts to a denial 
that human knowledge is a co- operative combination of 
data supplied through the senses and form or structure 
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provided by the discursive intellect. In Kant's epistem- 
:ological programme, the combination of form and matter is 
the fundamental element in the constitution of experience - 
all experience, not just theoretical; what is more,since 
Kant's transcendental idealism requires that the grounds 
of objectivity be located in the nature of the subject, the 
structuring or controlling principles regulating the rela- 
tion between form and matter in all areas of experience, 
must ultimately have their origin in the nature of the 
subject. For, "to understand Kant's theoretical philosophy, 
we must focus our attention upon the relation of 
form and matter in the production of "cognitive experience ". 
To understand Kant's moral philosophy we must attend to 
the relation of form and matter in the production of "moral 
experience ". To understand Kant's aesthetics we must 
examine the relation of form and matter in "artistic 
experience ". And to find the Kantian answer to all these 
areas of human life, we must ... look for the solution to 
the problem of the relation of form and matter in the nature 
of the subject. "1 As I see it, 'The Amphiboly' is under- 
:lining the necessity of including the formal and material 
elements in any account of the 'possibility of experience' 
and that this requirement is what is reflected in and 
preserved by, the distinction between the logical and the 
transcendental employment of concepts. If we look at the 
way Kant tailors this argument against the claims of Leibniz, 
it becomes possible to reconstruct a picture of the struc- 
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:tural features of the ontological posit - the kind of 
entity - which features at the level of experience, at the 
macro level of ordinary objects with respect to the Kantian 
and Leibnizian frameworks, where these are construed as 
metaphysical theories of the nature of reality. The object 
of this reconstructive exercise, it is worth repeating, is 
to show that talk about modes of knowing - epistemological 
discourse - leaves the essential differences between the 
two positions characterized (conceptual idealism and 
Leibnizian realism) unaddressed; this is because the prob- 
:lem of objectivity is an ontological problem first. 
We have seen that Kant's ontology is structured by, 
and arises from, his theory of objectivity; now it is wid- 
ely accepted that the two requirements controlling Kant's 
theory of objectivity as this is developed in CPR, are 
space and time as forms of intuition, and the categories. 
Although Kant would want no part of talk of essential prop - 
:erties, it remains true to say that on Kant's own arguments, 
there are certain features which objects must possess if 
they are to be objects for our cognitive apprehension, 
and these features are those described by the categories 
and space and time as the formal elements of sensibility. 
These two criteria of 'objecthood', so to speak, are essen- 
:tial in so far as it would be conceptually impossible to 
establish (or, impose) an objective order upon things and 
the relations of things, without engaging factors relating 
to things being in space and time and being organized along 
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the lines prescribed by the categories. These considera- 
:tions of space and time and the categories, effect, from 
the perspective of judgment, the 'conceptual unity' of the 
object and at the level of judgment it is just the possibi- 
:lity of expressing this 'objective unity' (rather than a 
merely 'subjective unity') which allows for an objective 
order amongst things and their relations in our experiences. 
Because space, time and the categories are conditions of 
the possibility of the objectivity of objects, and thus 
conditions of the possibility of making judgments about 
objects, we would not expect an analysis of judgments to 
be sufficient to reveal the conditions for their object- 
ive validity; and so it is. The unity of the concept 
of an object expressed at the level of judgment is, as 
Kant says, a synthetic unity, not an analytic unity. No 
analysis, for example, of the subject and predicate terms 
of a proposition would reveal the conditions for its 
objective validity. Despite this, however, Kant was 
one of the first philosophers to use space and time as 
individuating criteria for objects, at least he thought 
that spatial location was sufficient for establishing the 
numerical identity of an object. This suggests that 
Kant's notions of space and time are individuating criteria 
which cannot, as it were, be read off from the objects 
themselves - they are primitive rather than derivative 
concepts. Of course we can tell that an object is in 
space and time, that it has a location there and then simply 
by observing it but as evidence for the claim that space 
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and time are conditions of the possibility of objects, in 
experience, perceptual reports are irrelevant, for the 
possibility of making perceptual reports presupposes, on 
Kant's theory of the a priori status of the necessary 
conditions of experience, that the formal elements of 
sensible intuition and the categories are already operative. 
On Kant's theory, then, we can say fairly accurately that 
the essential criteria for objecthood are external to objects 
even though they describe features which objects must possess 
if they are to be comprehensible. In this respect Heidegger's 
claim to the effect that the categories "anticipate" the 
object, in the sense that they lay the groundwork for the 
object's presenting itself (providing a blueprint for the 
structure of every thing, as Heidegger says2) would seem to 
be correct, for the categories do provide a 'sketch' of the 
essential structural features of things without any prior 
input from experience from which it might be said that such 
information was derived( intuition affords input with res- 
:pect to content not form). 
The view that space and time are a priori with res- 
:pect to our knowledge of things is not a view shared by 
Leibniz. As space is simply the objects that occupy it, an 
object's spatial characteristics can be discerned from its 
appearance and because Leibniz never approached the notions 
of space and time from the perspective of knowledge of 
things it is hardly surprising to find that he has no 
conception of their logically a priori status. In brief, 
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space and time have no bearing on the overall cognitive 
situation. The point I want to make is that once we 
understand that the view of space and time from the per - 
:spective of knowledge (as presuppositions for its poss- 
ibility) was wholely foreign to Leibniz it becomes much 
easier to understand why he did not think an object's 
spatial and temporal characteristics were any more essential 
to their nature than other contingent qualities. In direct 
contrast to Kant's view, as construed above, for Leibniz 
the spatial and temporal aspects of objects can be read 
off from the objects themselves and rather than being 
'brought' to the objects, these characteristics seem to be 
internal to them. 
Kant's conception of space and time as in some sense 
(logically or conceptually) a priori, is based on the in- 
:sight that the spatial and temporal structure of material 
particulars must be reflected or mirrored in the structure 
of experience, i.e. in language and judgment. So intricat- 
:ely interwoven with the structure of experience that space 
and time are construed as conditions for its very possibil- 
:ity, at least from the perspective of knowledge or judg- 
:ment. When, then, Kant states that there is a pre- condi- 
:tion for the possibility of the "objective comparison of re- 
presentations", this ought to be taken as a claim to the 
effect that concepts (and language) are, so to speak, 
regulated or disciplined to miiror the spatial and temporal 
structure of experience, and the spatial and temporal 
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structure of the ordinary physical objects which go to make 
it up. Granted this, it follows that any attempt at de- 
:fining the structure of experience or developing a theory 
which might explain that structure (e.g. monadology) must 
engage this spatial and temporal component at the most 
basic and general level of explanation. Seen in this light, 
Kant's argument undercuts any explanation which ignores or 
better still, fails to incorporate, the distinction between 
concepts with respect to their origin (understanding and 
sensibility) and concepts treated logically; thus as soon 
as a Leibniz states his case, he is involved in a petitio 
principii, for he is using concepts which are (or allegedly 
have been shown to be) essentially connected with our 
spatial and temporal framework, to argue that the reality 
(the objectivity) of the objects falling under the concepts 
is a function, not of the spatial and temporal structure of 
experience but of the inner nature of the concepts (their 
clarity and distinction). 
The problem then, with the Leibnizian position and 
common to all dogmatic metaphysics, is a failure to recog- 
:nize that space and time are primitive conditions in the 
overall cognitive situation. But to what extent can this 
objection of Kant's be considered an effective one? By 
this I mean that Leibniz's theory of space, as we shall 
see momentarily, was formulated to meet a specific problem 
(the Newtonian theory of space) and to be consistent with 
certain fundamental metaphysical truths pertaining to the 
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nature of reality. To put this another way,Leibniz's 
theory of space grew out of a specific problematic context 
and if Kant's objections and suggested alternative are to 
be effective one would expect them to address this problem 
situation. If Kant's theory of the a priori status of 
space and time is not designed to solve this problem then 
what is its point? And if it is designed as a corrective 
to previous theories of space then we are entitled to 
evaluate it within the context of the problem situation 
of thesetheories. While I certainly think Kant's own 
story about space and time can be evaluated independently 
of this particular problem, the same cannot be said for 
his criticisms of Leibniz's theory since, for the most 
part, Kant is content to simply point out what Leibniz 
failed to do (i.e. conceive of space and time as forms of 
intuition) rather than point out what is mistaken in what 
he did do. Furthermore, since Kant's strategy is (as 
usual) to lay an epistemological context over tYe problem 
of space with respect to the Newtonian and Leibnizian 
discussion, it becomes all the more important to adopt 
some caution towards Kant's approach to a problem situation 
which arose within a context from which epistemological 
considerations were absent. Buchdahl argues to this 
effect when he says that "....Kant managed to tread his way 
between the Newtonian extreme of space as an empty vacuum, 
and Leibniz's theory of relational space, only by the 
creation of a specific technical device, that of a trans- 
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:cendental.(i.e. presuppositional) 'form of intuition'. 
And obviously this is not an answer to these other theories, 
but a different way of reshuffling the philosophical cards. "3 
It is to Leibniz's theory of relational space that I now 
turn. 
3. Traditionally, the central problem posed by space 
and time for philosophers who have formulated theories 
which might explain them, is whether space and time are 
substances, properties or relations. In this respect 
Leibniz is no exception. He rejects the theory of- 
absolute space because it amounts to making space a sub - 
:stance and for Leibniz, only substantial entities are 
absolutely (unconditionally) real. He also objects to 
the theory of absolute space on the grounds that it clashes 
with both the principle of identity and the principle of 
sufficient reason -in the following way. If the absolute 
theory is true then it follows that the universe could 
have occupied a different region of space (and a different 
stretch of time) than it does and still be the same universe. 
Furthermore, there would have been no reason for placing 
the universe within one set of spatial and temporal co- 
:ordinates rather than another; but god never acts but with 
sufficient reason and therefore, he would have had no reason 
to create the universe; there is a universe however, from 
which it follows that the theory of absolute space must be 
false.4 The other factor in Leibniz's rejection of a sub- 
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:stantial account of space is his conception of the sub - 
:ject- predicate logic. In short, if space is construed 
as a substance in its own right, then the relation be- 
:tween spaces and the substances occupying them cannot be 
represented within the logical form of the subject -predicate 
calculus.5 I'f both space and material substance are in- 
:dependent existents the relation of subject and predicate - 
(the relation of) the containment of the predicate in the 
subject - may change, such as when a space is evacuated 
by a body and then re- occupied by a different one. The 
change in the relation is not accompanied by a correspond - 
:ing change in the terms of the relation for the body simply 
occupies another space and the space it evacuated is occu- 
:pied It makes to claim that a 
relation of containment holds between two terms of a pro - 
:position in subject -predicate logic if a change in the 
subject term does not imply a change in the predicate term; 
indeed, this is the meaning of 'containment'. These argu- 
ments forcefully describe the metaphysical and logical 
prejudices at work with respect to Leibniz's theory of 
space but even more important for my purpose, is that they 
demonstrate that the considerations leading Leibniz to de- 
:fend the relational theory are far removed from epistemo- 
:logical considerations of the sort Kant was motivated by. 
This point can be established firmly by briefly looking at 
Kant's reasons for rejecting the theory of absolute space. 
With the possible exception of the 'Axioms of Intuition' 
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where Kant is concerned with showing the necessity of 
attributing a determinate structure to space, i.e. insofar 
as space is perceptible it must be possible to apply sens- 
:ible measure3 to it, Kant's stated reasons for rejecting 
the theory of absolute space are epistemologically rooted. 
Absolute space cannot be a possible object of experience 
for any possible object of experience occupies a spatial 
position, and absolute space obviously cannot do so. 
Absolute space is infinite and on Kant's theory of know- 
:ledge no possible object of experience can be infinite. 
(A426 - A433. = B454 - B461) 
(A427 - A434 = B455 - B462) 
At best the concept of absolute space functions as an ideal 
limit for thinking smaller spaces in ever larger spaces;it 
is,as Kant says in MFNS, "...a logical universality of any 
space, with which I can compare each empirical space as 
being included in it..." (482) In other words, absolute 
space is unacceptable as a characterization of space be- 
:cause it construes what is no more than a regulative idea 
as a possible object of experience; the concept of absolute 
space is an empty one lacking any corresponding intuition 
which is just to say that we can't demonstrate in Kant's 
chosen a priori fashion, the objective reality of the 
concept. In fact, it is epistemological considerations 
such as these that lead Kant ultimately (his mature view) 
to adopt a relational theory, thus following Leibniz (not 
without a twist of irony). Of course, space as relational 
does satisfy the conditions of 'the possibility of objects 
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of experience' insofar as the 'spaces' are measurable quan- 
:tities, thus allowing us to attribute,once again, a metric 
to space (Hence the topic of the 'Axioms', that 'all appear - 
:ances, in their intuition, are extehsive magnitides'). 
The fact is that Kant's eventual adoption of the relational 
theory of space rests on his epistemological thesis to the 
effect that space is the form of intuition and thus subject - 
:ive. We can measure space because space's metric is, in 
some sense, contributed by us (as the form of our intuition). 
Like Leibniz, Kant ends by denying the reality (uncondition- 
:al) of space but unlike Leibniz, he effects an indealization 
of space (= making space subjective). This idealization is 
meant to accomplish two things for Kant: by denying the 
reality of space Kant removes one possible source of alterity 
in the world (the other being matter) while simultaneously - 
by subjectivizing space or making space a form of knowing 
subjects - preserving the epistemological status of space 
as the ground (as a form of intuition along with time and 
the categories) of the order of things in the world. And 
it is here that we can see the real significance of the 
difference between the idealism of Kant and the realism of 
Leibniz: both deny the substantial alterity of space in 
rejecting the theory of absolute space but whereas Leibniz 
has an account of how at the phenomenal level the relations 
of things in space are grounded in ('well- founded in') sub - 
:stantial entities composed of. active forces, Kant has no 
such account. In a word, Kant's subjectivization of space 
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looks like being ultimate. We get a glimpse of Kant's 
line of argument from the chapter on 'Dynamics' in NFNS 
(to which we shall be returning in the final chapter): 
"The philosopher sees himself thus forced 
to depart from the assertion that matter 
is a thing in itself and space a property 
of things in themselves, however common 
and suited to the common understanding this 
assertion may be. But of course he departs 
from this assertion only under the condition 
that in the event of his making matter and 
space appearances only (hence making space 
only the form of our external sensible 
intuition, and thus making both matter and 
space not things in themselves but only 
subjective modes of representation of 
objects in themselves unknown to us)...." 
(506) 
If Kant's theory of space as the form of intuition is 
supposed to be an improvement on the absolute theory while 
at the same time avoiding the reduction of space to an un- 
:known property of substantial entities (the unacceptable 
side of the Leibnizian coin), Kant, like Leibniz, must 
provide some account of the relation between matter/or 
space on the one side, and mind, on the other. As I have 
said, Leibniz does have such an account of how substantial 
entities ground phenomena. Take for example Leibniz's 
handling of 'place': On the basis of his ontology, Leibniz 
could not accept that place was ontologically distinct from 
body; all entities in the phenomenal world are or can be, 
accounted for by explaining their appearance in terms of 
another type of entity, namely, substantial entities con- 
sisting of forces. Leibniz could thus provide a con- 
sistent account of how physical things were grounded in 
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the unconditionally real (ignoring of course other diff- 
iculties with Leibniz's account). Place could be explain - 
:ed in like fashion by reference to the well -founded phen- 
:omena. The place occupied by a physical thing is just its 
situation relative to other physical things; place isl'where.' 
one physical thing is situated with reference to 'where' 
other physical things are situated. All such entities are 
externally related to one another, possessing a determinate 
situation relative to each other. The total number of 
places defined in this way constitutes space. It is 
crucial to see that Leibniz does not deny the phenomenal 
nature of space, he simply wants to say that space or place 
are not fundamental, i.e. there exist more fundamental 
entities which serve to explain them. Now admittedly, 
this is a slightly loose interpretation of some of the most 
controversial of Leibniz's doctrines, or, more accurately, 
of how these 'levels of doctrine' fit with each other: this 
is nowhere more apparent nor more important, than with 
respect to the placing of Leibniz's eccentric metaphysics 
in relation to his physical theories of matter and force. 
Because Leibniz nowhere makes an attempt to explain or come 
to grips with the problem of the relation between the meta- 
:physical and the physical in his work, the task is inher- 
:ited by those of his commentators who feel the effort 
justified. Recent work on this knotted issue has brought 
to light the extent of Leibniz's use of, and in those 
instances when he was perhaps uncertain as to how to pro- 
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:ceed, his dependence on, analogical reasoning. Buchdahl, 
more than anyone, has pressed the overiding importance of 
metaphor and analogy especially in this difficult realm of 
relating Leibniz's general metaphysical world view to his 
more specific soundings on the constitution of matter and. 
substance. 
6 
I do not now believe that there is a straight - 
:forward approach to the problem of fitting these two 
levels of theory together in Leibniz's philosophy as a 
whole and my controlling principle when dealing with any 
aspect of Leibniz's work has therefore been to take a stand 
on specific issues and present what arguments I could mar - 
:shall on their behalf. This is most significant with 
respect to the question of relating Leibniz's dynamics and 
metaphysics and I shall explain my position in this regard 
when discussing Leibniz' s force theory in the Fi nál chapter. 
It will have to suffice here to say that although I am con- 
vinced that Leibniz was first and foremost a metaphysician 
(probably because he regarded metaphysics to be the realm 
proper for first truths) his actual metaphysical construc- 
:tions, such as the monad, the doctrine of mirroring, are 
so replete with analogy and metaphor as to make literal 
interpretation of their meaning quite out of the question. 
Thus, if I reject the view that the activity of force which 
is the essence of substantial entities, is no more than a 
series of changing perceptions in a monad, it is on the 
basis that perception was for Leibniz no more than an apt 
analogy for describing or picturing substantial activity. 
To return to the main discussion. Leibniz does 
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provide an account of the foundations of phenomena; there 
is something other than phenomena in the world. Leibniz 
rejects space as a possible candidate for what is other 
than phenomena, i.e. what grounds phenomena, largely for 
the reasons we have given - space is no more than an 
ordered series of material substances, or, to rephrase 
what I said earlier, space is a logical construction from 
the total number of 'places' occupied by material substance 
at the phenomenal level. Thus Leibniz rejects space and 
eventually accepts substantial entities as the source for 
what is other than phenomena, i.e. the grounds of object - 
:ivity. Locke, working within the influence of Newtonian 
physics, locates the foundations of appearances in matter, 
or, to be precise, in the configurations of matter in space 
but failed to provide an account of how the two levels are 
connected. Locke is thereby forced to push 'real knowledge' 
of things into the realm of ideal scientific knowledge of 
the essence of things. Within such a context, Kant's 
response is to shift the foundations of knowledge from what 
seemed to be the permanently unknowable source of the 
essence of things, i.e. matter, thereby separating matter 
from the realm of knowledge altogether. We continue to 
have knowledge of material things but the foundations of 
knowledge (and thus the source of the world -order) no 
longer is construed as residing in matter. In fact, it 
appears at times that Kant is not content to dislodge 
matter from the realm of knowledge but wants it dislodged 
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from the realm of being as well: 
"Matter, therefore, does not mean a kind 
of substance quite distinct and hetero- 
geneous from the object of inner sense 
(the soul), but only the distinctive 
nature of those appearances of objects - 
in themselves unknown to us - the rep- 
resentations of which we call outer as 
compared with those which we count as 
belonging to inner sense, although 
like all other thoughts these outer 
representations belong only to the 
thinking subject. They have, indeed, 
this deceptive property that, zepresent- 
:ing objects in space, they detach them - 
:selves as it were from the soul and 
appear to hover outside it. Yet the 
very space in which they are intuited 
is nothing but a representation, and 
np counterpart of the same quality is 
to be found outside the soul." (n385) 
By makiny space, as the form of experience, the property 
of the thinking subject (= soul) Kant removes one possible 
source of whatever might be other than mind from the world 
of experience while still allowing that space is the ground 
of the order of things. But in so doing Kant has carried 
out the idealization of space, an idealization which is 
made no lesseffective by Kant's claim that his idealism 
is a 'formal' idealism. How else could the re- character- 
:ization of space from a real condition of the world order 
to a transcendental condition be accomplished? Once the 
idealization of space has been accomplished then matter, 
in Kant's scheme of things, and as the just quoted passage 
shows, necessarily follows. It is no use appealing here 
to Kant's repeated claim that the idealization in question 
is 'transcendental' for what is problematic is how Kant is 
to account for (provide a source of) matter and this is a 
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question of what is to count ultimately as the grounds 
of objectivity, not a question as to whether matter is 
reducible to immaterial substance, or, matter is really 
mind. And this, as I have been arguing throughout the 
course of this essay is Kant's real problem: Kant must 
admit that there is something which is the source of 
appearances, that is, something that is other than appear - 
:ances, which is not mind and that we come to have know - 
:ledge of through mind (the understanding and the categories). 
Seen in this way, questions about the grounds of objectiv- 
:ity devolve into (meta -physical) theories with respect to 
the justificatory grounds of the order of things (and the 
kinds of things) in the world. This involves providing 
philosophical justification for our scientific theories 
(e.g. the realm of physical theory) and thereby establishing 
a proper theoretical domain for metaphysics. It is in 
pursuing this endeavour that I believe we are travelling 
with the undercurrent of Leibnizian realism, for Leibniz's 
permanent concern and the controlling force in his philos- 
:ophical investigations is manifested in his attempt to 
explain the connection between phenomena and the foundations 
of phenomena, or, what has become for us, the need to explain 
the connection between theories which allege to explain 
things and their relations in terms of laws and principles 
at the macro -level, and, theories alleging to do the same 
at the micro- level. Although for Leibniz as well as Locke, 
the metaphysical and the physical were kept separate, the 
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need to rely on the use of analogy, in Leibniz, to the 
extent that the analogy becomes the explanation ('window - 
:less°, 'mirroring' monads) tends to disguise that 
philosopher's overriding goal. Of course, the consequence 
of this 'analogical' explanatory device is that inevitably, 
at some point, the explanation becomes no more than a 
picture and as an explanation, breaks down. Kant saw this 
when he effectively argues against Leibniz that substantial 
entities cannot support real causal interaction and this, 
as we shall see in the final chapter means that we shall 
have to adopt Kant's own force theory of matter to 'complement 
the metaphysics of Leibnizian realism. In concluding this 
short aside, it is well worth quoting Buchdahl, who has 
provided the impetus for my interpretation of the relation 
between metaphysics and science, for his perspective of 
Leibniz's philosophical endeavours is most perceptive: 
"Locke, just like Leibniz, thinks of 
'real essence' as a basis, but is 
worried by the epistemological barrier. 
on the other side, Leibniz is so concern - 
:ed with the structure of the foundation 
that his assurance of its 'reality' 
prevents his epistemological qualms 
from even beginning to effect the 
issues ... Leibniz ... is so concerned 
to eliminate any gaps in the foundation, 
that he cannot have any truck with whose 
analysis of the limits of meaningful ? 
statements throws doubt upon the structure. 
For Leibniz is here simply not concerned 
with 'knowledge', but with 'foundations'; 
with what supports 'facts' or 'truths', 
not with what guarantees our knowledge 
of them... "7 
What,I hope, is beginning to emerge from this 
discussion is the extent to which Kant's ontology arises 
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from its Leibnizian roots. By making the known world, 
or, the grounds of the known world, rest on a transcenden- 
tal condition Kant effectively frees the known world from 
the constraints which are placed on it through its depend - 
:ence on the realm of being. This dependence is removed 
entirely once the source of the world -order is located, 
not in the world but outside the world in a transcendental 
condition, for from the perspective of our knowledge of 
the world, this means that the known world is autonomous 
(the requirements of knowledge reside with the knowing 
subjects). While the known world is autonomous with 
respect to the realm of being from the perspective of 
knowledge, from the perspective of the object the known 
world remains dependent on being. This, as I see it, is 
the upshot of Kant's official doctrine that the world is 
transcendentally ideal but empirically real. The ultimate 
justificatory grounds for knowledge of the world must 
reside in a transcendental condition thus making the 
world 'formally' ideal while preserving the real nature 
of things at the empirical level. And if we were to 
accept the standard interpretation of monadism, the 
picture of the relationship between the realms of knowledge 
and being provides us with a metaphysics that seems to 
complement Kant's epistemology. Each monad or individual 
substance locked within its own world nonetheless effects 
a knowledge of the whole world (thanks to the built -in 
guarantees of the pre -established harmony), the whole 
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world being the totality of all other monads. Thus know - 
:ledge of the world is an autonomous realm private to each 
monad yet each monad merely reflects (expresses) changes 
occurring in other monads without being either the source 
or the cause of those changes. In this sense, Leibniz 
does preserve the independence of the realm of being 
from the realm of knowledge. What is more, if I may say 
yet again, Leibniz can explain the relationship between 
the phenomena constituting our knowledge of the world and 
the source of that knowledge by appealing to the grounding 
function of substantial entities - the basic stuff of the 
world, or, the kind of fundamental entity which is the source 
of phenomenal order. Kant, on the other hand can at best 
provide an account of our knowledge of the world by appeal - 
:ing to the efficacy of the transcendental unity of apper- 
ception but he cannot, on his own arguments, attribute a 
grounding function with respect to the structure of things 
in the world, to a transcencental condition. 
4. Kant never succeeded in purging the heart of his meta - 
:physical programme of its uncritical (Leibnizian) elements. 
In the 'Ideas of Reason' of the Dialectic Kant presents under 
the guise of regulative principles for helping our investi- 
:gations into nature, a theory of the unconditioned which 
looks very much like being the uncritical hangover from the 
metaphysics of the.Inaugural Dissertation, ( =ID). Although 
I shall be discussing Kant's notion of the unconditioned in 
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detail in the next. chapter, I want here to present a 
brief argument to the effect that Kant's conception of 
the relation between the unconditioned (God, the Self or 
the World) is, so to speak, repressed rather than effect - 
:ively altered in any way by his critical position. With 
the help of some reconstructive analysis of Kant's 
'Ptolemaic Counter- Revolution' provided by M.J. Scott - 
Taggart,8 and the ID, it is possible to show that onto- 
:logically Kant has not demonstrated that the critical 
system does not require some interpretation of the uncon- 
:ditioned. The kernel of Scott -Taggart's article is 
that the critical philosophy fully developed effects two 
major conceptual displacements which enable Kant to estab- 
:lish the sought -after structural truths about the world. 
In Kant's systematic programme God is replaced by man and 
talk about things represented is replaced by talk about 
the representings of things, as the following little 
exercise evidences. In the passage: "The transcendental 
unity of apperception forms out of all possible appear - 
:ances, which can stand alongside one another in one 
experience, a connection of all these representations 
according to laws. "(A108), substitute 'God' for 'trans - 
:cendental unity of apperception'; 'substances' for 'appear - 
:ances' and 'representations'; and 'world' for'experience'. 
We get the following, very.Leibniz- sounding or ID- sounding 
passage: 'God forms out of all possible substances, which 
can stand alongside one another in one world, a connection 
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of all these substances according to laws'. Now one of 
the structural truths that Kant was most concerned to 
demonstrate (against Leibniz and Hume) was the objectivity 
of causal relationships. But long before the CPR, as 
Kant was working his way towards his final solution to 
the problem of demonstrating the objectivity of causal 
relationships, he was concentrating on the question as to 
how it is possible to have a whole of things represented 
and his answer to this was always to remain that the 
things represented should be substances standing in real 
causal connections with one another, 
9 
In fact, in ID, 
while recognizing that there is a difference between the 
world's being a real whole and an ideal whole, Kant states 
that it is not yet possible to argue successfully that 
the world is a real whole. As section 20 of ID shows and 
as Scott -Taggart explicates, 
10 
Kant's early answer to 
how it was possible to have a whole of things represented 
is: when the things represented in the whole stand in real 
causal connections with one another but this is only 
possible if the things represented are all causally depen- 
dent upon the one Creator (thus guaranteeing that they all 
have the same source). And by the time of the CPR, the 
appropriate substitutions have been made in Kant's answer 
so that it is seen that our knowledge of things represented 
is only possible through our representings of the things 
with man replacing God as the source of the causal order, 
from the point of view of knowledge. However, the dis- 
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:placement of the old terms by the new does not imply that 
Kant has altered the premises of the argument for he still 
maintains that we can have a representing of the whole only 
if there is a whole represented and there can be a whole 
represented if and only if the items in the whole stand in 
real causal connection with one another. But this is where 
Kant's problems begin: 
"For by taking several things together 
you achieve without difficulty a whole 
of representation, but not thereby the 
representation of the whole. Accordingly 
if there happened to be certain wholes 
consisting of substances, and these wholes 
were not bound to one another by any bond, 
the bringing of these wholes together, 
whereby the mind forces the manifold into 
an ideal unity, would not give expression 
to anything more than a plurality of 
worlds held together in a single act of 
thought. But the bond constituting 
the essential form of a world is seen as 
the principle of the possible influxes of 
the substances which constitute the world. 
For actual influxes do not pertain to the 
essence but to the state, and the transeunt 
forces themselves, which are the causes of 
the influxes, suppose some principle by 
which it may he possible that the states 
of several things whose subsistence is none 
the less independent each franthe other 
should be related to one another mutually 
as grounded determinations. If you depart 
from this principle you are debarred from 
positing as possible a transeuent force 
in the world." (ID: No. 2) 
To condense Scott -Taggart's argument and that presented 
in the quoted passage, Kant is saying that we could not 
have a representation of the whole unless substances 
causally interacted,. and substances could only be said 
to be in real causal connection with one another if they 
were held together by a bond the source of which was the 
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Creator. With the displacement of God (and his surrogates) 
however, Kant can no longer use God to establish structural 
truths about the world; instead Kant argues that there must 
be real causal connections between things in the world - as 
an a priori conceptual truth - if experience itself is to 
be possible, or, if consciousness (unity of experience) is 
to be possible. "We can establish that there is a whole of 
things represented only by appeal to man as that being 
through which our representings of things must necessarily 
relate, and through whom, therefore, they may be totalised."11 
Thus, what Kant has established in the absence of God is the 
structural truth that there must be real causal connections 
between the substances of the world (and the other structural 
truths represented by the categories); any detail with res- 
:pect to the specific nature of the real causal connections 
is now left out of account as being out of place in the new 
epistemological context which has accompanied Kant's con - 
:ceptual displacement. But under the old view, God was 
the real common bond explaining the real connection between 
substances, not the conceptual necessity to the effect that 
we must think the world as being constituted of substances 
so connected. In other words, under the old view, God 
wasused to explain how the different structures in the 
world were all held together - because they were the onto- 
:logical derivatives of a common source, a real source. 
In the new world -view, once all of the structural truths 
about the world have been established, Kant is left without 
an explanation as to why the various structures in the 
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world hold together, for God can no longer be appealed to 
as the real source of the structures and substances within. 
With God no longer construed as the real ground of thë 
whole, the whole is left ungrounded, which implies that 
there must be something else holding together the different 
structures: and the something else is God, or the Self, or 
the World now construed as regulative ideas 'ordering' the 
word as a system into a totality - an ideal totality. 
With no small degree of irony Kant thus comes to embrace 
the Leibnizian doctrine that he was beginning to move away 
from in ID - that the world is an ideal whole rather than 
a real one. And what does this amount to if not an 
admission that God or some surrogate of God, is the real 
ground (the ontological source) of the world -order but 
because this cannot be demonstrated we shall have to express 
this truth in an epistemologically cautious way by making 
God the regulative idea of the totality of the world sys- 
:tom. Kant still sees the necessity of construing the 
world as a totality only now the totality, as Scott -Taggart 
points out, is the work of man and thus, a conditioned total - 
:ity. But of course such a conditioned totality leaves 
the world ontologically underdetermined - as Kant recognizes 
- for such a totality cannot be explained. Because Kant 
always conceived the unconditioned as theological or super - 
:sensible in nature, rather than, say as a microentity 
whose explanation can at least be sought by science because 
it is within the world, not outside it, any reference to 
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the unconditioned as a source of explanation became 
illegitimate. This shows that Kant's epistemological 
edifice rests on ontological underpinnings and that Kant 
still sees the unconditioned as the true source of the 
world -order if only it wasn't epistemologically inaccess- 
:ible. Of course, from the perspective of science there 
is no reason why the unconditioned should be unthinkable 
or be construed as an inoperative concept within the 
realm of scientific explanation. We need only construe 
the unconditioned as that type of fundamental entity which 
up until the present time, we know to be the basic con- 
stituent of things. Everything else is explained in 
terms of it while it remains unexplained. Kant's concep- 
:tion of the unconditioned, or any candidate for the 
unconditioned, as a regulative idea of the totality of 
the world- system - as an ideal whole - shows that Kant 
regards the possibility of complete knowledge, or, the 
possibility of a K:ience working towards such knowledge, as 
ideal knowledge, or an ideal science. In the next chapter, 
I argue that Kant's conception of the unconditioned justi- 
:fies our attributing to him a conception of such a planned 
ontology of the world - once we have accepted Leibnizian 
realism - and that the goal of this sketched ontology is 
knowledge of the unconditioned. I believe that Kant has 
a candidate for such an unconditioned entity - forces - 
which I describe, at least tentatively, as monad -like 
(stripped of its idealist connotations) and characterize 
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as intensive magnitudes. Obviously, this is only a 
very sketchy and initial attempt to provide a conclusion 
- and thus a direction for the future - to the story begun 
in this essay. In its essentials, however, I believe it 
to be a sound conception. 
In Chapter I I argued that Kant's theory of object - 
:ivity arises from his doctrine of transcendental idealism 
and that Kant's ontology emerges from his theory of object - 
:ivity. Interpreted in this way, transcendental idealism, 
as a theory of the grounds of objetivity, is meant as a 
response to the metaphysical and scientific realism of 
Leibniz. Whereas according to the claims of transcenden- 
:tal idealism, the grounds of objectivity lie in the nature 
of the knowing subject, Leibnizian realism locates the 
grounds in the nature of objects. Since Kant rejects the 
Leibnizian doctrine to the effect that objects at the level 
of experience represent our perspectival grasping, or com- 
:prehension of, the basic and necessary properties making 
up their essential natures, it follows that Kant must 
reject the Leibnizian claim that the grounds of objectivity, 
regardless of whether we can attain to a knowledge of them, 
can be found in the constituting and essential predicates 
of the objects of knowledge. And if the grounds cannot 
be found in the nature of objects then they must be found 
in the predicates constituting the knower, or, in the 
structure defining the mode in which the knower, comes to 
know objects (the categorial structure, for example). But 
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there is a problem with this argument. For the truth of 
the claim that the grounds of objectivity can be found in 
the defining predicates of the knower implies the falsity 
of the claim that the grounds of objectivity can be found 
in the defining predicates of objects and this could only 
be shown if it could be shown that objects possess no 
essential properties or features. In order to illustrate 
this point, we can observe the way in which the grounding 
relation between phenomena and their essential natures 
is, according to Leibniz, supposed to work. We assume that 
an object, call it y, possesses a property, call it P, 
which is essential to the kind of object y is; without P 
the other properties which y possesses, call them L, M, 
N, would not be properties y, thus,.we can attribute 
the presence of L,M,N in y to P. Now, for Leibniz, to 
have a knowledge of y is to know that P is in some way 
(which would also be known) essentially connected with 
L,M,N such that without P, L,M,N would not be properties 
of y. But to say that L,M,N - the other properties of 
y - are essentially connected with P, is equivalent to 
saying that y would not be the kind of object it is, 
without P; thus, y is P essentially and without P y would 
not be known. However, and here is the point of this 
exercise, for a variety of reasons (limitations of our 
perspective, lack of empirical knowledge), we may not know 
that P is the essential defining property of y, while we 
do know that y has the properties L,M,N. Leibniz does 
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not think that the capacity to make objectively valid 
judgments about things, e.g. that y has the property of 
L, is dependent on our knowing the essential properties 
of things, e.g. that y is essentially P. We may, indeed 
do, not know this and are able to make perfectly valid 
objective judgments about things. In our example, it 
is the possession of P by y which makes Y the sort of 
thing it is and explains y,'s having the property L. Now 
Kant's claim that the grounds of objectivity are to be 
found in the essential predicates of the knower amounts 
to a claim to the effect that all necessity in our -know- 
:ledge of things is derived or comes from the essential 
predicates defining the structure of knowing subjects; but 
we know y as the sort of object the proper - 
:ties L,M,N because y possesses P then any necessity is 
attributable to y necessarily having P as that property 
(without which y would not be the sort of object it is). 
In a word, if the central claim of transcendental idealism 
is to be at all tenable then it must be shown that there 
are no properties which objects possess essentially: if 
Kant wants to refute conclusively the Leibnizian claim, or, 
the Leibnizian -type claim, then he must demonstrate that 
there are no properties like P which objects (qua things 
in themselves, as Kant would say) possess. If true, this 
argument shows the priority of our ontological locutions 
over our epistemological ones,.for the important question 
is whether there exist entities possessing properties de- 
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:fining their natures and if so, what relationship pertains 
between such entities and those not possessing essential 
properties. This objection to the central claim of trans- 
cendental idealism, lodged from the perspective of Leib - 
:nizian realism, reinforces an earlier one. By making 
knowing subjects the agents of the order in the world Kant 
blurs the distinction between an independently existing 
order and an order which knowing subjects create, thereby 
reducing the possibility of objective knowledge to an 
analytic truth about ourselves as knowing subjects. The 
world order we come to know through science is, structurally, 
the world order we ourselves are responsible for. Unless 
we want to accept this conclusion, we shall have to embrace 
the thesis that the source of the known world -order is the 
world -order as grounded in the nature of. things rather than 
our knowledge of things, i.e. some form of Leibnizian real - 
:ism. Leibniz himself comes very near to expressing a 
position such as I have just outlined; to my mind it rep - 
:resents the controlling center of his unwieldy metaphysics: 
"But, to explain myself distinctly, before 
all else it is necessary to consider that 
the modifications which may belong naturally 
or without miracle to a subject, must come 
to it from the limitations or variations 
of a real genus, or of a constant and 
absolutely original nature And every 
time that we find some quality in a sub- 
ject, we must believe that if we understood 
the nature of this subject and of this qual- 
:ity, we should conceive how this quality 
can result. therefrom. Thus, in the order 
of nature (miracles set aside), it is not 
optional with God to give to substances in- 
:differently such or such qualities, and he 
will never give them any but those which 
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shall be natural to them; that is, 
which can be derived from their 
nature as explicable modifications." 
And again, frcm the same passage in the New Essays, we see 
Leibniz anticipating the thesis that things (qua things in 
themselves) must have a structure of their own if it is to 
be possible to comprehend how some system of mechanical 
laws can apply to them: 
"Thus it may be asserted that matter 
will not naturally have the above 
mentioned attraction (gravitational -JD) 
and will not move of itself in a curved 
line, because it is not possible to 
conceive how this takes place there; 
that is, to explain it mechanically; 
whereas that which is natural, must be 
able to become distinctly conceivable 
if we were admitted into the secret of 
things." (Preface to New Essays) 
5. Kant relies heavily on the distinction between 
transcendental idealism and empirical realism in his 
attacks on dogmatic rationalism. He doesn't often make 
the distinction an explicit part of his arguments against 
Leibniz but it is clear enough that, not only when crit- 
icizing the claims of the Leibnizians, but in the course 
of Kant's assaults on dogmatism in all its forms, the 
arguments presuppose it. What exactly does Kant think 
the distinction accomplishes? As I see it, Kant's story 
goes something like this. Human knowledge is a limited 
knowledge of the conditioned and the source of these 
limits is the structure of reason as it is realized 
through the employment of the understanding. Man's 
(formally). limited capacity for knowledge is directly 
related to the structure through which this capacity is 
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realized. In so far as human knowledge is limited in this 
way by human reason, by the cognitive or conceptual struc- 
:ture of human reason, our claims with respect to possess - 
:ing knowledge of the structural truths of the world can 
be supported by the fact that we make objectively valid 
judgments based on our knowledge of these structural truths 
(= categorial specifications of the world- order, or, at the 
very least, of the order of experience). What makes itself 
known,within the prescribed limits and conditions, can be 
understood as the real in experience. But the proviso 
that human knowledge is necessarily knowledge of the 
conditioned, implies that what are known - appearances - 
are all phenomenal and conditioned, and what remains un- 
:known - the real - is noumenal and unconditioned. Within 
this context, one would think that what we come to know as 
appearance is the 'way' things in themselves are as com- 
:prehended from the limited perspective of human knowledge, 
structured as it is by sensibility and understanding. But 
this cannot be the case, for it implies that we could 
achieve knowledge of the real if we could exchange our own 
limiting perspective forme which was less 'perspectival', 
and grasp things in themselves (e.g. god's perspective). 
The point here is that while Kant does not think this is 
possible, his theory of knowledge - transcendental idealism/ 
empirical realism - is logically constructed so as to make 
the inaccessibilitÿ of things in themselves (a fact of on- 
tology) a presupposition of the limitation of knowledge 
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thesis (a fact of epistemology). This is, it seems to 
me, the logical center of the doctrine of transcendental 
idealism / empirical realism and it points to the possib- 
:ility that ontological considerations are lurking in the 
background of Kant's epistemology. The most that Kant 
is allowed to say regarding the status of things in them- 
:selves is something to the effect that things in them - 
:selves are, and must remain, problematic; yet Kant's 
claim that things in themselves are unknowable is a claim 
that is not really warranted by his epistemological thesis 
with respect to the problematic status of things in them - 
:selves. This suggests that the 'limits of knowledge' 
thesis notwithstanding, Kant is or might be, resorting to 
some unstated ontological sentiment regarding the onto - 
:logical status of things in themselves. 
The distinction between the transcendentally ideal 
and empirically real nature of things is, however, opera - 
:tive at two, or across two different levels. From the 
perspective of common sense and empirical science we 
simply take it for granted that the world of things and 
nature are real whereas from the perspective of philosoph- 
:ical reflection (where nothing is taken for granted) cer- 
:tain problems oblige us to acknowledge that the world is 
transcendentally ideal. This view receives its best 
expression in the writings on Kant of W.H. Walsh.12 Walsh 
argues that not only does Kant draw the empirical reality/ 
transcendental ideality distinction across two levels but 
further, Kant distinguishes appearance and reality at both 
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levels. This latter distinction when made at the level 
of common sense and science, comes to no more than a recog- 
:nition of the difference between primary and secondary 
qualities, viz. tastes, smells and colours are judged to 
be mere appearances or subjective while the spatial and 
temporal qualities of objects, being the same for all 
percipients, are or can be judged to be, objectively real. 
As Walsh states, "To remain at this level and deny reality 
to the space -time world is absurd. "13 From the perspec- 
:tive of critical philosophy, on the other hand, it is 
difficult to deny that while things are not dependent on 
one's perceptions of them for their existence, things do 
appear as they do largely because our perceptual and 
conceptual faculties have the structure they do have. It 
follows, from considerations made at this philosophical 
level, that things as they appear to exist in an indepen- 
:dent space and time are really (= ultimately) mind- depen- 
:dent, i.e. the world is ultimately or transcendentally, 
ideal. I should point out that Walsh eventually comes 
to reject Kant's claims with respect to the thesis that 
the world is a world of appearances in favour of his own 
argued -for position that the world is a common world of 
facts constituted through judgment.14 Walsh thus comes 
to the conclusion that Kant's transcendental idealism/ 
empirical realism distinction, in its original form, is 
indefensible. My position with respect to Kant's 'levels' 
analysis of the appearance /reality distinction is that such 
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an analysis follows as a natural result of Kant's central 
thesis of transcendental idealism and therefore, like 
that doctrine, is subject to the arguments raised against 
it in the first chapter of this essaÿ. In particular, 
while the distinction between appearance and reality at 
the two levels may have a prima facie plausibility when 
considered as an epistemological thesis, it would seem 
to lack all plausibility from the perspective adopted by 
the would -be ontologist. The problem of the grounds of 
objectivity arises in the context of Kant's theory of 
objectivity which, as I have argued, is the bed of Kant's 
ontology; thus interpreted the thesis of transcendental 
idealism is a theory with respect to the grounds of 
objectivity. Kant, in short, must justify his epistemol- 
:ogical strategy (re- interpretation of Locke'stheory of 
ideas) to the effect that things are empirically real for 
science and common sense but transcendentally ideal for 
those who care to think about the specific philosophical 
problems involved. I have argued in connection with 
Leibniz that epistemological modes of talking do not cut 
deeply enough and I would want to say the same in this 
case; what, after all, does it mean to say that ultimately 
the world is a world of appearances and that science is 
operative within the realm of appearances? It must mean 
(given Kant's limitations of knowledge doctrine) that we 
can never have a science grounded in the nature of things, 
regardless of how much empirical success is achieved. 
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Kant would say, presumably, that the discovery of the 
atomic structure of matter (say) provided an empirical 
insight and new understanding into the nature of things 
but ultimately even physics was applicable only to appear - 
:ances. In other words, at best Kant's theory that the 
world is a worldcf appearances devolves into a claim that 
empirical truth can never be more than phenomenal because 
we can never know whether other sorts of beings would 
perceive or cognize things in the way we do. But this 
amounts to acknowledging my claim that according to trans- 
cendental idealism, the grounds of the world order lie in 
the nature of the subject and this is the position Kant 
must defend and which I have been questioning from the 
perspective of ontology.' One recent commentator on Kant, 
one with unusually considerable sympathies with transcen- 
dental idealism as an epistemological thesis,reaches the 
conclusion that transcendental idealism cannot explain why 
the world should conform so readily to our cognitive cap - 
:acities, which is equivalent to my claim that transcenden- 
:tal idealism runs into difficulties (of an ontological 
kind) over th.e grounds of objectivity: 
"When he asked himself how we might know 
anything about the world Kant replied 
that there were three possible theories. 
Knowledge might be read off from the 
world; the empiricists would explain 
all our knowledge in this way. It 
might be read into the world by us; 
this is Kant's own view about the 
limited-synthetic a priori knowledge 
we possess .... Kant's own account is 
promising; at least in a slightly 
modified form - he has no right to deny 
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that the picture we construct may coincide 
with the real nature of the world in itself 
and his list of the principles of human 
thinking requires amendment. But it will 
not cover all the ground. As we saw 
earlier, constraints internal to his 
theory require him to admit the existence 
of things in themselves, with his own mind 
amongst them as an active subject of 
synthesis ... And finally we have now seen 
that Kant's solution leaves it unexplained 
why the world should be so readily compre- 
:hensible to us, and that it affords no 
ground for our confidence that the future 
will continue to follow those relatively 
simple laws which we make the basis for 
our inductive extrapolations. These are 
not things that can be read into the world, 
in the Constructions of the world of appear - 
i:ances; they depend on how the world itself 
turns out, and therefore on the character of 
the data we receive from sensory experience." 
C emphasis mine) 15 
I shall, for the sake of examining Kant's argument vis a' 
vis Leibniz, grant Kant his claim that we are committed 
to thinking about the world at two distinct levels; on 
this account, knowledge of objects is a knowledge con - 
:ditioned by (= limited by) our cognitive capacities. I 
think it can be shown that Leibniz's conception of know - 
:ledge likewise involves a 'limitation of knowledge' 
doctrine, only Leibniz does not think that any sceptical 
consequences need follow from this. To begin,, a brief 
review of Kant's theory of sensibility is required. 
According to this theory, space and time are the forms of 
intuition which the mind brings to what is given to the 
senses; space and time are themselves pure intuitions in 
so far as they are not abstracted from experience but 
contributed by the mind in ordering the sensory manifold 
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presented to it. Thus space and time are seen to be 
constitutive ingredients'in our knowledge of things; but 
while they may be constitutive of our knowledge in the 
sense that space and time regiment sensory data into 
specific spatial and temporal forms, the contribution 
they make is of a negative sort, i.e. they set limits to 
what can be known by human minds. The categories are 
the more positive constituting capacity being thoroughly 
active rather than passive like the forms of intuition. 
The constituting active capacity of the mind and its cap- 
acity for setting limits on what can be knowable áre the 
two sides of the same coin, so to speak; they are simply 
the concomitants of a perceptual and conceptual capacity 
combining form and content. 
Kant's theory of sensibility as presented in the 
'Transcendental Aesthetic' and before it is complemented 
by the theory of the understanding in the 'Analytic', 
construes sensible intuiton a necessary condition of 
objective knowledge. It is the failure to recognize this 
independent contribution to the overall cognitive situa- 
:tion by sensibility that Kant considers the central 
error in Leibniz's theory of knowledge. However, Kant 
is not consistent on this point; or, more accurately, he 
is of two minds about it. In the 'Amphibole of Concepts 
of Reflection' which I shall be discussing in more detail 
soon, Kant charges Leibniz with failing to distinguish 
between sensibility and understanding, of treating the 
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difference between ideas and images as one of difference 
in degree rather than kind. In 'On a Discovery', within 
the context of the controversy with Eberhard, Kant's 
story is quite different. Here Kant construes Leibniz as 
being concerned with how sensibility and understanding 
work together to make experience possible. Perhaps it 
is pointless to even attempt to explain these conflicting 
characterizations of Leibniz's position if only because 
the context of Kant's argument in each case is so differ - 
:ent. However, since I think it is possible to argue 
that on Leibniz's theory the senses do supply an indepen- 
:dent input to cognition and contribute indispensably to 
knowledge, I am obliged to consider Kant's ' Amphiboly' 
presentation where this is explicitly denied, Yet my main 
interest is by no means to try and rescue Leibniz from 
Kant's criticisms. In any case this is quite out of the 
question for the fact is there are really two opposing 
views which Leibniz adopts towards the sense -understanding 
issue only one of which could possibly represent the 
Leibniz criticised in the 'Amphiboly'. This is the 
position epitomized by Leibniz's identification of sense 
perception with confused thoughts. Of this Leibniz, Kant's 
critical remarks are both accurate and acute but it must be 
said that this is the Leibniz who filtered through in the 
school of Wolff, the most eminent of Leibniz's rationlist 
disciples and very much a part'of Kant's philosophical 
back -ground. The second position takes what is almost a 
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completely opposite view; in the New Essays for example, 
Leibniz attacks Locke for failing to distinguish 'image' 
and 'idea'. And, as I have already mentioned, Kant him - 
:self in the Eberhard controversy defends Leibniz against 
the Eberhardians and the Wolffians by interpreting Leibniz 
as being concerned to mark the two sources of knowledge, 
sense and understanding. What I do hope to do is simply 
mitigate the force of Kant's criticisms by demonstrating 
that they fall quite short of appreciating the full mean- 
ing of certain crucial aspects of Leibniz's theory of 
knowledge.16 Leibniz himself may not have agreed with 
some of the views I shall attribute to his general posi- 
tion (although I happen to think that he would) but I do 
not claim to be defending 
salvaging the few remains; rather, the aim is to show, 
with the help of some slight reconstruction, that despite 
Kant's anti- rationlist tendencies, the structural affini- 
:ties which exist between his theory of cognition and 
that of Leibniz are of considerable consequence in respect 
of the problems with the Kantian theory of objectivity. 
The unfortunate truth about Leibniz is that nowhere 
in his writings do we find a theory of knowledge as we do, 
for example, in Descartes, Locke and Kant. Leibniz never 
gave the subject a developed treatment in its own right. 
What we would consider topics proper to theory of know - 
:ledge are discussed by Leibniz in connection with his 
major concerns, metaphysics, logic and dynamics. There 
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is, however, one article in which Leibniz is solely con -. 
:cerned with his conception of knowledge and judging from 
his frequent references to it in his later writings, he 
considered his definitive statement on the subject. The 
article is entitled, 'Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and 
Ideas', published in a journal in 1684. As R. McRae in 
Leibniz: Perception, Apperception and Thought has recog- 
:nized, the article is simply too brief and of inadequate 
scope to be regarded as a complete theory of knowledge.17 
Still, the article would be central to any attempted re- 
:construction of such a theory from the available material. 
The article presents a classification of concepts and ideas 
in terms of their capacity to represent or express the 
characteristic properties of objects which properties, to 
a greater or lesser degree, approximate the 'real' prop - 
:erties which their objects possess. Knowledge is char - 
:acterized as expressible through concepts; by means of 
'clear' concepts one is able to identify an object as be- 
:longing to a certain class of objects. This implies that 
the concept supplies sufficient information about the 
characteristic properties of the object to set it apart 
from others. A concept which fails to do this is 'obscure' 
and explains one's inability to recognize a certain object 
for what it is. However, it is possible to have a clear 
concept of, say, gold, and yet not be able to enumerate 
its characteristic properties. In such a case, what one 
can do according to Leibniz, is identify the object as 
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gold solely by relying on memory, without knowing anything 
further about the characteristic properties which gold 
possesses. To possess such a concept is to have a 'clear' 
but undeveloped or 'confused', concept of the object in 
question: with further analysis of the object's properties 
it is possible to develop concepts which are 'clear' and 
'distinct' and it is plain enough that there can be and 
often are, degrees of 'distinctness' in this sense, the 
more sophisticated our analytical techniques the more 
progressive our concepts. Knowledge will be more or 
less complete as concepts are more or less adequately 
developed (MKTI, pp 291 -292) 
These terms are part of Leibniz's technical term - 
:inology and with one or two exceptions, his use of them 
is consistent in short articles, letters, the New Essays 
and the Discourse on Metaphysics which followed MKTI and 
contain either reformulations of the classificatory terms . 
first presented there or very slight elaboration on them. 
I mention this because it seems to me that Kant's reading 
of Leibniz in this respect is simply mistaken. It may 
be of course, that Kant did not read Leibniz at all but 
derived what he knew of Leibniz's doctrines from Wolff 
and his school, the most prominent of Leibniz's disciples; 
Kant does mention the New Essays in the Prolegomena and 
was almost certainly familiar with the so- called popular 
works, The Monadology and Theodicy. Whether Kant had 
read Leibniz or not, his (Kant's) discussion of Leibnizian 
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principles in the 'Amphiboly' and in 'On a Discovery' 
leave very little doubt that Leibniz's general philosophy 
was a permanent and influential feature of Kant's back - 
:ground and one with which he struggled (some might say, 
to free himself from) in defining his own position espec- 
:ially with respect to theoretical reason, teleology and 
the concept of matter. 
Again, by arguing that Kant misunderstands Leibniz 
regarding the meaning of 'clear and confused' concepts, 
ideas and representations, I hope to establish that the 
two theories of sensibility carry commitments to the pos- 
:ition that human sensibility is fundamentally a limited 
form of representation of things. As the issue centers 
around the ontological status of sensible (secondary) 
qualities, I shall begin with Leibniz's characterization 
of the 'sensible'. Leibniz argues that the concepts of 
sensible qualities are 'clear' but 'confused' concepts in 
that it is by means of them that we recognize the sensible 
qualities for what they are; for Leibniz, to have a clear 
idea or a clear concept is simply to have the capacity to 
recognize a particular appearance; the dispositional 
nature of ideas is stated or implied in various articles, 
for example, in 'What is an Idea ?'; "In my opinion, an 
idea consists not in some act, but in the faculty of think - 
:ing, and we are said to have an idea, even if we do not 
think of it, if only, on a given occasion, we can think of 
it" (L 207). Leibniz makes it clear that the capacity for 
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recognition of appearances is the function specifically, 
of 'clear ideas' or 'clear concepts' implying that he 
understands the capacity for recognition to be one of the 
most basic functions of thought since clear ideas are the 
most basic of ideas. Thus, to have a clear concept of 
red is to be able to recognize an instance of it, or to 
alter the idiom, to have a sensation of red and 'know', 
in the sense of 'recognize' or 'identify' one's experience 
as such. Thus,Leibniz states, "For this reason it is 
usually said that the 'concepts' of these qualities are 
'clear', since they serve us in recognizing them ..." 
(L 548). However, although sensible qualities are 
sufficiently recogniziable to allow of being identified 
and re- identified, they do not 'tell' us anything further 
about their constitutions, that is, we cannot, by obser- 
:vation alone (tactile, visual, audial) discover what 
sensible qualities are or what causes them to effect our 
sense organs in the way they do. Therefore, Leibniz 
declares that the concepts of sensible qualities are not 
'distinct' but 'confused'. He even says that "sensible 
qualities are occult qualities" (L547) but by this he 
means that sensible qualities are not self- explanatory; 
they are the manifestation of something (physical prop - 
:erties) which we have not as yet been able to discover 
and therefore do not fully understand. Leibniz is here 
making a perfectly legitimate,.i.e. scientifically accept- 
:able and commonplace distinction between the manifest 
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properties of sensible qualities and the physical or micro - 
:physical properties which serve to explain them. At the 
philosophical level this distinction is equivalent to the 
difference between having a concept which can do no more 
than help us recognize a particular experience and a con- 
cept or set of concepts, whose explanatory power is much 
broader. If it is true, says Leibniz, that red is the 
whirling of very small globes which produces light, how 
are we to connect such occurrences which we cannot perceive, 
with our familiar particular perceptions of the sensible 
qualities in question (L547). This looks very much like 
asking how our explanatory hypotheses 'hook on' to the 
complex physical processes they are about, or, how to 
express the relationship between the terms of our language 
at the observational level and the terms of our language 
at the theoretical level in scientific theory. There is 
another consideration which Leibniz thinks limits the 
explanatory power of concepts of sensible qualities; it 
would be very difficult, if not impossible, to define or 
explain the concept of red to someone whose experience did 
not include red objects or who had never had a. sensation of 
red. There is nothing contained in colour - concepts which 
would be of assistance to a person born blind attempting 
to understand what colours are like; perhaps this is too 
strong a view to attribute to Leibniz for we can after all 
describe colours without relying on colour -words and this 
might be sufficient for giving the blind person some idea 
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of experiencing and understanding colours. Nevertheless, 
Leibniz's point is sound. Descriptions of sensible 
qualities are secondary to the actual experience of them 
when what is in question is a basic, perhaps primitive, 
understanding of what they are. Thus, when Leibniz states 
that clear knowledge is "confused when I cannot enumerate 
one by one the marks which are sufficient to distinguish 
the thing from others, even though the thing may in truth 
have such marks and constituents into which its concept 
can be resolved" (ibid) and says that our knowledge of 
sensible qualities is just such knowledge, we now have a 
good idea of what he means. To possess a concept of a 
sensible quality is, for Leibniz, to be able to recognize 
that particular quality in Perception and to be able to 
distinguish it from others of the same kind, e.g. red 
amongst a spectrum of colours. We cannot, however, ex- 
:press or state the distinguishing marks of sensible 
qualities even though these qualities may, indeed do, 
possess properties which define their natures and serve 
to distinguish them from others. The point here is that 
these properties are not manifest and therefore, if we are 
to know what they are and how they define the nature of 
a particular thing or sensible quality we must probe 
further by analysis and experiment. Thus, though our 
knowledge of sensible qualities is confused in that our 
concepts do not express the marks or properties which dis- 
tinguish particular qualities and which define their 
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natures (if only we knew), there is nothing 'confused' 
about sensible qualities themselves. The technical or 
idiosyncratic sense of 'confused' becomes apparent. Our 
knowledge of the sensible is of necessity knowledge. 
characterized by the limitations of human perception and 
cannot therefore be taken at face value. If what is 
represented or expressed in perception (perception is 
essentially expressive for Leibniz) is so from a limited 
perspective, as indeed any perspectival knowledge must be, 
it (the expression) cannot stand as the complete story 
for what is expressed. If this is understood, it can be 
seen that the issue in question is not the ontological 
status of sensible qualities, as I have already mentioned, 
but the judging of the adequacy of human sensibility to 
characterize what is represented or expressed therein. 
If we approach this issue from a slightly different 
direction it will be seen that Leibniz is in fact emphasiz- 
:ing the (Kantian) distinction between the intuitional and 
the discursive. For Kant, concepts are the essential con - 
:stituents of judgment; intuitions are represented in judg- 
ment by being expressed in conceptual form for, it is the 
essence of intuitions that they (not being discursive) 
cannot qua intuitions be expressed in judgment. And 
Leibniz's point about sensible qualities, which are 
intuitional in kind, is that they can be expressed in 
judgment in only a limited fashion and like Kant, Leibniz 
thinks this is done by means of (clear) concepts. But 
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for Leibniz this simply means that to have a concept of 
a sensible quality is to be able to recognize an instance 
of it in perception. Now, given Kant's solid commitment 
to the sensibility /understanding distinction, can the 
having of empirical concepts like concepts of sensible 
intuitions, mean anything other than what it does for 
Leibniz, i.e. the ability to recognize or identify an 
instance of them in perception? Surely not, for what 
possible alternative role could empirical concepts have? 
Kant's model of the relation between concepts and intui- 
:tions dictates that intuitions, without concepts, would 
be unrecognizable and incomprehensible bits of sensation, 
sensation - yes, but not perception for perception involves 
the capacity for recognition ('intuitions without concepts 
are blind'); furthermore, this capacity for recognition 
is one of the functions of synthesis described in the 
'Transcendental Deduction' (A) and synthesis is a function 
of concepts. 
It is clear that Leibnizian position concerning the 
relation between concepts and sensible qualities and the 
Kantian position regarding the relation between.. concepts 
and intuitons share a common assumption or presupposition, 
viz. perception su pp oses the power of conception. What 
it is crucial to recognize is that a position (of which 
Leibniz is sometimes representative) which characterizes 
the difference between sensibility and understanding as 
one of degree and not of kind, that is, according to which 
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knowledge is but a continuous decline from the pure 
intellectual object to the confused objects of the senses, 
could attach no ultimate significance to the distinction 
between perception and conception. And Yet, Leibniz 
either makes this distinction explicitly or assumes it 
implicitly throughout his work and those passages (only 
one of which I think is really definite - L580) that do 
convey the impression of the 'descending scale' view of 
knowledge are the exception, and inconclusive ones at 
that. Furthermore, although I cannot discuss this point, 
it is Leibniz's view that thought is made possible only 
through the combination of perception and apperception 
(self- consciousness) and since perception always involves 
sensation (excepting the possibility of unconscious per- 
ception) in the sense that the capacity for sensation is 
the result of the union of soul (apperceptive entity) with 
a body having sense organs, the more complete and fully 
comprehensible story of a Leibnizian view of the possibility 
of and limitations on, human knowledge, begins to emerge 
once these cognitive distinctions are appreciated serious - 
:ly and not passed over in preference to the usually glib 
and generalized formulations of Leibniz's extreme rational- 
ist tendencies. This excerpt from a letter of Leibniz's 
to Wagner in 1710 (W 505) exemplifies Leibniz's recognition 
of the different kinds of faculties or abilities required to 
account for what human knowledge seemed to be: "...soul 
is attributed not only to animals, but also to all other 
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percipient beings. In the strict sense, soul is employed 
as a noble species of life, or sentient life, where there 
is not only the faculty of perceiving, but in addition 
that of feeling, inasmuch, indeed, as attention and 
memory are joined in perception. Just as, in turn, 
mind is a nobler species of soul, that is, mind is 
rational soul, where reason, or ratiocination from univer- 
:sality of truths, is added to feeling. As therefore, mind 
is rational soul, so soul is sentient life, and life is 
perceptive principle." 
As I mentioned earlier, when Kant took the oppor- 
:tunity of defining his own 'critical philosophy' vis -i -vis 
Leibnizian rationalism in the controversy with Eberhard, 
he seemed no longer to believe that Leibniz 'intellectual - 
:ized appearances'. In fact, when Eberhard repudiates 
Kant's charge that the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolffe 
fails to distinguish the objects of sensibility and under - 
:standing in terms of their content and origin, or, as 
Kant himself said in CPR, that "The concept of sensibility 
and appearance would be falsified ... if we were to accept 
the view that our entire sensibility is nothing but a 
confused representation of things ..." (A43 =B60), Kant 
falsely denies ever having made such a charge.18 The 
point being not to examine Kant's moral rectitude but to 
emphasize that, even if Kant did forget what he had written 
in CPR, he obviously no longer thought that Leibniz fals- 
:ified the concept of sensibility, at least not in the 
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straightforward way that Kant's criticism of Leibniz in 
the 'Amphiboly' would have us believe, for otherwise this 
was the ideal opportunity to press home such a criticism, 
in bold contrast to the position he wished to attack. To 
corroborate this suggestion I draw attention to Kant's 
almost complete turnaround regarding Leibniz's sense - 
understanding position. Towards the end of 'On a Discov- 
:ery' Kant characterizes the Leibnizian position as one 
which is really concerned with explaining how sense and 
understanding, as heterogeneous sources of knowledge, 
combine in making experience possible. As the following 
passage shows, Kant's final word on the Leibnizian position 
finds Kant getting to the core of the issue, i.e. the 
problem which it was Leibniz's central purpose to explain 
and towards which Kant eventually accepts a secure kind 
of scepticism; this is the problem of explaining ultimately 
why (if not how) our sensibility and understanding should 
combine in just such a way to make possible our experience 
of nature, i.e. the objective world. And as should be 
evident from Chapter One, this is merely another version, 
another way of specifying, th problem that arises over 
the foundations or grounds of objectivity which, for Kant, 
means that he must explain the fit between our categorial 
concepts and the world. In the context of the sharpening 
of the debate with Leibniz the fit requiring explanation 
is between sense experience (which is veredical as such) 
and the different minds (subjects) whose experiences 
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(perceptions) agree; same problem, different terms. Kant 
states: 
"The soul and the substrate of the appear- 
ances which we call bodies, a substrate 
which is completely unknown to us, are, 
to be sure, two completely different beings. 
These appearances themselves, however, which 
are conditioned by the form of their intui- 
:tion belonging to the constitution of the 
subject (soul), are mere representations, 
Thus, one can well conceive of the connec- 
:tion, according to certain 'a priori' laws, 
between understanding and sensibility in the 
same subject, and at the same time the 
necessary and natural dependence of the 
latter upon external things, without 
surrendering these things to idealism. 
As for the harmony between understanding 
and sensibility in so far as it makes 
possible an 'a priori' knowledge of 
universal laws, the Critique has essentially 
shown that without it no experience is 
possible .... We could, however, still 
provide no reason why we have precisely 
such a mode of sensibility and an under- 
:standing of such a nature, through the 
combinations of which experience becomes 
possible. Nor could we explain why they, 
as two otherwise completely heterogeneous 
sources of knowledge, always agree so well 
as to permit empirical knowledge in general 
and especially (as the Critique of Judgment 
points out) as to permit an experience of 
nature under its manifold particular and 
merely empirical laws, of which the under - 
:standing teaches us nothing 'a priori', 
as if nature were deliberately organized 
in view of our power of comprehension. 
This we could not (nor can any one else) 
((sic:)) further explain." (OAD, p 159) 
Here Kant's deeper disagreement with Leibniz's programme 
becomes apparent when we place this particular argument 
within the context of the general problem of objectivity. 
First, the issue does not center around the question of 
the two independent sources, of knowledge, sensibility and 
understanding and, we shall never understand the problem 
- 214 - 
if we consider it as an epistemological problem only. 
Consider: Even if Leibniz failed to distinguish between 
sensibility and understanding, that is, failed to make 
the kind of distinction which would keep Kant's theory of 
sensibility with its impositional (space and time) thesis, 
in tact, it is hard to see that the consequences are so 
damaging, for experience is essential for knowledge any - 
:way; even monads must have experiences and experiences 
of phenomena (bene fundata) at that. So even if we granted 
that the Leibnizian could have no recourse to the sense- 
understanding distinction (and we have shown that there 
is good reason to think this simply false) it would not 
be an admission of immaterialism, or spiritualism. Human 
knowledge is knowledge of phenomena and at the level of 
experience the conception of the monad is not involved. 
In other words, like Kant, Leibniz accepts that experience 
is experience of phenomena but unlike Kant, does not 
construe this as an epistemological judgment, or more 
precisely, it is not a conclusion reached by epistemolog- 
:ical considerations. It is a fact about objects that 
they are not experienced as they really are, i.e. in terms 
of their fundamental constituents, and this fact, far 
from having semi -sceptical consequences in respect to our 
access to the nature of objects (as it does for Kant) 
points to the necessity for postulating certain kinds of 
entities as the foundation of appearances. It is this 
ontological thesis that is the basis of Kant's disagree- 
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:ment with Leibniz and in terms of which Kant defines his 
own position vis d vis the Leibnizian. It is this onto - 
:logical reading which I believe the quoted passage helps 
to bear out. Kant begins by acknowledging that there 
are ultimately two types of being in the world, souls 
(mind) and the material substrate of appeararces, bodies 
(matter) with the usual Kantian proviso that what underlies 
appearances is in principle unknowable. That the sub - 
:strate or ground of appearances is unknowable need have 
no sceptical implications for our theory of knowledge once 
it is realized that objects are conditioned (constituted) 
by the nature of the subject (soul). And, once this is 
understood, that the relation between sensibility and 
understanding should be such as to make experience possible 
becomes conceivable, for both sensibility and understanding 
belong essentially to the subject; thus, the grounds of 
the objectivity of phenomena lie in the nature of the 
subject (in the subjectivity of the subject) in the form, 
for Kant, of the specified categorial concepts and the 
forms of sensibility. Ultimately, objectivity is grounded 
in the nature of subjectivity and the foundation or ground 
of appearances is just the objectivity as constituted 
through specifications of the nature of the subject. 
In the closing paragraphs of On a Discovery' from 
which the quoted passage is taken, Kant claims to be rep - 
:resenting Leibniz's true position (OAD; p. 159); what 
Kant is really doing, as commentators have recognized, is 
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to read Leibniz in a way which is consistent with the 
critical system. Accepting what I have just said with 
respect to the grounds of objectivity this means trying 
to show that Leibniz's position is a crude anticipation 
of Kant's own transcendental idealism, for the fundamental 
thesis of transcendental idealism is that the grounds of 
objectivity lie in the nature of the subject. And be- 
:tween this position and Leibniz's there is a great gulf 
fixed, so great that Kant's attempt at bridging it seems 
spurious indeed. Monadism, at both the metaphysical and 
physical levels of theory is a systematic formulation of 
the nature of reality; it is a rendering of the order of 
being in the universe into a hierarchy and the existence 
of phenomena at the level of experience is one kind of 
being with a fixed place in the order. The point which 
it is important to grasp here is that this order is 
grounded in the structure of the universe, it is an order 
that is determined by ontologically ultimate entities. 
Kant's transcendental idealism breaks radically with both 
the metaphysical. realism of Leibniz and the scientific 
realism of Locke but it is with respect to ontology 
( grounds of the world order, of objectivity) not epistemology, 
that the break is genuinely radical. In fact, Kant does 
come very near to adopting a position which looks very 
much like monadism (as he interpreted it), i.e. that the 
known world is an arto- affection of the soul ( "... for why 
should one accept bodies in general, if it is possible that 
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everything which occurs in the soul can be viewed as an 
effect of its own powers ... "; ibid) in the 'Second Para - 
:logism' (A358 - A359). Here, Kant in effect argues 
that if we assume the soul (thinking subject) to be some- 
:thing in itself and matter as appearance or a species of 
representations in us, then there exists no grounds for 
distinguishing matter, as one kind of entity, from mind, 
as another kind of entity. Indeed, the epistemology of 
transcendental idealism is structured along the lines of 
Kant's version of monadism; Kant, like some contemporary 
interpreters of monadology, gives the latter a strong 
phenomenalist reading and interpreted along these lines, 
the metaphysics of monadism is compatible with Kant's 
epistemology. For according to this interpretation of 
monadism, the known world is at once completely autonomous 
from the ream of being while remaining dependent on the 
realm of being. and Kant's transcendental idealism implies 
just such a separation between knowledge and being. 
There is however an absolutely crucial difference between 
the two (monadism And transcendental idealism); Leibniz 
provides an account of how individual substances provide 
foundations for phenomena (phenomena bene fundata) with- 
:out which, Leibniz took for granted, the known world 
floats in a metaphysical limbo. Kant cannot give any 
such account for to do so would be to deny the ascribed 
function of the transcendental subject - the transcenden- 
tal unity of apperception. Kant cannot provide an 
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account of how the known world is grounded in the noumenal 
world for he must be agnostic with respect to any purported 
characteristics of noumena. This restriction is rooted in 
the epistemology of transcendental idealism; there is another 
more consequential restriction on the legitimacy of any 
appeal by Kant to the grounding function of the noumenal 
world, vis: any such explanation stands in direct conflict 
with what is in effect the doctrinaire explanation provided 
by the 'Analytic' of CPR - the constitution of the known 
world by the transcendental subject. This restriction is 
rooted in the ontology of transcendental idealism for it 
is the result of making the known world ontologically 
equivalent to the world. This of course is not Kant's 
intention for the world apart from our knowledge of it, 
i.e. the world simpliciter, is permanently inaccessible. 
But Kant's actual formulation and use of transcendental 
idealism tells another story for if it is not assumed that 
the known world is isomorphic with respect to the world. as 
it actually or really is then the order apparent in the 
known world at all levels, from the most basic and unspeci- 
:fied level of experience in general to the more particular 
and complex level of the laws of nature (science), must be 
without a real source in the world and must therefore be a 
product solely of the constituting powers of the knowing 
subjects. And what is this a statement of if not a kind 
of ultimate idealism; that is, transcendental idealism 
is a more philosophically respectable way of saying that, 
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after all, the world is ultimately ideal even though for 
the purposes of everyday experience and science we must 
regard it as empirically real. However, for Kant and I 
should argue for any philosophically -oriented reflection, 
philosophy is the final court of appeal on this and re- 
:lated issues. The question, what is the grounds of the 
world- order? is one which must be answered philosophically 
even if the answer itself or the approach to an answer lies 
in science. To say that the answer to such a question 
lies in science is just to say that the foundations of the 
world order, the grounds of objectivity,. the establishing 
of objective knowledge - this kind of question - are in 
the world itself, not outside it. Whatever the flaws of 
monadism, does locate the grounds of the world order in 
the world, in the basic stuff of the world, and it thereby 
allows for the possibility of a science of nature which has 
complete knowledge, i.e. knowledge of both the conditioned 
and the unconditioned, as its goal. Leibnizian realism 
is structurally capable of countenancing or providing for 
just such an explanatory system. Monads, atoms, corpusc- 
:les, as candidates for the basic stuff of the world are 
unconditioned, that is, they do not depend on any other 
entity for their being; but they are not therefore outside 
the world (as Kant thinks they must be). To claim to 
have knowledge of the unconditioned is not to claim to 
have knowledge of something not standing in causal rela- 
:tions with other things. Nor is it to claim knowledge 
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of the intelligible world or knowledge by means of intell- 
:ectual intuition. It is to claim that as far as our 
knowledge has progressed (= as far assience has progress - 
:ed) nothing more basic or fundamental exists than this 
type of entity, e.g. monads, atoms, forces. Matter can 
be ultimately accounted for in terms of this type of 
entity and since nothing more basic than it is known we 
can say that it is (1) unconditioned in the sense that it 
does not depend on anything else for its existence; (2) 
it conditions everything else in so far as without it 
nothing would be. 
In Chapter One I argued that spontaneity is the 
ontological foundation of reason and here at least Kant 
is required to acknowledge the existence of the uncondition- 
:ed - the power of spontaneity. Furthermore, since there 
is one reason which manifests itself in different ways in 
our moral and theoretical experience, the unconditioned, 
far from being of marginal importance, lies at the heart 
of Kant's whole philosophy. There is at least one type of 
thing in the world which is unconditioned and it is central 
to Kant's whole philosophical enterprise. Now Kant does 
not, on the face of it, want to deny or even question, the 
existence of matter in the world; but the problem for Kant 
is how, given the claims about the ultimate ideality of 
the world and the grounding of the world -order in the 
nature of the subject, he can account for the existence 
of something - be it matter or space - which is other than 
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mind. I have said that Kant subjectivizes space and in 
the process attempts to execute the (ultimate) idealiza- 
tion of matter. But this destroys the credibility of 
the theory that transcendental idealism affords an object- 
ive knowledge of the world by introducing talk about 
appearances rather than things, for if we claim to have 
objective knowledge of the conditioned, then it must be 
the case that the ground of the conditioned objects of 
experience is not simply the ground for, or the subjective 
condition of, the possibility of knowledge or experience: 
The conditioned objects of knowledge must be related to a 
ground which is other than or not connected with, the 
conditions for knowledge; if not, then both the existence 
of the ground of the conditioned objects and the conditions 
for knowledge must be construed as deriving from the same 
source - the nature of the subject - and objective know - 
:ledge (knowledge of what is other than mind) becomes 
impossible. The solution, as I see it, is to make the 
ground of the conditioned objects of knowledge, the uncon- 
ditioned, so that appearances really are concerned with 
some kind of independently existing thing, thereby pro- 
viding for the possibility of a genuine 'objective know - 
:ledge' and something which is the foundation of appear - 
:ances ('phenomena bene fundata'), which is other than 
mind. Kant's theory of the ideas of reason provide us, 
if not Kant (who regarded the Ideas as having merely 
regulative value), with an account of how and why condition- 
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:ed totalities must have a conditioning ground if a deter - 
:minate structured knowledge of the world, and a science 
which has such knowledge as its goal, are to be possible. 
Now the conditioning ground of conditioned totalities 
must be unconditioned; the unconditioned for Kant is nec- 
:essarily unknowable, indeed it is incognizable. Conse- 
:quently, Kant's denial that the unconditioned plays a 
role in knowledge amounts to a denial of the possibility 
of a determinate structured knowledge of the world and of 
the possibility that science can move in the direction of 
completing itself, i.e. a knowledge of the material world 
which is structurally complete. When we align this 
interpretation of the ideas of reason with Kant's theory 
of science in general, the story is different; for, on 
Kant's theory of scientific theorizing, science has the 
unconditioned, or knowledge of the unconditioned, as its 
goal; and in MFNS Kant's analysis of matter into forces 
is meant to be a demonstration of the conceivability of 
Newton's laws of motion given that matter is composed of 
the parts it is composed of. Newton's mechanical system 
derives its explanatory power from the kind of thing which 
makes up the basic stuff of the world - forces of attrac- 
:tion and repulsion. And this looks like offering a just - 
:ification of the explanatory power of mechanical laws in 
terms of what is itself unexplained, for forces are the 
most basic type of thing and thus not explicable in terms 
of anything else; they are, in a world, unconditioned, 
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despite Kant's attempts to show that nothing could be 
known to exist which was unconditioned. 
6. We saw that Kant's argument with respect to spon- 
:taneity proceeded from the possibility of action and (free) 
thought to the requirement of an ontologically structured 
spontaneity - minds with the power of spontaneity; in 
Chapter V, I shall argue that we get a kind of variation 
on this pattern of argument proceeding once again from an 
argument concerning the 'possibility of knowledge' (epis- 
:temology) to an ontological thesis about the world. In 
this case, our starting point is the transcendental unity 
of apperception read (as i have argued for) in the Leib - 
:nizian mode as the requirement that any representing must 
be a whole of representing even though no whole of repre- 
:senting is a whole represented,as objects of knowledge 
are, for Kant, conditioned objects. But the ideas of 
reason specify that we must 'think' the unconditioned 
ground which is the whole represented and that this is the 
proper domain of reason rather than the understanding. 
In this way we arrive at the ontological thesis (once the 
architectonic restrictions on the full use of the ideas 
of reason as regulative principles have been lifted) that 
we must have or strive towards a whole of representings 
which is also a representing of a total whole (the totality 
of the world). Both these arguments, or argument - 
patterns end in an ontological conclusion, the former with 
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respect to minds and the latter with respect to the world; 
there must be a kind of entity which exists independently 
of our knowledge of it and which can be postulated as the 
ground of the conditioned objects of experience, otherwise 
our claims to possess objective knowledge of the world 
cannot be supported; there must be minds or something 
other than appearances since we know we possess the power 
to intiate the series of conditioned events. There are 
minds and there is a world. Kant's central doctrine, 
transcendental idealism, obliges Kant to locate the ground 
of the relation between minds and the world, in minds, i.e. 
the conditions necessary for the possibility of experience 
are injected into experience by the knowing subject. While 
this 'transcendental' shift of Kant's is fully comprehensible 
when placed within its problematic context (vis á vis Leibniz, 
Locke and Hume), I have tried to argue in this chapter that 
Kant's solution fails when considered specifically as an 
assault on the central thematic claims of Leibnizian 
realism. In the remaining two chapters, I shall argue 
that Kant's theory or philosophy of science not onlylends 
support to this conclusion but helps us to proceed a step 
further with it. Science,according to Kant, has the un- 
:conditioned as its goal and the necessity which binds 
theories together into a hierarchial arrangement is 
ultimately derived from an unconditioned ground. This 
amounts to stating that the necessity in the world, be- 
tween the conditioned objects of the world, is itself 
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derived from the relation these conditioned objects have 
to their unconditioned ground - thereby showing that the 
Leibnizian doctrine of the 'grounding' of phenomena cannot 
be dismissed after all in favour of transcendental idealism. 
With the help of an argument borrowed from P. Krausser, I 
attempt to demonstrate that science presupposes the exis- 
:tence of things in themselves for its possibility and 
that this requirement is met in the form of the uncondition- 
ed. Dismissing the theological associations with the un- 
:conditioned, we are left with the postulation of uncon- 
:ditioned entities in the world, such as atoms and forces 
or monads. A case can be made out for postulating the . 
forces of MFNS as the unconditionally real, constituting 
monad -like entities which are, in turn, stripped of any 
phenomenalist or idealist connotation. Kant has a very 
good argument against the acceptance of Leibniz's own 
conception of the monad, i.e. that monads do not enter 
into real causal connection. This makes the rejection 
of monadism in its original form necessary. Kant's own 
force theory of matter is not at all very different from 
Leibniz's and Kant does more or less accept Leibniz's own 
previously worked - out theories of matter, substance and 
space (as we have briefly seen already). If the fundamen- 
:tal forces of repulsion and attraction postulated by Kant 
in MFNS are unconditioned then we have a candidate for the 
unconditioned ground of the world -order or, what amounts 
to the same thing, a vindication of the Leibnizian concep - 
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:tion of the grounding of phenomena. Kant of course 
wants to say that we can have no knowledge of these fund- 
amental forces because they are unconditioned (and there - 
:fore incognizable) and do not stand or cannot be known 
to stand in real causal relation with other conditioned 
entities. If, however, it is possible to describe these 
fundamental forces (or monads) in terms of the 'real in 
perception', i.e. Kant's intensive magnitudes of the 
'Anticipations of Perception' then, we shall have a per- 
fectly comprehensible (knowable or cognizable) descrip- 
:tion for them. Forces are known, or can be known, under 
this limited description. Their existence must be pre - 
:supposed because without them nothing else would be. I 
am not arguing on behalf of a scientific theory about what 
the basic constituent of matter is - I hope that much is 
apparent. Rather, the argument is that it is this kind 
of metaphysical theory of the nature of reality, a meta - 
:physical theory concerned with the explanation of the 
grounds of the world -order, which it is the proper function 
of philosophy to propose. The alleged reduction of 
matter to forces is not, from the philosophical perspec- 
tive important because of the actual physical reduction, 
but for the fact that one kind of entity is being explained 
in terms of another. In the 'Second Antinomy' Kant 
argues, or seems to argue, against there being knowable 
unconditioned matter in experience, which is of course 
consistent with the central claims of transcendental 
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idealism. Kant's attempts in MFNS, to end up with two 
basic forces as the constituents of matter, must be regard - 
:ed as science and science, as we know from the CPR, belongs 
to the realm of the empirically real. Having argued against 
the claims of transcendental idealism however, we are just- 
ified in judging this final gesture of Kant's at preserv- 
ing the transcendentally ideal status of matter, a fail - 
:ure. Kant's argument in the 'Second Antinomy' can hard - 
:ly be judged successful anyway, for he doesn't show con- 
clusively that unconditioned entities could not be met 
with in experience. Perhaps they could not be met with 
under the descriptions Kant always seemed to think such 
entities must have; that they can be known under some 
other limited description is another question and one 
which Kant never considered. 
If all this is correct then there is no reason for 
not postulating, within the mode of philosophical theory 
with respect to the nature of reality; some entity as 
candidate for the unconditioned. I emphasize that what 
is of importance here is the philosophical prescription 
(of reality) which I believe it is possible to provide 
in this way; I have provided an account of what might 
be construed as a candidate for such a role, so as to 
complete the story, not because I think that I can show 
that forces really are the basic constituent of the uni- 
:verse. It is the type or kind of entity which forces 
are that identifies them as possible candidates for the 
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unconditioned or, to borrow phrase from Sellars, forces 
are the unexplained explainers which are required to sup - 
:port the theory of objects and more generally, a complete 
ontology, accounting for the variety of kinds of things 
in the world, as well as providing the justificatory 
grounds for our explanatory frameworks and conceptual 
schemes. Although I shall not be discussing this in de- 
:tail, I indicate in Chapers V and VI that Kant's cate- 
gories require an ontological interpretation to comple- 
ment the accepted epistemological reading they receive; 
I have argued that Kant's ontological problems concerning 
living things and persons show that the categorial frame - 
:work is not constitutive of certain kinds of things in 
the world and that therefore, there are things which fall 
outside the extension of the categories. As has been 
suggested to me by W. Hoffman19, it is possible to construe 
the categories as supplying a semantics for the concept of 
an object so that each categorial framework provides a 
theory of meaning for the objects falling within it. The 
semantical system provided by the categories of CPR for 
living things and persons (e.g.) is insufficient for undo -.r- 
:standing the kinds 'living things' and 'persons'; in so 
far as living things and persons are ordinary physical 
objects the categorial specification of CPR is sufficient 
to provide us with an understanding of them qua physical . 
objects - and this of course is the whole point. If the 
exclusivity of the categories of CPR is rejected, then 
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there exists a plurality of categorial frameworks and a 
plurality of semantical systems within which, and accord- 
ing to which, we understand the different kinds of 
entities there are in the world. We require an addition - 
:al semantics for living things and persons if we are to 
comprehend them as living things and persons. The cat - 
:egorial system of CPR is at best a semantics for the 
concept of an object at the most minimal and general 
level of explanation, in a word, it is the lowest -order 
conceptual framework for our understanding of the world. 
The categorial frameworks such as those specifying the 
ontological kind 'living things' and 'persons' are higher - 
order concepts or sets of concepts; the concepts of such 
kinds the type of entity falling within the 
framework in question. Our ontoloyy then, is built up 
from a formation of ontological kinds specified in this 
way so that a plurality of semantical systems providing 
a theory of meaning for the kind in question is equivalent 
to being able to comprehend a world in which there exist 
a plurality of ontological kinds. As I said towards the 
end of the third chapter, there is a distinction to be 
drawn between thBcategories as prescribing the when and 
where for their appropriate application and the categories 
as supplying the ontological predicates for determining 
the existence (= objective validity) of the kind of entity 
in question. The latter is a domain for empirical invest- 
igation, not a priori understanding. I conclude that 
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the concept of an object initiated by Kant's categories in 
CPR and made applicable to the plurality of kinds of enti- 
ties so that the predicates 'is a living thing' and 'is 
a person' are construed as sortal concepts of an object 
for that particular domain of entities, can only be filled 
out or completed by science or empirical progress in 
science. After completing the main business of the 
final chapter (matter and forces) the essay draws to a 
close with the remainder that if there is any importance 
in the general conclusions at which we have arrived, it 
must surely be this: from the perspective of Kantian 
(transcendental) idealism where the categorial concepts 
are considered as conceptually or epistemically necessary, 
and where the object is construed solely from the perspec- 
:tive of judgment, we must move (thereby complementing 
the Kantian account) to the perspective of Leibnizian 
realism where the categories, while they intiate the 
forming of conceptual frameworks, are themselves rooted in 
the foundations of phenomena, the structure of the world 
which it is metaphysically necessary to posit as the 
ground of the world- order; from the perspective of Leib - 
:nizian realism, to complete the account, the object is 
considered from the point of view of the unconditioned. 
We thus move from a consideration of the world as a world 
of appearances, or, a world'in which physical objects are 
just what they appear to be, tò a consideration of the 
world as constituted by things in themselves where this 
means a world consisting of ontologically essential entities. 
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Chapter V Kant's Philosophy of Science and the Ideas of 
of Reason : The Unconditioned. 
"The Law of reason which requires us to seek 
for this unity, is a necessary law, since 
without it we should have no reason at all, 
and without reason no coherent employment 
of the understanding, and in the absence 
of this no sufficient criterion of 
empirical truth. In order, therefore, 
to secure in empirical criterion we have 
no option save to presuppose the systematic 
unity of nature as objectively valid and 
necessary." (A651 =B679) 
1. In this chapter I shall argue that Kant's philosophy 
of science amounts to a statement of the Leibnizian thesis 
that the ground of the world order lies in the nature of 
things. According to Kant's theory of system, science is 
a goal-oriented activity Ly which has the unconditioned as 
its goal. Kant's cautious- sounding statement to the 
effect that we must proceed in science 'as if' nature was 
designed to be amenable to the system of classification by 
which we find unity within a widely diverse_ range of natural 
things, is simply an epistemologically safe way. of saving 
that nature possesses natural forms and 'specifications of 
itself' into species and genera which make it comprehensible 
to us. The fact that Kant does not adopt an empiricist 
theory of scientific progress according to which the princ- 
:iples we use in constructing theories are used just be- 
:cause they give results, i.e. are explanatorily successful, 
but offers instead what looks very much like a rationlist 
theory of science, creates the suspicion that Kant thinks 
there is a strong connection between scientific theorizing 
and nature itself, a connection which might perhaps explain 
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why we are not really free to, for example, give up our 
belief in induction. What would count as evidence 
against such a principle? The fact that it fails on 
occasion is insufficient to make us adopt counter- induc- 
:tion instead. The necessity with which the laws in the 
systematic unity of nature are related to each other is, 
we shall see, derived from the unconditioned - the highest 
principle - which is necessary in itself and which refers 
to an entity or kind of entity necessary to the world - 
order. When it comes to the necessity binding together 
our empirical theories into a hierarchial system, Kant 
traces this kind of necessity - physical necessary - not 
to the transcendental unity of apperception, but to some 
unconditioned ground, hypothesized of course, since the 
unconditioned is not capable of entering into relations 
with the conditioned. On Kant's account science must 
proceed with its progressive search for the unconditioned 
because the unconditioned is what is required for a com- 
:plete science; knowledge of the unconditioned is equiva- 
lent to knowledge of the one basic power of which those 
powers known to exist are simply different manifestations: 
"The logical principle of reason calls upon us to bring 
about such unity as completely as possible; and the more 
the appearances of this and that power are found to be 
identical with one another, the more probable it becomes 
that they are simply different manifestations of one and 
the same power .... the fundamental power." (A640 = B677) 
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A complete science or the possibility of a knowledge of 
nature in all its forms is thus seen to presuppose the 
existence of the unconditioned, and the unconditioned is, 
in Kant's scheme of things, the functional equivalent of 
the thing in itself. Since Kant argues that scientific 
activity presupposes that science have a unified system 
of laws as its goal (for the criterion of empirical truth 
is supplied by systematic unity) and, since that unity is 
derived from, or built up from, the unconditioned -which 
is the source of the necessity binding the system; I 
shall take it that Kant's theory of system can provide 
the metaphysical basis for a Leibnizian ontology, an onto - 
:logy based on the unconditioned. 
Kant, perhaps surprisingly, seems to have an account 
of physical necessity; it arises in the course of the 
empirical investigation of nature. We must regard causal 
laws as necessary in order to comprehend the laws cf nature 
as laws at all: "This understanding is no doubt a priori in 
possession of universal laws of nature, apart from which 
nature would be incapable of being an object of experience 
at all. But over and above this it needs a certain order 
of nature in its particular rules which are only capable of 
being brought to its knowledge empirically, and which, so 
far as it is concerned, are contingent. These rules, 
without which we would have no means of advance from the 
universal analogy of a possible experience in general to 
a particular, must be regarded by understanding as laws, 
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i.e. as necessary - for otherwise they would not form an 
order of nature - though it be unable to cognize or even 
get an insight into their necessity." (CoJ; Intro. V) On 
this account we read the necessity into the particular 
causal sequences in order to form a conception of the 
order of nature, or, in other words, by regarding particu- 
lar causal sequences as necessary we are able to under - 
:stand laws of nature. Of course, for Kant, since we can 
never get an insight into how these laws hold with necess- 
: ity, it follows that we are to regard the laws of nature 
as necessary whether or not we know what it is about the 
objects to which the laws apply that might explain the 
necessity of the laws. Thus Kant tries to account for 
the necessity of particular causal sequences, clearly re- 
garding such an account as essential for the comprehen- 
:sion of nature and its laws, without any reference to 
the entities over which such laws range. Kant's diffi- 
:cu]ty here is that he is trying to explain the nereg itv 
of particular causal sequences and thus the necessity 
possessed by simple causal laws as well as higher order 
laws of nature, without having a theory of necessity other 
than his theory of a priori(conceptual) necessity operative 
at the level of experience in general. If we agree that 
there are different kinds of necessity - logical, physical 
(natural), conceptual - then presumably something other than 
conceptual necessity is required to demonstrate the necess- 
ity of a particular causal sequence. Kant does not think 
that necessity can be derived from objects standing in 
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causal relation with each other because objects of ex- 
:perience are all conditioned objects and the conditioned 
is always empirical and the empirical, in turn, never 
more than accidental. And this is just to say that Kant 
does not recognize other than conceptual necessity. There 
is a passage in CPR in which the transition from the nec- 
:essity involved at the level of experience in general 
to that required at the level of empirical nature ('order 
of nature in its particular rules') is viewed, as we have 
seen in CoU, as a transition from the necessity of 'rules' 
to the necessity of laws of nature. It is as if Kant 
was suggesting that we simply require a greater degree of 
necessity in order to regard causal sequences as subject 
to empirical laws of nature: "The representation of a 
universal condition according to which a certain manifold 
can be posited in uniform fashion is called a rule, and, 
when it must be so posited, a law. Thus all appearances 
stand in thoroughgoing connection according to necessary 
laws, and therefore in a transcendental affinity, of which 
the empirical is a mere consequence." (A113) 
Now while it may be true that the objects of ex- 
perience conform to the rules of the understanding and 
that particular causal sequence can be comprehended as 
subject to empirical laws, there is no obvious connection 
between the two, as Kant seems to be suggesting. In fact, 
as we shall see, it is Kant's considered opinion that only 
reason or judgment can, by treading where the understanding 
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dare not, secure the possibility of empirical laws with 
which nature might be systemized into a unity. As one 
recent commentator on Kant's theory of science remarks, 
we would still be left with the problem of 'laws', 
of explaining the sense in which they are necessary...j1 
Yet, just as transcendental laws are necessary for the 
possibility of experience, the possibility of a nature 
unified into a system would seen to require necessary 
empirical laws, in some sense of'necessary' never fully 
explicated by Kant: 
"A concept of this sort is that. of 
' experience as a system according to 
empirical laws. For although exper- 
ience forms a system under. trañscen- 
:dental laws, which comprise the con - 
:dition of the possibility of experience 
in general, there might still occur such 
an infinite multiplicity Of empirïcal'laws 
and so great a heterogebeity of natural 
forms in particular experience that the 
concept of a system in accordance with 
these empirical laws would necessarily 
be alien to the understanding, and 
neither the possibility nor still less 
the necessity of such a unified whole is 
conceivable." (F. Intro., II; cf. CoJ, 
Intro. V - p.25) 
Despite the systematic uniformity of nature according to 
the universal laws and principles of the understanding, 
we are left with a possibly unintelligible, i.e. unsystem- 
:atic and undetermined, unity of nature at the empirical 
level; and for this, some added principle or law is re- 
quired, a principle to discipline and direct our construc- 
:tion of the empirical unity of nature. Thus, Kant argues, 
the infinite detail of scientific knowledge could only be 
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brought to an empirical unity of nature with the aid of 
such a guiding principle of constructión. Notice once 
again that the mere fact, if it is a fact, that the princ- 
:iples we use in constructing theories are adopted because 
they are successful, carries little weight with Kant, and 
this is because success in scientific investigation is 
itself a function of a theory's or principle's systemizabi- 
:lity which ultimately is the sole criterion of empirical 
truth for Kant (see quotation beginning this chapter). 
Kant thinks that nature in its particular forms and 
varieties must conform to the unifying capacity of our 
cognitive faculties, reason and judgment, and that only by 
thus conforming can the unity of nature be realized in a 
way which is comprehensible to us. For this purpose Kant 
introduces the Principle of Judgment, which he construes 
as a guarantee that the empirical laws of nature will form 
a systematic unity rather than, as Kant says, being "con- - 
:fronted by a crude, chaotic aggregate totally devoid of 
system ". On analogy with the way in which representations 
are unified in an individual consciousness, there is 
supposed to be an affinity amongst empirical laws which 
explains why they are orderable into a single system: 
"Therefore it is a subjectively necessary, transcendental 
EL.111211D08ition that this dismaying, unlimited diversity of 
empirical laws and this heterogeneity of natural forms does 
not belong in nature, that, instead, nature is fitted for 
experience as an empirical system, through the affinity of 
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particular laws under more general ones." (F. Intro; IV) 
So we are to take it that the principle of judgment is a 
'transcendental' principle in that it is a necessary pre - 
:supposition for the possibility of regarding nature as 
a unified system describable in terms of empirical laws. 
But so far Kant has offered only the analogy of 'affinity' 
with the unity of consciousness to encourage us to regard 
the principle of judgment as a transcendental principle; 
it is true that the principle of judgment is only a sub - 
:jective, transcendental principle but I shall simply 
understand this customary proviso. of Kant's to be no more 
than a warning that the principle of judgment does not 
have a concept of an object of its own, i.e. we must not 
expect new knowledge with respect to objects from the use 
of such a principle '(ibid; III) . 
Kant's characterization of the principle of judg- 
:ment tells us that he clearly sees it or something very 
much like it, as a necessary pre- supposition for the 
rationality of scientific inquiry, indeed, the principle 
of judgment is the one means available to us by which the 
objectivity of science can be secured. How this is sup - 
:posed to work brings us to the story of judgment and its 
essential principle, a principle intended to structure the 
rational outlook for science; the essential principle of 
judgment is: ' "Naturé specifies 'its' 'universal- laws to 
empirical ones,' according to the form of a 'logical system, 
for the púrpösé 'of the' judgment." '('ibid; V) It is difficult 
to see how this principle, seemingly personifying nature or 
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treating nature as the functional equivalent of a god who 
might be the source of the empirical order of the world, 
is supposed to secure the objectivity of the scientific 
enterprise; could we reasonably expect the objectivity of 
science to be established in this a priori way in any case? 
Does the assumption that it could, not imply that what 
science actually achieves or fails to achieve, is irrele- 
:vant to its objectivity as a systemized knowledge of 
nature? Surely, science could fail to establish itself as 
an objective form of investigation into nature, for example, 
nature could, in some respects prove to be resistant to 
our repeated attempts at comprehending it; indeed, it is 
almost a truism that certain phenomena within nature seem 
cognitively impregnable. The point is that the objectivity 
of scientific inquiry and thus the objective status of 
science depends much more on the actual progress of science 
than on an a priori principle alleged to justify cur con- 
:fidence in science, as it were, once and for all. 
Once again we find Kant attempting to establish a 
structural truth about the world by means of a priori or 
epistemic necessity; the connection between judgment 
(reason) and science is effected by means of conceptual 
necessity whereby our empirical theories must be thought 
as systematically (i.e. by affinity) relatable to each 
other. Empirical theories which serve to explain natural 
phenomena derive their explanatory power in part from the 
fact that they 'hang together' in this way. One assumes 
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that, according to Kant, an empirical theory which cannot 
be made to fit into a logical order within the system is 
just not part of the explanatory hypotheses of the science 
in question. Thus, the unity of system is a necessary 
condition of the possibility of scientific theorizing and 
the necessary presupposition of the rationality of science, 
for the variety of empirical laws and not only can but 
must be thought as belonging to a system, "on the grounds 
that the special natural laws fall under more general laws, 
and that parsimony in principles is not only an economical 
requirement of reason, but is one of nature's own laws." 
(A650 = B678) We have here a parallel in the degree of 
necessity of the principle of judgment for science and the 
degree of necessity of the principles of the understanding 
(constitutive) for knowledge of experience; because the 
principles of understanding are operative within the lowest 
level framework of the possibility of experience they are 
the necessary but mìn_imalconditions for knowledge whereas 
the principle of judgment operative within the higher 
level framework of empirical theories is necessary for 
science but not with respect to knowledge in general. 
Thus with respect to science the principle of judgment is 
indispensable but dispensable with respect to knowledge 
in general. However, we can also take this difference 
in degree of necessity as an indication, on Kant's part, 
that the categorial principles of the CPR require the 
additional scientific framework spelled out by the princ- 
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:iple of judgment in order to establish the objectivity 
of science or, in Kant's day, of Newtonian physics; the 
categorial scheme of the CPR is insufficient for providing 
a justification (the ground for support) of Newtonian 
physics. Arid. this provides us with a direct link between 
Kant's theory or philosophy of science and his attempt to 
show that, if matter is made out of, or, constituted by, 
the forces of repulsion and attraction, then, these laws 
(Newton's) will be true of it. If this is true, then it 
looks like making good my claim that the 'objectivity' of 
the categorial concepts in CPR is established, or can be 
established, only in conjunction with the framework of 
science, which is just to say, that the claims of Leibnizian 
realism with respect to the grounds of objectivity are 
vindicated. 
Kant maintains that in the course of scientific 
investigation we build up a system of laws in accordance 
with a logical system and that it is this logical frame 
:work of laws which lends intelligibility to the scientific 
enterprise. Let us take a look at Kant's logical system. 
Kant uses the model of a genus - species classification 
system to spell out the kind of logical system he has in 
mind whereby lower order empirical concepts are subsumed 
under higher order concepts (just as particulars are 
classified as belonging to some universal); (F.Intro; V); 
classes of species are then grouped into their appropriate 
genus and the classes of genera brought under higher 
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genera until the one highest genus is reached (in princ_. 
:iple). Kant also says that we can proceed from universal 
to particular, thus reversing the procedure, and he regards 
the system of classification as a derivative from the 
traditional (Aristotelian) model according to which 'matter' 
is the genus and 'form' the specific difference, so that 
"the genus, logically regarded, is as it were the matter 
or crude substrate which nature works into particular 
species and subspecies through multiple determinations; 
thus one can say that nature specifies itself according 
to a certain principle (or the Idea of a system) .. 
II ( Intro; V). This is the logical structure of the 
system which is to make comprehensible the orderly and 
systematic investigation of nature; but when we map this 
logical structure onto the physical world we get quite 
clearly a stratification of the natural world into the 
corresponding logical divisions of subspecies - species - 
genera - genus, in such a way as to render the logical 
structure of the system an anticipation of the physical 
structure of the world it is allegedly about, and in a 
way that lends some plausibility to Kant's claim that 
'nature specifies itself according to the Idea of a system'. 
Of course, once the mapping has been effected, we are left 
with a world consisting of natural kinds ultimately and 
ideally, traceable to one fundamental kind of thing. 
Only this conception of science can account for the multi- 
plicity of kinds and the variety of explanatory forms. 
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Indeed, Kant says as much himself: 
"The various appearances of one and the 
same substance show at first sight so 
great a diversity, that at the start 
we have to assume just as many differ- 
ent powers as there are different 
effects. For instance, in the human 
mind we have sensation, consciousness, 
imagination, memory, wit, power of 
discrimination, pleasure, desire, etc. 
Now there is a logical maxim which 
requires that we should reduce, so far 
as may be possible, this seeming 
diversity, by comparing these with one 
another and detecting their hidden 
identity. We have to enquire whether 
imagination combined with consciousness 
may not be the same thing as memory, wit, 
power of discrimination, and perhaps even 
identical with understanding and reason. 
Though logic is not capable of deciding 
whether a fundamental power actually 
exi si s the ï r {en power i _ 
the problem involved in a systematic 
representation of the multiplicity of 
powers. The logical principle of 
reason calls upon us to bring about 
such a unity as completely as possible..." 
(A649 = B677) 
It must be emphasized that this sketch of the structure 
of science represents for Kant what a possible and 
cognitively significant science must be like if it is to 
be science at all, for the logical structure is meant to 
be tailored to the demands of judgment and judgment (reason) 
is in the present context no less than the necessary 
adjunct to the understanding in the domain of science. 
Now, one of the powers referred to by Kant is the causal- 
ity of substance (ibid; A648 = B676) the various manifest - 
:at.ions of which create the impression that here we have 
as many powers as there are different manifestations; 
the goal of science in this case is to seek to discover one 
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causal power which is the source of the different but 
related manifestations, thereby establishing the identity 
of a basic or 'fundamental' causal power in terms of 
which explanatory empirical theories can then be formulated. 
The nearer our approach to reducing the multiplicity of 
powers to the 'absolutely fundamental power' the more 
explanatorily powerful will be our empirical theories, 
that is to say, the search for and discovery of, basic 
entities is essential to scientific advance. Furthermore, 
Kant specifies three 'maxims' or "aphorisms of metaphysical 
wisdom" (CJ, Intro; V) as aids to the investigation of 
nature, all three of which are inherited from traditional 
metaphysics. They are the law of parsimony, the law of 
continuity in nature and in natural forms, and the princ- 
iple that principles are not to be unnecessarily mutli- 
:lied, and that Kant considers such maxims to be regulative 
in the construction of genus - species systems is clear 
from a number of passages in CPR (A652 = B680; A656 = B684). 
The status of these metaphysical principles and the princ- 
iple of judy,uent as necessary aids in the construction of 
a system of empirical laws for understanding nature is 
underlined by Kant in his repeated claim that such princ- 
:iples are not psychological in origin nor in any way de- 
:rived from experience. It is not a psychological nec- 
essity that drives us towards systemization with respect 
to natural forms but a necessity arising, Kant thinks, out 
of the need to guarantee the rationality of science. 
- 245 - 
As I have said, the logical structure of the system 
of laws is meant to reflect the physical structure of the 
world and this implies that as the logical structure is, 
as it were, filled out by the continual discovery of em- 
:pirical theories, our knowledge of the structure of the 
world grows accordingly. And if we take seriously the 
notion of the logical system as a mapping of the structure 
of the physical universe, Kant's conception of the system - 
:atic unity of nature amounts to an unfinished picture of 
what a genuine science of nature must be like if it is to 
be capable of capturing, at least in principle, the struc- 
:ture of the world and doing it in such a way so as to make 
the science comprehensible to us. The logic of this sys- 
:tem of Kant's is generated by the genus - species class- 
ification system which is of interest here if only he- 
:cause it demonstrates that Kant must have understood such 
a classification to have a legitimate use in the under- - 
:standing of natural forms, i.e. it served to measure the 
actual division of nature into natural kinds from the low- 
est subspecies to the highest genus. All the ingredients 
are present for the construction of a physical system based 
on the explanatory equivalent of first principles or, the 
ontological equivalent of the source of the world order - 
the highest genus which is, when cashed out in real terms, 
the positing of some fundamental entity. In brief, it is 
beginning to look as if Kant's conception of the structure 
of scientific activity and science itself presupposes the 
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truth of the basic claims that one would expect in a def- 
:inition of the Leibnizian model for science, according 
to which, all knowledge including science (which inciden- 
:tally Leibniz repeatedly claimed could not be replaced by 
theological - metaphysical truths) is essentially tele- 
:ological and oriented towards knowledge of the fundamen- 
:tal structure of the universe, a structure which ideally 
could be revealed by the discovery of fundamental entities. 
It is salutary to reflect in this connection that as 
bizarre as Leibniz's original conception of the monadoloóy 
appears to us, Leibniz had no doubt that.it was logically 
required to explain the phenomenal world in a way that 
kept in tact the world -view (the scientific world -view) 
based on a few metaphysical principles. Just as accord - 
:inq to Leibnizian realism, a -full comprehension of the 
structure of the universe could only be based on a knowledge 
of the fundamental stuff the universe was composed of and, 
thus an investigative approach to the natural world which 
embodied this as an ideal, Kant's conception of system is 
a model of scientific progress without which the comprehen- 
:sion of the vast body of empirical knowledge we have 
accumulated would be impossible; thus, the necessity for 
the systematic 'unity' of empirical knowledge, the necessity, 
that is, for each member of the system to be related by 
rules like therrinciple of parsimony, to some other member 
and through such interrelationships to unite into a total - 
:ity. Knowledge of the totality, if attained (it would 
have to be merely hypothetical knowledge for Kant as it 
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is knowledge of the unconditioned), represents a comprehen- 
:sive understanding of the world- order. In light of 
this, Kant's conception of empirical truth is really quite 
modern, anticipating as it seems to do, the inadequacy of 
the empiricist model of truth as the simple truth or fals- 
:ity of empirical theories. The real criterion of truth 
is not whether a given theory corresponds with some state 
of affairs in the world, but how a given theory fits with 
the system of empirical theories as it is at the time; the 
'fit' is simply a measure of the theory's expression of 
nature's stratification or multiplicity of natural -forms 
so that, if the theory fits, what has been discovered is 
another manifestation of a more basic power. So also with 
empirical laws which have each their own place in the 
hierarchy of laws ranging over such and such a kind of 
entity. Empirical truth is thus to be seen as a function 
of the systemizability of empirical theories and empirical 
laws because such a hierarchial ordering is expressive of 
the real stratification of the natural world and the 
multiplicity of powers ideally reducible to the one basic 
power. Now I am aware that Kant would not agree that we 
are entitled to make any empirical claims with respect to 
the actual structure of the physical world; but this is 
irrelevant to my argument which is supposed to be showing 
that Kant assumes (and rightly) that nature must be divid- 
ed into natural kinds according to the specification of 
the logical structure of the unity of system. Kant 
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argues towards the justification of his theory of system 
from the basic assumption that the natural world contains 
the 'specifications within it'; there are a number of 
passages which bring this out very clearly, suffice it to 
give the following from (F. Intro; V): 
"The principle of reflection on any 
given natural object is that for 
all things in nature empirical 
concepts can be found; in other 
words, that one can always pre - 
:suppose in the creations of 
nature a form which is possible 
under universal laws accessible 
to our knowledge. For were we not 
entitled to assume this, and were 
not to base our treatment of em- 
pirical representations on this 
principle, all reflection would 
be carried on at random and b i nñ1 y 
and as a result with no sound 
expectation of its agreement with 
nature." 
2. My basic contention is that Kant's principle of 
judgment amounts to a specification of the structure and 
aims of science and that Kant's chosen mechanism in terms 
of which science can accomplish this task (essentially, 
of completing itself) is a conception of science as a 
system of laws and theories which is alleged to represent 
in advance the actual physical structure of the world. 
The kind of world which is prefigured in Kant's system is 
not the world of transcendental idealism but the world 
structured in accordance with the fundamental claims of 
Leibnizian realism or something resembling it in kind, i.e. 
a world the ontology of which can support a diversity of 
entities and within which complete knowledge is ideally a 
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knowledge of independently existing fundamental entities. 
As is becoming clear with respect to Kant's theory of 
science, the proper goal of scientific theorizing is the 
pursuit of just such a fundamental entity which, as we 
shall see presently, is characterized as the unconditioned. 
Throughout the sections of the texts I am dealing with 
here, Kant is emphasizing both the normative and teleologi- 
:cal nature of scientific activity. The principle of 
judgment is, Kant says, a principle about how we ought to 
judge nature ( "according to what rule our powers of judg- 
:ment actually discharge their functions, and how we judge, 
but how we ought to judge; and we cannot get this logical 
objective necessity where the principles are merely 
empirical." CJ, Intro; V) which is just to say that the 
principle of judgment is meant to guide us in the construc- 
:tion of theories but not to effect the content of scien- 
tific theories themselves. Again at (F. Intro; II) we 
find that the principle of judgment "offers a principle 
for progression in accordance with empirical laws through 
which the investigation of nature is possible." By analogy 
with the understanding in accordance with the transcendental 
laws of which the objects of experience in general form a 
totality (= system), "in precisely the same way experience 
as well must ideally form a system of pötential' empirical 
knowledge according to universal as well as particular laws, 
insofar as this is objectively possible,' at least' in princ- 
:iple." (F. Intro; IV; emphasis mine) Science must, in 
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other words, strive to explain the structure of the world 
even if this proves to be unattainable; and Kant's logical 
picture of how science is to proceed requires that only 
the discovery of the one fundamental power or kind of 
entity which is the ontological ground of the existing 
world -order could count as the final aim of science. I 
shall argue in the next section on the unconditioned that 
this is because, as Kant's formulation of the Ideas of 
Reason will show, Kant really thinks that the ground of 
the world -order does lie in the unconditioned but the 
unconditioned is of necessity inaccessible so thee is no 
point in postulating metaphysical theories with respect 
to it as the unconditioned ground. And of course Kant 
always thought of the unconditioned as necessarily super- - 
:sensible and never conceived of the possibility of the 
unconditioned being postulated as entering into causal 
relations with the conditioned -- the unconditioned condi- 
tion. 
In arguing that systemizability is the sole 
'empirical criterion of truth' Kant is arguing against 
the view that truth in science is a matter of simply deter - 
:mining the truth or falsity of individual theories, for 
on this account, science would be none the worse if it 
turned out that our empirical theories, even if true, were 
to prove resistant to our attempts at ordering them into a 
system; but the point behind the principle of judgment is 
that the rationality of the scientific enterprise depends 
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on this systeniizability just because science is teleologi- 
cal. Without a knowledge of whether particular theories 
fit the system we would have no basis for criticizing them 
and thus, once again, no basis for determining their em- 
pirical truth according to the accepted principles of 
rationality. However, it is important to note that the 
source of Kant's rationality criterion - system - is judg- 
:ment and judgment, Kant points out, is an "heautonomy ", 
i.e. it prescribes laws to itself which is just to say 
that the principle of judgement is not empirical. This 
surely shows that the account of the possibility of a 
genuine nature provided by Kant is a metaphysical one 
(regardless of what Kant thought it was) and thus confirms 
my point that metaphysics does have a legitimate role to 
play in the acquisition of knowledge with rese.. 1 ect to the 
structure of the world, a point I am arguing takes us 
back to a Leibni zian ontology of the world. I am taking 
Kant's suggestion that through science we must formulate 
normative principles on how nature ought to be judged as 
a suggestion that the proper function of metaphysical 
theories is to guide the construction of a full blown 
ontology. It has become almost a truism to say that our 
investigations into nature yield fruitful results only 
when we approach nature armed with an untested theory or 
cluster of theories, much in the way that we require con - 
:cepts to make sense of experience. In the case of an 
ontology rooted in the basic stuff of the world we require 
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a metaphysics with which to sort out the multiplicity of 
phenomena and determine how the various kinds (e.g. organ -. 
:isms, persons, micro- entities) fit together. In order 
to accomplish this task we require theories with which to 
guide and interpret what we do even though the most we 
can establish (philosophically) are structural truths with 
respect to ontological kinds and the ontological hierarchy 
into which these kinds are ordered. As I said earlier in 
this essay, Kant's categories and principles of the under- 
:standing as well as the ideas of reason, can be construed 
as providing just such an ontological picture of the 
structure of the world. I shall not argue for this in any 
detail as it is a subject in itself but will present an 
account in the final chapter of what such a picture would 
be like. 
Kant's transcendental idealism, as discussed in 
the first part of this essay, manages to be an 'empirical 
realism' at the same time, which means that despite the 
ultimate idealism of the form of the world, the world of 
everyday experience is real, just is as we experience it. 
This is the heart of the epistemological doctrine of trans- 
cendental idealism: by allowing that the only world which 
could be a world for us is that which conforms to the 
categorial framework of CPR (because nothing could be 
experienced outside this framework) Kant effects the con- 
flation of the world as experience or categorially con- 
ditioned with the world simpliciter. The consequence 
- 253 -- 
in terms of epistemology is that we are no longer entitled 
to distinguish between the world as experienced and the 
world, at least not in a way which would be comprehensible 
to beings with our cognitive constitution. The world as 
experienced is the world of ordinary physical things and 
events, thereby keeping our faith in the empirically real 
nature of the world in tact. By arguing that the form of 
the world viewed from the perspective of everyday exper- 
:ience is that legislated by the categories (thus holding 
with transcendental necessity) Kant makes good his conten- 
tion that this is the only world for us; but with respect 
to the world as it is systematically unified by the mach - 
:anism of judgment, i.e. with respect to the complexity 
of its content and diversity of kind, Kant has to admit 
that here the best we can do is to suppose that the world 
conformed to our cognitive capacities, for judgment legis- 
lates laws for its own use; not for nature. Thus while 
we can be said to determine, through transcendental nec- 
:essity, the form of the world of experience, the natural 
world cannot be so determined; instead, Kant relies on a 
kind of anthropormorphism with respect to the specifica- 
:tion of the detailed structure of nature, viz. "nature 
specifies itself" (F. Intro; V). We are to suppose that 
nature or some personified form of nature (god) is the 
source of the natural order within the world and must 
suppose this for the sake of salvaging the rationality of 
scientific activity. As Kant makes clear, the work of 
judgment in this respect is "art" for while judgment orders 
empirical laws into an organized whole, it is simply making 
explicit the form by which nature makes itself comprehens- 
ible: "Since this kind of classification is not ordinary 
experiential knowledge, but is rather an artistic knowledge, 
insofar as nature is thought in such a way that it can be 
rendered specific by this kind of principle, it is regard- 
ed as art." (ibid; V) Of course, if judgment works 
artistically then the systematic order brought about in 
our conception of nature can be regarded as purposive, 
and hence the judgment contains "a transcendental principle 
of the finality of nature" (ibid; VI). We can achieve 
objective knowledge with respect to the detail of nature 
only if we assume that nature or a surrogate of nature 
ordered the detail into a systematic unity comprehensible 
to us, just as we can have objective knowledge of objects 
in general because the unders Landing is the source of the 
principles whereby the 'unity of experience' is effected. 
Kant's maxim, "For we have complete insight only into what 
we can make and accomplish according to our conceptions" 
(CJ;i68) holds sway with respect to both our knowledge of 
experience in general and, it would appear, the detailed 
knowledge of nature. Kant's 'empirical realism' when 
seen in this context (its original context of transcenden- 
:tal idealism) is a realism which must have the idealist - 
sounding proviso - that the understanding or judgment effects 
the unity of experience or system - attached to it if it is 
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to make sense at all. however, that nature be suited to 
our cognitive faculties or that nature be systemizable - 
the necessary presupposition for the rationality of science - 
does not require that we posit God, Nature or some surro- 
:gate thereof who or which, actually organizes our empiri- 
:cal laws into a hierarchy, or otherwise "fitting nature 
for an empirical experience ". It is the employment of 
a classification system, in this case, the species - genus 
model, which allows for the possibility that nature might 
be suited to our cognitive faculties because, as I have 
indicated, such a formal logical account of the division 
of nature into kinds presupposes (at least in principle) 
that nature is in fact divisible as anticipated by the 
metaphysical principles of differentiation. That some 
such classification of nature in terms presupposing the 
division of nature into kinds, is in Kant's mind, is 
particularly evident from the following: 
"Now it is clear that the nature of 
the reflective judgment is such that 
it cannot undertake to classify the 
whole of nature by its empirical 
differentiation unless it assumes 
that nature itself specifies its 
transcendental laws by some princ- 
iple. This principle can be none 
other than that of conformity to 
the power of judgment itself, find - 
:ing in the infinite multiplicity 
of things subject to possible empiri- 
:cal laws enough kinship to bring 
them under empirical concepts 
(classes) and these under more universal 
laws (higher genera), and thus to 
achieve an empirical system of nature." 
(F. Intro; V) 
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The principles (such as judgment) guiding our investiga- 
tions into nature are neither empirical nor psychological; 
they specify the kinds of objects, the systematic ordering 
of the 'multiplicity (of kinds) of things' so that a detail- 
ed knowledge of them is possible through a system of 
empirical laws and theories; this anticipation of the 
order of nature amounts to a sketch of a possible ontology 
in terms of the structural characteristics of the concept 
of an object. Thus Kant's theory of system is completing 
the task begun by the principles of the understanding 
according to which the features possessed by a possible 
object of experience are specified; however, that there 
exists objects which could or do possess such features 
cannot be demonstrated by a a priori means just as, with 
respect to the classification of nature according to Kant's 
theory of system, judgment cannot demonstrate that there 
exists the natural kinds specified by the genus - species 
system. It is one thing to say that such and such a con - 
:cept or general feature must be presupposed for the poss- 
:ibility of experience or knowledge and quite another to 
suppose that a demonstration of the necessity for pre- 
:supposing a concept's objective validity or a feature's 
possession by an object, implies the existence of the thing 
in question. This gap between what the principles (meta - 
:physical) of Kant's theory of system and the principles 
of the understanding tell us nature in its particularity 
and nature in general must be like, and, how experience 
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and nature actually turn out, can only be filled by em- 
:pirical knowledge of things and their relations. Thus, 
I am arguing that Kant's epistemological reading of the 
categories and the principles of the understanding ought 
to be revised so as to provide a sketch or detailed guide 
for the construction of a possible ontology. Kant's 
theory of system as presented thus far and when aligned 
with the conception of the ideas of reason, provides the 
rudiments for such a possible ontology, one that proceeds 
from the conditioned to the unconditioned, from the 
conditioned objects of knowledge to the unconditioned 
source of the world -order. Such an ontology can support 
a science of nature because it allows for the possibility 
that a complete science of nature can be achieved, at 
least in principle, which seems to be the idea behind 
Kant's conception of system as the principle of rationality 
or intelligibility of science. Of course Lhis conception 
of ontology presupposes the plausibility of metaphysical 
or scientific realism, thus my defense of the metaphysics 
of Leibnizian realism. 
3. In what follows I shall contend that Kant's theory 
of science prepares the way for acceptance of the uncond- 
itioned as ontologically ultimate, in part because science, 
on Kant's interpretation of it, presupposes the postula- 
:tion of things in themselves for its intelligibility. 
In pursuing this line of argument I shall be following the 
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direction originally suggested by P. Krausser in a signi- 
:ficant article on the relation between Kant's theory of 
scientific inquiry and things in themselves.2 Finally, 
I bring this chapter to a close, appropriately, by argu.- 
:ing that Kant's attempt in the 'Second Antinomy' to show 
that the unconditioned is not to be met with in experience 
(because, as we have already seen, matter can only be 
appeararre for us) can hardly be deemed a success, and 
therefore, we are at least tentatively licensed to proceed 
with an argument with respect to the unconditioned as the 
ontological ground of the world- order, in the final chapter. 
According to Kant's theory of the world as a world 
of appearances and on the account provided by Kant's 
theoretical programme in CPR in general, 'nature' is just 
what is experienced as nature so that 'nature' is, insofar 
as it has any cognitive significance for us, 'experienced 
nature'. More specifica]ly, experienced nature iq cnnç- 
:tituted by the categories, the pure concepts of the under - 
:standing which when schematized assume the character of 
rules or principles allowing for the objective employment 
of the categories in the realm of t1 objects of possible 
experience. It is the principles of the understanding 
which guarantee that experienced nature will be a system 
of law- abiding objects of possible experience and it is 
the principles, as the necessary rules conditioning the 
possibility of any experience at all, which allow for the 
formulation of empirical laws of nature and empirical 
hypotheses pertaining to some particular detail of nature: 
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"The laws of nature, indeed, one and all, without excep- 
:tion, stand under higher principles of understanding. 
They simply apply the latter to special cases (in the 
field) of appearance." (A159 = B198) However, as the 
graph drawn up by Krausser to depict Kant's theory of the 
structure of empirical scientific inquiry shows,3 and as 
Kant's own words support, the above account of experienced 
nature is insufficient. Quite simply, if experienced 
nature were entirely the result of the principles of 
reason - comprising the principles of the understanding, 
schematism and the categories - then, "reason would not 
have to learn anything from nature, and experienced nature 
could not contradict or disappoint logically expected con- 
:squences of laws and hypotheses thought up according to 
the principles of reason. "4 But, as wo have already soon 
and as the following passage from CPR show, Kant insists 
that science, in order to progress, must be able to toot 
laws and theories to discover if they are indeed a part of 
the 'system' of our knowledge of nature. In the 'Preface' 
to the second edition of CPR, Kant states: "Reason, holding 
in one hand its principles, according to which along con - 
:cordant appearances can be admitted as equivalent to laws, 
and in the other hand the experiment which it has devised in 
conformity with these principles, must approach nature in 
order to be taught by it." (Bxiii) In connection with the 
legitimacy of formulating hypotheses Kant is no less clear 
that hypotheses must either be based on 'physical grounds', 
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not ' hyperphysical', or, if a hypothesis is a priori, it 
is acceptable only if it actually succeeds in explaining 
a fact of nature (A773 = B801); "... and the wildest 
hypotheses, if only they are physical, are here more toler- 
:able than a hyperphysical hypothesis, such as the appeal 
to a divine Author, assumed simply in order that we may have 
an explanation." (A773 = B801) 
Now reason can be taught by nature only if nature is 
or represents, an independent source of information, i.e. 
whatever 'nature' is, it must be more than what is 'cons - 
:tituted' by reason; otherwise, the possibility of .a 
'knowledge of nature' would be a misomer and all justifi- 
:cation for the use of experience and observation with 
respect to nature would be absent. Graphically; if what 
goes into and what comes out of the block 'nature' ig 
limited to the various phases of reason's goal -oriented, 
search - for -system, enterprise, from the initial questions 
'put' to nature duc to a particular puzzle or problem, 
through to the formulation of empirical laws by means of 
modus tollens, then, the search for an empirical knowledge 
of nature comes to no more than a process by which reason 
rediscovers, as it were, what it has already contributed. 
Hence, we must posit a source of information about nature 
which is completely and genuinely unconnected with 
'experienced nature' as such, and which reason can be said 
to, in a cognitively significant sense, work into a system- 
:atic unity. It follows that such an independent input 
- 
<. f. .! . 
must be the ontological equivalent of what Kant would call 
things in themselves; this implies no conclusions with 
respect to our knowledge of things in themselves, only 
that such an independent source of material must, a fortiori, 
be unknown (without making nonsense of the claim that it 
is independent). Kant's philosophy of science in general 
and his theory of system in particular presuppose the 
reality of things in themselves even though the latter 
remain unknown. If Kant's conception of scientific pro- 
:gross requires the postulation of some aspect of nature 
as the thing in itself, without which there would be no 
way of discerning if and how reason's planned system of 
empirical laws and theories failed in light of unexpected 
empirical (testable) consequences; then, a second impor- 
:tant implication can be got as well from the basic strii- 
:tine of Kant's plan. Consider: It is a familiar point 
about P.ant's theoretical programme that the principles of 
the understanding are necessary principles for the poss- 
:ibility of experience in general but insufficient to 
account for the order within nature itself, i.e. the system - 
vatic unity of particular experiences. Only specific 
empirical laws derived from experience and applicable to 
a certain range of natural phenomena can serve to explain 
the detail of the natural world. If our formulated empiri- 
:cal laws turn out unsatisfactory in that they fail to 
account for the range of phenomena in some way (e.g. new 
relevant information derived from experimentation and 
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further observation of experience), then, according to the 
basic plan prescribed by reason for science, viz. that the 
systematic unity of nature in its detail is the very basis 
for intelligibility in science and must therefore be pre - 
:served above all else, the unsatisfactory empirical laws 
must be withdrawn from the system of empirical laws and 
replaced by yet more laws which likewise are retained on 
the conditional basis that they explain the range of natur- 
al phenomena they allegedly cover. But if nature, or 
some particular aspect of nature, is to prove resistant to 
our even hypothetical empirical laws, it must be the case 
that not only is there some independent material which 
forms (partially) nature as we experience it, that inde- 
:pendent material must possess at least a minimal order of 
its own, independent of the order 'imposed' by reason 
through empirical laws; if this is not assumed, then it 
would remain a complete mystery that a totally unordered, 
unstructured independent material should prove resistant 
to our empirical laws. Not only, it seems, does Kant's 
philosophy of science presuppose a reality which is the 
source of appearances, it must, as well, be an already 
structured and ordered reality. That Kant thought there 
must be some independent input to the overall learning 
situation, over and above that provided by reason, is 
certain; for example, the following from the 'Transcenden- 
:tal Deduction' (B): "But in the above proof there is one 
feature from which I could not abstract, the feature, 
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namely, that the manifold to be intuited must be given 
prior to the synthesis of understanding, and indendently 
of it. How this takes place, remains here undetermined." 
And remains, we might add, for Kant,' everywhere undeter- 
mined for its determination would imply that the realm 
of things in themselves could be assigned a function in 
the overall learning situation. And we know that for 
Kant this is impossible. 
Unless we assume that nature's contribution to em- 
:pirical knowledge was in some way already structured, we 
would have to admit that progress in science could not 
occur, or, at best, any progress would be incomprehensible 
to us: "For just as appearances do not exist in themselves 
but only relatively to the subject in which, so far as it 
has senses, they inhere, so the laws do not exist in the 
appearances but only relatively to this same being, so far 
as it has understanding. Things in themselves- Would _?cam- - 
:essarily, apart from anv understanding that knows them, 
conform to laws of their own." (B164 - emphasis mine) 
There would seem to be a lingering ontological thesis with 
respect to things in themselves, explicitly recognized by 
Kant in this passage, insofar as some such thesis is re- 
quired in order to give due weight to the distinction 
between our empirical laws and the law -like structure of 
things in themselves. Without an ontological construal 
of things in themselves in this context, we would have no 
grounds for claiming that our scientific theories are 
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applicable to nature (i.e. that our empirical theories 
are objective). Kant acknowledges that nature must have 
some form of law-like structure of its own but argues 
that such a structure can have no significance for us 
since the only law -like structure we can understand is 
that which fits the prescription for objects of experience 
and their interaction issued by the understanding. But 
not only must we acknowledge that nature must have a law- 
like structure of its own, we must also recognize that 
things in themselves have such a structure and their hav- 
ing such a structure is essential for the progress of 
science and the growth of empirical knowledge. Kant 
comes closest to actually stating that the empirical 
association of representations in the reproductive imagina- 
:tion presupposes the associability of appearances them - 
:selves at (A100); after point out that it is a merely 
empirical law of the reproductive imagination that r_ep- 
:resentations are associated with each other, Kant goes on 
to state: "But this law of reproduction presupposes that 
appearances are themselves actually subject to such a rule, 
and that in the manifold of these representations a co- 
:existence or sequence takes place in conformity with 
certain rules. Otherwise our empirical imagination would 
never find opportunity for exercise appropriate to its 
powers.... ". 
In order to accept that appearances are themselves 
associable (in contrast to their merely being reproduced 
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as associable representations in the imagination) it is 
necessary that some law -like structure of the postulated 
things in themselves be assumed; if this is correct then 
the empirical laws we do formulate are no more than an 
expression of our attempts to understand the law -like 
structure of things in themselves - a continuous series 
of attempts to grasp that structure in the only way we 
know how, viz. a hit and miss strategy within the wider 
framework of systematic progress and growth with respect 
to nature. And this systematic growth is possible only 
if we take seriously the claim that things in themselves 
have a structure of their own, i.e. reality has some kind 
of ordered structure which is presupposed by the represen- 
:tational character of the structure of appearances. 
What emerges from this discussion is a conclusion 
I have touched upon previously but which could become 
fully evident only in the context of Kant's theory of 
science. Krausser gives partial expression to this 
important point towards the end of his article: "Kant's 
whole Critique qua philosophy of science and experience 
turns on the point that the a priori principles or forms 
of reason are necessary but riot sufficient conditions of 
possible experience and experimental science."5 As 
indicated, I am taking this as a measure of the range of 
the validity of the categories; the categories provide 
specifications of the concept of an object in general at 
the most general level and these specifications are extended 
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and filled in at the level of empirical knowledge of 
nature, the level at which our empirical laws are opera - 
:tive. Thus Kant`s contention that empirical laws must 
accord with the general requirements of the categories: 
"Certainly, empirical laws, as such, can never derive 
their origin from pure understanding ... But all empirical 
laws are only special determinations of the pure laws of 
understanding, under which, and according to the norm of 
which, they first become possible." (A127 - A128)6 Kant 
even goes so far as to suggest that the empirical laws of 
nature when regarded as specific determinations of the 
principles of understanding, express necessary (A159 = B198); 
the formulation of empirical laws can be seen to be an 
endeavour by which the validity of the categories can be 
demonstrated - investigating nature with a purpose to 
showing that the categories are indeed vindicated there. 
Thus, the categories initiate the construction of a pro- 
:visional sketch of a complete ontology by providing the 
specifications for the concept of an object in general; 
this in principle complete ontology is detailed by empiri- 
:cal science, the proper workings of which are guaranteed 
by reason in making its aims (system) the aims of the 
activity of scientific theorizing - in the way we have 
just seen. 
4. Kant says repeatedly that the proper task of reason 
is to render the diverse empirical activities of the under- 
:standing into a systematic unity and, in order to have any 
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hope of accomplishing this task, we must posit an 'analogon' 
of a schema of sensibility for the complete systematic 
unity of the understanding (A665 = 3693). Kant thus 
comes to employ a sustained analogy to the schema of under- 
:standing for reason: This analogon is the idea of the 
maximum in the division and unification of the knowledge 
of the understanding under one principle." (ibid) To arrive 
at the idea of a maximum in relation to the understanding 
entails that the normal restrictions under which the 
understanding functions be left aside, and as we would 
expect, such a suspension of the usual restrictive condi- 
:tions under which the understanding operates, indicates 
that the use of the idea of unity with respect to the 
understanding is entirely methodological, i.e. does not 
yield ob_ective knowledge (ibid). The problem however; 
is that if the concepts of the understanding are being 
applied to the 'schema of reason' in order that they might 
achieve systematic unity in respect of their empirical use, 
then it is not clear how reason is supposed to bring about 
such unity when its ideas do not possess objective validity. 
Indeed it would seem that an objective interpretation of 
the reaulative principle of the idea of unity with respect 
to the understanding is essential because nature, accord - 
:ing to Kant, can be legitimately thought only in accord-- - 
:ance with the law -like a priori structure of the under - 
:standing, and reason is the means through which this law- 
like structure is unified in its special determinations 
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at the empirical level. To deny objectivity to the idea 
of unity amounts to a denial of the possibility of a 
unified law -like structure for nature, or, at least, a 
law -like structure that we could ever know. At (A646 = 
B674) Kant states that reason's drive toward further and 
further systemization is based on the evidently metaphysi- 
cal principle, "that of the form of a whole of knowledge - 
a whole which is prior to the determinate knowledge of the 
parts and which contains the conditions that determine a 
priori for every part its position and relation to the 
other parts ", with the suggestion that this idea in turn 
generates the idea of a law -like unity of the world. 
Kant's unambiguous recognition that a purely logical or 
methodological principle of unity is inadequate to ensure 
a unity amongst our empirical laws and theories without 
some commitment to the actual constitution of nature it- 
:self, comes in this passage at (A651 - B679) : 
"It is, indeed, difficult to understand 
how there can be a logical principle by 
which reason prescribes the unity of 
rules, unless we also presuppose a 
transcendental principle whereby such a 
'systematic unity is a priori assumed to 
benecessarily inherent in the objects. 
For with what right can reason, in its 
logical employment, call upon us to 
treat the multiplicity of powers ex- 
:hibited in nature as imply a disguised 
unity, and to derive this unity, so far 
as may be possible, from a fundamental 
power - how can reason do this, if it 
be free to admit as likewise possible 
that all powers may be heterogenous, 
and that such systematic unity of 
derivation may not be in conformity 
with nature ?" 
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We can finally justify our confidence that nature will 
turn out as our investigation and research presupposes it 
to be by viewing nature from the combined perspective of 
the understanding and the unity of reason, i.e. from the 
transcendental perspective. But is this sufficient to 
justify talking "the systematic unity of nature as object- 
:ively valid and necessary "? (ibid); especially when we 
consider that Kant, on the one hand, says that regulative 
principles are not just methodological in character ( "Hence 
these principles carry their recommendation directly in 
themselves, and not merely as methodological devices." 
(A661 = B689), and on the other hand, that the "systematic 
unity (as a mere idea) is, however, only a projected unity, 
to be regarded not as given in itself, but as a problem 
only." (A647 = B675) This ambiguity in Kant's position is 
not surprising for their is a tension in the account Kant 
has provided of the necessity of the systematic unity of 
nature. We have seen that Kant wants to place our empiri- 
:cal theories into a. system in accordance with a specific 
arrangement, i.e. a hierarchy, such that lower order princ- 
iples can be derived from higher order principles, etc. 
But the necessity which the members of the system have on 
this account, is simply derived from their rlace in the 
logical system so that the most they can be said to possess 
is Ppistemi.c or logical necessity. Yet there is another 
aspect to this involving the notion of the unconditioned. 
The system of empirical nature is in principle, a complete 
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system whereby the highest- principle - which must be the 
unconditioned - does not and logically could not,derive 
its necessity from any other principle more necessary than 
itself; in other words, the highest principle must he nec- 
:essary in itself; furthermore, it is because the highest 
principle is necessary in itself that the subordinate 
principles are necessary in relation to one another. 
Necessity is derived from the postulation of the uncondi- 
tioned as the source of theorder of appearances. Notice 
that with respect to nature in its detail, or, with respect 
to the connections between natural forms, the transcendental 
unity of apperception cannot, so Kant thinks1serve as the 
source or ground. And this is consistent with my contention 
that the categories and the framework for the objects of 
experience in general provided by them, are necessary but 
not sufficient conditions of the possibility of experienced 
nature. Conceptual necessity cannot account for the kind 
of necessity binding together our system of empirical laws 
since such laws range over physical things; only a necess- 
ity appropriate in kind with the laws and things they 
range over can provide such an account, i.e. a necessity 
derived from thesource of appearances - the unconditioned. 
Of course, the unconditioned, on Kant's epistemological 
programme, cannot enter explanatorily or otherwise, into 
the realm of appearances where alone real causal inter- 
:action between appearances is possible, thus obliging us 
to construe the 'ideas' of the unconditioned as purely 
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methodological. A complete knowledge of nature aided by 
the guidance of reason can therefore never be more than a 
'projected' unity of knowledge and insofar as our knowledge 
of nature is a knowledge of appearances, the necessity of 
the parts of the systematic unity of knowledge, our theor -. 
:ies and laws, is derived from the transcendental necessity 
with which we presuppose the objective validity of that 
systematic unity of nature, or, as Kant says, from the 
'focus imaginarius' of the system (A644 = B672). But when 
Kant says that the ideas or principles of reason as regula- 
:tive ideas carry their necessity in themselves he clearly 
doc not think that transcendental necessity is sufficient 
to account for the necessity required for our physical 
laws in their systematic order; Kant has no option but to 
deny the possibility of providing such an account of 
necessity (although, as we saw, he does in fact have the 
beginnings of such an account) since to do otherwise 
would mean that the things over which our laws ranged were 
ultimately real (rather than ultimately ideal or transcen- 
:dentally ideal). So Kant occupies the middle ground, 
using the ideas of reason to form a conception of an in 
principle complete knowledge of nature thereby allowing for 
the possibility of progress in science, but characterizing 
the goal of completing such a system as unattainable, not 
because of empirical considerations, but because the uncon- 
:ditioned can only be hypothesized as ground, never known 
as such. What Kant didn't realize is that on his epistemo- 
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:logically - tailored account of science, epistemic or 
conceptual necessity is unsufficient to account for the 
systematic interconnection of the empirical laws of nature 
and that therefore, the possibility of an even in principle 
complete knowledge of nature, i.e. science, is at the very 
best, problematic. The general direction of Kant's argu- 
:nient is from the long -standing premise that the uncondition- 
:ed cannot enter into relations with the conditioned to the 
parallel thesis with respect to empirical knowledge, that 
things in themselves, since they are incognimble, cannot 
be postulated as the source of appearances in accordance 
with structure of empircal inquiry (ideas of reason). 
Kant gives an account of three ideas of reason each 
of which, I shall maintain, are supposed to be things in 
themselves serving as the unconditioned ground of the 
conditioned totalities (A334 = B391). They are: (1) the 
self as that which is subject but never predicate; (2)the 
world as a complete totality; (3) the source or cause of 
the series of appearances - God. (A323 = B379; A334 = B391) 
Kant, not one to miss an opportunity for making use of his 
architectonic skills, sets out to generate the three ideas, 
of pure concepts, of reason, by applying the form of 
syllogisms to the three forms of synthesis for the relation- 
:al categories, viz. categorial synthesis to the self, 
hypothetical synthesis to the world as totality and the 
disjunctive synthesis to the source of the series of appear - 
:ances - God. Kant's argument here is peculiar to say the 
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least, but one can clearly see what he is doing. In brief, 
Kant argues that the basis (logical or intuitive) for 
syllogistic inferences is the relation of conditioned to 
unconditioned (A322 = B378 -B379) and by using the faculty 
of reason in one of its proper domains, that of drawing 
inferences, we can, by applying the unconditioned to the 
forms of synthesis for the relational categories, arrive 
at the ideas of reason.7 
"They (ideas of reason - JD) follow the 
guiding thread of the categories... it 
can be shown how reason, simply by the 
synthetic employment of that very 
function of which it makes use in 
categorial syllogisms, is necessarily 
brought to the concept of the absolute 
unity of the thinking subject, now the 
logical procedure used in hypothetical 
syllogisms leads to the idea of the 
completely unconditioned in a series of 
given conditions, and finally how the 
mere form of the disjunctive syllogism 
must necessarily involve the highest 
concept of reason, that of a being of 
all beings ...." (A335 = B392) 
The world as the absolute unity of the series of conditions 
of appearances is the world as an unconditioned totality or 
unconditioned substance; as such, the world is that which 
is a subject and never a predicate, and in terms of, or 
from the perspective of, science, this is equivalent to 
the world construed as a system forming a law -like totality. 
The absolute of the categorical synthesis is the Self, 
which, since it is unconditioned must also be an uncondition- 
ed substance. Indeed, it is only the Self which Kant des - 
:cribes as the 'subject which is itself never a predicate' 
(A323 = B379); but if we take the ontological rendering of 
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the concepts World and Self seriously, a rendering effect- 
ed by bringing the relational categories under the uncon- 
:ditioned, then we are left with two substances, the World 
and the Self, or things and persons. The moral law deter - 
:mines the Self and the categories do likewise for the World, 
or things in the World; but if the only subject which is 
never a predicate is the Self (according to Kant) then 
there is really only one substance - the Self or thinking 
subject. However, if the ideas of reason are to be gener- 
ated by applying the unconditioned to the forms of syn- 
:thesis for the relational categories, then the absolute 
of the categorial synthesis should correspond to substance 
as the permanent in appearances, i.e. the First Analogy, 
becoming, when brought under the unconditioned, the total - 
:ity of the world as substance. In fact, since the three 
relational categories correspond, in Kant's architectonic 
sheme, to the three analogies, the ideas of reason genera- 
:ted should correspond in turn to the three analogies. We 
then get: the absolute of the categorical synthesis as the 
totality of the world as substance; the hypothetical 
synthesis as the totality of causal sequences; the absolute 
of the disjunctive synthesis as the community of substances 
in mutual interaction. Kant's derivation of 'that being 
of all beings' from the disjunctive syllogism rather than 
the totality of substances in mutual interaction , is of 
particular interest when we recall what the disjunctive 
judgment is supposed to express. In the disjunctive judg- 
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:ment, all the propositions mutually condition each other 
so that together they form the sum -total of the sphere of 
knowledge even though, taken separately, each excludes the 
other. Kant makes it clear that what the disjunctive 
judgment expresses is not the mutual exclusion of each 
proposition by the other but the totality of knowledge 
which all the propositions taken together determine: 
"Finally, the disjunctive judgment 
contains a relation of two or more 
propositions to each other, a relation 
not, however, of logical sequence, but 
of logical opposition, in so far as 
the sphere of the one excludes the 
sphere of the other, and yet at the same 
time of community, in so far as the 
propositions taken together occupy 
the whole sphere of the knowledge in 
question. The disjunctive judgment 
expresses, therefore, a relation of 
the parts of the sphere of such know - 
:ledge, since sphere each 
is a complement of the sphere of the 
others, yielding together the sum -total 
of the divided knowledge. Take, for 
instance, the judgment, 'The world 
exists either through blind chance, 
or through inner necessity, or through 
an external cause'. Each of these 
propositions occupies a part of the 
sphere of the possible knowledge con - 
:cerning the existence of the world in 
general; all of them together occupy 
the whole sphere. To take the know- 
:ledge out of one of these spheres 
means placing it in one of the other 
spheres, and to place it in one sphere 
means taking it out of the others. 
There is, therefore, in a disjunctive 
judgment a certain community of the 
known constituents, such that they 
mutually exclude each other, and yet 
thereby determine in their totality 
thetrue knowledge.-"--(A74 = B99) 
When we consider the disjunctive judgment in its categorial 
form as the synthesis in mutual interaction with one another, 
- 276 - 
the mutual exclusion yet determination as a community is 
that between substances, such that, while substances 
mutually exclude each other by repelling each other in 
contact, they mutually determine each other in so far as 
their individual existences are maintained by this mutual 
interaction. Now Kant thinks that the unconditioned of 
the disjunctive synthesis is expressed not by the community 
of interacting substances but by God, from which it can be 
concluded that Kant must think the totality of interacting 
substances to be a conditioned totality. Since the total- 
:ity is the complete series of conditioneds taken together, 
and epistemologically, all that can be known, the uncon- 
:ditioned condition of the totality cannot be known. The 
unconditioned forms no part of the totality and therefore 
is essentially unknowable. Once again, we meet with this 
lingering ontologicalconstrual of the unconditioned: the 
whole is really grounded but because the unconditioned 
ground can form no part of the whole and only that which 
is part of the whole - the conditioned parts of the whole - 
can be known, then, the unconditioned must be unknowable. 
Each of the ideas of reason are supposed to be 
expressions of the conditioning grounds of the conditioned 
totalities, viz. things in themselves. But the self in 
itself, world in itself and God, are all unknowable; there- 
:fore, as Kant repeatedly, implies, we can have no knowledge 
of the inner nature of reality. When this thesis with 
respect to thé unknowability of things in themselves because 
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things in themselves are unconditioned, is transposed to 
the domain of science or any system of empirical knowledge 
or knowledge of the world in its detail, it leaves us with 
the semi- sceptical position that empirical knowledge of 
nature can never form a complete system, for completeness 
depends on knowledge of the unconditioned and such know - 
:ledge is impossible for us. The true structure of the 
world is forever beyond our grasp. We can try to dis- 
:cover the inner structure of things, indeed, this is the 
very purpose of the ideas of reason; but it is a vain task 
if what we hope for is knowledge of the whole or a truly 
determinate knowledge of the world order: "How, then, can 
anyone dispute their (ideas of reason - JD) objective 
reality? He who denies their possibility must do so with 
just as little knowledge (of this possibility) as we can 
have in affirming it. It is not, however, a sufficient 
ground for assuming anything, that there is no positive 
hindrance to our doing so; we are not justified in intro- 
:ducing thought -entities which transcend all our concepts, 
though without contradicting them, as being real and deter - 
:minate objects, merely on the authority of a speculative 
reason that is bent upon completing the tasks which it has 
set itself....What we then think is a something of which, 
as it is in itself, we have no concept whatsoever, but 
which we none the less represent to ourselves as standing 
to the sum of appearances in a relation analogous to that 
in which appearances stand to one another." (A674 = B702) 
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What is necessary is that we think in some way, under some 
limited description, the unconditioned thematically ex- 
:pressed in the ideas of reason as things in themselves 
and that we do think the unconditioned is a necessary 
presupposition of any systematic knowledge whatever;indeed, 
the unconditioned is itself the requirement for an even 
possibly complete knowledge if nature and the structure of 
the world but because we are not, or, more appropriately, 
cannot, form a determinate (i.e. objectively valid a priori 
concept) idea of the unconditioned, we must adopt a semi - 
sceptical attitude towards its possibility, while recog- 
:nizing that it is essential to systematic knowledge of 
nature. Thus the problematic center of the drive towards 
a complete knowledge of nature. In connection with the 
problem of providing some account of the source of the world 
of appearances (the ontological source of which Kant always 
construed as God) Kant has Luis Lo say: "If, in connection 
with a transcendental theology, (God as the absolute source 
of the world of appearances -- JD) we ask; first, whether 
there is anything distinct from the world, which contains 
the ground of the order of the world and if its connection 
in accordance with universal laws, the answer is that there 
'Undoubtedly is. For the world is a sum of appearances; and 
there must therefore be some transcendental ground of the 
appearances, that is, a ground which is thinkable only by 
the pure understanding." (A696 = B724) 
As I indicated earlier, we are once again forced to 
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the conclusion that Kant's refusal to accept an ontological 
construal of the unconditioned and thing in itself looks 
like having more to do with a failure to provide an epis- 
:ternological justification of the grounding relation be- 
:tween the unconditioned and the conditioned, rather than 
anything about the unconditioned as the ground itself of 
the world order: and it is this failure which might account 
for Kant's formulation of a transcendental condition as the 
ground of the world order, a transcendental condition made 
accessible by being placed in the nature of knowing sub - 
:jects. Kant's thesis about the limits of knowledge would 
seem, on this account, to have been precir_itaInd by a sep- 
:arate and long -standing ontological thesis with respect 
to things in themselves; things in themselves are uncondi- 
tioned and the unconditioned is the source of the world - 
order, only we can no longer say so. But it is Kant's 
theological and dogmatic -sounding interpretation of things 
in themselves which leads him into the crisis whereby onto - 
:logy and epistemology are separated in this way. Once 
these theological overtones are dropped and substituted 
with an account of fundamental entities such that appear- 
ances or the world of physical objects are construed as 
the manifestation of the nature of fundamental entities of 
one kind or another, it is possible to construct an onto - 
:logy based on the phenomenal -noumenal distinction. I 
try to indicate what this might look like in the next and 
final chapter, 
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We know that Kant tries to avoid the dogmatism of 
a Leibniz while escaping the scepticism of a Hume; this 
means trying to construct an ontology with a matching 
epistemology, such that we do not have to account for the 
existence of a world -order in terms of necessary entities. 
But in ID, we saw that Kant construed the Creator as supply - 
:ing the kind of bond between things which would otherwise 
be provided by necessary existents. The point is that 
Kant realizes that without some necessary entities or 
principles there could be no necessary relations between 
things for the world would consist of entirely contingent 
existents. But if all relations between the substances in 
the world are contingent then there can be no rules or 
laws governing their interaction. We must provide some 
account of ar_ order or structure in the world and if God 
is unacceptable because unhelpful in the long run, and the 
categories and principles can provide at best, structural 
truths with respect to the concept of an object in general, 
then, we must search for an explanation for the justified 
postulation of fundamental entities in the world. And this 
is just what the ideas of reason, even in their original 
unadulterated Kantian form, are designed to do. They 
specify the paths towards the unconditioned by extending 
the legitimacy of the categorial concepts into the realm 
of things in themselves - in a regulative way of course. 
The ideas of reason, like the principle of judgment, guide 
the understanding in the construction of a system of em- 
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:pirical laws, a construction which would effectively 
vindicate the categories at the level of nature. The under - 
:standing can demonstrate that the categories are trans - 
:cendentally necessary (perhaps) but reason must show that 
they are even empirically required. The sustained par - 
:allel between the understanding and reason is unmistakable - 
the unity of a priori principles at the level of experience 
in general, the unity of empirical laws at the level of 
nature in its detail. In ID, Kant, not yet having devel- 
:oped his Critical position, ayues that in order to have 
a representing of the whole we must posit some ground for 
the whole; he still believes this come the CPR stage only 
now he must try and defend the claim within the confines 
of his newly discovered epistemological doctrine. This 
he does by means of the ideas of reason or, the conception 
of reason and its relation to the understanding. What is 
crucial, even at the time of ID, is that some ground or 
source of the world -order be postulated as simply being, 
as this passage from ID shows: "So, a whole of substances 
is a whole of contingents, and the world, In its own 
essence, is 'coMpiosed of Mere contingents. Moreover no 
necessary substance has a bond with the world except as 
cause with caused, and accordingly not as a part with its 
complements to the whole (since the bond of coparts is one 
of mutual dependence which dependence does not enter into 
a necessary entity). Therefore the cause of the world 
is an extramundane entity and so is not the soul of the 
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world nor is its presence in the world local but Virtual." 
(No. 19; last emphasis mine) That it is present at all is all 
that need be assumed, whether in the context of providing 
an explanation for a specific principle of natural phil- 
:osophy, such as the principle of continuity or in the 
context of more general philosophical truths, such as the 
principle of sufficient reason. We still must think the 
world as being somehow (even if indefensibly) connected 
with the unconditioned because all empirical knowledge, 
indeed, all knowledge not falling within the range of the 
categorial framework, is possible only if we make the 
search for this connection a part of our scientific 
investigiations, viz. the goal of science. 
In Ch. II I argued that there is an ontological 
structure to Kant's conception of reacon and that this 
structure could not be eliminated. We now see that this 
ontological structure is presupposed by Kant's theory of 
science, a theory articulated under the guise of a des - 
:cription of the proper domain for the function of reason. 
Kant's theory of reason points to the unconditioned as the 
ground of the order of the world which becomes the unattain- 
:able goal of science thereby guaranteeing continuous pro - 
:gress. But Kant's reasons for thinking the unconditioned 
unattainable are unconvincing if only because he always 
conceived the unconditioned as essentially unknowable and 
therefore unable to enter into our explanatory theories with 
respect to the metaphysical structure of the world. We are 
thus entitled push on with the attempt at specifying a 
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philosophical sketch of the unconditioned, and this means 
adopting some form of Leibnizian realism for, as we saw 
in the last chapter, it is Leibnizian realism which makes 
claims to the effect that the world of appearances is nec- 
:essarily connected with and grounded in, unconditioned 
entities, and, as well, that such unconditioned entities 
need not be fully specified in order to be known as the 
ground, or source of appearances. The analysis of the 
unconditioned I shall present, as indicated, is in terms 
of the unconditioned parts of matter as argued for by 
Kant in his force theory of matter in MFNS. This follows 
naturally from what we have said for it will be recalled 
that Kant must provide some account of what is other than 
mind even at the level of transcendental idealism. Before 
setting out with this final chapter, it remains to argue 
that Kant's attempt in the `Second Antinomy' to show that 
we can have no knowledge of, or experience (iii any sense) 
of, matter as unconditioned, is unsuccessful. I have no 
knock -down argument to show that Kant's argument is false 
but I believe it is possible to demonstrate that the argu- 
:ment isn't strong enough to prove what Kant wants it to, 
i.e. the world (and therefore matter) is a world of appear- 
ances. 
5. Kant's final objective in the 'Second Antinomy' 
that 
does seem to be to establish /in experience the uncondition- 
:ed, as matter, body or substance, cannot enter, but as has 
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been pointed out in some detail by W.H. Walsh, the Second 
Antinomy represents an indirect proof of transcendental 
idealism.8 I shall take it that the Second Antinomy is 
an attempt to demonstrate that the matter of experience 
is mere appearance. In fact Kant's strategy in the 
Antinomy as a whole is to deny that the world is a world 
of things in themselves, indirectly, by arguing that the 
world can only be a world of appearances for us. In one 
of the many remarks which he makes to this effect, he 
says: 
"It is therefore also false that the world 
(the sum of all appearances) is a whole 
existing in itself. From this it then 
follows that appearances in general are 
nothing outside our representations - which is 
just what is meant by their transcendental 
ideality. 
This remark is of some importance. It 
enables us to see that the proofs given in 
the fourfold antinomy are not merely baseless 
deceptions. On the supposition that appear - 
:ances, and the sensible world which compre- 
:hends them all, are things in themselves. 
these proofs are indeed well- grounded. The 
conflict which results from the propositions 
thus obtained shows, however, that there is 
a fallacy in this assumption, and so leads 
us to the discovery of the true constitution 
of things, as objects of the senses." 
(A507 = B535) 
The argument of the Second Antinomy is that from the 
assumptions (thesis and antithesis) that the world is com- 
:posed of simples and that the world, in so far as it is 
matter or substance, is infinitely divisible, it follows 
that neither of these contentions could be proved true. 
The first thing I want to say about this argument is that, 
while it may follow from the assumption of both thesis and 
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antithesis that neither proposition can be shown to be true 
in terms of their a priori conceivability, it does not 
follow that neither can (in the future) be true as empirical 
theories. Thus, the most Kant can hope to establish is that 
both thesis and antithesis cannot be shown to be true on 
grounds of a priori conceivability. There is a second 
point which is important here because it determines my read - 
:ing of the argument of the Second Antinomy as a whole. 
Kant's position with respect to the infinite divisibility 
of matter is that the infinite divisibility of space 
entails the infinite divisibility of matter and, therefore, 
the postulation of infinitely small substances as the 
centers of attractive and repulsive forces must be reject - 
:ed as impossible (as such substances could not be found or 
discovered in space). (MFNS; 551 -553) This however, is 
just the view of Leibniz with respect to space, matter and 
substance and it is the view that Kant himself comes to 
accept, i.e. matter is not composed of simples (monads or 
otherwise) because simples cannot possibly be the proper 
parts of matter. "In this way it remained open to the meta- 
:physician to compound space of points and matter of simple 
parts .... Now, the composite of things in themselves must 
certainly consist of the simple; for the parts must here be 
given before all composition. But the composite in the 
appearance does not consist of the simple, because in the 
appearance, which can never be given otherwise than as 
composite (: extended), the parts can be given only through 
division and thus not before the composite but only in it. 
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Therefore, it was not Leibniz's intention, as far as T 
comprehend, to explain space by the order of simple entit- 
:ies side by side, but rather to juxtapose this order as 
corresponding to space while yet belonging to a merely 
intelligible (for us unknown) world." (ibid; 508)9 Now, 
accepting that Kant approves of this more or less Leibniz- 
:ian view, including the thesis that bodies are aggregates 
of infinitely many nonsensible entities ('On A Discovery; 
203), we can read the Second Antinomy, and the argument 
of the antithesis especially, as an indirect defense of 
the thesis that there are unconditioned simple and non - 
sensible entities, which cannot be discovered in space. 
This implies that the Second Antinomy is best understood 
as proffering a disguised ontological thesis, an inter- 
pretation not undefended in the literature.10 This 
reading of the Second Antinomy in no way interferes with 
Kant's actual arguments in either the t hesis or antithesis 
but represents an attempt to interpret the direction of 
the overall argument of the Second Antinomy. The thesis I 
understand to be a defense of the Newtonian position with 
respect to simples; matter is composed of inelastic atoms. 
The anithesis represents the Leibnizian position on simples, 
viz. composite things are infinitely decomposable and now - 
:where in the world (spatial) can there be found simple 
entities. According to Kant's procedure in the first two 
antinomies, the argument is that neither the Leibnizian nor 
Newtonian positions with respect to simples can be firmly 
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established and therefore neither position can be serious - 
:ly entertained as the basis for cosmological views of the 
world. Structurally, this conclusion is meant to be a 
kind of support for transcendental idealism since in a 
world of appearances no simple entities can be found. But, 
at best, the argument might persuade us to simply wait upon 
experience andsee if our physical investigations turned up 
new information regarding the structure of the simple en- 
:tities of the world; the argument does not establish that 
either the Newtonian or Leibnizian position are absolutely 
false, if only because it would have to demonstrate-some- 
:thing like the necessary impossibility of either position 
and that, we can agree, it does not even come close to 
doing. Kant's argument allows for the possibility that 
o ne or either of the positions might be empirically veri- 
:fied so that if atoms were postulated as the simple parts 
Of matter - or, the simplest dLScvVeïeu at the L h OY 
it would have to be acknowledged that there exist uncondi- 
:tioned simple entities in the world. Kant presents the 
opposing positions as intellectual and rational views 
once removed from empirical theory but this, surely, could 
never be sufficient to establish the truth or falsity of 
what after all, are physical theories pertaining to the 
basic stuff of the universe. Once aligned with a demon- 
:stration of the empirical impossibility of either position, 
the impossibility on the grounds of a priori conceivability 
would undoubtedly add weight to the overall argument, but 
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alone it is inadequate for the task assigned it. Of course, 
since Kant`s presupposition throughout the antinomies is 
that the world is a world of appearances, the antinomy of 
simplicity cannot be resolved and from the fact that the 
antinomy is irresolvable we can infer that unconditioned 
simples of any description will never be discovered in 
experience. Thus Kant is in this sense arguing from 
entirely a priori grounds to the impossibility of a physi- 
cal discovery; Kant would say, for example; if atoms 
were discovered at some point, that we must assume them 
to be infinitely divisible even if we cannot conceive this 
form the point of view of its empirical possibility. This 
is what Kant must demonstrate if he is to lend support to 
the ontological position that no unconditioned entities 
can be found in experience; if he fails to do this then we 
have at least prima facie plausibility for disregarding 
the thesis of transcendental idealism with respect to the 
matter or substance of experience. 
The argument of the thesis can be condensed as 
follows: If we assume that composition can be removed from 
a body we are assuming there are simples. If it is imposs- 
:ible to remove all composition from a body, then the com- 
posite would not be made up of substances; composition, 
as applied to substances, is an accidental relation apart 
from which substances are self -subsisting. Since this 
contradicts the original supposition that composite sub - 
:stances are not made up of simple parts, we are left with 
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only the thesis, i.e. every composite substance is made up 
of simples. Kant succeeds in carrying through the reductio 
only by plugging in, at the middle of the argument, a defin- 
ition of substances, viz. that they -are self- subsistent, 
unconditioned beings, and of course this contradicts the 
original supposition. But of substances really are self - 
subsisting simple entities, then composition of substances 
(even if only an accidental relation) must be of simples 
and likewise all removal of composition will leave only 
simples.' To inject this into the reductio as a defini- 
:tion is surely begging the question at issue, Thé_argu- 
:ment on behalf of the thesis cannot be considered valid; 
in any case, construing the overall argument as I am - to 
show that no unconditional entities can be met in exper- 
:ience- makes th.e possible failure of the thesis argument 
of little consequence. For even if the thesis isn't false 
as an independent argument, it will still be confronted with 
the antithesis and exposed as no more than a fanciful 
illusion. By showing that the antithesis of the Second 
Antinomy is true, Kant can provide indirect support for the 
argument that there are no unconditioned entities to be met 
with in experience, for the antithesis purports to shów 
that all parts of matter must be conditioned. The argu- 
ment in the antithesis follows the reductio pattern as 
did the thesis argument; in brief, if the parts of things 
were themselves simples, then the parts could not be 
spatial because space is not made up of simple parts; any - 
:thing non -spatial, is incognizable. Now, in the 
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'Observation' on the antithesis, Kant makes it quite clear 
that he thinks it follows from the argument of the anti - 
:thesis that, granted the infinite indivisibility of matter, 
if someone (namely, the monadists - A439 - A440 = B467 - 
B468) wanted to maintain that matter was made of simples, 
these simples would be mathematical points as well as phy- 
:sical points conceived as "having the distinguishing 
characteristic of being able, as parts of space, to fill 
space through their mere aggregation." (ibid) This con - 
:clusion, Kant regards as quite unwarranted, indeed, absurd, 
especially in view of his doctrine that the world is a 
world of appearances; we thus see the rationale behind the 
conclusion representing the true position of Leibniz, viz. 
absolute simples cannot be parts of wholes (material). 
Hence, atomism must be false. Unfortunately for Kant, this 
argument is not without its flaws. Kant's argument, first 
of all, assumes that all extended things are composite, 
i.e. non -simple and his intuitive support for this assump- 
:tion consists in the belief that, if a thing is extended, 
then it is conceivable that it be capable of further and 
further division; but we cannot grant the real possibility 
of further extension from its mere conceivability. Once 
again, Kant's mode of argument is insufficient to support 
the rather empirically- grounded conclusions he wants to 
get from them. Consider what might 'conceivably' occur 
if the attempt to divide an atom alleged to be extended 
but simple, was carried out. There are three well rehearsed 
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possibilities here; the atom might resist all attempts at 
splitting it and remain absolutely impenetrable; the atom 
might be annihilated; the atom may undergo a transformation, 
i.e. turn into pure energy. These are plausible if not 
very likely possibilities for they say no more than; the 
atom remains the same or is destroyed (entropy supports 
this possibility in so far as according to the laws of 
entropy the amount of energy in the universe is decreasing, 
i.e. not available in usable forms), or is changed. The 
second unacceptable aspect of this argument concerns Kant's 
dismissal of the possibility of unextended points being 
the center of what fills space; this is especially curious 
because Kant's position in MFNS does postulate attractive 
and repulsive forces as what fills space, only there, space 
is filled. not by the repulsive force radiating from a point 
center but by a continuous field of repulsive (and attract- 
ive) forces: ". .. and it is clear that the hypothesis of a 
point filling a space by mere driving force and not by 
means of other likewise repulsive forces is completely im- 
:possible." (MENS; 504) We shall be looking at MENS in 
more detail in the next chapter, especially Kant's force 
theory of matter. Now, while Kant is no doubt correct in 
dismissing the idea of space being filled by the aggrega- 
:tion of mathematical or physical points as an absurdity, 
the idea of a field of attractive and repulsive forces 
constituting the substance of the world is not, in any 
obvious way, non -simple. While a force field just is the 
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continuousness of forces in space, points are still in 
space with either a repulsive or attractive capacity or 
power which is realized in the context of the field. Also, 
forces, even in MFNS, are not compounded out of anything 
else, and in this sense, can legitimately be described as 
simple. This cannot be discussed properly before the 
MFNS and its background have been introduced but I hope 
that it has been possible to show here that even if we 
assume the infinite divisibility of matter it is not clear 
that this necessarily entails that all parts of matter are 
conditioned, i.e. non -simple. Atomism may be false but 
that alone is not sufficient for Kant's overall argument 
in the Second Antinomy to go through since something else, 
some other kind of entity can be posited as that which 
fills space, entities like Kant's forces of attraction 
and repulsion. They fill space and there exists nothing 
from which forces are made - they are the fundamental 
'stuff' of the world. 
I conclude then, that Kant has not demonstrated that 
transcendental idealism with respect to the matter of 
appearance is true. This failure leaves open the poss- 
ibility that an account of the source of appearances can 
be provided in terms of the unconditioned. What I have 
described as the main direction of Kant's argument in the 
2nd Antinomy, viz. the ontological possibility of there 
being simple entities which cannot be found in space, has 
at least a prima facie plausibility in light of Kant's 
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doctrinal stance on issues epistemological and ontological. 
Something other than mind really is the source of appear - 
:ances but we can no longer say that it is; hence, it must 
be pushed into the realm of the unconditioned - like all 
ontological problems - and the order of appearances made 
to rest on a transcendental condition. We have seen that 
transcendental idealism cannot support this sort of move 
because it cannot account for the constraints placed on 
knowledge by what is other than, or is derived from a 
source other than, knowing subjects. These constraints are 
the foundations of objectivity. In the final chapter I 
shall try to provide an initial outline of the kind of 
metaphysical theory, based on the unconditioned (Leibnizian 
realism), which might complement Kant's epistemological 
programme. 
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Chapter VI Realism: Matter and the Ontology of Forces 
"Thus the whole discussion of essence, 
attributes, and so on, absolutely does 
not belong to metaphysics (where Baumgarten, 
along with several others, has put it) but 
only to logic the real essence (the 
nature) of any object, that is, the primary 
inner ground of all that necessarily belongs 
to a given thing, this is impossible for man 
to discover. For example, extension and 
impenetrability are the whole logical essence 
of the concept of matter, that is, they are 
all that is necessarily and primitively 
contained in my, and every man's concept 
of matter. But to recognize the real 
essence of mater, the primary, inner, 
sufficient ground of all that necessarily 
belongs to matter, this far exceeds tree 
capacity of human powers. We cannot 
discover the essence of water, of earth, or 
the essence of any other empirical objects; 
even the real essence of space and time and 
the reason why the former dimensions, has three 
the latter only one, areyulnknowable. " (Kant 
to Reinhold; May 12, 1789) 
1. We have seen that science, according to Kant's 
philosophy of science, is teleological, that is, science 
is a goal- oriented enterprise; as such, and for its 
possibility as such, science must presuppose the existence 
of things in themselves. It is the continuous striving 
after knowledge of things in themselves (the independent 
and unknown source of information in nature) which is the 
essential activity of science, and since according to Kant's 
epistemological programme, all knowledge is necessarily 
knowledge of appearances and appearances are phenomenal-and 
conditioned while the real is noumenal and unconditioned, 
science is the continuous search for knowledge of what is 
unknown, that is, science has knowledge from the perspective 
of the unconditioned as its aim. In this final chapter, as 
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indicated, I try to complete - at least in outline - this 
argument, by suggesting that Kant's own conception of forces 
as the fundamental constituents of matter is a plausible 
philosonhicalcandidate for the unconditioned. The uncondi- 
:tionally (i.e. Leibnizian) real are forces understood in 
terms of Kant's conception of intensive magnitudes; only 
the real has intensive magnitude and only the real as such 
has Being. As we shall see, intensive magnitudes cannot 
be classified as either primary or secondary properties; 
primary and secondary properties are notior,cannot be1cat- 
:egorized as, the real, if for no other reason than the 
real as that which alone possesses being is the ground of 
the manifest primary and secondary properties. Forces as 
the unconditioned can be described as monad -like in so far 
as forces arc not in space and time (in Kant's sense of 
'in' where something must be observable or constructible 
or picturable) j:11-!le they condition everything that is in 
space and time. Forces do not however, share that feature 
of monads according to which substances d not enter into 
real causal relationship with each other; forces, as the 
'parts' of matter are unconditioned but not in such a way 
as to make causal relations impossible. Nor, of course, 
are forces no more than the changing series of perceptions 
in each monad; on this idealist reading, monads are 
incapable of producing transeunt forces which can be sal 
to actually cause changes in the states of entities exist- 
ing outside the entities producing the force in question. 
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It is not crucial to my interpretation of forces as the 
fundamental stuff of the world that they be characterized 
as monads; it is simply an appropriate description of forces 
as a kind of entity in view of the unconditionally real 
status of monads in their original Leibnizian form. I 
shall return to this shortly. 
I shall proceed with the argument as follows: (1) 
I begin with a brief discussion of the problem of matter 
from the atomist cosmology through to Descartes and con- 
:eluding with Leibniz and Kant. Leibniz's theory of force 
is unacceptable as it stands only because it fails to ex- 
:plain, as Kant charges, real causal interaction amongst 
substances or entities. We thus adopt Kant's force theory 
of matter which, apart from the question of causal inter- 
:action, is Lcibnizian in all other important respects. 
Thus my contention that we have in MFNS the postulation of 
the fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion which 
provide for a Leibnizian (realist) ontology. Kant thought 
that a realist interpretation of the physical world was 
the correct one, or so one must assume from the empirically 
real nature of physical objects which his epistemology 
countenaced and which his analysis of the concept of matter 
in MFNS demands; Kant's philosophical theory that the physi- 
cal world was transcendentally (= ultimately) ideal res- 
:strained him from making strong claims with respect to 
the'real' nature of fundamental forces constituting matter. 
Once, however, we have argued against the priority of trans- 
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:cendental idealism as an epistemological theory over the 
very different story which Kant's theory of science seems 
to tell, there is no reason for Kant not to admit that 
forces are the unconditioned -conditioners of the world 
order. Forces emanate from point centers of influence 
and point centers of influence are unconditioned in that 
there are no entities beneath point centers holding them 
up or sustaining them; point centers do not depend on any 
other entity for their being. In order to make themselves 
manifest however, there must exist other point centers 
which do condition them in so far as point centers must 
be prevented from dispersing themselves to infinity. It 
is difficult to describe this unconditioned- conditioned 
character of fundamental forces but it does help to think 
of forces in this respect analogously with the power of 
spontaneity as the ground of freedom and reason. (2) I 
shall present a defense of the interpretation of forces as 
intensive magnitudes; Kant's attempt to construct bodies 
from point centers of influence in the 'Metaphysical 
Foundations of Dynamics' represents, or, can be construed 
as representing, the further specification or detailing of, 
the real in perception being an intensive magnitude; this 
is of course, just as Kant himself suggests in the 
Anticipations of Perception of CPR. Since forces do not 
seem to be describable as primary or secondary properties, 
there would seem to be little else for them to be but 
intensive magnitudes. We can, as has been considered by 
some commentators, construe Kant's force theory of matter 
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as a remarkably advanced articulation of field theory. 
In fact, the picture of the physical world as a system of 
point centers of influence attracting and repelling one 
another and requiring the existence of surrounding point 
centers to prevent their dispersion to infinity is the 
beginnings of a field theory; however, the point centers 
within the field are ontologically distinct and uncondi- 
:tioned entities even though they depend on the field for 
their manifestation. It is not the task of this essay to 
address questions of detail such as this; nor am I competent 
to do so. The point is, and it is worth repeating, that 
I am not trying to address the empirical question as to 
whether forces in fact are the basic stuff of the universe 
but defend the possibility (and this is a philosophical 
question) that something like forces - that kind of entity - 
could count as the unconditioned, the fundamental stuff of 
the universe. In other words, it is the Le i hni zian i roti'Iem 
to the effect that experience must have foundations which 
are ultimate even if we can't discover these ultimates; 
Kant's answer to this is to say that it is precisely because 
we can't discover them that we can't postulate them in any 
but a provisional way. Both are philosophical responses, 
Kant's challenging the possibility Leibniz never even 
questioned. (3) Finally, throughout the discussion and 
argument I shall remark as to the characteristics of the 
crude sketch of the possible ontology based on the uncon- 
ditioned as here conceived, for example, a theory of onto- 
:logy based on unconditioned sources of the world order 
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must incorporate both a theory of reality which takes up 
the perspective of knowledge and a theory of reality from 
which the object (physical reality and laws pertaining to 
it) is viewed from the perspective of being, or, from the 
perspective of the object (ontically). This will be of 
necessity very brief as indeed, shall be this chanter 
generally, for it is essentially an attempt to sketch the 
kind of ontology required to complement the structural 
truths with respect to the world specified by Kant's cat- 
:egories, principles and ideas, an account which can be 
supplied not by transcendental idealism but Leibnizian 
realism. And this is as it should be for only science, 
which adopts the perspective of the unconditioned, can fill 
in the story begun by the categories,and Leibnizian realism, 
which is the philosophical framework for science, provides 
the kind of ontology required by science and in turn, 
possibly filled in or realized by science in its pursuit 
of the unconditioned. 
The postulation of atoms as the material or stuff out of 
which physical things are composed represents a possible 
answer to the problem of explainingthe basic constituents 
of matter; the substance of the physical world are atoms. 
Kant rejects atomism because simples cannot form a part of 
the world of appearances; true simples, as we have seen, 
would have to be ontologically independent entities and 
if they are ontologically independent, then there exists 
nothing to condition them, as it were, from below; this 
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amounts to recognizing things in themselves in the empiri- 
:cally real world and for Kant, things in themselves cannot 
enter into real causal connection with conditioned entities. 
It follows that atoms, as the simples of matter, cannot be 
postulated within the world as the basic constituents of 
the world. The world of appearances is a world which forms 
a totality of conditioned entities, that is, there exists 
nothing within the world of appearances which could serve 
as The ground of that world. It follows that all knowledge 
is knowledge of the conditioned, of appearnces, and thus we 
arrive at one of the central claims of transcendental 
idealism. Notice, however, that this tenet of transcenden- 
tal idealism arises naturally from Kant's views with res- 
:pect to the ontological status of self -sustaining entities 
like simples. The problem of simples and matter is, for 
Kant, the problem ofexplaining how unconditioned entities 
could enter into relations with conditioned entities: 
because Kant saw no way that this could be explained with- 
:out serious epistemological risk, atoms, monads and the 
like must be considered illegitimate, at least, such enti- 
:ties could not be construed as existing within the world. 
The atomist world view has as its most distinguished 
proponent, Newton/to whom the most sophisticated form of 
atomism is ascribed: all material things are composed of 
basic corpuscles which are absolutely impenetrable. The 
best, or one of the best, statements of this view by 
Newton is found in 'Query 31' of the Opticks: 
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"All these things being consider'd, it seems 
probable to me, that. God in the beginning 
formed Matter in solid, massy, hard, impen- 
:etrable, movable particles, of such Sizes 
and Figures, and with such other Properties, 
and in such Proportion to Space, as most con - 
:duced to the End for which he form'd them; 
and that these primitive Particles being 
Solids, are incomparably harder than any 
porous Bodies compounded of them; even 
so very hard, as never to wear or break 
in pieces; no ordinary Power being able 
to divide what God himself made one in 
the first Creation." 
As the basic or ultimate constituents of bodies, atoms or 
particles, were designed on the analogy of ordinary, physi- 
:cal, observable bodies so much so that the properties 
ascribed to macro- objects were likewise believed to be 
possessed by the atoms out of which they were composed. 
Again, Newton provides the most articulate expression of 
the general beliefs and reasoning underlying the atomist 
world -view; thafollowing passage is taken from the third 
'Rule of Reasoning in Philosophy' at the beginning of 
Bk. III of the Principia: 
"We are certainly not to relinquish the 
evidence of experiements for the sake of 
dreams and vain fictions of our own de- 
:vising; nor are we to recede from the 
analogy of Nature, which is wont to be 
simple, and always consonant to itself. 
We no other way know the extension of 
bodies than by our senses, nor do these 
reach it in all bodies; but because we 
perceive extension in all that are sen- 
sible, therefore we ascribe it univer- 
:sally to all othens also. That abundance 
of bodies are hard, we learn by experience 
and because the hardness of the whole 
arises from the hardness of the parts, 
we therefore justly infer the hardness 
of the undivided particles not only of 
the bodies we feel but of all others. 
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That all bodies are impenetrable, we gather 
not from reason, but from sensation. The 
bodies which we handle we find impenetrable, 
and thence conclude impentrability to be an 
universal property of all bodies whatsoever. 
That all bodies are movable, and endowed 
with certain powers (which-we call inertia) 
of preserving in their motion, or in their 
rest, we only infer from the like properties 
observed in the bodies which we have seen. 
The extension,hardness, impenetrability, 
mobility, and inertia of the whole, result 
from the extension, hardness impenetrability, 
mobility, and inertia of the parts; and 
hence we conclude the least particles of 
all bodies to be also all extended, and hard 
and impenetrable, and moveable, and endowed 
with their proper inertia. And this is the 
foundation of all philosophy. "j 
This characterization of material bodies indicates that the 
essential power of bodies and by extension, of matter, is 
the power to remain in motion or at rest, i.e. the power 
of inactivity. Atomic particules move and are moved but 
they cannot move themselves because they do not possess 
an active force. For Newton, the vis inertiae of bodies 
is a merely passive principle by which bodies receive 
motion depending on the force impressing itself on them, 
and resist motion depending on the forces of resistance 
which they meet. Without an active principle, however, 
motion remains unexplained for the principle of inertia 
alone cannot account for the possibility of motion in the 
world. We require some other principle which could be 
responsible for putting bodies into motion and maintaining 
or conserving motion. Newton recognized the necessity of 
some such principle as this for he believed that the total 
amount of motion in the world would be dissipated unless 
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it was continuously renewed; that motion is lost was clear 
to Newton from the evidence of the apparent loss of motion 
in inelastic collisions. 
Descartes can be classified as an atomist, at least 
in so far as his theory of matter takes shape, size and 
motion to be the basic properties of bodies. It is true 
that Descartes understands matter to be continuous because 
there cannot, for philosophical reasons, be any truly empty 
space, but to this it must be added that Descartes also 
thought matter was divided - into particles of increasing 
size in proportion to conditions of heat and light. The 
important point is not afterall, whether Descartes was an 
atomist similar to Newton but that, as Buchdahl states, 
"his hypothetical scheme is still particularistic, and this 
helped considerably to reinforce the seventeenth - century 
fashion for corpuscularism."4 Since shape, size and 
motion are the only clearly observable properties of bodies, 
Descartes comes to identify spatial extension with bodily 
substance so that where there is space there is body. This, 
coupled with the denial of the possibility of empty space 
means that the universe is in fact a plenum. Descartes' 
vortex theory of motion follows from this quite naturally 
for if the universe is a plenum any motion ascribed to a 
single particle must result in a circular motion of bodies 
moving together. The principle of inertia, as is well 
known, was stated by Descartes (before Newton) in the 
Principles of PhilosoElj (ii, 37, 39): "Every reality, in 
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so far as it is simple and undivided, always remains in 
the same condition so far as it can, and never changes 
except through external causes" and "Any given piece of 
matter considered by itself tends to go on moving, not in 
an oblique path, but only in straight lines." Thus, like 
Newton, Descartes is left with the problem of explaining 
how bodies come to be in motion and how the quantity of 
motion in the universe is preserved. 
We come next to Leibniz who attacked both the 
Newtonian and the Cartesian conceptions of matter, argued 
against atomism in general and denied that extension could 
be the basic property of bodies. Because Leibniz does not 
identify matter with substance he can consistently regard 
extension as an attribute of bodies without regarding it 
as a primitive aLtibut:e of substance; extension is, in 
other words, not ontologically primitive because it is not 
an essential constituting attribute of substance: 
....I do not think that substance is 
constituted by extension alone, since 
the concept of extension is incomplete. 
Nor do I think that extension can be 
conceived in itself, but I consider it 
an analyzable and relative concept, for 
it can be resolved into plurality, con - 
:tinuity, and coexistence or the existence 
of parts at one and the same time. 
Plurality is also contained in number, 
and continuity also in time and motion; 
coexistence really applies to extension 
only. But it would appear from this 
that something must always be assumed 
which is continuous or diffused, such 
as the white in milk, the colour, ductility, 
and weight in gold, and resistance in 
matter. For by itself, continuity (for 
extension is nothing but simultaneous 
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continuity) no more constitutes substance 
than does multitude or number, where some - 
:thing is necessary to be numbered, re- 
:peated, and continued. So I believe that 
our thinking is completed and ended in the 
concept of force rather than that of 
extension. And we need seek no other con - 
:cept of power or force than that it is 
the attribute from which change arises, 
and whose subject is substance itself." (L516) 
The concept of extension cannot be the constituting con - 
:cept of substance because it is an incomplete concept, 
i.e. something must be extended or, more accurately, there 
must be something which is extended implying that the some - 
:things and extersions cannot be identical. For a Cartesian, 
however, this is not quite good enough for it could be 
argued that it is enough that extension is an essential 
attribute of bodies such that statanents about extensions 
entail statements about bodies and statements about bodies 
entail statements about extensions. Leibniz of course does 
have a ready made rebuttal to this challenge: not only is 
extension an incomplete concept, it is also a relative 
concept, that is, extension is properly attributed to 
pluralities ('it can be resolved into plurality') of sub- 
:stances, e.g. coexistence and continuity. Following 
Leibniz's argument in the above passage, continuity is 
itself insufficient to constitute substance since there 
must be something which is continuous and this something 
must be presupposed. And these somethings are, for Leibniz, 
centers of force and activity, called variously, entelechies, 
monads, substances; the continuous activity of these sub- 
:stances existing together is what really constitutes an 
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extended thing. Leibniz's argument against the atomists 
amounts to a defense of the continuity-of bodily substance. 
All parts of extended things must be likewise extended and 
the division of extended things must be continuable to 
infinity; to suppose otherwise, i.e. extended things are 
not divisible to infinity, implies that body lacks contin- 
uity and thereby extension. Thus Leibniz reasons to the 
conclusion that there can be no smallest extended thing. 
Leibniz also uses this argument to good effect against 
Descartes. Since extension is ontologically derivative, 
extended wholes, regardless of how small they may be, must 
be ideal. But it is not just extension which is ontolog- 
:ically derivative; both inertia (principle of inactivity) 
and the concept of motion are 'relative concepts', i.e 
they are proper to bodies not substances. For Leibniz, a 
body's resistance to motion is explained by its impene- 
:trability and its inertia as he makes clear in this 
letter to de Voider in 15 '19: 
"Thus the resistance of matter contains two 
factors: impenetrability or antitypy, and 
resistance or inertia. And since these 
two factors are Everywhere equal in a body 
or are proportional to its extension, it 
is in them that I locate the nature of 
the passive principle or of matter, even 
as I recognize, in the active force which 
exerts itself in various ways through 
motion, the primitive entelechy or in a 
word, something analogous to the soul, 
whose nature consists in a certain per - 
:petual law of the same series of changes 
through which it runs unhindered. We can - 
:not dispense with this active principle 
or ground of activity, for accidental or 
changing active forces and their motions 
are themselves certain modifications of 
some substantial thing, but forces and 
actions cannot be modifications of a 
merely passive thing such as matter." 
(T. 517) 
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Before commenting on this and continuing our discussion of 
matter, it will be appropriate at this point to clarify 
my position with respect to Leibniz's scattered references 
to the active force as analogous to the soul. That Leibniz 
was not identifying the substantial activity of primitive 
entities with the perceptual changes in the soul, at least 
not in a literal way, can be seen in the guarded approach in 
the letters to de Voider with which Leibniz introduces and 
.discusses the conception of substance he wishes to defend; 
Leibniz is aware to the possibility, indeed, the strong 
likelihood, of being misunderstood in this respect for he 
is himself unclear as to how to describe the kind of entity 
whose nature is constituted by active force. This unclari.ty 
leads to a sometimes excessive dependence on the use of 
analogy, analogy with examples taken from optics, the 
nature of the soul, and even biology. There is a wonderful 
passage from a letter to de Voider ;170G) J V h x:1captures 
Leibiziz's sense of frustration: "... he still desired one 
thing - to know the reason for the union between the two 
(soul and body) which he held to differ from their agree - 
:ment. I replied that this metaphysical 'union' - I know 
not what - which the School assumes in addition to their 
agreement is not a phenomenon and that there is no concept 
and therefore no knowledge of it. So neither could I think 
of a reason that might be given for it." 
"I fear that the force which is thought to be in 
extension or mass, yet outside of the percipient beings 
and their perceptions, is of this nature. For there can 
be nothing real in nature except simple substances and 
the aggregates resulting from them. But in the simple 
substances themselves we know nothing besides perceptions 
or the reasons for them. Whoever assumes more must give 
the marks by which the additional natures are to be veri- 
:fied and explained. I consider it demonstrated - as I 
have written several times, although I cannot yet order 
everything in such a way as to present the demonstration 
conveniently to the eyes of others " (L539) And again 
in an earlier letter to de Voider (1699): "But est alLguid 
prodire tenus (an allusion to Horace: 'One can advance to 
a certain point, even though nothing further is possible' - 
JD): what is not yet ready to be defended by rigorous de- 
:monstrations will meanwhile recommend itself as a 
hypothesis ..." (L515) More often than not, the 'hypothetical' 
explanations Leibniz put forward were dressed in analogical 
reasoning to such an extent that what emerged was more a 
picture constructed from concrete and readily comprehensible 
images, of the nature of the sort of entity constituted by 
active force1than anything resembling a literal and direct 
explanation. I am not suggesting that we ought to accept 
this use of analogy as a substitute for reasoned argument 
in explanation - Leibniz himself did not consider it per- 
manent - but that we understand it for what it is, a meta- 
physical analogue, if you will, a metaphysical character- 
:ization of the only fundamentally real or basic constituent 
in the universe. Leibniz did not present his metaphysical 
descriptions of substantial entities instead of physical 
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analyses of bodies endowed with force, for his conception 
and grasp of the latter was adequate to rebut the chall- 
:enges of the atomists and Descartes. Leibniz's use of 
the expression 'as if' anticipates Kant's employment of 
the analogical term in the context of reason's pursuit of 
systematic unity in nature. The important point is not 
the historical question as to whether Leibniz understood 
his analogies as analogies or whether he perhaps meant them 
literally - a question for which one could unearth in the 
texts evidence for both sides, but whether Leibniz's con - 
:ception of substantial entities constituted by a basic 
active force, makes good philosophical sense and fits in with 
attempts in physical theory to define the nature and essence 
of things in terms which can stand up to criticism, both 
logical and dynamical. Kant comes to accept a good deal of 
Leibniz's analyses of the dynamical nature of substances 
and the consequent theories of space and matter, Buchdahl 
has documented the function of analogy in Leibniz's meta- 
:physical scheme and argues that we can yu along with reason- 
ing by analogy when there exists no alternative but must 
recognize that the analogy breaks down eventually, i.e. 
analogies are replaced by explanation.5 That there are 
such things as individual substantial entities constituted 
by active force is a logical requirement or perhaps more 
accurately, a conceptual requirement, of a metaphysical 
was 
scheme which /alleged to represent the real order of things 
in the universe, and it is instructive in this respect to 
recall Wittgenstein's metaphysical scheme as presented in 
- 310 - 
the Tractatus Logico-Philosóphicus: Leibniz thinks there 
must be substantial entities much in the same way that 
Wittgenstein believed that the logic of our language 
required that there be simple objects named by logically 
proper names. Leibniz could do no more than argue to the 
necessity of substantial entities just as Wittgenstein 
argued to the conceptual necessity of the existence of 
simple objects as such; of course, it is irrelevant that 
neither philosopher was able to produce a sample of the 
putative object or entity operative in their respective 
systems, irrelevant, that is., to the success or failure of 
the attempt to produce, in a philosophically idealized mode, 
a metaphysical theory of the nature of reality. One final 
passage from Leibniz's first published account of his 
'system' will serve to warn us against taking Leibniz's 
'picture -talk' literally; the true concept of substance, 
for Leibniz, is the concept of an entity essentially active 
and endowed with a living force concentrated at a putative 
point, and we shall see that both Boscovich and Kant come 
to present a theory of forces according to which forces 
emanate from point centers of influence: 
"To find these real unities, therefore, I 
was forced to Nave recourse to a formal 
atom, since a material being cannot be 
at the same time material and perfectly 
indivisible, or endowed with true unity. 
It was thus necessary to restore and as 
it were, to rehabilitate the substantial 
forms which are in such disrepate today, 
but which in a way makes them intelligible 
and separates their proper use from their 
previous abuse. I found then that their 
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nature consists of force and that there 
follows from this something analogous to 
sense and appetite, so that we must think 
of them in terms similar to the concept 
which we have of souls. But just as the 
soul ought not to be used to explain the 
details of the economy of the animal's body, 
so I concluded that one ought not to use 
these forms to explain the particular pro - 
:blems of nature though they are necessary 
to establish its true general principles. 
Aristotle calls them first entelechies. 
I call them, more intelligibly perhaps, 
primitive forces, which contain not only 
the actuality or the completion of poss- 
:ibility but an original activity as well." 
(L 454) 
I shall take it then that Leibniz's metaphysical analogies 
are projections as to what the universe must be like with 
respect to the kind of entities which are necessary to the 
world -order and to the possibility of explaining the world - 
:order in terms of such necessary entities. The fact that 
Leibniz himself never clarified the precise nature of the 
relation between these metaphysical analogies and his 
dynamical theories needn't prevent us from doing sn, of 
course, from the perspective of metaphysical or scientific 
realism. Such an endeavour takes the form of specifying 
the kind of entity, the ontological posit, which could 
possess the features required by the sort of thing capable 
of being the unconditioned and basic 'stuff' of the world. 
To return to the main discussion. According to 
Leibniz, the presence of forces and activity require the 
postulation of the active principle of substance for mere 
passive existents could not explain modifications such as 
force and action. This leads Leibniz to distinguish 
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secondary motive force and secondary matter from the liv- 
ing force which characterizes substantial entities; body, 
on this account, can be characterized as secondary matter 
possessing secondary motive force, i "e. motion. In this 
way Leibniz derives all the primary qualities which the 
atomists ascribe to simple corpuscles, from the relations 
of continuity and coexistence which hold amongst plurali- 
:ties of substantial entities, as Leibniz more or less 
states himself in the passages we have quoted.. The impor- 
tant point here is that Leibniz thus effects an explana- 
:tion of the forces active in the world by reference to 
the substantial entities whose existences are postulated 
within the world rather than outside it. There are stock 
objections which any defender of Leibniz's theory must 
confront, the most significant of which would appear to 
be that (1) substantial entities are not really discover - 
:able; (2) Leibniz relies too heavily on metaphysical 
principles in moving from one step in his argument to another 
but it is the criticism which Kant makes that poses a serious 
problem for a theory of force such a Leibniz's. Substantial 
entities, as I have indicated earlier,/do not causally inter - 
:act with each other so that one cannot use substantial 
entities to explain the production of transeunt forces which 
in turn bring about the state -changes in entities existing 
outside the entity actually producing the force. This drives 
Leibniz to his notorious conclusion that phenomena (which, 
it must be remembered, are what are to be explained here) 
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do not really interact with each other. There is a genuine 
gap here between Leibniz's metaphysically -oriented theory 
of dynamics and the way the world really is, or for that 
matter, even appears to be. There is no justification 
for explaining the causally constructed and causally ground- 
ed order amongst phenomena in terms which contain not even 
the possibility of causal interaction for the entities 
underlying that order; in brief, there is a serious lack 
of structural isomorphism between the order apparent in the 
world and the order responsible for it in the realm of sub- 
stantial entities. We have already met such non -isomorphism 
with respect to Jant's doctrine of things in themselves in 
the context of science. 
Thus both Leibniz's theory of force /and atomism, as 
kinds of reductionism of one type of entity to another will 
not do. On e of the flaws of atomism at least in its Newton- 
ian version is that it does not seem to be able to explain 
why, on its account of things, the amount of motion in the 
world isn't steadily diminishing. The problem, as Boscovich 
pointed out, concerned the supposed interaction amongst in- 
:elastic bodies (the atomist corpuscle). In order to explain 
inelastic collision, that is, force exerted by one inelastic 
body on another such body, we must suppose instantaneous 
acceleration and this latter is equivalent to infinite 
acceleration, or supposing infinite acceleration on the part 
of one of the bodies involved. The possibility of infinite 
acceleration presupposes the existence of infinite forces 
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but according to Newtonian nr_inciple infinite forces ought 
not to be really possible. As I said, it was Boscovich 
who presented a proof of this in his A Theory of Natural 
Philosophy6: 
"Suppose there are two equal bodies, moving 
in the same straight line and in the same 
direction; and let the one that is in front 
have a degree of velocity represented by 6 
and the one behind a degree represented by 
12. If the latter, that is the body that 
was behind, should ever reach with its 
velocity undiminished, and come into abso- 
lute contact with the former body which 
was in front, then in every case it would 
be necessary that, at the very instant of 
time at which this contact happened the 
hindermost body should diminish its 
velocity and the foremost body increase 
its velocity, in each case by a sudden 
change ... without any passage through 
the intermediate degrees ... For it cannot 
possibly happen that this kind of change 
is made by intermediate stages in some 
finite part, however small, of continuous 
time, whilst the Lodies iehiain in contact. 
For if at any time the one body then had 
7 degrees of velocity, the other would 
still retain 11 degrees, thus during the 
whole Lime that has passed since the 
beginning of contact when the velocities 
were respectively 12 and 6, until the time 
at which they are 11- and 7; the second 
body must be moved with a greater velocity 
than the first; hence it must traverse a 
greater distance than the other. It follows 
that the front surface of the second body 
must have passed beyond the back surface 
of the first body; and therefore some part 
of the body that follows behind must be 
penetrated by some part of the body that is 
in front. Now, on account of impenetrability, 
which all Physicists in all quarters recog- 
nize in matter, and which can be easily 
proved to be rightly attributed to it, 
this cannot possibly happen. There 
really must be, in the commencement of 
contact, in that indivisible instant of 
time which is an indivisible limit between 
the continuous time that preceded the contact 
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and that subsequent to it ... a change of 
velocity taking place suddenly, without 
any passage through intermediate stages; 
and this violates the Law of Continuity, 
which absolutely denies the possibility 
of a passage from one magnitude to another 
without passing through intermediate 
stages." 
Now if it is granted that infinite forces are impossible 
and that all action is continuous , then ultimate entities 
cannot be atomic particles i.e. the ultimate constituents 
of matter cannot be massy, impenetrable corpuscles. 
2. We are now prepared to examine Kant's own force 
theory of matter. At (551 -553) of MFNS Kant offers a proof/ 
or more accurately, an argument to Lue effect that causa- 
tion by contact of atomic bodies is an impossibility. The 
argument is almost identical in essentials with Boscovich's. 
Kant, however, differs from Boscovich with respect to the 
characterization of forces responsible for a body's motion 
in the following very important way. As we saw in our 
discussion of the 'Second Anti nnmy' Kär,t maintains that 
the infinite divisibility of space entails the infinite 
divisibility of matter and hence that no infinitely small 
substance of the sort normally postulated as responsible 
for the attractive and repulsive forces, are to be found 
in space. And we also saw that in this regard Kant can 
be taken to follow the true Leibnizian position as to the 
nature of space, substance and matter; matter is not made 
out of simples, whether these be monads or atoms or any- 
:thing else. Simples can be postulated, if not as the parts 
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of matter, then as the parts proper of the non -sensible 
and unknown ground of the appearances which we call matter 
(to be distinguished from the composite matter constitut- 
:ing appearances ('On a Discovery'; 203). Accepting the 
proviso that things in themselves are, or, can be said to 
be, composed of simples, Kant agrees with Leibniz's argu- 
:ment that matter, as extended, must be continuous. 
Since the assumption that bodies are inelastic or 
composed of impenetrable, hard atoms, leaves the possibi- 
:lity of collisions between bodies unaccounted for on 
strict Newtonian principies, it follows for one accepting 
the truth of the overall Newtonian picture of the physi- 
cal world as Kant did, that one should deny that bodies 
are composed of inelastic parts at all; and if matter is 
not composed of inelastic parts then the impenetrability 
of the parts is not absolute but relative and this is just 
how Knit argues in the chapter on ' T)ynamic' ' in M.FNS 
(499 -503). Matter fills space by the "repulsive force of 
all its parts" (ibid, 499) and because the power to fill 
space in this way must be relative /Kant argues that the 
forces filling space should possess a determinate degree 
always greater than zero but always less than infinity 
(ibid, 499). From this Kant reasons to the conclusion 
that all matter is "origii liy elastic" (ibid, 500) and 
in the process avoiding the problem of inelastic collisions. 
Kant is now free to argue that even if one matter could 
compress another matter to infinity, this would not and 
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could not, imply that one matter could completely penetrate 
another matter so as to completely abolish the space of 
that matter; since matter is originally elastic, complete 
penetration would require the existence of infinite forces 
and these are an impossibility (ibid, 501). The success 
of Kant`s argument here can thus be seen to depend on the 
impossibility of infinite forces: matter fills space in 
virtue of its relative repulsive forces and since there 
can be no infinite forces, one body cannot conceivably 
pass beyond the surface of another body. Kant thus arrives 
at the same conclusion as Boscovich did in the quoted 
passage we discussed; Kant however is able to explain bodily 
contact in a way that is in keeping with Newtonian dynamics 
while at the same time avoidingthe problem that arises under 
the assumption that bodies are inelastic and impenetrable: 
"Absolute impenetrability is indeed nothing 
more or less than a qualitas occulta. For 
one asks, what is the reason why matters 
cannot penetrate one another in their 
motion? He receives the answer, because 
they are impenetrable. The appeal to 
repulsive force is free of this reproach. 
For although this force likewise cannot 
be further explicated according to its 
possibility and must hence be admitted as 
a fundamental one, it nevertheless yields 
the concept of an active cause and of the 
laws of this cause in accordance with 
which the effect, namely, the resistance 
in the filled space, can be estimated 
according to the degrees of this effect." 
(ibid, 502) 
The problem with absolute (and thus primitive) impenetrabil- 
ity is that we have no means of measuring it quantitatively, 
a problem which does not arise with respect to forces; poss- 
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:essing a degree, forces can be measured by comparing 
their repulsive powers with each other. In this way Kant 
provides us with a candidate for the dynamical stuff of 
the world which is both primitive and fundamental (its 
possibility cannot be demonstrated) while remaining sub- 
ject to quantitative treatment. Forces can be cognized 
and treated by science; from the perspective of a possible 
ontology based on the real and unconditioned which is at 
the -same time 'in' the world, according to the prescrip- 
:tions of Leibnizian realism, forces as thus conceived 
would appear to satisfy all the requirements. This poss- 
ibility receives further ontological 'embellishment' from 
Kant who, in the 'Anticipations of Perception' of CPR 
speaks of that alone which is real as that possessing 
being - the real in perception which possesses a determin- 
ate degree (intensive magnitudes). 
By postulati ng a fundamental repul- i ve force Kant 
accounts for the impenetrability and solidity of material 
things; this is insufficient, however, to construct a 
complete theory of material bodies. If matter consisted 
entirely of repulsive forces and space, as we must assume, 
possessed no quality by which the manifestation of these 
repulsive forces could be limited, then matter "would 
disperse itself to infinity, and no assignable quantity 
of matter would be found in any assignable space. Cons- 
equently, with merely repulsive forces of matter, all 
spaces would be empty; and hence, strictly speaking, there 
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would be no matter at all." (ibid, 509) Kant says that 
even though we do not have immediate sensory evidence of 
attractive forces, they must be recognized as fundamental 
forces (ibid, 509 -10). A solid body will thus be a 
collection of attractive and repulsive forces in which the 
repulsive force of the aggregate is greater than the 
attractive, thereby explaining the ability of the aggregate 
to resist penetration by other solid bodies. Now, the 
qualities of impenetrability, hardness and extension are 
the essential qualities possessed by matter in the atomist 
or corpuscularian world - view. The possibility that Kant's 
theory of forces might be capable of accounting for these 
primary qualities can be shown in the following way, sugg- 
:ested by R. Harré8. Harré designates as the surface of 
a body a 'point' at which the actual nett force amongst 
the aggregates is equal to zero. In order to carry this 
out, Harré postulates that the repulsive force of a body 
will have a larger absolute value near the center of the 
body (near the point center of influence) than the attract- 
ive force. As tlerepulsive force approaches the body's 
surface, its absolute value falls off rapidly, so that at 
the surface the two forces are equal and in balance. I do 
not, as I have indicated, propose to pursue this in detail. 
The reader is referred to Harré's account of the possibility 
of showing that the fundamental qualities of hardness and 
impenetrability can be understood as the effect of powers 
of mutual attraction and repulsion between centers of 
influence.. It is sufficient for my purposes that the phy- 
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:sical possibility exists which would admj t plaus- 
ibility to the philosophical conceivability of such an 
account. So far, Kant's theory does appear to be prima 
facie plausible in this respect although we must now con- 
sider an important difficulty which arises in connection 
with Kant's account of repulsive forces and his account 
of attractive forces. The problem here, as M. Hesse has 
explicated with admirable clarity9, concerns the lack of 
symrietry in Kant's account of the two kinds of forces. 
Repulsive forces act by contact, that is, in order to act 
they must do so where they are and not where they are not, 
so to speak. If we were to postulate a repulsive force 
acting on a distant matter, we would have to suppose that 
such action was effected by means of an intermediate 
matter. Attractive forces, on the other hand, can act 'at 
a distance' or, without a medium, through empty space. 
But there is ä problem here: if space is filled to some 
degree with repulsive forces in all places it is impossible 
that attractive force should have an empty medium through 
which to act unimpeded. The only solution is that attract - 
:ive forces must be different in kind from repulsive forces, 
or, quite simply, have a different status. As Hesse points 
out,10 attractive forces cannot be substantial in that they 
penetrate space without filling it: "If it were (if attrac- 
tive force were substantial - JD), it would be subject to 
the same antinomy as that concerned with infinite divisibi- 
:lity of matter, and Kant would have to regard the question 
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of action at a, distance or continuous action as one to be 
settled by regulative principle and not as factual. But 
he nowhere suggests this, and appears to regard the exis- 
:tence of attractive forces at a distance as an a priori 
truth of the metaphysics of matter. "11 Indeed, Kant 
must regard attractive forces - the existence of attrac- 
tive forces - as an a priori truth of the metaphysics of 
matter in a way which is more fundamental than that of 
repulsive forces. If we look at how Kant speaks of the 
possibility of action at a distance, the distinct impress - 
:ion emerges that he considers the concept of continuous 
action to involve a non- sequitut: "Therefore, attraction 
acts directly in a place where it is not - something that 
seems to he contradictory. But it is so far from being 
contradictory that one can say, rather, that everything 
in space acts on another only in a place where the acting 
thing is not. For if the thing should act in the same 
place where it is itself, then the thing upon which it 
acts would not be outside it; for "outside" means presence 
in a place where the other thing is not." (MFNS, 513) 
Because attractive force is a condition for the possibility 
of material bodies, Kant thinks that, regardless of the 
counter -intuitiveness of the idea of attraction at a dis- 
:tance, attraction must not be limited to attraction by 
contact. In other words, because Kant appears to believe 
that attractive forces are a condition for the very poss- 
ibility of matter, or material bodies, attractive forces 
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are in some sense (logical, conceptual) prior to, the poss- 
ibility of contact and thus cannot be made dependent on 
contact as its only possibility (ibid, 514 -515). So Kant 
argues to the conclusion that attractive forces do not act 
continuously from the conceptual or logical priority of 
the existence of attractive forces with respect to the 
possibility of matter. But all that is required for the 
possibility of material bodies is that repulsive and attrac- 
:tive forces exist in a body, or, that there exist attrac- 
:tive forces in a body to prevent the repulsive forces from 
dispersing the body to infinity. And this does not carry 
any implications regarding the non- continuousness of attrac- 
:tive forces. In fact there is an argument usually put 
forward by proponents of field theory to the effect that 
continuous action through a medium gives a much simpler 
and more readily comprehensible model of causal action in 
space. Take two separated bodies E and F and suppose bh t 
E moves quickly with respect to F; because of the motion 
of E, F will itself come to experience a change in motion. 
However, it cannot be assumed that F will experience a 
change in motion at the same time as E for that involves 
the further assumption that a change in the force field 
surrounding E and F could be transmitted at an infinite 
speed, and such an assumption can of be admitted. If the 
velocity of the change through the force field is finite, 
then the energy and momentum of the body will be given up 
to the space surrounding it. And this, according to field 
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theorists, requires the adoption of a field theory for its 
explanation, for in order to plot the initial conditions 
of the system we must specify the actual relations holding 
between bodies (or atoms, point atoms)and not just the 
individual momenta of all the bodies or atoms in the sys- 
:tem only: but in order to specify the relations holding 
between the point atoms we must specify the momentun present 
at each point in space.12 
According to Kant's theory then, attractive forces 
prevent the repulsive forces of bodies dispersing to infin- 
ity. However, Kant thinks that because attractive-forces 
are what makes contact between bodies possible, gravita- 
:tional action (action at a distance) acts independently 
of the filling of space: 
"The original attractive force itseli 
contains the ground of the possibility 
of matter as that thing which fills a 
space in a determinate degree, and hence 
contains the ground of the very possibi -- 
:lity of a physical contact of matter. 
Therefore, this attractive force must 
precede the physical contact of matter; 
and its action must, conaquently, be 
independent of the condition of contact. 
Now, the action of a moving force that 
is independent of all contact is also 
independent of the filling of space 
between the moving thing and the thing 
moved, i.e. such action must take place 
without the space between the moving 
thing and the thing moved being filled, 
and hence take place as action through 
empty space. Therefore, the original 
and essential attraction of all matter 
is an immediate action of one matter 
upon another through empty space." 
(MFNS; 512) 
The problem here is that later in MFNS (from 524 -535, 
esp. 534 - 535) Kant comes very near to denying the exis- 
tence of empty space and he certainly does not consider 
it to be 'actual' but at most, a mere hypothesis the 
reality of whichcan never be shown. Of course, Kant also 
states that it is repulsive force which fills space but in 
the present context we are dealing with gravitational force 
which Kant claims to act independently of repulsive force. 
It follows then, that Kant would require the postulation 
of the void to explain the action of gravitational forces. 
Now, if gravitational action is to be thought of as inde- 
:pendent of repulsive forces (ibid; 516) then what are we 
to make of the claim that material bodies are made possible 
by attractive forces (gravitational) interacting with re- 
:pulsive forces to prevent their (repulsive forces) dis- 
:persal to infinity? The interaction of attractive and 
repulsive forces is supposed to explain bodies possessing 
determinate boundaries and thus definable with respect to 
other bodies and this is possible only if both the repulsive 
and attractive forces are in bodies. But, if gravitational 
(attractive) forces act ind ndently of all contact, i.e. 
are not in continuous and immediate contact, then how are 
attractive forces supposed to prevent repulsive forces 
within bodies from dispersing? For it surely follows 
from Kant's description of attractive and repulsive forces 
that each requires the existence of the other in order to 
manifest itself. This problem can only be solved by amend- 
- 325 - 
:ing Kant's theory so that, in order to preserve the con - 
:ceivability of the two forces interacting to explain 
relative impenetrability and thus material bodies, the 
action of attractive forces is continuous. Once again, 
I can do no better here than refer the reader to the 'proof' 
of the Law of Continuity offered by Harré as an improve- 
:ment to the original presented by Boscovich.13 
The point is that even if (say) quantum mechanics 
exemplifies a conceptual system in which discontinuous 
changes in states of entities are regular occurrences 
thereby paving the way for the possibility of treating 
space and time themselves as quantized and likewise, dis- 
:continuous, this is hardly sufficient to make us over - 
:throw a law like continuity which is, for the most part, 
exemplified in nature. The law of continuity is coherent 
while concepts like discontinuous time and space remain. 
inscrutable to our cognitive comprehension; considering 
this and the fact that most natural phenomena continue to 
unfold in such a way as to renew our faith in such a law, 
we can be allowed to grant it a priori rational conceiv- 
ability. 
3. Accepting the argument thus far, and recalling our 
attempt in the last chapter to show that Kant's 'Second 
Antinomy' proof against the possibility of there being 
ultimate constituents in the world (simples), is unsucc- 
essful, then we are entitled to proceed with the task of 
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presenting a philosophically -oriented theory of what such 
discoverable entities might be like. A metaphysical (phil- 
:osophical) theory of the nature of reality on my account 
functions as a possible ontology which can anticipate from 
the perspective of Leibnizian realism (that is, from the 
perspective of ontology and not only epistemology) the 
structural properties appropriate to different kinds of 
things. So, in the present case, philosophy can determine, 
a priori, that matter must be endowed with attractive and 
repulsive forces, even though only the physicist can cal - 
:culate the particular magnitude of such forces. 
We know that Kant in the MFNS wants to provide impen- 
etrability with an explanatory basis that is dynamical/ 
for on this account, impenetrability is relative to the 
density of a repulsive force in a given space, not, as it 
would be under the atomist picture, explicable in terms 
of the unconditioned parts of body. According to the force 
theory put forward by Kant and amended as above, the sub- 
:stance of the world is a continuous field of repulsive 
and attractive forces. Further, and as we argued in the 
last chapter, a continuous field of forces in space is 
infinitely divisible but it does not follow from this that 
forces need be construed as conditioned, at least not in 
the sense in which I want to understand the concept of 
unconditioned with respect to simples existing in the 
world. Forces are simple insofar as they are not reducible 
to any other kind of thing nor constituted by any other 
thing, and, there will be either an attractive or repulsive 
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force for every point in space. The unconditionedness of 
forces consists in this: unlike Kant, we can construe un- 
:conditionedness as purely ontological so that forces, 
which require no other existent for their existence, are 
ontologically unconditioned: and since forces are the only 
unconditioned entity there is, qualities such as extension, 
which for the atomist is primitive, are derivative with 
respect to forces. This implies as well that although 
a bódy may be divisible because it is an extended thing, 
forces need not be so divisible since extension is merely 
derivative, i.e. does not constitute an essential part of 
them. Another interesting aspect to this, and one which 
has been discussed by J. Bennett,14 is that Kant's argu- 
:ment about the divisibility of simples makes sense only 
if we assume that the simples in question are countable 
items which are in turn composed of countable items. Kant 
has however, rejected this atomist view and replaced it 
with a dynamical one according to which it is nonsense to 
suggest that the division of a field results in 'parts of 
the field' for fields are not really divisible in this 
sense. Forces are continuous yet simple insofar as they 
are ontologically unconditioned, to wit, do not depend on 
anything else for their existence. There is nothing, so 
to speak, which props them up from below even though they 
require the existence of other forces in order to manifest 
themselves. Now Kant would have assumed that any entity 
which required the existence of other entities to manifest 
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itself would not, just because of this, be unconditioned. 
But look at the example of spontaneity with respect to the 
power of the will. My free willing is unconditioned by 
any other factor, state of mind, etc., it is pure spon- 
taneity. However, the moral law is a necessary condi- 
:tion for the realization of that free willing, as we saw 
in the second chapter. In order for my free willing to 
manifest itself as such, something against which it can 
realize itself, is required. This in no way effects the 
absolute unconditionedness of pure spontaneity and it is 
spontaneity which is the ontological and unconditioned 
source of both freedom and reason. As for spontaneity, 
so for a point center of influence from which forces rad- 
iate. Without other forces emanating from point centers, 
repulsive forces would disperse to infinity. This, how- 
:ever, leaves unaffected their ontological irreducibility 
(unless, of course, something Clse is discovered Which 
constitutes them). Because Kant possessed such an epistem- 
:ologically oriented conception of the unconditioned, it 
remained inconceivable for him to regard the unconditioned 
and the conditioned as able to enter into causal relations 
without the unconditioned thereby becoming completely con- 
ditioned. An entity can be unconditioned in its being 
without being unconditioned in the way that it manifests 
itself. 
Spontaneity is the ontological ground of both 
rationality and freedom and the powers which make them- 
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:selves manifest as a result of this ontologically uncon- 
ditioned source eliminate any need to demonstrate the a 
priori possibility of spontaneity. Indeed, Kant ought to 
maintain that no demonstration of the possibility of spon- 
taneity can be provided for the unconditioned cannot be 
so 'proved', which may perhaps explain why he nowhere 
attempts such a demonstration. He clearly thinks that no 
such demonstration of the possibility of attractive and 
repulsive forces is possible and just for this reason, to 
wit, what is fundamental cannot be shown to be possible: 
"For to comprehend original forces a priori according to 
their possibility lies generally beyond the horizon of 
our reason. Rather, all natural philosophy consists in 
the reduction of given forces apparently diverse to a 
smaller number of forces and powers sufficient for the 
explication of the actions of the former. But this re- 
duction continues only to fundamental forces, beyond 
which our reason cannot go." (MFNS; 534) Both spontaneity 
and fundamental forces are unexplainable because uncon- 
ditioned, yet they are themselves the explainers of the 
manifest powers of the mind and material bodies respect - 
:ively. To adopt a phrase of Sellars, explanations offered 
in terms of such unconditioned entities will be the un- 
:explained first principles of a system - the unexplained 
explainers.15 This is how such explanations would func- 
:tion if there were such first principles and it may be 
that we must adopt some principles as first principles if 
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only to justify, in the sense of providing an explanatory 
basis for, the whole system of explanation in question. 
Kant however, refuses to accept even the problematic status 
of entities such as fundamental forces which might possibly 
function as the unexplained explainers of the system, 
since, as the passage quoted above clearly shows, the fact 
that we cannot go beyond fundamental forces is taken to 
indicate, not a provisional characterization of forces as 
the unconditioned, but that there must be more-to compre- 
:hend than such fundamental forces; thre must exist some- 
:thing else which could explain them even if it be inaccess- 
:ible to our cognitive apprehension. Kant, in other words, 
cannot, for epistemological reasons built into the structure 
of his system, accept something as unconditioned in its 
being even if there exists nothing else with which to ex- 
:plain it. But as I have argued throughout, Kant's only 
defense of this lies in his repeated claim that all know- 
:ledge must be knowledge of the conditioned series and as 
I have also argued, the unconditioned manifests itself as 
conditioned but is itself unconditioned in its being. It 
is this possibility that Kant cannot account for. That 
something can be conditioned with respect to our knowledge 
of it but unconditioned in the order of being should be 
evident from Kant's notorious difficulty with the self as 
an object of knowledge and as an experienced existent. 
Why should we not assume the existence of the spontaneous 
power of the self from our own experiences of the moral law 
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and the will in conflict? Beck identifies this structural 
(built -in) ambiguity of Kant's theory: 
"When Kant in his precritical period believed 
that there was an intellectual intuition it 
was to the faculty of spontaneity that he 
ascribed consciousne-s of the self. With 
the denial of intellectual intuition Kant 
hedges the question of our knowledge of our 
own spontaneity but the experience is not 
denied. "16 
Kant no doubt thought that unconditioned entities, if they 
did exist, could not be described simply because, like 
the self in its spontaneity, they could not be experienced 
items. However, it is possible to give a limited descrip- 
tion of such unconditioned entities in terms of powersfand 
force fields and point enters of influl nce have both been 
characterized in this way. Unconditioned entities can be 
understood as point centers of influence or centers of 
power distributediri space. The powers of influence being 
the forces of attraction and repulsion and the point centers 
which constitute the field are characterized by nothing more 
than attraction and repulsion. The state of the field can 
be described or specified by a vector (which Kant himself 
considers in MFNS) which indicates the strength and direction 
of the force that a unit charge would experience if it were 
at that point. Fundamental material things such as atoms 
or corpuscles which are normally defined in terms of their 
primary properties, can be described as a collection of 
centers of power, of "mutual influence, which are jointly 
such that a continuous limiting surface of an infinite 
region of zero repulsive 'force' surrounds it. The surface 
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is created by the mutual effect of the constituent centers 
of influence. "11 Forces are fundamental if they are not 
generated by or through the composition of other forces; 
only those purely original point centers of influence 
whose being is just the attractive and repulsive forces 
with which they are endowed, are genuinely unconditioned 
entities. I do not propose to pursue this analysis of 
the unconditioned in terms of pure powers of point centers, 
nor -is this the place; for the important point for our 
purposes is that we can reasonably expect that some spec - 
:ification of the unconditioned parts of experience can 
be provided despite Kant's epistemological strictures. 
Indeed, Kant himself provides us with a possible limited 
description of such unconditioned entities, a description 
which reflects Kant's epistemological attitude towards the 
conditioned and the unconditioned: Kant offers a dynamical 
theory of matter in terms of forces; as such, forces are 
the real responsible for the constitution of the physical 
world and even Kant must admit that forces are the fund- 
amentally real stuff of the world. This description how - 
:ever, meets the description of the real in perception as 
an intensive magnitude presented in the 'Anticipations of 
Perception'. Consider: the 'Axioms of Intuitions' pre - 
:sent the formal or structural characteristics of matter 
in its spatial relations while the 'Analogies of Experience' 
present the formal and structural characteristics of 
objects in their temporal relations.18 The Antici- 
:pations are designed to characterize the dynamical 
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aspect of matter in terms,essentially/of the degree of 
intensity of the real in perception1or more accurately, of 
the degree of intensity corresponding to the real in per - 
:ception. As such, an intensive magnitude ought to be char - 
:acterized as a measure of such intensity pure and simple, 
that is to say, in a way which is not related to any metric 
of space and time. To suppose otherwise would destroy the 
plausibility of making the distinction between extensive 
and intensive magnitudes in the first place. Force fields 
composed of point centers are distributed across space but 
not in such a way as to imply that space and time exist 
prior to the field. We must remember here that for Kant 
spaces and times are themselves extensive magnitudes; 
considered by themselves, spaces and times are pure intui- 
: tions of spatial and temporal manifolds. However, in 
order to have empirical manifolds we require the matter of 
experience, so that even the possibility of spatiotemporal 
empirical manifolds depends upon there being more than just 
space and time. It is this necessity which I believe is 
described in the Anticipations as intensive magnitudes 
and which can serve as a description of the unconditioned 
forces of attraction and repulsion. 
The primary qualities of the atomist corpuscle such 
as shape, size, extension all relate to our conception of 
what observable bodies must be like. It is this collec- 
:tion of determinable qualities essentially connected with 
space and time that Kant describes as extensive magnitudes. 
What of secondarycpalities? Colour, taste, smell, and the 
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rest, as sensible quaiities,would seem to depend on a 
basic spatiotemporal frame of reference in order to be 
displayed to our senses. Colours are magnitudes displayed 
in space and time as are the smells and tastes the being 
of which is partially in their being perceived; the forms 
of our perceiving are space and time so it would be diffi- 
:cult to argue that smells and tastes are not extensive 
magnitudes. It follows then that the accepted list of 
priary and secondary qualities is characterized as belong- 
:ing to extensive magnitude. We are left with just one 
problem, that common to all philosophical attempts at list- 
ing primary and secondary qualities, to wit, what to do 
with 'solidity'. It is clear that solidity cannot be 
classified in any direct way as a primary quality if only 
because solidity in bodies is a matter of the varying 
degree of intensities in bodies themselves. The problem 
is that this degree of intensity does not depend on the 
display in space and time of anything recognizable as 
either a secondary or primary property. I shall take it 
that solidity is a secondary quality which differs from 
our usual secondary quality in that it is not displayed 
across a spatiotemporal framework. In any case, solidity 
(or impenetrability) is a derivative quality of bodies on 
the basis of a force theory of matter such as Kant's, 
being produced by the interaction of attractive and repul- 
sive forces which, at the surface of a body, are balanced. 
Now, since intensive magnitudes are neither primary nor 
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secondary properties, and all primary and secondary 
properties of bodies are, on the basis of a force theory 
of matter, derived properties, intensive magnitudes can 
be characterized as ontologically primitive, or, if you 
like,ultimate. Secondary qualities, as is customary, can 
be accounted for in terms of primary qualities but there 
must be both primary and secondary qualities in our onto - 
:logy for there must be something which possesses exten- 
:sión, or, is extended, and has shape, etc. Only the real 
in the field of appearances have a degree, that is, only 
the real has intensive magnitude (as opposed to extensive 
magnitude); if tI forces of attraction and repulsion are 
the real, then only forces are intensive magnitudes and 
only forces or point centers from which they emanate, 
have being without being spatiotemporal. Not being either 
primary or secondary properties, intensive magnitudes do 
not depend for their being on a spatiotemporal spread cf 
some kind. Forces, therefore, as the unconditioned char - 
:acterized as intensive magnitudes, fill space without 
themselves being located in space as are shapes, sizes or 
motions, nor are forces temporal like change or motion. 
It remains to bring this sketch into line with Kant's 
doctrine of the real and sensation in the Anticipations, 
thereby demonstrating that the real which corresponds to 
sensation - the what of a thing - can only be what is un- 
conditionally real. In the following analysis I pick up 
clues provided by Heidegger's reading of the 'Anticipations 
- 336 - 
of Perception', especially his claim to the effect that 
the historical precedent of the topics discussed in the 
Anticipations is Baumgarten and his pre- critical metaphy- 
:sics of the real and the "whatness" of a thing.19 Accord- 
:ing to Baumgarten, what distinguishes the real is deter - 
:minateness with respect to the essential nature of a thing 
(rather than knowledge). Determinations belong to the 
'res' or body as such and Baumgarten thought that such 
determinations were extension and materiality. The important 
point for us is the notion that the real is what determines 
what a thing is. Without the real, whatever it may be, 
actuality and inactuality remain but empty concepts, for 
there would be nothing to be 'actual', or, we would not be 
able to judge as to what was and was not, actual. The 
opposite of the real is "a what which does not determine 
a thing positively, but in regard to what is missing in 
, i,e. the opposite of the real is privation or 
"negation ". And this we find stated by Kant in the 
Schematism: 
"Reality, in the pure concept of the 
understanding, is that which corres- 
ponds to a sensation in general;. it 
is that, therefore, the concept of 
which in itself points to being (in 
time). Negation is that the concept 
of which represents not -being (in 
time). The opposition of these two 
thus rests upon the distinction of 
one and the same time as filled and 
as empty." (A143 = B183) 
What this tells us is that the real which corresponds to 
sensation in the world is being, not, as we might expect 
from the Analytic, appearance or existence. The differ- 
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:ence between time- filled and time -empty is a difference 
between being and non -being. This implies quite clearly 
that an empty time is one in which thr e is nothing to be 
known; it doesn't imply that there is something which can - 
:not be known. However, even here in the Anticipations 
we find Kant arguing that, granted there is something real 
in sensation, or corresponding to sensation, since it 
determines a thing in time and time, as we know, is the 
form of intuition, then, we must assume that whatever 
corresponds ' sensation in the object is not the trans- 
cendental matter of all objects as things in themselves 
(A143 = B183). But we have already dealt with this posi- 
tion of Kant's and have tried to show that such a posi- 
:tion Kant into admitting that the world really 
exists only in inner sense or the soul and we simply make 
do with the appearances lingering outside it. Without 
repeating our reaons for rejecting this, once we do reject 
it, we can reach the conclusion that indeed, what corres- 
:onds to sensation in the object is the transcendental 
matter of objects, and this transcendental matter, further - 
:more, provides us with the (as Kant says) the thinghood 
of the things, or as we choose to say, the basic stuff of 
the world. In view of this the Anticipations take on a 
different meaning. Once the inner sense doctrine is re- 
jected, the real which corresponds to sensation - the 
what of a thing - its quality or as Heidegger says, its 
" duale" which must occupy the void of space and time, 
can be used to provide the basis for an ontological theory 
which in turn is centered around a force theory of things. 
Heidegger's suggestion that the real in sensation is what 
must occupy space and time supplies us with the key to 
understand the Anticipation in the ontological way we re- 
:quire. The difference between a void and occupied space 
is just the difference described (conceptually) by Kant as 
negation corresponding to not -being and reality correspond- 
:ing. to being. We have at the theoretical level Kant's 
categorization of the realand negation (being and not - 
being) fulfilled at the physical level by what could poss- 
:ibly fill space and time, and complete nothingness. How, 
the question is, do we characterize what fills space and 
time? We cannot choose to characterize what fills space 
and time in terms of secondary qualities since they are 
reducible to primary qualities (at least in principle). 
Primary qualities, on the other hand, satisfy the require- 
:ments of extensive magnitMes provided by Kant in the 
'Axioms of Intuitions' and besides, as we have stated, 
primary qualities are not primitive insofar as it can 
always be asked of them - what is it that is extended, has 
shape and figure, etc. If we are granted, at least in a 
tentative fashion, that Kant's concept of the real in per- 
ception does not require for its existence a presupposed 
spatiotemporal system, and since Kant himself identifies 
the real in perception as a quality, then, we can postu- 
late intensive magnitude as the only quality which might 
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possibly characterize the real. Kant`s definition of the 
anticipations of perception in the first edition CPR is 
more easily appropriated to our purposes here: "In all 
appearances sensation, and the real which corresponds to 
it in the object (realitas phaenomenon), has an iritensibe 
magnitude, that is, a degree. "(A166 -A167) Every sensation 
and every reality in the field of appearance, Kant tells 
us, has its own degree of intensive magnitude and the 
range of possible degrees of intensity of such magnitudes 
can fall anywhere between reality (complete being) and 
negation (not -being = 0) (A169 = B211). ' In this sense, 
it is true that secondary properties such as colour can 
and do have some degree of intensive magnitude but this 
does not count against my attempt to discount secondary 
qualities as intensive magnitudes since there are no 
secondary qualities which can be entirely accounted for 
in terms of intensive magnitudes, e.g. red has a degree of 
intensity, according to whether it is a bright or dull red, 
but it also requires a spatial and temporal layout, so to 
speak. The same holds true for all the primary and 
secondary qualities., with solidity being the possibly 
problematic exception (for which we offered at least a 
plausible explanation). As manifest qualities the primary 
and secondary properties of objects cannot possibly be the 
real in perception for they are not self -sustaining "types ", 
indeed, the real, whatever it is, is designed to provide a 
foundation for just the kind of properties represented by 
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primary and secondary qualities. Kant seems to be not un- 
:aware of this fundamental difference between primary and 
secondary qualities, on the one hand, and the real, on the 
other hand: "The duality of sensation, as for instance in 
colours, taste, etc., is always merely empirical, and 
cannot be represented a priori. But the real, which 
corresponds to sensations in general, as opposed to nega- 
tion = 0, represents only that something the very concept 
of which includes being..." (A175 = B217). On this 
account, the difference between the quality of a sensation 
and the real which corresponds to it, is the difference 
between being in some way affected sensorily and there 
being something which is affecting me sensorily. It follows 
from this that statements reporting matter -of- -fact sensory 
experiences do not capture the necessity of there being 
('in general') something which fills space and time, i.e. 
Being = the Real. In other words, the real cannot be do ̂ - 
:cribed simply by observational reports because primary and 
secondary properties are not what fills space and time, for 
only the real fills space and time, and the only means we 
have of describing the real (which fills space and time but 
is not in space and time) is in terms of intensive magnitudes. 
Aligning this with Kant's MFNS doctrine that only attractive 
and repulsive forces radiating from point centers of influ- 
ence can fill space and time (and thus account dynamically 
for impenetrability and solidity), forces are the uncondi- 
tionally real, describable in terms of intensive magnitudes. 
That the Principle of the Anticipations of Perception can 
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be interpreted in this manner is defended by Heidegger who 
says: "But, the principle wants to assert that the real 
has first and properly as quale a quantity of degree - and 
therefore also does sensation, whose objective intensity 
rests upon the prior givenness of the reality character 
of what can be sensed. The wording of A. is, therefore, 
to be modified in the following way: 'In all appearances 
sensation, and that means first the real, which lets the 
sensation show itself as an objectivity, has an intensive 
magnitude.' 
1121 
Only the real can fill space and time 
which amounts to saying that, not primary. or secondary 
qualities, but intensive magnitudes used to describe (say) 
forces or basic powers, can explain appearances. Kant's 
category of Quality with its moments of reality and nega- 
:tion can thus he seen to be vindicated only in such a 
way (paradoxically for Kant) as to provide for an account 
of an unconditioned power which can be postulated as the 
source of phenomena. 
To complete this account it would be required to 
provide a detailed description of how powers function as 
an explanatory basis for understanding objects and their 
primary and secondary properties; the properties of objects, 
for example, become powers objects possess in virtue of 
their internal structures and these powers account for the 
way in which we are affected by objects. It will have to 
suffice here to suggest in rough outline, the picture that 
needs to be constructed., As a guide in the presentation 
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of this account I have relied upon Harré's account of the 
constitution of ultimate entities.22 If we identify the 
or. ci.nary properties of objects with their powers we can 
explain how the distinction between the real and the un- 
:real (negation) is the conceptual category required for 
treating forces as intensive magnitudes. 
We can characterize fundamental entities solely by 
what they are able to do and thus by their powers. Forces, 
identified as ultimates, satisfy the description of inten- 
sive magnitudes as the real; as point centers of influ- 
:ence, however, forces are intensive magnitudes which can 
exist for a point instant. As such, forces are simply 
pure powers: 
"Fundamental entities of the world will 
be those which, having no nominal essence 
of manifested qualities of any kind can- 
:not be altered, and being the bearers 
of numerical identity cannot be trans- 
:formed: that is whose real essences are 
p`r.:1ren t . 23 
Ultimate entities can have neither primarynor secondary 
qualities because such qualities are manifestations of a 
more basic potential. Point centers of influence are the 
foci of such potentialities and can thus be described as 
powers or the bearers of powers. Though such powers may 
be in space and time, since they are what are constitutive 
of spatial and temporal things, they are not in space and 
time in Kant's sense, because they are not demonstrable 
(they cannot be manifested qualitatively). Powers are of 
course spatially distributed insofar as they are potentials 
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attri:.J!tcd to points in space. There is no plausible 
reason against characterizing powers therefore as intensive 
magnitudes. In addition, Kant's own warning to the effect 
that forces cannot be constructed, or, they cannot be ex- 
:plairied by being constructed, fits rather well for ulti- 
:mate entities whose properties are just their powers. 
The powers of a. field are thus intensive magnitudes and 
the only unconditioned entities in the world. In this 
sens, powers are intensive magnitudes - the Real in per - 
:ception. The advantage in characterizing fundamental 
entities in terms of powers describable as intensive mag- 
nitudes, is that it provides us with a way of attributing 
a state or constitution to a thing in virtue of which it 
behaves as it does, causally or otherwise. To do this with 
talk of forces or monads would be awkward to say the lc a t. 
Notice, however, that monads, once we have rejected the pro - 
:viso that they do not enter into real causal interaction, 
fit in with the analysis of forces, point centers of influ- 
:ence and powers. Monads are constituted by their centers 
of activity (force) and what is infinitely indivisible in 
space is simply the sphere of activity of the point center. 
We can in this way identify regions in space from which 
different forces or force fields radiate. Whether we 
characterize unconditioned entities as monads, powers, or 
point centers of influence, is not of major importance, at 
least not for the purpose of this essay. The rough picture 
sketched above is thus not meant to be satisfactory in this 
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respect; it will be agreed that to provide such an account 
constitutes a project all its own. What is important is 
that our argument in the second part of this essay entitles 
us to seek for a theoretical characterization of the un- 
conditioned in terms which would provide a philosophical 
basis for the construction of an ontology which is essen- 
tially Leibnizian (realist). It is a distinct and in my 
view, likely possibility that Kant thought the only com- 
:plete (in principle) explanation of the source of appear - 
:ances could come from an explanation grounded in the post- 
ulation of the unconditioned; of course Kant didn't-think 
such an explanation was possible but that does not mean he 
didn't continue to believe that it was the proper one: 
"Wherever there is action - and therefore 
activity and force - there is also sub- 
:stance, and it is in substance alone 
that the seat of this fruitful source 
of appearances must be sought." (A204 = 
B250) 
..because alterableness is to be met 
with only in certain determinations of 
appearances, and because, whereas (in 
fact) the cause of these determinations 
lies in the unalterable, experience alone 
can teach what they are." (A171 = B213) 
We can, finally, present one concluding picture of the sort 
of cntology we envisage: the world consists of material 
things and their states and these things are in complete 
(thoroughgoing) interaction with each other at any given 
time. Since these bodies or material things are composed 
of attractive and repulsive forces and these forces are 
essentially parts of a field of force, then, material 
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things are ultimately pure forces specified or grouped 
off within the field by the particular power which con - 
:stitutes them and in virtue of which they manifest the 
properties they do. These forces, powers, point centers, 
or monads, are the ultimate constituents of the world and 
the real which fills space and time; as such they are des - 
:cribable as intensive magnitudes. Phenomena like change, 
are reducible to state -changes in the force field, since 
matter is the continuous flow of forces from point centers 
in the force field. But the point centers or powers which 
are the foci of forces radiating from them, are themselves 
unchanging. Forces as the unconditioned or fundamentally 
real do not change fundamentally although they do of course 
take on different manifestations depending on the varying 
degrees of intensity with which they are active. Our laws 
will be applicable to the Real in perception and govern 
the manifest changes therein. The various powers of things 
which Kant attributed to things as in principle reducible 
to one fundamental power can, on our tentative account of 
things, be construed as due to the putative existence of 
attractive and repulsive forces. These forces are the 
powers of point centers of influence (or monads with our 
proviso attached) to attract or repel. These forces must 
be basic and unchanging for there exists nothing which 
could explain their changing fundamentally. 
4.It only remains for me to conclude by specifying the 
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structural and controlling principles of the metaphysical 
theory of the nature of reality which can be constructed on 
the basis of an ontology derived from the postulation of an 
unconditioned ground as the source of the world -order. The 
key structuring principle of such a theory is that things 
in the world be considered (from the point of view of phil- 
:osophical theory) from a double perspective. We must 
adopt the perspective of being and the perspective of know - 
:ledge and this means that it is crucial to recognize that 
the object of judgment is an ideal object because it is 
judged only from the perspective of judgment and all that 
implies. Kant's complicated story about how we identify, 
reproduce and synthesize empirical manifolds, must remain 
incomplete as an account of objectivity if only because it 
fails to take into account the fact, and it is a fact, that 
the features of things constrain and direct the judging but 
they do not determine it. An essential feature of concepts 
and language (not the only essential feature) is their 
classificatory and identificatory function. We identify 
and classify what is given "in intuition ", in the manifold 
of experience, by imposing our conceptual clamps, as it 
were, upon it. But in doing this we are constrained by 
the actual features which things already possess before 
we arrive on the scene, and if what we are interested in 
is providing explanations and theories which will help us 
understand the world and the order of the world (and our 
place in it), then these features of things in the world 
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will act as constraints against which we must theorize and 
investigate. In this light, to propose to deduce or other - 
:wise arrive at, knowledge of the world by deriving our 
basic structural truths from concepts (even if they be 
categorial) alone, amounts to placing our faith blindly 
in a kind of conceptual idealism. Leibniz stands radically 
opposed to this methodology despite the traces of idealism 
in his writings. Knowledge for Leibniz is obtained by 
deducing the effects of things from their true natures 
and the fact that the true natures of things are hidden 
from us need not imply that we must give up all knowledge 
of things. Because we do not have direct and immediate 
knowledge of how phenomena are grounded and what, precisely, 
grounds them, doesn't imply that what knowledge we do have 
is not due to the effects of things caused by their true 
natures. There exists ways of deducing the effects of 
things from their true natures, for example, we might 
discover the rules or principles connecting appearances 
with things in themselves; indeed, by describing things 
in terms of fundamental powers we are doing just this, to 
wit, claiming that the manifest properties of things result 
from their inscrutable but not incognizable natures. To 
adopt the perspective of the unconditioned is to adopt a 
perspective different from that of judgment for it is to 
view things with respect to their real ground. 
If this is true, that is, if the distinction between 
the perspectives of judgment and the object is a legitimate 
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one, then, Kant's description of the structural features 
of things (material) is or represents, a partially ideal - 
:ized one. The categories as specifications of the con - 
:cept of an object in general are specifications operative 
within the domain of judgment. This is not to say in ad- 
vance that the categorial specifications must be false 
or inadequate to how things really are; it is to say that 
the objective validity of the categories and any a priori 
system of 'determining' concepts, seen as specifying the 
structural features of things, cannot be determined by 
means of conceptual necessity alone. For there is a 
difference between having justification for employing the 
categories or any system of concepts like them and their 
being objectively valid in this sense, and the categories 
being constitutive of things, i.e. telling us in advance 
what structural features or defining predicates different 
kinds of things possess. It is not that the latter isn't 
possible; indeed, it is this possibility which a theory of 
ontology based on the unconditioned can fulfill. It isn't 
possible for a system of concepts the origin of which is in 
the nature of knowing subjects. Kant's categories and the 
principles of the understanding can be interpreted fruit - 
:fully as supplying the specifications for the concept of 
an object at the most general and the minimal level of ex- 
:planation, namely, at the level of the possibility of ex- 
perience. In order to discover whether these specifications 
are or can be, fulfilled, we must turn to the things they 
are specifications of and check out our prescriptions. In 
- 349 - 
this way, Kant's categories can be genuinely validated by 
completing (if possible) the specification begun by the 
understanding. This process of completion is the business 
proper of science. I suggest that we canshow this in the 
following way: I have argued that there are different 
kinds of things in the world and different features char_ - 
:acterizing each kind. From the perspective of science, 
the detailed defining structures or features of different 
kinds will be determined by, for example, the use of gen- 
etic codes for the various kinds in question. A certain 
kind of organism is identified according to its specific 
genetic code not in accordance with any general features 
in terms of which that kind could become a possible 
object of knowledge for us. Physical things are identi- 
fied, as a matter of course, by their atomic properties, 
so that anything not having the atomic number 79 (and 
everything else this means) is not a piece of gold and will 
not be expected to behave like gold; likewise, anything 
which is not H2O is not. water. If categorial frameworks 
are to be relevant in the sense of being fully applicable 
to the world, then, they must do more than simply mark off 
conceptual boundaries with respect to the legitimate and 
illegitimate use of concepts. Categorial concepts must 
function as sortal concepts which identify ontological 
kinds. Kant's concepts are thus the specifications for 
the most general features of an object but each categorial 
framework can be construed as possessing its own concept 
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of an object for all the objects falling within the domain 
in question. If we can define the essential features of 
every particular kind then we would have within our grasp 
the possibility of understanding (= explaining) everything 
there is, from the most general types to the most particu- 
lar. This is, as I argued, the driving force behind 
Kant's classification scheme for understanding the diversity 
of forms in nature and it is in terms of natural kinds that 
the ideas of reason can receive vindication. 
Categories are thus semantical in nature for they 
tell us what any given domain of objects consist in and 
by doing this, they tell us how.they are 'constituted' 
from the point of view of meaning. Every categorial frame- 
:work specifies for its own kind the concept of an object 
and thereby injects moaning into the constitution of that 
kind as separate and distinct from any other kind. In 
this sense, ontological kinds are accompanied necessarily 
by a theory of meaning or semantics specifying how we are 
to understand the kind in question. It follows from this 
that language and concepts embedded as they are in the 
world, will be ontologically revealing and discriminatory 
as to the sorts of things there are and, even more import - 
:ant, there will be an isomorphism between our conceptual 
structures and our ontological structures. On this 
account then, ontology is inseparable from a system of 
categories for the system of categories is simply the 
semantics for the ontology. It is in this way, according 
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to this conception of a possible ontology that the two 
perspectives of knowledge and being (judgment and the 
object) form the basis for a metaphysical theory of the 
nature of reality which takes the unconditioned as the 
ground of the world- order. Only in this way can Kant's 
categories receive their required 'filling -out'. Science, 
and the progress of science (in the search for the uncon- 
:ditioned) can secure the objective validity of our cate- 
:gorial frameworks. We move from the point where the 
categories are initiated in advance (prescribed) from the 
perspective of judgment to the categories considered-onto- 
:logically, from the perspective of the metaphysically nec -. 
:essary structure of the world. From epistemology to onto- 
:logy and back again. From the point of view of knowledge, 
necessity is what is defined by the transcendental condi- 
:tions of the possibility of experience whereas from the 
point of view of the object, what is necessary is a. com- 
:plete ontology (in principle) based on the unconditioned 
and a semantics to accompany such an ontology including the 
physical laws with which to explain it. 
Kant's central problem was that he never appreciated 
that an ontology which allowed for, or even required, a 
degree of necessity stronger than conceptual or epistemic 
necessity, might be able to justify the attribution of 
necessity to certain entities within the ontology, by appeal 
to an unconditioned ground in the world rather than outside 
it. If there are existents whose being is necessary to 
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the world -order then we can never understand them ( =explain 
them) unless we suppose that everything is related to every- 
:thing else necessarily, thanks to a pre- established har- 
:mony. In that case, however, we have only necessary 
entities. Kant's "way out" of this dilemma was to ground 
all necessity in a transcendental condition, in the nature 
of the thinking subject, thereby effectively replacing God 
with man. I have argued in this essay that this move of 
Kant's is a failure and that it is possible after all to 
construct an ontology, in the light of science, based on a 
postulated unconditioned ground within the world - an onto - 
:logy the historical and philosophical precedent for which,' 
is Leibnizian. realism. 
Notes and Bibliography 
Notes 
I Transcendental Idealism 
and the Problem of Objectivity 
1. As I have said, this presentation of outer sense 
makes nonsense of any purported distinction be- 
tween the objects of outer and inner sense. For 
the objects of outer sense really exist in inner 
sense but only appear to hover outside us; if 
space and time are forms of human intuition, then 
there can be nothing which is, strictly speaking, 
outside us, even for sensible intuition. Any - 
:thing which is really outside us is, as Kant 
never tired of saying, unknowable. 
2. Sellars' reading of Kant's phenomenalism approp- 
:riates a phenomenalistic interpretation of 
material objects to the conceptualism of transcen- 
:dental idealism. On this view, material objects 
are fundamentally physical but are bracketed with- 
:in the representational mode, i.e. for the purposes 
of description, physical objects are regarded as 
not existing outright (out -side the representational 
mode). For the relevant sections in Science and 
Metaphysics, see pp. 48 - 53, p. 60. 
3. Ibid., pp. 48 - 53 
4. In connection with the problem of getting from judg- 
ments about representations to judgments about the 
extended world when the extended world is alleged to 
exist only in representations, my position in this 
essay is that this contrast does not require the 
adoption of the phenomena - noumena distinction, a 
point which is supported by J. Bennett, albeit, in 
the context of judgment specifically. Bennett says: 
"From the premiss that we must handle the extended 
world in judgments about possible experience, what 
Kant infers is not that the extended world is not 
our ultimate topic but rather that we must handle 
our ultimate topic in judgments about possible 
experience." (Kant's Dialectic, p. 49) When we 
ask why the extended world must be handled in judg- 
ments about possible experience, we are in effect 
asking for the grounds of objective knowledge; Kant's 
answer to this question is to say that because the 
real grounds of the extended world are in principle 
unknowable - since to have such knowledge implies 
having knowledge of the inner nature of things 
which Kant thinks is unconditioned - the only alter- 
:native is to locate the grounds of the order of 
things in the world, in the nature of the knowing 
subject himself, or, in Bennett's case, in the nature 
of judgment. 
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5. See pp. 213 -219 in Kemp Smith's Commentary. 
6. MFNS: 475; p. 13n. 
7. R. Walker in his recently published Kant makes out 
a case for regarding the concept of the transcenden- 
tal object as a category, or, a pure concept derived 
from a category. The non -empirical conception of an 
object is, he states, "... simply the idea of a thing 
which exists independently of me and of all other 
perceivers. But like the concept of cause it can 
be called transcendental, for we cannot (Kant thinks) 
dispense with it if experience is to be possible. 
We may naturally ask why in that case he did not 
consider it a category; but it turns out that at 
one time he did, for in the Duisburg'sche Nachlass 
(c. 1775) , where we can see the doctrine of the 
transcendental object developing, it is quite 
clearly this that Kant means by 'substance'. "But 
Walker goes on to say, mistakenly I think, that 
once we accept Kant's use of 'transcendental - 
object' as the concept of a non -empirical object 
it becomes apparent that.when Kant applies the 
term to noumena, he is simply using a category in 
its unschematized form, i.e. to transcend the 
limits of possible experience. What is puzzling 
about this is that one suspects that Walker thinks 
it is harmless to use unschematized categories and 
that such use is somehow cognitively different from 
using the term transcendental object to refer to 
noumena. But this is simply question- begging for 
the point is why Kant uses the concept of the 
transcendental object at all, whether it be as pure 
category or to refer to the object = X. Dressing 
up, as it were, the transcendental object in pure 
category clothing doesn't explain what is presumably; 
some kind of ontological posit on Kant's part, even 
if it is a purely hypothetical one. I discuss this 
in the pages that follow. For Walker's discussion, 
see Kant, p. 107 
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1. J. Silber, 'The Ethical Significance of Kant's 
Religion' in Religion Within the Limits of Reason 
Alone, p. xcii. 
2. Ibid., esp. pp. xcvii -ciii. The articles by 
Silber which have most influenced my thinking with 
respect to Kant's moral philosophy are given in the 
bibliography. The underlying conviction of Silber's 
work on Kant -and it is a conviction that I share - 
is that it must be shown how Kant can account for 
the heterogeneity of the formal and material 
elements of experience, all experience and not just 
that legislated by the categories of CPR, i.e. 
moral, cognitive, artistic and teleological exper- 
:ience. All these kinds of experience are 
structured by a relationship between matter and 
form which Kant's synthetic a priori emphasizes. 
3. Ibid., p. xcix. 
4. A.C. Ewing, Kant's Treatment of Causality, p. 201 
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7. The concepts of heteronomv and autonomy are central 
to Kant's argument in the Foundations of the Meta- 
:physics of Morals but most important for my dis - 
:cussion of these concepts in this chapter is Book 
One of the Religion, esp. pp. 19, 40; 45n. 
8. 'The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion', in 
Religion, p. lxxxix. 
8a. J. Hintikka, "Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or 
Performance ? ", in Descartes, ed. W. Doney; pp. 128- 
129. 
9. 'The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion' in 
Religion, pp. cxxviii - cxxxiv. 
10. The relationship between Kant's theory of personality, 
the fulfillment or destruction of one's personality, 
and Kant's theory of the will (in moral struggle) is 
represented diagrammatically by Silber in Ibid., 
p. cxxvi. In brief, Kant claims that sustained 
heteronomous action results in the gradual diminution 
of autonomy and moral goodness since only autonomous 
action is morally good. The steady loss of moral 
goodness has a dispositional effect on the Willkür 
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whose originally good disposition is gradually 
transformed (by constantly subordinating its moral 
incentive - the Wille - to its non -moral ones) into 
an evil one. In all of this, Wille - the voice 
of tl-e moral law - is still present in the form of 
the awareness of what the Willk{Br is doing. The 
Wille, however, becomes less and less effective 
as it is continuously ignored and finally becomes 
totally ineffective through disuse. At this point, 
the personality is non -existent and the individual 
is reduced to no more than an animal. Thus it can 
be seen that Kant's splendidly tailored and rigorous 
theory entails the fact that an evil disposition 
feeds on the continuous denial of the condition 
for personal fulfillment, indeed, as Silber points 
out, a person's evil "consists in his abandonment 
of the conditions of free personal fulfillment in 
favour of the adoption of the conditions of his 
fulfillment as a natural creature of desire." 
(Ibid., cxxiv) 
11. ID, No. 5 - No. 8. 
1 1 14. 'The Ethical c Significance 1t Kant's Religion', 111 
Religion, p. xcii. 
13. Ibid., pp. xcix - ciii., cf. L.W. Beck's suggestion 
to the same effect in his A Commentary on Kant's 
'Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 191 - 194. 
14. Ibid., p. ci. 
15. Heidegger's two works concerning Kant: Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics and What is a Thing? 
16. What is a Thing ?, p. 146 
17. In both works on Kant, Heidegger attempts to demon- 
strate the priority of intuition over thought in 
Kant's formulation of his theory of human knowledge. 
The clearest presentation of his arguments for this 
position, which is central to his entire interpreta- 
:tion of Kant, can be found in What is a Thing ?, 
pp. 140 - 147. 
18. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 123 
19. What is a Thing ?, p. 243 
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Chapter III Teleology J-11 Livi.!'; Things: Ontology 
1. A point appreciated by R. Walker in Kant, p. 167 
2. See especially A. Woodfield's Teleology, pp. 26 -33. 
Woodfield's analysis of teleological descriptions 
within the context of the problem of objectivity 
has proven very useful in my attempt to characterize 
the nature of Kant's problem of recognizing the 
objectivity of objects not legislated by the 
categories, in the present case, organisms. 
3. Ibid; p. 26. 
4. Ibid; pp. 31-32. 
5. - Ibid; p. 32. 
6. Ibid; p. 32. For a full presentation of Woodfield's 
attempt to show that teleological descriptions are 
objective, i.e. do describe objective features of 
the world, see pp. 124 -140 of Teleology. 
7. J.D. McFarland in Kant's Concept of Teleo10 y, P- 
139. 
8. Without metabolic processes living things would 
quite simply not be the kind of things they are. 
In an essay in The Phenomenon of Life, p. 83, 
Jonas comments on this essential feature of 
organisms: "Its can is a must, since its execution 
is identical with its being. It can, but it 
cannot cease to do what it can without ceasing to 
be." 
9. See especially p. 493 and p. 567 of Me taphysics 
and the Philosophy of Science. 
10. Buchdahl, who supports the interpretation just 
given, states: "For, if we. read on, we soon find 
that as usual Kant couples the notion of 'construc- 
:tion' with that of 'possibility'. His main 
concern is that of demonstrating the 'possibility' 
of the phenomenon of 'communication of motion', in 
the course of which the law of action and reaction 
is likewise derived..." (ibid; p. 680) 
11. McFarland; Kant's Concept of Teleology, p. 138 
12. McFarland; ibid, p. 109 and p. 119 for the quotation 
immediately following. 
13. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, p. 681. 
I follow Buchdahl here and shall, in Part II, make 
further use of the notion of supplying a foundation 
for làws. 
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Part Two 
Leibnizian Realism, Science and the Perspective 
of Ontology 
Chapter IV The Ontology of Leibnizian Realism: Toward 
the Unconditioned. 
1. J. Silber, 'The Context of Kant's Ethical Thought' 
Part II; Philosophical Quarterly (1959); p. 317 
2. What is a Thina ?; p. 92 
3. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science; p.467 
4. Leibniz's theory of space is most clearly present - 
:ed in the 'Fifth Letter' to Clark and I have 
limited my textual resources to it and the Leibniz- 
Clarke correspondence as a whole. See 'The 
Controversy Between Leibniz and Clark' in Loemker; 
pp. 675 -721. For my later remarks with respect 
to Leibniz's conception of place, especially the 
notion that space is a logical construction out 
of the aggregate of places, see esp. Loemker, pp. 
702 -706. Leibniz does not only advocate accept - 
:ance of the relational theory of space; he argues 
against the views that space is substance or space 
is a property of substance (Loemker, pp. 700 -701). 
I discuss Leibniz's theory of space with respect 
to the notion of place below; here I present a 
condensed version of Leibniz's actual argument on 
behalf of the theory that space is relational. 
Suppose bodies C, E, F, and G to be coexistents 
that do not change their position relative to each 
other. Suppose further that a body A coexistent 
with C, E, F and G does change its position 
relative to these. Again suppose that body B 
acquires the position relative to C, E, F and G 
formerly held by A; Leibniz describes this 
relation as 'B's being in the same place as A was'. 
Place is that which is common to A and B when the 
relation of coexistence of A and B with C, E, F and 
G is identical. It would appear that in this anal - 
:ysis place is reduced to a logical construct, a 
construction of the 'relations of coexistence'. 
It should be noted that Leibniz must suppose that 
C, E, F and G constitute a fixed system from one 
moment to the next, so that when the relations of 
coexistence of A and B to the fixed system C, E, 
F and G is the same, the relation can be defined 
as the relation of 'occupying the same place', and 
this seems to amount to a definition of place as a 
(quasi) logical construction out of similar rela- 
:tions of coexistence amongst bodies. Space then 
is a logical construction out of places, and can 
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be said to be ideal in that it is a mapping of the 
order of coexisting things; this however, could be 
misleading especially when aligned with the common 
belief that Leibniz denies the reality of space. 
What Leibniz denies is that space is an absolute 
existent, a substance within which things move and 
can be said to deny the absolute reality of space 
(space as a container). 
5. See B. Russell's Philosophy of Leibniz for a full 
discussion of this point; pp. 118 -119. 
6. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science; pp. 
406 -407. 
7. Ibid; p. 445. 
8. M.J. Scott -Taggart, 'The Ptolemaic Counter - 
Revolution' in Kant's Theory of Knowledge, edited 
by L.W. Beck (1974). 
9. ID; No. 16. 
10. 'The Ptolemaic Counter -Revolution'; pp. 16 -17. 
11. Ibid; p. 19 
12. W.H. Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics; pu. 
28 -33. See also sections No. 17 and No. 29 for 
a full discussion of Kant's theory of the world as 
a world of appearances. 
13. Ibid; p. 29 
14. Ibid; See Section No. 17, pp. 91 -93 for Walsh's 
arguments in defense of this position. 
15. Ralph C.S. Walker, Kant; p. 174 
16. Kant's stated views on, and objections to, the 
Leibnizian philosophy are provided for the most 
part in the following two texts: the section of 
CPR entitled 'Amphiboly of the Concepts of 
Reflection' (= ' Amphiboly') and 'On a Discovery 
According to which Any New Critique of Pure 
Reason Has Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One' 
(= 'On a Discovery' or OAD) in The Kant -Eberhard 
Controversy; Henry E. Allison. 
Support for my contention that it is not the 
case that according to Leibniz's theory of knowledge, 
sensory experience is merely confused thought, can 
be provided by showing that Leibniz rejected Locke's 
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alleged identification of 'image' with'idea'. The 
following passages from the New Essays Concerning 
Human Understanding (= New Essays) make this quite 
clear: Leibniz speaks of "how necessary it is to 
distinguish images from exact ideas, which consist 
in definitions." (BK.II, Ch. IX, sec. No. 8); In 
(Bk. II, Ch. XXIX, sec. No. 13) of the same work, 
Leibniz soon resorts to his customary and unfor- 
:tunate habit of using 'idea' when he must mean 
'image', for Leibniz is here criticizing Locke 
for just this confusion: "However this clear image, 
or this feeling which we may have of a regular 
decagon or of a weight of ninety -nine pounds, con - 
:sists only in a confused idea (sic:), since it is 
of no use in discovering the nature and the prop- 
erties of this weight or of the regular decagon, 
which requires a distinct idea. And this example 
served to show better the difference between ideas, 
or rather that between idea and image." And 
finally, "It is the same qui pro quo of the Image 
for the idea which I am astonished to see so con - 
:fused." (Bk. II, Ch. XXIX, sec. No. 16) 
17. Leibniz's article 'Meditations on Knowledge, Truth 
and Ideas' (= MKTI), in Loemker, pp. 291 -295; R. 
McRae's statement concerning Leibniz's article, in 
Leibniz: Perception, Apperception and Thought; p.3. 
Reference to Loemker's collection of Leibniz's 
writings in the body of this essay is with L, 
followed by the page number, and to P. Weiner's 
collection of Leibniz's writings with W followed 
by the page number. In his recently published 
book, McRae attempts to piece together a theory 
of knowledge from Leibniz's unsystematic presenta- 
:tion of three central notions: perception, thought and 
the relation between the understanding and sense 
with Leibniz's concept of apperception always kept 
at the center of the discussion. This is the 
first effort to confront Leibniz's notorious views 
on epistemological topics with a measure of 
thoroughness they deserve. The book's greatest 
merit is that it demonstrates how misleading, with 
respect to Leibniz's epistemological views, is the 
conception of Leibniz as the creator of the fantasy 
world of the monads. Indeed, in the final chapter 
of Leibniz: Perception,' Apperception and Thought, 
McRae argues that (1) the accepted view that sense 
perception is confused thought, for Leibniz, does 
not bear close scrutiny: "Leibniz's scale of ideas 
from obscure to clear, and from confused to distinct, 
is throughout knowledge of essence or possibility, 
and comes under the heading 'thought', although 
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sanctioned by distinct perception of the existent, 
either immediately in the case of the merely clear 
but confused idea, or in the end in the case of 
the relatively distinct or incompletely analyzed 
ideas. Distinct perceptions, feelings, or 
images, or what come under the heading 'sense', 
are not part of this scale. Sense perception is 
not confused thought (euphasis mine) , even although 
it never exists apart from the clear, but confused 
idea of possibility." (p. 129) This close detective 
work of Leibniz's text, when aligned with my argu- 
:ment, given in the next few pages, to the effect 
that the perception. and conception were for Leib - 
:niz, on philosophical grounds, different kinds 
of cognitive capacities affords a strong case for 
re- thinking the received opinion that for Leibniz 
the arch- rationlist, sense experience played no 
role in the overall cognitive situation. Finally, 
McRae makes an attempt to show that (2) far from 
regarding the senses as having at best a derivative 
role in knowledge and thought, Leibniz argues that 
the senses are necessary to thought in that the 
senses, which are, according to Leibniz, by nature 
intentional, are responsible for the intentionality 
of thought: "Thought begins with the apperception 
or recognition of sensory images as expressing, 
and without this consciousness of them as express - 
:ing there would be for thought no objects, not 
even the ego, for to be conscious of the ego is to 
be conscious of it as expressing." May it not be 
the case that where others had simply assumed that 
the senses make our awareness of the world possible, 
Leibniz thought it required an explanation? 
"Descartes and Locke could do no better than appeal 
to the involuntary nature of sense experience which 
leads the mind to infer the existence of an external 
cause of its experience. Leibniz finds the reason 
in the intrinsically intentional nature of sensation, 
such that to be aware of perceptions or sensations 
at all is to be aware of them as expressing what lies 
beyond the private states of the self." (this and 
previous quotation; p. 130). 
18. Kant's erroneous denial of Eberhard's charge to the 
effect that he (Kant) claimed the philosophy of 
Leibniz and Wolffe had falsified the concept of 
sensibility and appearance, found in 'Kant's Letters 
to Reinhold' (Appendix A, OAD, p. 170). 
19. In Kant's Theory of Freedom: A Metaphysical Inquiry 
(1979); pp. 37 -39. Hoffman doesn't construe the 
categories themselves as supplying a possible 
semantics for the concept of an object but the 
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schemata as providing a set of semantical rules of 
reference to render the categorial concepts of 
objectively valid; reason also requires a semantics 
for its activities both in the theoretical and 
speculative domains. While Hoffman's application 
of the notion of a semantics for the understanding 
and reason is different than mine, the principle 
is the same - using semantics to open up a 
domain (Hoffman's dimension' - p. 38) within which 
it is then possible to import a context of meaning 
- thus legislating for the kind of entities fall- 
:ing within the extension of the domain in ques- 
tion. 
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of Reason: The Unconditioned. 
1. Gordon G. Brittan, Jr., Kant's Theory of Science, 
p. 184. See also Buchdahl's discussion of the 
relationship between understanding and reason 
in the context of a general causal principle 
and causal laws with some causal sequence as 
an instance of them; for example, Buchdahl 
states: "Consequently, from the fact that the 
possibility of an empirical sequence (as part 
of 'nature') presupposes the abstract concept 
of cause, we cannot infer that such a sequence 
is an instance (even in principle) of some 
causal law or other." (Metaphysics and the 
Philosophy of Science; pp. 500 -501) 
2. Peter Krausser; 'Kant's Theory of the Structure 
of Empirical Scientific Inquiry and Two Implied 
Postulates Regarding Things In Themselves', in 
Kant's Theory of Knowledge edited by L.W. Beck; 






I here reproduce the graph drawn by Krausser to 
represent Kant's theory of empirical scientific 
inquiry and especially, the two possible sources 
of input into the overall learning situation. 
Krausser's graph is Eplit into two halves with 
the upper half indicating the connection of 
the Critique of Pure Reason as a whole with 
the theory of empirical inquiry in parLicular. 
As this part of the graph is not relevant in 
any important sense in the present context, 
I shall only reproduce the lower part. This 
part of the graph displays the dynamics of 
Kant's theory of empirical scientific inquiry 
or the dynamics of reason if such empirical 
inquiry is to be possible. The crucial point 
for my discussion is the necessity that there 
be a separate and genuine new source of 
information besides reason's contribution otherwise 
experienced nature would literally be a construct 
of reason, i.e. we would have no independent stan- 
:dard of empirical truth and falsehood. Hence, 
the necessity of postulating things in themselves 
as the source of previously unknown information 
regarding nature and, as I explain in the text, 
things in themselves with some form of law -like- 
:ness of their own, independent of the understand - 
:ing or reason. 
'-`mpirical Laws of Nature 
' questi 
tit 
lypthe s i s P 
Pro.essing byl modus ,,mod consequences to be 1
tollens and modus ponens/ expected if hypothesis 
is true 
1 
perceptio planed experimentation 
and /or observation 
Nature - --Ding an sich = X 
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4. Ibid; p. 163 
5. Ibi.d; p. 164 
6. Cf. B165; "Nature, considered merely as nature in 
general, is dependent upon these categories as the 
original grounds of its :iecessary conformity to 
law (natura formaliter spectata)." 
7. For further discussion of and elaboration on, the 
derivation of the ideas of reason or regulative 
principles of reason, see A682 -A687 = B710 -B714. 
8. W.H. Walsh; Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics; Walsh 
states: "But it should be emphasized that Kant's 
motive in mounting the attack is not just to dis- 
:credit a form of speculation which he saw as 
equally seductive and unprofitable. It is also 
to provide an indirect proof for his own thesis 
of transcendental idealism, a thesis which is 
central in his attempt to show that the sphere 
of knowledge is limited to possible experience..." 
(p.197) And again, "T .. l the problem of the C1 . 11 "To solve 1.110 LVLlelil Vi l..11 
antinomies we must therefore recognize that the 
world of things in space and time, the world 
discussed by Rational Cosmologists, has 
a peculiar status: it exists not absolutely but in 
essential relation to mind, which means in effect 
only so far as it is constructed or constituted in 
judgment." (p.199) 
9. For another statement of what Kant considered to 
be the 'true view' of Leibniz, see 'On a Discovery' 
(203): "Hence, if Leibniz at times expressed him- 
:self in such a manner that his doctrine of simple 
being can be interpreted as implying that matter 
is a composite thereof, it is nonetheless fairer 
to him, as long as it is reconcilable with his 
express teachings, to understand him to mean by 
the simple not a part of matter but the non -sensible, 
and to us fully unknown ground of the appearance 
which we name matter (which may be a simple being 
even if the matter which constitutes the appearance 
is composite)." 
10. Especially in the work of Heinz Heimsoeth; see 
'Metaphysical Motives in the Development of 
Critical Idealism' where Heimsoeth presents a 
condensed version of his ontological and metaphysical 
reading of Kant, ranging from the attribution of an 
ontological basis for Kant's theory of the self 
(spontaneity) to the ontological characterization 
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of Reason: The Unconditioned. 
with respect to substances causally interacting 
in space in Kant's critical philosophy. It is 
worth noting Heimsoeth's remark to the effect 
that "...Kant himself later regarded his theory 
of space and time as a consequence of what Leibniz 
meant...." (p. 182) And with regard to the Second 
Antinomy, Heimsoeth states: "In the Critique of 
Pure Reason the second antinomy battles against the 
fact that space resolves all simple substances into 
an infinitely divisible continuum. Its intention 
is to ground the ontological possibility of simple 
things that cannot be sought in space itself." 
(p.186) 'Metaphysical Motives in the Development of 
Critical Idealism' in Kant: Disputed Questions; 
edited by Moltke S. Gram; pp. 159 -199. 
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1. In Kant: Philosophical Correspondence, 1759 -1799; 
pp. 139 -140. 
2. Isaac Newton, Opticks, 4th edition, 1931; p.400 
3. Isaac Newton, Princinia, vol. II, Systems Of the 
World (Cajori edition), 1966; pp. 398 -399. 
4. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science; p. 97 
5. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science; pp. 393- 
405. It is a mistake to dismiss Leibniz's picture 
of the world as composed of monads each mirroring 
the world from its own privileged vantage point, 
as an outrageous fantasy. Leibniz thought (and 
argued accordingly) that this picture was logically 
required to explain phenomena and that such a 
picture was consistent with the apparent order 
revealed at the phenomenal level. Buchdahl, in 
concluding his discussion of Leibniz's use of 
analogy, points to the ambivalence which is the 
result of the Leibniz's.heavy reliance upon analogy 
- ambivalence and strain - but never nonsense or 
inconsistency: "The problem of the relation between 
the empirical analogues and the metaphysical posi- 
:tions, the pull between 'identiy and difference', 
apparently so neatly resolved through the concept 
of the analogical relationship, with its cvertones 
of 'suggesting without proving', never quite dis- 
appears from the Leibnizian scene. It manifests 
itself in a certain vacillation, Leibniz sometimes 
stressing the immunity of his metaphysics from 
physical principles of enquiry and even its results, 
sometimes the great relevance of the latter for 
the former.... "(p. 405) 
In this connection, G. Brittan, Jr., in his 
attempted reconstruction of a realist interpretation 
of Kant's theory of science, presents a three -pronged 
definition of the problematic status of the objective 
reality of physics, i.e. of the reality of forces, 
and the central aspect of this problem Brittan 
identifies as the need to show the real possibility 
of the concept of matter. This involves, from Kant's 
perspective, simply showing that the concept of 
matter has application. Kant is concerned with demon- 
strating the real possibility of forces in this way 
because, in part, say Brittan, the claims of Descartes 
and Berkeley (and the traditions they are representa- 
:tive of - rationalism and empiricism) had to be 
defeated for their central idealism, with respect 
to physics, amounts to a denial of the possibility 
of a realist or materialist interpretation of it. 
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Brittan's analysis or reconstruction of the problem - 
:situation which supplies the background against 
which Kant might have possibly written the MFNS 
suffers from one, not insignificant flaw, to wit, 
he fails to confront the full implications of Kant's 
transcendental idealism (both for ontology and 
science) especially with respect to Kant's doctrine 
of matter. It must be shown why Kant should not be 
placed in the idealist camp if transcendental 
idealism is accepted within the context of science. 
It is incumbent upon Brittan to show that this is 
not the case since he accepts the feasibility of 
Kant's overall epistemological programme especially 
the prima facie plausibility of the legitimacy of 
the transcendental idealist - empirical realist 
distinction. (see p. 130 of Kant's Theory of Science). 
The point I want to make with respect to Leibniz is 
that Brittan notes, like Buchdahl, the difficulty 
posed by Leibniz's philosophical position, i.e. 
Leibniz is not really an idealist because he takes 
the reality of forces as fundamental: " Leibniz's 
view is complex in this respect and not so easily 
characterized. There is sense in which he is an 
"idealist" and yet takes the reality of forces as 
fundamental." (ibid; p. 129n) 
6. In A Theory of Natural Philosophy, M.I.T. Press, 
pp. 24 -25 (Article 18), 1966. This proof of 
Boscovich's was first brought to my attention in 
R. Harrè's The Principles of Scientific Thinking, 
pp. 286 -287. 
7. For a proof of the Law of Continuity, see Harré's 
embellished version of Boscovich's original proof; 
ibid pp. 287 -289 and for furtliex discussion of the 
importance of the law see pp. 289 -293. 
8. Ibid; pp. 305 -307. 
9. Mary Hesse, Forces and Fields; p. 177 
10. Ibid; p. 177 
11. Ibid; p. 177 
12. This particular example is Maxwell's; for a discussion 
of the concept of continuous action through a medium 
(aether) see Forces and Fields, pp. 206 -222. 
13. See note 7 above. 
14. J. Bennett, Kant's Dialectic; 1974, ch. 9. 
- 368 - 
Chapter VI Realism: Matter and the Ontology of Forces 
15. W. Sellars, S'cience, Perception and Reality; 1963 
pp. 120-122. 
16. L.W. Beck, A Commentary on Kant's' 'Critique of 
Practical Reason'; 1960, pp. 194 -195. 
17. Harré, The Principles of Scientific Thinking, from 
where this suggested analysis of powers is derived; 
see esp. p. 308. 
18. See the layout of the Categories, Principles and 
Definitions of Matter, on separate page. 
19. Heidegger, What is a Thing ?; pp. 212 -222. 
20. Ibid; P. 213 
21. Ibid; p. 219 
22. Harré, Principles of Scientific Thinking,pp. 296 -314. 
For an alternative account of ontologically fundamen- 
tal entities in terms of powers, one which might 
conceivably be appropriate to my depiction of the 
world as containing a set of ontologically uncon- 
:ditioned entities which 'ground' the world 'from 
within', see R. Bhaskar's A Realist Theory of 
Science, Appendix, pp. 229 -250. 
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